Preview
Filed January 8, 2019
Penny Clarkston, District Clerk
7th District Court
Cockrum, Terry
CAUSE NO. 17-2085-A
CRISTINA CALDERON, On Behalf of § IN THE 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
D.G., a Minor Child, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. §
§ COURT OF
LEO RENTERIA, ANGELA §
RENTERIA, and LEO RENTERIA, §
On Behalf of D.R., a Minor Child, and §
ADELA MURO, §
§
Defendants. § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
JOINT PRE-TRIAL ORDER
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL
Evan Lane (Van) Shaw COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
State Bar No. 18140500
David J. Welch
State Bar No. 24098593
Jeremy B. (Beau) Powell
State Bar No. 24099163
Law Office of Van Shaw
2723 Fairmont
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 754-7110
(214) 754-7115 Fax
van@shawlaw.net
Shane McGuire CO-COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT,
State Bar No. 24055940 LEO RENTERIA On Behalf of D.R., a
Minor Child
THE McGUIRE FIRM, P.C.
102 N. College, Suite 301
Tyler, TX 75702
(903) 630-7154
(903) 630-7173
shane@mcguirefirm.com
1
CLAY M. WHITE COUNSEL FOR DEFEDANTS,
State Bar No. 21292220 ADELA MURO RAMOS and LEO
WHITE SHAVER RENTERIA, On Behalf of D.R., Minor Child
205 W. Locust Ave.
Tyler, Texas 75702
Telephone: (903) 533-9447
Telefax: (903) 595-3766
cwhite@whiteshaverlaw.com
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury case brought about as a result of an incident that occurred on July
20, 2017. On that date, D. G., minor plaintiff, sustained personal injuries when she fell from the
hood of a moving vehicle being operated by D. R., minor defendant. The vehicle in question was
owned by Adela Muro Ramos. The incident occurred at the home and real property of the minor
defendant’s father Leo Renteria. The plaintiffs have filed suit based on negligence of the minor
defendant and negligent entrustment as to Adela Muro Ramos. Defendants allege negligent
contribution on the part of the minor plaintiff.
MOTIONS
1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine.
2. Defendant’s Motion in Limine.
3. Defendant’s Special Exceptions regarding statutory claims.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
1. Plaintiff’s Contentions:
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants D.R., a minor child, was negligent, grossly negligent,
and negligent per se of Texas Law as D.R. was underage and had no license to operate the
motor vehicle made the basis of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs further contend that Defendant
ADELA MURO was negligent and negligently entrusted her vehicle to D.R. despite
knowing the same was underage and unlicensed to drive.
2
Defendants both foresaw the actions and injuries to Plaintiff D.G., a minor child. ADEL
MURO consented and encouraged D.R. to operate the vehicle illegally.
Plaintiff was not negligent and is not liable for her serious and permanent injuries.
2. Defendant’s Contentions:
Defendants contend that that D.G., minor plaintiff, was negligent, in that, she knowingly
placed herself in harm’s way by riding on the hood of the vehicle in question. That during the
process of riding on the hood of the vehicle, she repeatedly released her grip on the hood of the
vehicle further contributing to her own injuries. Defendants contend that D.G., minor plaintiff is
primarily responsible for her own injuries.
Defendant, Adela Muro Ramos was never asked if D.G., minor plaintiff, could ride on the
hood of her vehicle. Adela Muro Ramos never gave permission to anyone to ride on the hood of
her vehicle. It was not foreseeable that D.G., minor plaintiff, or any one would intentionally ride
on the hood of her vehicle, as such, there is no proximate cause as it relates to Adela Muro Ramos.
Defendants contend that D.G., minor plaintiff, has had good results from her medical
treatment and, as such, future medical treatment is not expected or limited.
ADMISSIONS OF FACT
D. G., a minor child, rode on the hood of the vehicle being operated by D.R..
D. R., a minor child, operated the vehicle on July 20, 2017. D. R. was 14 years old at the time of the
accident and had no license to operate the vehicle.
The incident occurred on the real property, driveway, owned by Leo Renteria, father to minor
defendant.
The incident did not occur on a public roadway.
The vehicle involved in the incident was owned by Adela Muro Ramos.
3
CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT
The extent of negligence of the parties.
The entrustment of the vehicle by Adela Muro Ramos to D.R, a minor, was not a proximate cause
of the injuries in question.
The extent of damages regarding the minor plaintiff.
AGREED APPLICABLE PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
This is a negligence case. The applicable Texas laws of negligence and comparative fault apply.
Legal issues regarding negligent entrustment apply.
CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW
There are no contested issues of law.
EXHIBITS
Plaintiffs will file an exhibit list under separate Cover.
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT A: DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT LIST
WITNESSES
Plaintiffs will file a witness list under separate cover.
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT B: DEFENDANT’S WITNESS LIST
“In the event there are any other witnesses to be called at the trial, their names, addresses
and the subject matter of their testimony shall be reported to opposing counsel as soon as they are
known.”
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Settlement discussions have been ongoing over the course of the entire case. However,
4
the parties have been unable to reach a settlement and the matter will have to be tried.
TRIAL
Probable Length of trial: 3 days including jury selection.
Availability of witnesses, including out-of-state witnesses: All witness are in the
local area or will be by deposition.
There are no additional matters necessary for the disposition of the case at this time.
/s/ David J. Welch (by permission)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
David J. Welch CLAY M. WHITE
State Bar No. 24098593 State Bar No. 21292220
State Bar No. 24098593
/s/ Shane McGuire (by permission)
SHANE MCGUIRE
State Bar No. 24055940
GRANTED this 4th
______day January
of_____________________ 19
, 20___.
HONORABLE KERRY L. RUSSELL
Presiding Judge
7th Judicial District Court
5
EXHIBIT A: DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT LIST
1. Video tape of incident in question.
2. Text messages between the girls involved in the incident in question.
3. Christus Trinity Medical Records
4. UT Health Northeast Medical Records
5. Children’s Health Medical Records
6. ENT Associates of East Texas Medical Records
7. Smith County Sheriff’s Department Records
6
EXHIBIT B: DEFENDANT’S WITNESS LIST
1. Christina Calderon (Live)
2. D.G., Minor Child (Live)
3. Adela Muro Ramos (Live)
4. Angela Renteria (Live or by Depostion)
5. Leo Renteria (Live or by Deposition)
6. D. R., Minor Child
7. Alison Kathleen Boggs, FNP (by deposition)
8. Philip Lamar Wilson, M.D. (by deposition)
7
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Ruling
LAUREN TAXTER VS 900 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET APARTMENTS INVESTORS LLC
Jul 10, 2024 |
22STCV09946
Case Number:
22STCV09946
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
52
Plaintiff Lauren Taxters Motions to Compel: (1) Deposition of Defendants Person Most Qualified, (2) Responses to Form Interrogatories, (3) Responses to Special Interrogatories
Motion to Compel Deposition
Plaintiff Lauren Taxter moves to compel the deposition of defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLCs person most qualified on several matters of examination.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(a) provides, If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action & without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, &
the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony.
Plaintiff does not show defendant failed to appear for a deposition.
Plaintiff served a notice of deposition of defendants person most qualified on several topics for March 2, 2024, which was a Saturday.
(Gabrielyan Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A.)
Plaintiff served an amended notice of deposition to take place on March 11.
(
Id.
, ¶ 5, Ex. B.)
Before that date, plaintiff agreed to reschedule the deposition.
(Motion, p. 5.)
Defendants counsel did not respond to plaintiffs counsels requests for alternate dates to depose defendants person most qualified.
(Gabrielyan Decl., ¶¶ 7-9, Ex. C.)
Plaintiff did not, however, serve a second amended notice of deposition for which defendant failed to appear.
Plaintiff agreed to reschedule the deposition.
Failing to provide alternate dates for a deposition is not the same as failing to appear at a properly noticed deposition.
I
t may be a professional courtesy to mutually schedule a deposition, but the Civil Discovery Act does not require that.
An oral deposition shall be scheduled for a date at least 10 days after service of the deposition notice.
(CCP § 2025.270(a).)
The service of a deposition notice under Section 2025.240 is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action& to attend and to testify.
(CCP § 2025.280(a).)
Plaintiff had to serve a new notice of deposition.
If defendant did not appear on the date as noticed, then plaintiff could move to compel the deposition.
Motions to Compel Responses to Form and Special Interrogatories
Plaintiff Lauren Taxter moves to compel defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to form interrogatories, set seven and special interrogatories, set one.
When the responding party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses.
(CCP § 2030.290(b).)
Failing to serve a timely response waives any objection to the interrogatories.
(Id., subd. (a).)
Plaintiff served form interrogatories - general, set seven and special interrogatories, set one, on defendant on January 26, 2024.
(Gabrielyan Decls., ¶ 4, Ex. A.)
Plaintiffs counsel agreed to extend defendants deadline to respond to March 7.
(
Id.
, ¶ 7.)
Defendant had not served any responses as of May 14, when plaintiff filed these motions.
(
Id.
, ¶ 11.)
Defendant did not serve a timely response to plaintiffs form interrogatories, set seven and special interrogatories, set one.
Plaintiff is
therefore entitled to an order compelling defendant to serve verified responses without objections to the interrogatories.
On each motion, plaintiff moves for $1,460 in sanctions against defendant.
Failing to respond to an authorized method of discovery is a misuse of the discovery process subject to monetary sanctions.
(CCP § 2023.010(d).)
Defendant failed to respond to plaintiffs interrogatories.
It did not act with substantial justification.
Sanctions are just under the circumstances.
Plaintiff, however, did not reasonably incur $1,460 in expenses for each motion.
These expenses include 2 hours of attorney fees at $350 hourly anticipated for reviewing defendants oppositions and preparing replies.
(Gabrielyan Decls., ¶ 12.)
Defendant did not file an opposition.
Plaintiff did not file a reply.
The court therefore reduces the sanctions by $700 on each motion.
Disposition
Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendants deposition is
denied
.
Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendant
900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to form interrogatories, set seven, is
granted
.
Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC
is
ordered
to serve verified responses without objections to form interrogatories general, set seven, within 20 days.
Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is
ordered
to pay plaintiff Lauren Taxter $760 in sanctions within 20 days.
Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendant
900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to special interrogatories, set one, is
granted
.
Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC
is
ordered
to serve verified responses without objections to plaintiffs special interrogatories, set one, within 20 days.
Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is
ordered
to pay plaintiff Lauren Taxter $760 in sanctions within 20 days.
Ruling
Privalov, Valentina vs. Bennett Engineering Services Inc. et al
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S-CV-0052339
S-CV-0052339 Privalov, Valentina vs. Bennett Engineering Services
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Ruling
CHIANG vs PARKING CONCEPTS, INC.
Jul 10, 2024 |
CVRI2305474
Demurrer on 1st Amended Complaint for
Other Personal Injury/Property
CHIANG vs PARKING
CVRI2305474 Damage/Wrongful Death Tort (Over
CONCEPTS, INC.
$25,000) of HUIHSIEN CHIANG by CITY
OF RIVERSIDE
Tentative Ruling:
This is a premises liability case. On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff Huihsien Chiang (“Plaintiff”) parked
her vehicle at a garage owned and operated by Defendant Parking Concepts, Inc. (“Garage”)
where she had a monthly parking space. While walking down the stairs in the Garage, Plaintiff
slipped on a greasy pizza box and fell at least six stairs causing serious injuries. On October 10,
2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against the Garage and the City of Riverside (“City”). She
asserts two cause of action for: (1) Negligence—Premises Liability; and (2) Acts and Omission of
Public Employees within the Scope of Employment.
The City now demurs to the second cause of action against it. The City argues that a pizza box
is not a dangerous condition of public property and Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the
characteristics of the stairway were dangerous in connection with the pizza box. The City argues
that the dangerous condition was caused by a third party rather than a City employee. The City
argues that Plaintiff has not stated any facts showing actual or constructive notice of the pizza
box. The City argues that it is not liable for obvious dangers. The City argues that it is immune
from liability for failure to enforce litter laws.
Plaintiff argues that she addressed the issues identified by the Court in sustaining the Demurrer
to the initial Complaint. Plaintiff argues that she was not required to name any City employees
because she alleges that third-party negligence increased the risk of danger constituting the
dangerous condition. Plaintiff argues that the characteristics of the stairway created a dangerous
condition in that the stairway was steep and deteriorated and adjacent to a food court. Plaintiff
argues that the pizza box on the stairway constitutes a dangerous condition. Plaintiff argues that
the City had actual or constructive notice of the pizza box. Plaintiff argues that the defect was not
trivial. Plaintiff argues that the failure to enforce litter law is not relevant to whether the litter created
a dangerous condition.
In its Reply, the City argues that the Complaint does not allege any physical defect in the stairway
that was a cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. The City argues that the pizza box is not a physical
characteristic of the stairwell.
Analysis
Meet and Confer:
Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a), “Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter,
the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the
pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be
reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” The demurring party must
file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating the means by which the demurring party
met and conferred, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised
in the demurrer. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(3).)
On May 23, 2024, counsel for the City sent Plaintiff’s counsel a meet and confer letter. (Rivera
Dec., ¶ 2.) The parties met and conferred telephonically on May 24, 2024, but were unable to
resolve the issues. (Id at ¶3.) This satisfies the meet and confer requirements under section
430.41.
Demurrer:
A party may object by demurrer to a complaint on grounds that the pleading does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §430.10(e).) For the purposes of a
demurrer, the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true no matter how unlikely or
improbable. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.)
However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar
v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 713.) To survive a demurrer or motion for
judgment on the pleadings, a complaint need only state ultimate facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550.) Each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s
proof need not be alleged. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th
861, 872.) In granting a demurrer, courts must only consider properly pleaded or implied factual
allegations as well as judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) The
specific statute must be alleged in the complaint. (Washington v. County of Contra Costa (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 890, 896.)
Here, the second cause of action is entitled Acts or Omissions of Public Employees Within Scope
of Employment. However, the only statutory basis referenced in the FAC is Govt. Code § 835,
which provides for liability of a public entity caused by a dangerous condition of public property.
Dangerous Condition of Public Property:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such
injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee. (Cal. Govt. Code
§815(a).) Thus, in California, “all government tort liability must be based on statute.” (Lopez v.
Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785, n. 2; see also See Searcy v. Hemet
Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) “[T]o state a cause of action [against a
government entity,] every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with
particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at 802.)
Here, liability is based on Govt. Code §835, pursuant to which a public entity is liable for injuries
caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in
a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the
dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the
kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition;
or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section
835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous
condition. “Dangerous condition” means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as
distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent
property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be
used. (Cal Gov Code § 830.)
Plaintiff alleges that on February 8, 2023, Plaintiff slipped and fell in parking garage located at
3601 Market Street in Riverside, California (“Parking Garage”) after stepping on a greasy pizza
box left in a stairway adjacent to the Parking Garage (“Stairway”), which created a dangerous
condition. (FAC, ¶12.) Plaintiff alleges that the Parking Garage and Stairway were owned,
operated and/or controlled by the City and Parking Concepts. (Id at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that
pizza box had been left in the Stairway due to the negligent maintenance of Defendants. (Id at ¶
20.) This allegation of negligence is not sufficiently specific to show a wrongful act or omission of
an employee of the City.
A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property even where the
immediate cause of a plaintiff’s injury is a third party’s negligent or illegal act, if some physical
characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence.
(Song X. Sun v. City of Oakland (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1187.) A dangerous condition
exists when public property “is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to
foreseeably endanger those using the property itself,” or possess physical characteristics in its
design, location, features or relationship to its surroundings that endanger users. (Bonanno v.
Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 139, 149.)
Plaintiff asserts that the Stairway was dangerous because it is steep and inclined and unlevel,
and therefore causes an increased risk of falling than would be caused by a pizza box left on flat
ground. (FAC, ¶¶40, 41.) This assertion would render every stairway dangerous since stairways
are, by their nature, inclined and unlevel, and therefore more dangerous than flat surfaces.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Stairway was in a state of disrepair and deterioration, as not only
was there a greasy pizza box that Plaintiff slipped on, but there was also additional food trash and
cups left on the Stairway. (Id at ¶ 42.) This allegation is somewhat vague as it still appears to be
based on third-party litter rather than actual deterioration of the Stairway itself. Additionally,
Plaintiff alleges that the location next to the food court is also adjacent to a food court, which
encourages customers to discard trash in the Stairway. (Id at ¶ 43.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that
the Stairway lacks warning signs and barriers. (Id at ¶ 29.) While there are some additional facts
alleging deterioration and lack barrier that involve the physical characteristics of the Stairway, the
allegations are still vague and insufficient.
The City argues that Plaintiff has not established that the City had actual or constructive notice of
the dangerous condition. To prevail on a claim against a public entity for dangerous condition, the
plaintiff must show that the entity either created the condition or had actual notice or constructive
notice of its existence and sufficient time before the injury for it to have taken remedial action.
(People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485.)
In this case, there are no allegations or specific facts, showing that the City caused any dangerous
condition. Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the City had actual and/or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition created by the greasy pizza box and knew or should have known that that
this dangerous condition could cause injury to Plaintiff or other patrons. (FAC, ¶14.) However, as
stated above, the pizza box itself is not a dangerous condition without a connection to physical
characteristics of the Stairway. Plaintiff does not allege that the City had actual or constructive
notice of the characteristics that, in connection with the third-party litter, created the dangerous
condition.
Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged all elements of the dangerous condition cause of
action, the Demurrer is sustained as to the Second Cause of Action without leave to amend.
4.
Notice of Motion and Application for
CVRI2306889 DOE vs HELLENIKON, INC. Order for Counsel to Appear Pro Hac
Vice
Tentative Ruling:
Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice is granted. Proposed ordered submitted has been signed by
the Court.
Ruling
FREDERICK HENRY HOWARD JR VS. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. ET AL
Jul 10, 2024 |
CGC18572443
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 4. PLAINTIFF FREDERICK HOWARD's Motion To Vacate Arbitration Award. Hearing required re lack of (1) proof of service and (2) exhibits to Howard declaration in register of actions. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
Wolfpack Wood Recycling, Inc. vs. Winterburn
Jul 10, 2024 |
23CV-0203080
WOLFPACK WOOD RECYCLING, INC. VS. WINTERBURN
Case Number: 23CV-0203080
Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on
May 21, 2024 to Plaintiff Wolfpack Wood Recycling, Inc. and counsel Carr, Kennedy, Peterson & Forst for
failure to timely serve Defendant in compliance with CRC 3.110(b). The same day the Order to Show Cause
issued, Plaintiff filed an Application to Serve by Publication which the Court granted. While Plaintiff did not file
a written response to the Order to Show Cause, the declarations filed in support of the Application provide
sufficient excuse for the delay. The Order to Show Cause is DISCHARGED.
******************************************************************************************
9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings
******************************************************************************************
Ruling
JANE DOE K.C. 1, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL. VS DEFENDANT DOE 1, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 |
22GDCV01128
Case Number:
22GDCV01128
Hearing Date:
July 11, 2024
Dept:
P [TENTATIVE] ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFF
I.
INTRODUCTION
This case concerns allegations of childhood sexual abuse and childhood sexual assault. The two plaintiffs, Jane Doe AH and Jane Doe KC (together Plaintiffs) allege that they suffered childhood sexual abuse at the hands of Defendants Gloria De Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz aka Gloria Trevi (Trevi), Sergio Gustavo Andrade Sanchez aka Sergio Andrade (Andrade), and Maria Raquenel Portillo Jimenez aka Mary Boquitas and Mary Raquenel (Raquenel or Defendant). The alleged abuse took place in 1991-1992, when Jane Doe AH was 13 and Jane Doe KC was 15. The abuse occurred in both Mexico and California, while the Doe plaintiffs were backup singers and dancers for Defendant Trevi, a Mexican popstar.
There are two cross-complaints in this action, as well as a related case filed by a third Jane Doe, as well as the two Doe plaintiffs here.
On August 31, 2023, Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs and other Cross-Defendants, which was later amended.
Defendant alleged causes of action for (1) indemnity, (2) contribution, (3) defamation (libel and libel per se), (4) false light, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The third, fourth and fifth causes of action were alleged against Plaintiffs only.
On November 16, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Special Motion to Strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion). On December 22, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs Anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the third, fourth and fifth causes of action, finding that the FACC does appear to clearly and expressly base the causes of action for defamation, false light, and IIED directly on the allegations made by Plaintiffs against Cross-Complainant in their complaint.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees and costs under CCP § 425.16(c)(the Motion), concurrently filed on April 15, 2024, with the declaration of Karen Barth Menzies (Barth Menzies Decl.) and the declaration of Laura Nagel, (Nagel Decl.). Defendant Raquenel filed an opposition on July 1, 2024. Plaintiffs filed a reply on July 3, 2024.
The hearing is scheduled for July 11, 2024.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED and fees are awarded in the amount requested.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code Civ. Proc. §1033.5(a)(1) provides for attorney fees as costs when provided for by contract, statute, or law.
Code Civ. Proc. §425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, provides for a special motion to strike. The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from
any
liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage
, meritless
claims arising from protected activity. (
Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics in original.)
The anti-SLAPP statute applies where a party is being sued for an act in furtherance of the persons right of petition or free speech including, (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Section 425.16(e).)
[W]e may summarize a courts task in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion to strike as follows. Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendants burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken in furtherance of the [defendant]s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue, as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Prevailing
Party
Plaintiffs argue that as the prevailing party in the Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP motion), they are entitled to attorneys fees and costs from Defendant. Plaintiffs cite the December 22, 2023, Minute Order granting their Anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety as well as the Notice of Dismissal. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 6; Exhs. 1, 2.)
Plaintiffs also cite
Ketchum v. Moses
for the proposition that the attorney fee award under CCP Section 425.16(c)(1) is mandatory. (See
Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 113.)
Therefore, as Plaintiffs are the prevailing party on a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP), they are the prevailing party under CCP 425.16(c). As such, they are entitled to attorney fees.
B.
Reasonableness of Fees
Self-Representation
The analysis of reasonableness of attorney fees considers the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorneys efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the particular type of work demanded& (
Berry v. Chaplin
(1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 669, 678-679, citations omitted.)
[1]
There is no requirement that both parties be represented by legal counsel to impose an attorney fee award.
Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys.
Under the law one may be his own attorney if he wants to be. A layman with resources who insists upon exercising the privilege of representing himself must expect and receive the same treatment as if represented by an attorney -- no different, no better, no worse (Citation omitted). A litigant is permitted to present his own case, but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded." (
Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Co
., 131 Cal. App. 2d 156.)
[2]
In opposing the instant motion, again appearing in pro per, Defendant urges the court to consider her pro per status and align with well-established principles of fairness and justice when ordering Plaintiffs award of attorney fees and costs. (Oppn., p. 3.)
However, Defendant had ample opportunity to reverse course on the cross-complaint.
On August 4, 2023, Defendant made eight filings with the court including: an answer to Plaintiffs Unverified First Complaint; one redacted and one unredacted version of the above-mentioned cross-complaint and a summons, with proof of service executed by her assisting Attorney Edna Felix; requests for judicial notice; a motion to seal the filings; demand for a jury trial; notice of posting jury fees; and proof of electronic service. (Motion., p. 4-5.)
On August 7, 2023, Defendant filed redacted versions of the judicial notice request, notice of posting and cross-complaint summons which the court rejected due to insufficient redactions. (
Id.,
at 5.)
On August 25, 2023, Plaintiffs counsel sent Defendant a letter explaining the California anti-SLAPP statute and case law and warned Defendant that she (Plaintiffs counsel) would be filing a Special Motion to Strike if Defendant re-filed the cross-complaint. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 7; Exh. C.) On the same day, attorneys Barth Menzies and Nagel conducted a conferral via telephone with Defendant Raquenels lawyer assistant, Edna Felix, where they discussed Defendants inability to afford legal counsel and urged Defendant to reconsider re-filing the cross-complaint. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 8.) Nonetheless, Defendant re-filed the FACC on August 31, 2023.
As a self-represented litigant, Defendant is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney.
Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion as it would with a licensed attorney in determining the reasonableness of the mandatory fee award.
There is no requirement that billing records be provided to a trial court in connection with a motion for fees pursuant to contract. The declaration of counsel regarding the hours expended on this litigation and the hourly rates charged for such time is all that is required. [T]here is no legal requirement that an attorney supply billing statements to support a claim for attorney fees. (
Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff
(2007) 135 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) [T]here is no legal requirement that such statements be offered in evidence. An attorneys testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. (
Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co.
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.)
Here, the declaration of Plaintiffs counsel, Attorneys Barth Menzies and Nagel, provide a sufficient basis for the fees requested.
Attorney Barth Menzies requests a total award of $37,100.37 for the work performed on this anti-SLAPP motion. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 12; Exhs. 4-6.) This amount is based on the application of a $600 Laffey Matrix hourly billing rate applied to herself and a $100 Laffey Matrix hourly billing rate applied to work performed by Barth Menzies paralegal. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 9.)
That total includes Attorney Nagels request for $19,950.00 in attorneys fees for the work performed on this case. (Nagel Decl., ¶ 16.)
As to the time spent on the Anti-SLAPP motion, attorney Nagel includes an invoice, which includes a description of the services rendered. (Nagel Decl. ¶ 13, see Exh. A.) The Laffey Matrix hourly billing rate varies as applied to each attorney and paralegal that worked on the case. (Nagel Decl. ¶ 9.) This amount is based on a $600 hourly billing rate for herself, below a Laffey Matrix rate given her experience; and the following hourly billing rates for each firm attorney $600 rate as to Ari Wilkenfeld; $300 rate as to Caroline Whitlock; and a $300 as to Kathryn Kelly. (
Id.,
¶¶ 8-14.)
The Court has examined the evidence presented by Plaintiffs and makes the following findings: Plaintiffs counsels provided hourly rates are reasonable and 89.95 hours is a reasonable amount of time spent, given the complexity of an anti-SLAPP motion and the overall complexity of this case. As such, the Court GRANTS the motion for attorney fees in the amount of $37,408.37.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Defendant
Maria Raquenel Portillo Jimenez aka Mary Boquitas and Mary Raquenel
is ordered to pay $37,408.37 in attorney fees to Plaintiffs
Jane Doe AH and Jane Doe KC
within 30 days notice of this order.
Plaintiffs are to provide notice of this order.
Dated:
July 11, 2024
JARED D. MOSES
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
[1]
The Court apologizes to the parties and attorneys for the archaic, male-centric gender references by the Courts archaic, mid-century judicial predecessors.
[2]
Ditto.
Ruling
SIMON GEYSIMONYAN VS FREDDIE JUDSON
Jul 10, 2024 |
22STCV32850
Case Number:
22STCV32850
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Demurrer of
Defendants SIOF 1 PROPERTIES, LLC, MARTIN MUOTO, ARI HORN, and GRAY LUSK to Second Amended Complaint.
BACKGROUND
This case consists of two consolidated cases related to a commercial lease dispute between the parties. In consolidated case number 22STCV38250, SIOF 1 PROPERTIES, LLC alleges claims against
PHOOD FARMACY 2 LLC, ROBERT ANCILL, and THELMA ANCILL based on allegations that SIOF, as commercial lessor and lender, agreed to provide over $350,000 for Phood Farmacys improvements to prepare 1000 E. 60th Street, Los Angeles for occupancy to operate a restaurant, but Phood Farmacy abandoned the premises after about 7 months of possession and refuses to repay the loan or pay the rent.
In consolidated case number 22STCV39896, PHOOD FARMACY 2 LLC, ROBERT ANCILL, THELMA ANCILL, and THE NEXT IDEA CONSULTING, LLC filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against SIOF 1 PROPERTIES, LLC; MARTIN MUTO; ARI HORN; and GRAY LUSK (Demurring Defendants) regarding Demurring Defendants alleged failure to perform commercial lease agreements including preparations for the new restaurant. Those Causes of Action are (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Violation of Californias Unfair Competition Law, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4) Accounting, (5) Intentional Misrepresentation, (6) Negligent Misrepresentation, (7) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, (8) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, (9) Conversion, (10) Unjust Enrichment, and (11) Promissory Estoppel.
Demurring Defendants demur to the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action of the SAC. PHOOD FARMACY 2, LLC; THE NEXT IDEA CONSULTING, LLC; THELMA ANCILL; and ROBERT ANCILL (Opposing Plaintiffs) advocate overruling or leave to amend.
LEGAL STANDARD
Demurrers are to be sustained where a pleading fails to plead adequately any essential element of the cause of action.
Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp
. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879-880. Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice.
Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc
. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556.
In ruling upon demurrers, courts treat as being true not only the complaint's material factual allegations, but also facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.
Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.
ANALYSIS
1.
Fifth Cause of Action- Intentional Misrepresentation
Demurring Defendants contend that, after the Court sustained the demurrer as to the same claims of the FAC, Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation still lacks particular descriptions of misrepresentations and financial statements allegedly made by Demurring Defendants.
With regard to fraud claims, pleadings must allege facts as to how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered."
Stansfield v. Starkey
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73. As to the degree of particularity required to allege fraud, considerations of practicality enter in.
Miles v. Deutsche Bank Natl Trust Co
. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 403. A cause of action for promissory fraud must include specific factual circumstances from which a contemporaneous intent not to perform can be inferred.
Hills Transportation Co. v. Southwest Forest Ind., Inc.
(1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.
Here, the amendments contained in the SAC suffice to allege that the Demurring Defendants had made the 6/30/20 lease without intent to perform promises about creating space suitable for restaurant operation. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 75, 96-101.
Beyond the contract, the SAC alleges specific details of other promises, as to how, when, where, to whom, and by what means, representations were tendered. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 75 (promises were the contract and oral), 76 (identities), 82 (representations of named parties about intent to remedy issues), 83 (8/1/22 representation by Defendant MARTIN MUOTO about cost of construction), 84-85 (8/31/22 representation by Defendant GRAY LUSK to Plaintiff ROBERT ANCILL via a schedule of costs), 86-88 (details of invoice representations),
While arguably some of the representations are lacking in detail, the procedural rule applies that a demurrer does not lie as to only part of a claim. E.g.,
Poizner v. Fremont General Corp
. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 (A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.).
Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the misrepresentation claim.
2.
Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action - Intentional and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
Demurring Defendants contend that the SAC still does not allege an independently wrongful act and an actual disruption of any relationship. In response, Opposing Plaintiffs argue that, beyond just the lessors privilege to select tenants, the SAC alleges independent, wrongful acts designed to disrupt a known economic relationship, done by fraudulent promises such as a promise to lease the shared space, resulting lost economic benefit that was caused by not having the nearby office.
The elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage are: (1) economic relationship existing between the plaintiff and third party, (2) probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff, (3) defendant's knowledge of the relationship, (4) defendant's intentional acts designed to disrupt the relationship, (5) defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act in disrupting the relationship beyond just inducing disruption of economic advantage, (6) actual disruption of the relationship, and (7)
economic harm to the plaintiff caused by the acts.
Salma v. Capon
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.
The elements of a claim for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage are (1) economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) that contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff, (3) defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware, or should have been, that if it did not act with due care, its actions would interfere with the relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future economic benefit or advantage, (4) defendant was negligent, (5) negligence caused damage to plaintiff because of actual interference or disruption, and (6) plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship.
North Amer. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 786.
Specific facts are not required in order to allege disruption and loss. Cf.
J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803 (court must assume the truth of all material allegations in the complaint&, including the allegations of negligence and cause in fact. The only question & is whether a cause of action for negligent loss of expected economic advantage may be maintained under these facts.).
Furthermore, a complete disruption of an economic relationship is not required, but instead the loss may be only partial. See, e.g.,
N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 786787 (the relationship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff lost
in whole or in part
the economic benefits or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship.). (Underscoring added.)
First, the SAC sufficiently alleges Demurring Defendants oral promise to allow Opposing Plaintiffs to share commercial real estate space in relation to a partnership agreement between Plaintiff The Next Idea Consulting, LLC and LETA. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 9, 38-42 and 143. Additionally, the SAC contains allegations inferring the fraudulent nature of the oral promise, based upon allegations of many other instances of fraudulent promises, reasonably inferring an ongoing pattern of those. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 76-79, 82, 93, 106-107, 133 and 149.
Second, the SAC adequately alleges SIOFs disruption causing at least a partial loss of benefits due to not being able to locate an office beside Phood Farmacy, including Robert Ancills resultant needing to travel regularly to different locations, and Opposing Plaintiffs inability to proceed with their partnership as planned. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 144-148 and 164-168.
In sum, the Court overrules the demurrer as to these claims.
CONCLUSION
The demurrer is overruled. Twenty days to answer.
Ruling
Bright vs Sutter Bay Hospitals
Jul 10, 2024 |
SCV-265779
SCV-265779, Bright v. Sutter Bay Hospitals
The parties are ordered to appear. As noted in the Court’s June 20 order, Plaintiff’s counsel
should be prepared to explain to the Court their intention regarding the use at trial of any evidence of Dr.
Wager’s March and April examination of Plaintiff, including without restriction Dr. Wager’s testimony or
reports. Both parties should be prepared to discuss limitations on the length and scope of the proposed
independent medical examination.
6. 24CV00705, Anthony v. Whitmire
The plaintiff called and informed the Court of a medical issue. The hearing on the Demurrer is
CONTINUED to October 2, 2024, at 3:00 p.m.
Preview
Filed January 8, 2019 Penny Clarkston, District Clerk 7th District Court Cockrum, Terry CAUSE NO. 17-2085-A CRISTINA CALDERON, On Behalf of § IN THE 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT D.G., a Minor Child, § § Plaintiff, § § VS. § § COURT OF LEO RENTERIA, ANGELA § RENTERIA, and LEO RENTERIA, § On Behalf of D.R., a Minor Child, and § ADELA MURO, § § Defendants. § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS JOINT PRE-TRIAL ORDER APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL Evan Lane (Van) Shaw COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS State Bar No. 18140500 David J. Welch State Bar No. 24098593 Jeremy B. (Beau) Powell State Bar No. 24099163 Law Office of Van Shaw 2723 Fairmont Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 754-7110 (214) 754-7115 Fax van@shawlaw.net Shane McGuire CO-COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, State Bar No. 24055940 LEO RENTERIA On Behalf of D.R., a Minor Child THE McGUIRE FIRM, P.C. 102 N. College, Suite 301 Tyler, TX 75702 (903) 630-7154 (903) 630-7173 shane@mcguirefirm.com 1 CLAY M. WHITE COUNSEL FOR DEFEDANTS, State Bar No. 21292220 ADELA MURO RAMOS and LEO WHITE SHAVER RENTERIA, On Behalf of D.R., Minor Child 205 W. Locust Ave. Tyler, Texas 75702 Telephone: (903) 533-9447 Telefax: (903) 595-3766 cwhite@whiteshaverlaw.com STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a personal injury case brought about as a result of an incident that occurred on July 20, 2017. On that date, D. G., minor plaintiff, sustained personal injuries when she fell from the hood of a moving vehicle being operated by D. R., minor defendant. The vehicle in question was owned by Adela Muro Ramos. The incident occurred at the home and real property of the minor defendant’s father Leo Renteria. The plaintiffs have filed suit based on negligence of the minor defendant and negligent entrustment as to Adela Muro Ramos. Defendants allege negligent contribution on the part of the minor plaintiff. MOTIONS 1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine. 2. Defendant’s Motion in Limine. 3. Defendant’s Special Exceptions regarding statutory claims. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 1. Plaintiff’s Contentions: Plaintiffs contend that Defendants D.R., a minor child, was negligent, grossly negligent, and negligent per se of Texas Law as D.R. was underage and had no license to operate the motor vehicle made the basis of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs further contend that Defendant ADELA MURO was negligent and negligently entrusted her vehicle to D.R. despite knowing the same was underage and unlicensed to drive. 2 Defendants both foresaw the actions and injuries to Plaintiff D.G., a minor child. ADEL MURO consented and encouraged D.R. to operate the vehicle illegally. Plaintiff was not negligent and is not liable for her serious and permanent injuries. 2. Defendant’s Contentions: Defendants contend that that D.G., minor plaintiff, was negligent, in that, she knowingly placed herself in harm’s way by riding on the hood of the vehicle in question. That during the process of riding on the hood of the vehicle, she repeatedly released her grip on the hood of the vehicle further contributing to her own injuries. Defendants contend that D.G., minor plaintiff is primarily responsible for her own injuries. Defendant, Adela Muro Ramos was never asked if D.G., minor plaintiff, could ride on the hood of her vehicle. Adela Muro Ramos never gave permission to anyone to ride on the hood of her vehicle. It was not foreseeable that D.G., minor plaintiff, or any one would intentionally ride on the hood of her vehicle, as such, there is no proximate cause as it relates to Adela Muro Ramos. Defendants contend that D.G., minor plaintiff, has had good results from her medical treatment and, as such, future medical treatment is not expected or limited. ADMISSIONS OF FACT D. G., a minor child, rode on the hood of the vehicle being operated by D.R.. D. R., a minor child, operated the vehicle on July 20, 2017. D. R. was 14 years old at the time of the accident and had no license to operate the vehicle. The incident occurred on the real property, driveway, owned by Leo Renteria, father to minor defendant. The incident did not occur on a public roadway. The vehicle involved in the incident was owned by Adela Muro Ramos. 3 CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT The extent of negligence of the parties. The entrustment of the vehicle by Adela Muro Ramos to D.R, a minor, was not a proximate cause of the injuries in question. The extent of damages regarding the minor plaintiff. AGREED APPLICABLE PROPOSITIONS OF LAW This is a negligence case. The applicable Texas laws of negligence and comparative fault apply. Legal issues regarding negligent entrustment apply. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW There are no contested issues of law. EXHIBITS Plaintiffs will file an exhibit list under separate Cover. PLEASE SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT A: DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT LIST WITNESSES Plaintiffs will file a witness list under separate cover. PLEASE SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT B: DEFENDANT’S WITNESS LIST “In the event there are any other witnesses to be called at the trial, their names, addresses and the subject matter of their testimony shall be reported to opposing counsel as soon as they are known.” SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS Settlement discussions have been ongoing over the course of the entire case. However, 4 the parties have been unable to reach a settlement and the matter will have to be tried. TRIAL Probable Length of trial: 3 days including jury selection. Availability of witnesses, including out-of-state witnesses: All witness are in the local area or will be by deposition. There are no additional matters necessary for the disposition of the case at this time. /s/ David J. Welch (by permission) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT David J. Welch CLAY M. WHITE State Bar No. 24098593 State Bar No. 21292220 State Bar No. 24098593 /s/ Shane McGuire (by permission) SHANE MCGUIRE State Bar No. 24055940 GRANTED this 4th ______day January of_____________________ 19 , 20___. HONORABLE KERRY L. RUSSELL Presiding Judge 7th Judicial District Court 5 EXHIBIT A: DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT LIST 1. Video tape of incident in question. 2. Text messages between the girls involved in the incident in question. 3. Christus Trinity Medical Records 4. UT Health Northeast Medical Records 5. Children’s Health Medical Records 6. ENT Associates of East Texas Medical Records 7. Smith County Sheriff’s Department Records 6 EXHIBIT B: DEFENDANT’S WITNESS LIST 1. Christina Calderon (Live) 2. D.G., Minor Child (Live) 3. Adela Muro Ramos (Live) 4. Angela Renteria (Live or by Depostion) 5. Leo Renteria (Live or by Deposition) 6. D. R., Minor Child 7. Alison Kathleen Boggs, FNP (by deposition) 8. Philip Lamar Wilson, M.D. (by deposition) 7