Motion-Secondary: BRANDI N. SHAPLEY, AS NATURAL PARENT, NEXT FRIEND AND LEGAL GUARDIAN OF JLR, A MINOR VS. KATHARINA A. KLOUDA, M.D. AND FOUR SEASONS WOMEN'S HEALTH, P.A.

Case Number: 22STCV09946 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 52 Plaintiff Lauren Taxters Motions to Compel: (1) Deposition of Defendants Person Most Qualified, (2) Responses to Form Interrogatories, (3) Responses to Special Interrogatories Motion to Compel Deposition Plaintiff Lauren Taxter moves to compel the deposition of defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLCs person most qualified on several matters of examination. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(a) provides, If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action & without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, & the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony. Plaintiff does not show defendant failed to appear for a deposition. Plaintiff served a notice of deposition of defendants person most qualified on several topics for March 2, 2024, which was a Saturday. (Gabrielyan Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Plaintiff served an amended notice of deposition to take place on March 11. ( Id. , ¶ 5, Ex. B.) Before that date, plaintiff agreed to reschedule the deposition. (Motion, p. 5.) Defendants counsel did not respond to plaintiffs counsels requests for alternate dates to depose defendants person most qualified. (Gabrielyan Decl., ¶¶ 7-9, Ex. C.) Plaintiff did not, however, serve a second amended notice of deposition for which defendant failed to appear. Plaintiff agreed to reschedule the deposition. Failing to provide alternate dates for a deposition is not the same as failing to appear at a properly noticed deposition. I t may be a professional courtesy to mutually schedule a deposition, but the Civil Discovery Act does not require that. An oral deposition shall be scheduled for a date at least 10 days after service of the deposition notice. (CCP § 2025.270(a).) The service of a deposition notice under Section 2025.240 is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action& to attend and to testify. (CCP § 2025.280(a).) Plaintiff had to serve a new notice of deposition. If defendant did not appear on the date as noticed, then plaintiff could move to compel the deposition. Motions to Compel Responses to Form and Special Interrogatories Plaintiff Lauren Taxter moves to compel defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to form interrogatories, set seven and special interrogatories, set one. When the responding party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses. (CCP § 2030.290(b).) Failing to serve a timely response waives any objection to the interrogatories. (Id., subd. (a).) Plaintiff served form interrogatories - general, set seven and special interrogatories, set one, on defendant on January 26, 2024. (Gabrielyan Decls., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs counsel agreed to extend defendants deadline to respond to March 7. ( Id. , ¶ 7.) Defendant had not served any responses as of May 14, when plaintiff filed these motions. ( Id. , ¶ 11.) Defendant did not serve a timely response to plaintiffs form interrogatories, set seven and special interrogatories, set one. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an order compelling defendant to serve verified responses without objections to the interrogatories. On each motion, plaintiff moves for $1,460 in sanctions against defendant. Failing to respond to an authorized method of discovery is a misuse of the discovery process subject to monetary sanctions. (CCP § 2023.010(d).) Defendant failed to respond to plaintiffs interrogatories. It did not act with substantial justification. Sanctions are just under the circumstances. Plaintiff, however, did not reasonably incur $1,460 in expenses for each motion. These expenses include 2 hours of attorney fees at $350 hourly anticipated for reviewing defendants oppositions and preparing replies. (Gabrielyan Decls., ¶ 12.) Defendant did not file an opposition. Plaintiff did not file a reply. The court therefore reduces the sanctions by $700 on each motion. Disposition Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendants deposition is denied . Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to form interrogatories, set seven, is granted . Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to serve verified responses without objections to form interrogatories general, set seven, within 20 days. Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to pay plaintiff Lauren Taxter $760 in sanctions within 20 days. Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to special interrogatories, set one, is granted . Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to serve verified responses without objections to plaintiffs special interrogatories, set one, within 20 days. Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to pay plaintiff Lauren Taxter $760 in sanctions within 20 days.

S-CV-0052339 Privalov, Valentina vs. Bennett Engineering Services No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/14/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Bennett Engineering Services, Inc.; Mitchel, Brandon Robert; Patterson, Sandra Lynne; Privalov, Sergey, Rajeev, Joseph; Rajeev, Rose Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Bennett Engineering Services, Inc.; Mitchel, Brandon Robert; Patterson, Sandra Lynne; Privalov, Sergey, Rajeev, Joseph; Rajeev, Rose

Demurrer on 1st Amended Complaint for Other Personal Injury/Property CHIANG vs PARKING CVRI2305474 Damage/Wrongful Death Tort (Over CONCEPTS, INC. $25,000) of HUIHSIEN CHIANG by CITY OF RIVERSIDE Tentative Ruling: This is a premises liability case. On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff Huihsien Chiang (“Plaintiff”) parked her vehicle at a garage owned and operated by Defendant Parking Concepts, Inc. (“Garage”) where she had a monthly parking space. While walking down the stairs in the Garage, Plaintiff slipped on a greasy pizza box and fell at least six stairs causing serious injuries. On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against the Garage and the City of Riverside (“City”). She asserts two cause of action for: (1) Negligence—Premises Liability; and (2) Acts and Omission of Public Employees within the Scope of Employment. The City now demurs to the second cause of action against it. The City argues that a pizza box is not a dangerous condition of public property and Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the characteristics of the stairway were dangerous in connection with the pizza box. The City argues that the dangerous condition was caused by a third party rather than a City employee. The City argues that Plaintiff has not stated any facts showing actual or constructive notice of the pizza box. The City argues that it is not liable for obvious dangers. The City argues that it is immune from liability for failure to enforce litter laws. Plaintiff argues that she addressed the issues identified by the Court in sustaining the Demurrer to the initial Complaint. Plaintiff argues that she was not required to name any City employees because she alleges that third-party negligence increased the risk of danger constituting the dangerous condition. Plaintiff argues that the characteristics of the stairway created a dangerous condition in that the stairway was steep and deteriorated and adjacent to a food court. Plaintiff argues that the pizza box on the stairway constitutes a dangerous condition. Plaintiff argues that the City had actual or constructive notice of the pizza box. Plaintiff argues that the defect was not trivial. Plaintiff argues that the failure to enforce litter law is not relevant to whether the litter created a dangerous condition. In its Reply, the City argues that the Complaint does not allege any physical defect in the stairway that was a cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. The City argues that the pizza box is not a physical characteristic of the stairwell. Analysis Meet and Confer: Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a), “Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” The demurring party must file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating the means by which the demurring party met and conferred, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(3).) On May 23, 2024, counsel for the City sent Plaintiff’s counsel a meet and confer letter. (Rivera Dec., ¶ 2.) The parties met and conferred telephonically on May 24, 2024, but were unable to resolve the issues. (Id at ¶3.) This satisfies the meet and confer requirements under section 430.41. Demurrer: A party may object by demurrer to a complaint on grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §430.10(e).) For the purposes of a demurrer, the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true no matter how unlikely or improbable. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 713.) To survive a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint need only state ultimate facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550.) Each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 872.) In granting a demurrer, courts must only consider properly pleaded or implied factual allegations as well as judicially noticed matters. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) The specific statute must be alleged in the complaint. (Washington v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 890, 896.) Here, the second cause of action is entitled Acts or Omissions of Public Employees Within Scope of Employment. However, the only statutory basis referenced in the FAC is Govt. Code § 835, which provides for liability of a public entity caused by a dangerous condition of public property. Dangerous Condition of Public Property: Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee. (Cal. Govt. Code §815(a).) Thus, in California, “all government tort liability must be based on statute.” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785, n. 2; see also See Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) “[T]o state a cause of action [against a government entity,] every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at 802.) Here, liability is based on Govt. Code §835, pursuant to which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. “Dangerous condition” means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. (Cal Gov Code § 830.) Plaintiff alleges that on February 8, 2023, Plaintiff slipped and fell in parking garage located at 3601 Market Street in Riverside, California (“Parking Garage”) after stepping on a greasy pizza box left in a stairway adjacent to the Parking Garage (“Stairway”), which created a dangerous condition. (FAC, ¶12.) Plaintiff alleges that the Parking Garage and Stairway were owned, operated and/or controlled by the City and Parking Concepts. (Id at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that pizza box had been left in the Stairway due to the negligent maintenance of Defendants. (Id at ¶ 20.) This allegation of negligence is not sufficiently specific to show a wrongful act or omission of an employee of the City. A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property even where the immediate cause of a plaintiff’s injury is a third party’s negligent or illegal act, if some physical characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence. (Song X. Sun v. City of Oakland (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1187.) A dangerous condition exists when public property “is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself,” or possess physical characteristics in its design, location, features or relationship to its surroundings that endanger users. (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 139, 149.) Plaintiff asserts that the Stairway was dangerous because it is steep and inclined and unlevel, and therefore causes an increased risk of falling than would be caused by a pizza box left on flat ground. (FAC, ¶¶40, 41.) This assertion would render every stairway dangerous since stairways are, by their nature, inclined and unlevel, and therefore more dangerous than flat surfaces. Plaintiff also alleges that the Stairway was in a state of disrepair and deterioration, as not only was there a greasy pizza box that Plaintiff slipped on, but there was also additional food trash and cups left on the Stairway. (Id at ¶ 42.) This allegation is somewhat vague as it still appears to be based on third-party litter rather than actual deterioration of the Stairway itself. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the location next to the food court is also adjacent to a food court, which encourages customers to discard trash in the Stairway. (Id at ¶ 43.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Stairway lacks warning signs and barriers. (Id at ¶ 29.) While there are some additional facts alleging deterioration and lack barrier that involve the physical characteristics of the Stairway, the allegations are still vague and insufficient. The City argues that Plaintiff has not established that the City had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. To prevail on a claim against a public entity for dangerous condition, the plaintiff must show that the entity either created the condition or had actual notice or constructive notice of its existence and sufficient time before the injury for it to have taken remedial action. (People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485.) In this case, there are no allegations or specific facts, showing that the City caused any dangerous condition. Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the City had actual and/or constructive notice of the dangerous condition created by the greasy pizza box and knew or should have known that that this dangerous condition could cause injury to Plaintiff or other patrons. (FAC, ¶14.) However, as stated above, the pizza box itself is not a dangerous condition without a connection to physical characteristics of the Stairway. Plaintiff does not allege that the City had actual or constructive notice of the characteristics that, in connection with the third-party litter, created the dangerous condition. Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged all elements of the dangerous condition cause of action, the Demurrer is sustained as to the Second Cause of Action without leave to amend. 4. Notice of Motion and Application for CVRI2306889 DOE vs HELLENIKON, INC. Order for Counsel to Appear Pro Hac Vice Tentative Ruling: Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice is granted. Proposed ordered submitted has been signed by the Court.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 4. PLAINTIFF FREDERICK HOWARD's Motion To Vacate Arbitration Award. Hearing required re lack of (1) proof of service and (2) exhibits to Howard declaration in register of actions. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

WOLFPACK WOOD RECYCLING, INC. VS. WINTERBURN Case Number: 23CV-0203080 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on May 21, 2024 to Plaintiff Wolfpack Wood Recycling, Inc. and counsel Carr, Kennedy, Peterson & Forst for failure to timely serve Defendant in compliance with CRC 3.110(b). The same day the Order to Show Cause issued, Plaintiff filed an Application to Serve by Publication which the Court granted. While Plaintiff did not file a written response to the Order to Show Cause, the declarations filed in support of the Application provide sufficient excuse for the delay. The Order to Show Cause is DISCHARGED. ****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings ******************************************************************************************

Case Number: 22GDCV01128 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFF I. INTRODUCTION This case concerns allegations of childhood sexual abuse and childhood sexual assault. The two plaintiffs, Jane Doe AH and Jane Doe KC (together Plaintiffs) allege that they suffered childhood sexual abuse at the hands of Defendants Gloria De Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz aka Gloria Trevi (Trevi), Sergio Gustavo Andrade Sanchez aka Sergio Andrade (Andrade), and Maria Raquenel Portillo Jimenez aka Mary Boquitas and Mary Raquenel (Raquenel or Defendant). The alleged abuse took place in 1991-1992, when Jane Doe AH was 13 and Jane Doe KC was 15. The abuse occurred in both Mexico and California, while the Doe plaintiffs were backup singers and dancers for Defendant Trevi, a Mexican popstar. There are two cross-complaints in this action, as well as a related case filed by a third Jane Doe, as well as the two Doe plaintiffs here. On August 31, 2023, Defendant filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs and other Cross-Defendants, which was later amended. Defendant alleged causes of action for (1) indemnity, (2) contribution, (3) defamation (libel and libel per se), (4) false light, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The third, fourth and fifth causes of action were alleged against Plaintiffs only. On November 16, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Special Motion to Strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion). On December 22, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs Anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the third, fourth and fifth causes of action, finding that the FACC does appear to clearly and expressly base the causes of action for defamation, false light, and IIED directly on the allegations made by Plaintiffs against Cross-Complainant in their complaint. Before the Court is Plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees and costs under CCP § 425.16(c)(the Motion), concurrently filed on April 15, 2024, with the declaration of Karen Barth Menzies (Barth Menzies Decl.) and the declaration of Laura Nagel, (Nagel Decl.). Defendant Raquenel filed an opposition on July 1, 2024. Plaintiffs filed a reply on July 3, 2024. The hearing is scheduled for July 11, 2024. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED and fees are awarded in the amount requested. II. LEGAL STANDARD Code Civ. Proc. §1033.5(a)(1) provides for attorney fees as costs when provided for by contract, statute, or law. Code Civ. Proc. §425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, provides for a special motion to strike. The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage , meritless claims arising from protected activity. ( Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics in original.) The anti-SLAPP statute applies where a party is being sued for an act in furtherance of the persons right of petition or free speech including, (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Section 425.16(e).) [W]e may summarize a courts task in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion to strike as follows. Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendants burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken in furtherance of the [defendant]s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue, as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. ( Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) III. ANALYSIS A. Prevailing Party Plaintiffs argue that as the prevailing party in the Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP motion), they are entitled to attorneys fees and costs from Defendant. Plaintiffs cite the December 22, 2023, Minute Order granting their Anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety as well as the Notice of Dismissal. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 6; Exhs. 1, 2.) Plaintiffs also cite Ketchum v. Moses for the proposition that the attorney fee award under CCP Section 425.16(c)(1) is mandatory. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 113.) Therefore, as Plaintiffs are the prevailing party on a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP), they are the prevailing party under CCP 425.16(c). As such, they are entitled to attorney fees. B. Reasonableness of Fees Self-Representation The analysis of reasonableness of attorney fees considers the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorneys efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the particular type of work demanded& ( Berry v. Chaplin (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 669, 678-679, citations omitted.) [1] There is no requirement that both parties be represented by legal counsel to impose an attorney fee award. Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys. Under the law one may be his own attorney if he wants to be. A layman with resources who insists upon exercising the privilege of representing himself must expect and receive the same treatment as if represented by an attorney -- no different, no better, no worse (Citation omitted). A litigant is permitted to present his own case, but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded." ( Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Co ., 131 Cal. App. 2d 156.) [2] In opposing the instant motion, again appearing in pro per, Defendant urges the court to consider her pro per status and align with well-established principles of fairness and justice when ordering Plaintiffs award of attorney fees and costs. (Oppn., p. 3.) However, Defendant had ample opportunity to reverse course on the cross-complaint. On August 4, 2023, Defendant made eight filings with the court including: an answer to Plaintiffs Unverified First Complaint; one redacted and one unredacted version of the above-mentioned cross-complaint and a summons, with proof of service executed by her assisting Attorney Edna Felix; requests for judicial notice; a motion to seal the filings; demand for a jury trial; notice of posting jury fees; and proof of electronic service. (Motion., p. 4-5.) On August 7, 2023, Defendant filed redacted versions of the judicial notice request, notice of posting and cross-complaint summons which the court rejected due to insufficient redactions. ( Id., at 5.) On August 25, 2023, Plaintiffs counsel sent Defendant a letter explaining the California anti-SLAPP statute and case law and warned Defendant that she (Plaintiffs counsel) would be filing a Special Motion to Strike if Defendant re-filed the cross-complaint. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 7; Exh. C.) On the same day, attorneys Barth Menzies and Nagel conducted a conferral via telephone with Defendant Raquenels lawyer assistant, Edna Felix, where they discussed Defendants inability to afford legal counsel and urged Defendant to reconsider re-filing the cross-complaint. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 8.) Nonetheless, Defendant re-filed the FACC on August 31, 2023. As a self-represented litigant, Defendant is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion as it would with a licensed attorney in determining the reasonableness of the mandatory fee award. There is no requirement that billing records be provided to a trial court in connection with a motion for fees pursuant to contract. The declaration of counsel regarding the hours expended on this litigation and the hourly rates charged for such time is all that is required. [T]here is no legal requirement that an attorney supply billing statements to support a claim for attorney fees. ( Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 135 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) [T]here is no legal requirement that such statements be offered in evidence. An attorneys testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. ( Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.) Here, the declaration of Plaintiffs counsel, Attorneys Barth Menzies and Nagel, provide a sufficient basis for the fees requested. Attorney Barth Menzies requests a total award of $37,100.37 for the work performed on this anti-SLAPP motion. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 12; Exhs. 4-6.) This amount is based on the application of a $600 Laffey Matrix hourly billing rate applied to herself and a $100 Laffey Matrix hourly billing rate applied to work performed by Barth Menzies paralegal. (Barth Menzies Decl., ¶ 9.) That total includes Attorney Nagels request for $19,950.00 in attorneys fees for the work performed on this case. (Nagel Decl., ¶ 16.) As to the time spent on the Anti-SLAPP motion, attorney Nagel includes an invoice, which includes a description of the services rendered. (Nagel Decl. ¶ 13, see Exh. A.) The Laffey Matrix hourly billing rate varies as applied to each attorney and paralegal that worked on the case. (Nagel Decl. ¶ 9.) This amount is based on a $600 hourly billing rate for herself, below a Laffey Matrix rate given her experience; and the following hourly billing rates for each firm attorney $600 rate as to Ari Wilkenfeld; $300 rate as to Caroline Whitlock; and a $300 as to Kathryn Kelly. ( Id., ¶¶ 8-14.) The Court has examined the evidence presented by Plaintiffs and makes the following findings: Plaintiffs counsels provided hourly rates are reasonable and 89.95 hours is a reasonable amount of time spent, given the complexity of an anti-SLAPP motion and the overall complexity of this case. As such, the Court GRANTS the motion for attorney fees in the amount of $37,408.37. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendant Maria Raquenel Portillo Jimenez aka Mary Boquitas and Mary Raquenel is ordered to pay $37,408.37 in attorney fees to Plaintiffs Jane Doe AH and Jane Doe KC within 30 days notice of this order. Plaintiffs are to provide notice of this order. Dated: July 11, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT [1] The Court apologizes to the parties and attorneys for the archaic, male-centric gender references by the Courts archaic, mid-century judicial predecessors. [2] Ditto.

Case Number: 22STCV32850 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 55 NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Demurrer of Defendants SIOF 1 PROPERTIES, LLC, MARTIN MUOTO, ARI HORN, and GRAY LUSK to Second Amended Complaint. BACKGROUND This case consists of two consolidated cases related to a commercial lease dispute between the parties. In consolidated case number 22STCV38250, SIOF 1 PROPERTIES, LLC alleges claims against PHOOD FARMACY 2 LLC, ROBERT ANCILL, and THELMA ANCILL based on allegations that SIOF, as commercial lessor and lender, agreed to provide over $350,000 for Phood Farmacys improvements to prepare 1000 E. 60th Street, Los Angeles for occupancy to operate a restaurant, but Phood Farmacy abandoned the premises after about 7 months of possession and refuses to repay the loan or pay the rent. In consolidated case number 22STCV39896, PHOOD FARMACY 2 LLC, ROBERT ANCILL, THELMA ANCILL, and THE NEXT IDEA CONSULTING, LLC filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against SIOF 1 PROPERTIES, LLC; MARTIN MUTO; ARI HORN; and GRAY LUSK (Demurring Defendants) regarding Demurring Defendants alleged failure to perform commercial lease agreements including preparations for the new restaurant. Those Causes of Action are (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Violation of Californias Unfair Competition Law, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4) Accounting, (5) Intentional Misrepresentation, (6) Negligent Misrepresentation, (7) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, (8) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, (9) Conversion, (10) Unjust Enrichment, and (11) Promissory Estoppel. Demurring Defendants demur to the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action of the SAC. PHOOD FARMACY 2, LLC; THE NEXT IDEA CONSULTING, LLC; THELMA ANCILL; and ROBERT ANCILL (Opposing Plaintiffs) advocate overruling or leave to amend. LEGAL STANDARD Demurrers are to be sustained where a pleading fails to plead adequately any essential element of the cause of action. Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp . (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879-880. Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice. Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc . (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556. In ruling upon demurrers, courts treat as being true not only the complaint's material factual allegations, but also facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112. ANALYSIS 1. Fifth Cause of Action- Intentional Misrepresentation Demurring Defendants contend that, after the Court sustained the demurrer as to the same claims of the FAC, Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation still lacks particular descriptions of misrepresentations and financial statements allegedly made by Demurring Defendants. With regard to fraud claims, pleadings must allege facts as to how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered." Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73. As to the degree of particularity required to allege fraud, considerations of practicality enter in. Miles v. Deutsche Bank Natl Trust Co . (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 403. A cause of action for promissory fraud must include specific factual circumstances from which a contemporaneous intent not to perform can be inferred. Hills Transportation Co. v. Southwest Forest Ind., Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707. Here, the amendments contained in the SAC suffice to allege that the Demurring Defendants had made the 6/30/20 lease without intent to perform promises about creating space suitable for restaurant operation. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 75, 96-101. Beyond the contract, the SAC alleges specific details of other promises, as to how, when, where, to whom, and by what means, representations were tendered. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 75 (promises were the contract and oral), 76 (identities), 82 (representations of named parties about intent to remedy issues), 83 (8/1/22 representation by Defendant MARTIN MUOTO about cost of construction), 84-85 (8/31/22 representation by Defendant GRAY LUSK to Plaintiff ROBERT ANCILL via a schedule of costs), 86-88 (details of invoice representations), While arguably some of the representations are lacking in detail, the procedural rule applies that a demurrer does not lie as to only part of a claim. E.g., Poizner v. Fremont General Corp . (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 (A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.). Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the misrepresentation claim. 2. Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action - Intentional and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Demurring Defendants contend that the SAC still does not allege an independently wrongful act and an actual disruption of any relationship. In response, Opposing Plaintiffs argue that, beyond just the lessors privilege to select tenants, the SAC alleges independent, wrongful acts designed to disrupt a known economic relationship, done by fraudulent promises such as a promise to lease the shared space, resulting lost economic benefit that was caused by not having the nearby office. The elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage are: (1) economic relationship existing between the plaintiff and third party, (2) probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff, (3) defendant's knowledge of the relationship, (4) defendant's intentional acts designed to disrupt the relationship, (5) defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act in disrupting the relationship beyond just inducing disruption of economic advantage, (6) actual disruption of the relationship, and (7) economic harm to the plaintiff caused by the acts. Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290. The elements of a claim for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage are (1) economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) that contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff, (3) defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware, or should have been, that if it did not act with due care, its actions would interfere with the relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future economic benefit or advantage, (4) defendant was negligent, (5) negligence caused damage to plaintiff because of actual interference or disruption, and (6) plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship. North Amer. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 786. Specific facts are not required in order to allege disruption and loss. Cf. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803 (court must assume the truth of all material allegations in the complaint&, including the allegations of negligence and cause in fact. The only question & is whether a cause of action for negligent loss of expected economic advantage may be maintained under these facts.). Furthermore, a complete disruption of an economic relationship is not required, but instead the loss may be only partial. See, e.g., N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 786787 (the relationship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship.). (Underscoring added.) First, the SAC sufficiently alleges Demurring Defendants oral promise to allow Opposing Plaintiffs to share commercial real estate space in relation to a partnership agreement between Plaintiff The Next Idea Consulting, LLC and LETA. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 9, 38-42 and 143. Additionally, the SAC contains allegations inferring the fraudulent nature of the oral promise, based upon allegations of many other instances of fraudulent promises, reasonably inferring an ongoing pattern of those. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 76-79, 82, 93, 106-107, 133 and 149. Second, the SAC adequately alleges SIOFs disruption causing at least a partial loss of benefits due to not being able to locate an office beside Phood Farmacy, including Robert Ancills resultant needing to travel regularly to different locations, and Opposing Plaintiffs inability to proceed with their partnership as planned. E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 144-148 and 164-168. In sum, the Court overrules the demurrer as to these claims. CONCLUSION The demurrer is overruled. Twenty days to answer.

SCV-265779, Bright v. Sutter Bay Hospitals The parties are ordered to appear. As noted in the Court’s June 20 order, Plaintiff’s counsel should be prepared to explain to the Court their intention regarding the use at trial of any evidence of Dr. Wager’s March and April examination of Plaintiff, including without restriction Dr. Wager’s testimony or reports. Both parties should be prepared to discuss limitations on the length and scope of the proposed independent medical examination. 6. 24CV00705, Anthony v. Whitmire The plaintiff called and informed the Court of a medical issue. The hearing on the Demurrer is CONTINUED to October 2, 2024, at 3:00 p.m.