Document for SERRANO, MILAGROS vs. KIN INTERINSURANCE NETWORK

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable With Production of Documents. As ordered by the Court, a Joint Statement regarding what remains in dispute as to this motion was filed by the parties on July 12, 2024. After the case did not resolve at the Mandatory Settlement Conference of July 15, 2024, the court set the Motion on shortened noticed to be heard on July 24, 2024. Defendant was to file an Opposition no later than July 19, 2024. After reading all the papers filed, the Court issues the following tentative ruling: The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. Defendants are ordered to produce Person(s) Most Knowledgeable as to Category Nos. 1 through 15, 19 and 20. The Defendant is ORDERED to produce Person(s) Most Knowledgeable no later than August 9, 2024. For purposes of the deposition of the Person(s) Most Knowledgeable ONLY, discovery is extended through that date. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion as to the following Category Nos. 16 through 18. In regards to the Production of Documents, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion as to Requests Nos. 1 through 11, 15 and 16. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to as to Requests Nos. 12 through 14. Blanca A. Bañuelos Judge of the Superior Court of California Directions for Contesting or Arguing the Tentative Ruling Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org that they intend to appear remotely or in person in Dept. 10B no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. Department 10B is open for in person appearances. For remote appearances, please call into the dedicated conference bridge line for Department 10B at the time set for the hearing. The conference bridge phone number is (209) 992-5590. Follow the prompts and dial 6939 (4-digit bridge line) and 3892 (4-digit pin number).

Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org. that they intend to appear in person or remotely no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department and Case Number must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties, that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. To attend the hearing remotely in Dept. 10-D: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # and Pin # as follows Bridge # 6940 Pin # 3782 TENTATIVE RULING - On its own motion, the Court continues this Demurrer to October 9, 20024 at 9:00 A.M. in Department 10D. Court will post a Tentative Ruling pursuant to the Court's Tentative Ruling procedure as set forth in the Local Rules. The Court also continues the Further Case Management Conference and Court's OSC to October 9, 2024 at 9:00 A.M. in Department 10D. No oral argument will be allowed as to this continuance. Barbara A. Kronllund

23CV01376 MAYER v. HSBC BANK, N.A. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 664.6 Plaintiff’s motion is denied, in part. I. BACKGROUND This case involves an ongoing dispute concerning a loan obtained by plaintiff Mayer for a piece of property in Santa Cruz County. On January 13, 2017, Mayer filed a complaint against the lender defendants alleging wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, cancellation of trustee’s deed, unfair business practices, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and negligent training and supervision. On April 2, 2019, a notice of conditional settlement was filed and on May 21, 2020 the parties entered in a stipulation for dismissal and order. The case was dismissed with prejudice but the court retained jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The parties entered into a confidential settlement agreement on April 17, 2020.1 On December 30, 2021, Mayer filed a motion to enforce settlement which was withdrawn. On January 11, 2024, Mayer filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and request for issuance of an order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction. Mayer also filed a motion to enforce settlement pursuant to section 664.6. The TRO sought to halt the foreclosure sale of the property in question as the loan went into default again. On January 16, 2024, a hearing occurred on the TRO and preliminary injunction. The Court granted the application for a TRO on foreclosure and set an order to show cause for the preliminary injunction. Mayer now brings another motion to enforce settlement. 1 The court notes that though this agreement is marked as “confidential”, the parties have raised the terms of the agreement in both the moving papers and the opposition and have not requested the pleadings be filed under seal. Page 2 of 16 II. DISCUSSION “Where the statutory requirements are met, the court may, upon motion, enter judgment pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement.” (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (TRG 2023) § 12:950.) Such judgment can be entered “where parties to pending litigation stipulate to a settlement either orally before the court or in writing, signed by the parties or their counsel outside court.” (Id. at § 12.952.) Cal Code Civ Proc § 664.6 Judgment pursuant to terms of settlement provides: (a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following: (1) The party. (2) An attorney who represents the party. (3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer’s behalf. A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810.) “Under § 664.6, the court decides whether or not a factual dispute exists. If there is a dispute as to the facts of settlement, the court acts as a trier of fact [Citations.] The court thus determines issues such as (1) whether the attorney possessed actual [Citations], and (2) terms of the agreement. [Citation.]” (1 California Trial Handbook § 16:41.) The primary terms of the settlement agreement concern the reinstatement of the loan. Paragraph 1 addresses Mayer’s obligation to reinstate the loan by making a payment of $158,125.89. Paragraph 2 obligated PHH to pay $75,000.00 to Mayer or his counsel. Paragraph 5 obligated PHH, within 30 days of receipt of the reinstatement amount to submit Universal Data Forms to all three major credit reporting agencies, reporting the loan as paid as agreed from the time Ocwen began servicing the loan through the effective date. The agreement contained a Page 3 of 16 release limitation in paragraph 12 which included any future disputes between Mayer and PHH and Defendants, arising out of the parties’ continuing relationship as mortgagor and mortgagee. Mayer seeks a court order on the following seven issues. The court’s response to each issue is outlined below. 1. Order that PHH clear all unpaid escrow fees from his account as they wrongfully kept him from making his own tax payments and failed to properly apply the $43,537.56 in property tax reimbursement that they received under the settlement agreement. Going forward, PHH is not to open any escrow account. The court reviewed the settlement agreement and it does not address an escrow account or how the property taxes and insurance are to be paid or structured. This request is denied. 2. Mayer be released from making the June 1, 2020 – December 1, 2020 payments due to PHH as he tendered the funds and PHH, through its attorney, wrongfully did not apply the payments. This appears to be a post-settlement agreement dispute and not part of the agreement before the court. 3. PHH to report that Cory Mayer has paid his loan “as agreed” from the time Ocwen took over servicing through June 2024 to give Mayer time to refinance his home. PHH is to, within 5 days of receipt of request, sign such a letter indicating the same at the request of Mayer, his attorneys or any lender wishing to verify mortgage payments with proper releases signed. Defendants assert they have complied with this term, which is found in paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement. (See Dec. of Verdooren at ¶ 10.) Mayer contends they have not. Defendants are directed to provide proof they submitted “Universal Data Forms” to all three major credit reporting agencies in conformance with this provision of the agreement. 4. Mayer to be awarded his reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in enforcing this settlement agreement. The court declines to award attorney’s fees and costs unless defendants are unable to demonstrate they complied with paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement regarding credit reporting. Page 4 of 16 5. Mayer to pay PHH 38 months of mortgage payments (which represents the remaining mortgage payment due through and including March 1, 2024) at the rate of $3,432.96 equaling $130,452.48. The court reviewed the settlement agreement and it does not address the amount of monthly mortgage payments. This request is denied. 6. PHH permanently modify its servicing module to reflect that Mayer is not subject to an escrow account for real property taxes or homeowner’s insurance. The court reviewed the settlement agreement and it does not address how the taxes and insurance are to be structured. This request is denied. 7. Going forward that PHH is to issue mortgage statements to Mayer reflecting $3,432.96 as the monthly mortgage payment due through April 1, 2036 and it must follow the amortization chart as provided by PHH’s attorney when payments are made. Once the payments are made through the March 2024 payment, the statement showing the April 1, 2024 statement shall reflect the balance due on the loan before the April 1, 2024 payment is $370,520.58 and the payment due is $3,432.96. The court reviewed the settlement agreement and it does not address how payments are to be structured. The court notes the primary terms of the agreement are related to the borrower’s obligation to reinstate the loan (par. 1), payment of settlement funds in the amount of $75,000.00 (par. 2), dismissal of the action (par. 3), attorneys’ fees (par. 4), credit reporting, (par. 5), confidentiality (par. 6), release of borrower (par. 7), release of unknown claims (par. 8), limited release by defendants and release limitations (pars. 11-13), acknowledgements (par. 14), tax consequences (par. 15), compromise of disputed claims (par. 16), severability (par 17), binding effect (par. 18), governing law (par. 19), further assurances (par. 20), counterparts (par. 21) integration clause (par. 22), time is of the essence clause (par. 23), headings and captions (par. 24), and effective date (par. 25.). Paragraph 12 states the agreement does not release (1) claims arising out of the failure of either Party to perform in conformity with the terms of this Agreement; (2) any future disputes between the Borrower and PHH and Defendants, including their successors and assigns, which arise out of or relate to the Parties’ continuing relationship as mortgagor and mortgagee; and (3) PHH and Defendants’ (including their successors’ and assigns’) right to foreclose. (Emphasis added.) Page 5 of 16 Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections Declaration of Mayer 1-5. The court declines to rule on evidentiary objections which were not dispositive to its ruling on the motion before it. 6. Overruled except as to the statement “wrongly paid them”, which is sustained. 7. Sustained as to the phrase “wrongfully advanced.” 8-14. The court declines to rule on evidentiary objections which were not dispositive to its ruling on the motion before it. 15-16. Overruled. Declaration of Simmons 1 – 9. The court declines to rule on evidentiary objections which were not dispositive to its ruling on the motion before it. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

REDDING BUSINESS PARK, LLC VS. AMAZING FINDS, LLC, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV19-0192492 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication: Plaintiff Redding Business Park, LLC moves for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication. The Motion was originally filed on April 26, 2024, and noticed for June 17, 2024. An Amended Notice was filed on April 30, 2024, that noticed the motion for today’s date. In addition to the Notice of Motion and Motion filed on April 26, 2024, Plaintiff also filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, a Separate Statement, and Declarations from Mike Rastegar and Alex Dell. Both declarations reference exhibits and indicate that the exhibits are “attached hereto.” The Separate Statement also references exhibits. No exhibits were filed with the Motion. A motion for summary judgment or adjudication must be supported by evidence in support of the motion. CRC 3.1350(c)(4). The only evidence presented is the declarations which are insufficient to support the facts asserted in the Separate Statement. The only cause of action alleged in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint is breach of contract and the Court was not provided with the contract. The Court notes that Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s Exhibit List and Exhibits for Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication on October 4, 2023. However, this was for a different Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication noticed for January 8, 2024, and eventually heard on March 4, 2024. On March 4, 2024, the Court noted procedural defects and gave the parties the option of continuing the hearing or refiling. Counsel for Plaintiff elected to refile. Nowhere in the Notice of Motion filed on April 26, 2024, or the Amended Notice filed on April 30, 2024, does Plaintiff request that the Court consider evidence presented in a previously filed motion. Therefore, there is no notice to the Court or Defendants regarding the previously filed evidence and the basis for Plaintiff’s arguments. Due process requires that Defendants be provided proper notice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Plaintiff submitted a proposed Order that will be modified to reflect the Court’s ruling.

Demurrer on 1st Amended Complaint for ARAUJO vs GENERAL CVPS2305503 Breach of Contract/Warranty by GENERAL MOTORS, LLC MOTORS, LLC Tentative Ruling: Overruled Defendant to file their answer within 20 days of this order becoming final. Plaintiff to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5. This is a lemon law case. On 3/27/2024, Plaintiffs filed their operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against GM, alleging (1) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(b), (3) violation of Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3), (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and (5) fraudulent inducement – concealment. GM now demurs to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment on the grounds that it fails to state facts relevant to the elements of the claim and fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. It concurrently moves to strike the demand for punitive damages from the FAC. In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their FAC contains all essential elements of fraudulent inducement – concealment cause of action, and that a “transactional relationship” is not required under California law for the manufacturer to have a duty to disclose. With respect to punitive damages, Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged GM’s oppression, fraud, and malice to support punitive damages, which are available under the Song-Beverly Act. In reply, GM reemphasizes that it had no duty to disclose to Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs’ allegations in the FAC fail to establish a fraud cause of action. With respect to punitive damages. GM argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable cause of action for fraud because their fraud cause of action fails. Demurrer A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded and of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.) A demurrer, however, does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defects can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 5th Cause of Action – Fraudulent Inducement The elements of fraudulent concealment are: “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612–13.) As concealment is a species of fraud, it must also be pled with specificity. (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 878.) Less specificity is required where the defendant necessarily possesses the information. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.) As noted by one court, it is not practical to allege facts showing how, when and by what means something did not happen. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement Sys. Planning Assn. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) However, if the concealment is based on providing false or incomplete statements, the pleading must at least set forth the substance of the statements at issue. (Id.) In this case, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged all the elements of a fraudulent inducement – concealment cause of action in the FAC. The FAC alleges that Plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with GM on 6/4/2021 (¶¶ 6–7); that GM knew of the defects posed by the subject vehicle prior to Plaintiffs’ purchase and withheld from Plaintiffs (¶¶ 63–64, 67–70, 72); that GM had exclusive/superior knowledge of the defects (¶¶ 65–70, 73a–73b); that the defects presented a safety hazard (¶¶ 25, 64); that Plaintiffs would not have purchased the subject vehicle had they known about the defects (¶¶ 66, 70, 75, 78); and that Plaintiffs suffered damages (¶ 78). These allegations are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to assert a cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment. GM nonetheless argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege a duty to disclose. This argument is not persuasive. A duty to disclose arises under four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: “(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311 [citation & internal quotation marks omitted].) The last three require an evidence of some transaction, i.e. direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant. (Id. at 311–12.) Here, the allegations in the FAC are sufficient for pleading purposes to demonstrate that GM and its agents owed a duty to disclose known defects but that they purposely withheld such disclosures from consumers, including Plaintiffs. (See FAC ¶¶ 63–74.) Plaintiffs are not required at the pleading stage to prove the agency relationship between GM and its dealership, and there is no question that GM communicates to consumers, at least in part, through its authorized dealers. (See, e.g., Daniel v. Ford Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 1217, 1226–27.) Moreover, in Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (review granted 2/1/2023, S277568), the court addressed the sufficiency for concealment for pleading purposes in fraud in a lemon law case. The Dhital court found that plaintiffs alleged a transmission defect in numerous vehicles, including the plaintiff’s, the defendant knew of the defect and the hazard they posed, defendant had exclusive knowledge of the defect and failed to disclose that information, defendant intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known defects, the plaintiffs would not have purchased the vehicle if they had known of the defects, and they suffered damages on the sum paid to purchase the vehicle. Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations largely mirror the allegations as discussed above. (See FAC ¶¶ 25, 63–70, 72, 75, 78.) Accordingly, the Court must overrule the demurrer on this ground.

Case Number: 23BBCV01735 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B sargon restoration, inc. , et al. , Plaintiffs, v. morrison studios, ltd. lp , Defendant. Case No.: 23BBCV01735 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: Motion for attorneys fees pursuant to CCP § 8488 in the amount of $4,550.00 BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiffs Sargon Restoration, Inc. (Restoration), Environmental Abatement, Inc. (Abatement), and L.Y. Environmental, Inc. (L.Y.) allege that they each entered into an agreement with Defendant Morrison Studios, Ltd. L.P. (Defendant) by which Plaintiffs each agreed to furnish certain labor, services, equipment, and materials for a work of improvement at the property located at 5001 Lankershim Boulevard, North Hollywood, CA 91601. Plaintiffs allege that they performed all conditions and obligations required, but Defendants breached their contractual obligations by failing and refusing to compensate each of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that the reasonable value and market price of said labor, services, equipment, and materials when provided and at all relevant times herein mentioned and now is as follows: (1) the sum of $378,950.05 to Restoration for fire and water restoration &; (2) the sum of $16,000.00 to Abatement for construction and fire/water restoration &; and (3) the sum of $6,375.00 to L.Y. for environmental testing&. (FAC, ¶13, Exs. B-D.) The first amended complaint (FAC), filed July 2, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of written contract (Restoration); (2) breach of oral contract (Abatement); (3) breach of oral contract (L.Y.); (4) Quantum Meruit (Restoration); (5) Quantum Meruit (Abatement); and (6) Quantum Meruit (L.Y.). B. Relevant Background and Motion on Calendar On April 30, 2024, Defendant filed a petition for removal of the mechanics lien on the property located at 5001 Lankershim Blvd., North Hollywood, CA 91601. On May 13, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On May 16, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief. On May 31, 2024, the Court granted Defendants petition to release the property from the mechanics lien. On May 31, 2024, the Court signed the Order on the Petition to Remove Mechanics Lien from Property Pursuant to Civil Code, § 8480. LEGAL STANDARD Civil Code, § 8488 states: (a) At the hearing both (1) the petition [for an order to release the property from the claim of lien] and (2) the issue of compliance with the service and date for hearing requirements of this article are deemed controverted by the claimant. The petitioner has the initial burden of producing evidence on those matters. The petitioner has the burden of proof as to the issue of compliance with the service and date for hearing requirements of this article. The claimant has the burden of proof as to the validity of the lien. (b) If judgment is in favor of the petitioner, the court shall order the property released from the claim of lien. (c) The prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees . (Civ. Code, § 8488 [emphasis added].) DISCUSSION Defendant moves for attorneys fees in the amount of $4,550.00 pursuant to Civil Code, § 8488(c). [1] In opposition, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendant succeeded on the merits of its petition but argue that the attorneys fees claimed are excessive. (Opp. at p.2.) Plaintiff does not take issue with defense counsels hourly rate of $350, but argues that the 13 hours she spent on a simple petition in light of her accomplished experience is unreasonable when Defendants motion to remove the lien and the motion for attorneys fees appear to be forms that were reproduced with dates and information to fill in. ( Id. ) As stated above, the parties do not dispute that Defendant prevailed on the petition for removal of the mechanics lien. As such, Defendant is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees from Plaintiffs. The only issue is whether the $4,550.00 requested by Defendant is reasonable in amount. Defense counsel, Araksya Boyadzhyan, provides her declaration in support of the motion for attorneys fees. Ms. Boyadzhyan states that her hourly rate is currently $350/hour. (Boyadzhyan Decl., ¶5.) She details her legal experience; she was admitted into practice in Claifornia in December 2014 and spearheaded Mgdesyan Law Firms civil litigation department. ( Id. , ¶¶6-7.) She states that she spent 13 hours on this action, which included: 0 .5 hour expended drafting correspondence and meeting and conferring with Plaintiffs counsel regarding the removal of the mechanics lien; .4 hours researching in preparing the Petition; 3 hours expending in drafting the Petition to Remove the Mechanics Lien, the Request for Judicial Notice, and my declaration in support of the Petition; 2 hours expended on researching and drafting the Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to the Petition; 1 hour to attend the hearing on the Petition; 0.5 hour expended drafting the Proposed Order on Removal of the Mechanics Lien; and 2 hours expended in researching and drafting the instant motion for attorneys fees. ( Id. , ¶8.) Ms. Boyadzhyan anticipates spending additional time if the motion for attorneys fees is opposed. ( Id. , ¶9.) Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Boyadzhyans 4 hours spent in researching to prepare the petition and 3 hours to draft the petition are unreasonable in light of Plaintiffs belief that the petition was clearly a form documents with dates and names filled in. (Opp. at p.2.) They also argue that spending 2 hours on this motion for attorneys fees is also unreasonable when it is a form motion with stock declarations with blanks filled in. ( Id. ) The Court finds that the time spent by Ms. Boyadzhyan to research and prepare the Petition is not unreasonable. The Court will not make a determination regarding whether the Petition or this attorneys fees motion were forms as claimed by Plaintiffs. Regardless of whether they were form documents, Ms. Boyadzhyan would still have had to have expended time to research the law and the facts of the particular case before her, prepare the Petition and attorneys fees motion, and draft the requisite accompanying papers (declarations, requests for judicial notice, etc.). The expenditure of 13 hours for two law and motion matters is not unreasonably high. Ms. Boyadzhyan has adequately explained the time she has spent and the Court sees no grounds to reduce the fees. The requested sum is reasonable for the work done on the Petition and the attorneys fees motion and is not excessive in amount. The motion for attorneys fees is granted in the amount of $4,550.00. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendant Morrison Studios, Ltd. L.P.s motion for attorneys fees is granted in the amount of $4,550.00. Defendant shall provide notice of this order. DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________ John J. Kralik Judge of the Superior Court [1] (The Court notes that Defendants make reference to the Code of Civil Procedure, § 8488, but the correct section is Civil Code , § 8488(c).)

S-CV-0052536 North Mill Equipment Finance LLC vs. Berzin, Bella No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/28/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Berzin, Bella

22CV021552: CENTRAL VALLEY FAST FOODS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. vs PRILA FOOD, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/26/2024 Compliance Hearing in Department 17 Tentative Ruling - 07/25/2024 Frank Roesch CMC/Compliance hearing 07/26/24 @9:00 am in Dept 17 Join ZoomGov Meeting https://www.zoomgov.com/j/16146216257 Meeting ID: 161 4621 6257