Case Number: 23NWCV02045 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C HERRERA v. BAGUES CASE NO.: 23NWCV02045 HEARING: 07/09/24 #8 I. Defendants CUNNINGHAM; GUERRA ENTERPRISES, INC.; and BAGUES Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is placed OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT pursuant to the Joint Stipulation to File a Second Amended Complaint RECEIVED on June 24, 2024. II. Defendants CUNNINGHAM; GUERRA ENTERPRISES, INC.; and BAGUES Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is placed OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT pursuant to the Joint Stipulation to File a Second Amended Complaint RECEIVED on June 24, 2024. The Second Amended Complaint RECEIVED by this Court on June 24, 2024 is REJECTED. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to FILE and SERVE their Second Amended Complaint within 5 days of the Courts issuance of this Order. Court Clerk to give notice.

22CV-01322 Barbara Ruiz v. Perlei Luxury Salon and Boutique, et al. Status Conference Appearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remote appearance. Appear to address the status of the case. The Court notes that there is a motion by Plaintiff’s counsel to withdraw set for August 16, 2024.

Case Number: 21STCV35189 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 21STCV35189 MOTIONS : Motion for Order Authorizing and Requiring Release of Cell Phone Records MOVING PARTY: Defendants Mickey Vasquez, Red Bull North America, Inc., and Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Mickey Vasquez, Red Bull North America, Inc., and Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc. (Defendants) move to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena for Defendant Mickey Vasquezs cell phone records served on non-party T-Mobile USA, Inc. Plaintiff Elia Rosa Mercado Leiva (Plaintiff) has filed a notice of non-opposition. No other opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking discovery from a person who is not a party to the action may obtain discovery by oral deposition, written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010.)¿ A deposition subpoena may command either: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.)¿ A service of a deposition subpoena shall be affected a sufficient time in advance of the deposition to provide the deponent a reasonable opportunity to locate and produce any designated documents and, where personal attendance is commanded, a reasonable time to travel to the place of deposition.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (a).)¿ Personal service of any deposition subpoena is effective to require a deponent who is a resident of California to: personally appear and testify, if the subpoena so specifies; to produce any specified documents; and to appear at a court session if the subpoena so specifies.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (c).)¿ A deponent who disobeys a deposition subpoena may be punished for contempt without the necessity of a prior order of the court directing compliance by the witness.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.240.)¿A motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena must be made within 60 days after completion of the deposition record, the date objections are served, or the date specified for production, and be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., §2025.480, subd., (b); Board of Registered Nursing v. Sup.Ct. (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 59 CA5th 1011, 1032-1033.) California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, [i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the courts own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, . . . in making an order pursuant to motion made . . . under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . . MEET AND CONFER The Declaration of Anneke J. Shepard , Defendants counsel, does not describe a meet and confer effort. DISCUSSION On June 5, 2024, Defendants personally served a subpoena on T-Mobile USA, Inc. (T-Mobile) requesting cell phone records for Mickey Vasquez (Vasquez). Plaintiff alleges Vasquez was using his cell phone when the subject motor vehicle accident took place. Defendants dispute this theory. Therefore, both parties appear to seek the cell phone records to support their various positions. However, Defendants filed this motion before T-Mobile objected to the subpoena or failed to comply. Defendants appear to bring this motion because Plaintiff previously subpoenaed the records in August 2023. (Shepard Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.) However, at the time, T-Mobile objected that it would not produce the records absent a Court order. It does not appear that Plaintiff attempted to move to compel the subpoena at that time. The instant motion was filed on June 5, 2024. However, the production date specified on their subpoena is June 25, 2024. (Shepard Decl. Exh. F.) Defendants bring this motion anticipating that T-Mobile will also request a Court order before producing the documents. No opposition and no reply has been filed for this motion. Therefore, Defendants produce no evidence that T-Mobile objected or failed to comply with the subpoena. Defendants however attach declarations from Mickey Vasquez and Tania Vasquez, owners of the subject cell phone number, giving authorization for releasing their cell phone records. ( Id. ¶¶ 56, Exh. D, E.) A nonparty must comply (or not) with the subpoena on the date specified for production. If a party is not satisfied with the nonparty's compliance, the party has 60 days in which to meet and confer with the nonparty. These meet and confer efforts do not affect the mandatory 60-day deadline. The meet and confer process is part of the 60-day period in which to file a motion; it does not extend it. If the party is still unsatisfied with the nonparty's compliance with any portion of the subpoena at the end of this period (because, for example, the nonparty still has not produced the requested documents), the party may file a motion to compel. ( Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court of Orange County (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 103435.) Therefore, since there is no evidence that T-Mobile objected to the subpoena or failed to comply, the motion to compel compliance is conditionally denied, subject to Defendant providing updated information at the hearing. The Court further notes that counsels failure to meet and confer further provides the Court with no information regarding T-Mobiles position as to this current motion.

FCS059656 TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Nationwide Insurance Company Of America’s Unopposed Motion To Compel Responses To Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories And Request For Production Is Granted. Defendant is ORDERED to serve responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production, Set One, without objections within Thirty (30) days of this Order.

Case Number: 21SMCV01343 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Khorsandi v. Mitchell, et al. CASE NO.: 21SMCV01343 MOTION: Motion for Leave to Amend to File Fourth Amended Cross Complaint HEARING DATE: 7/10/2024 Legal Standard If a party wishes to amend a pleading after an answer has been filed, or after a demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the pleading as a matter of course, the party must obtain permission from the court before amendment. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.) Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . .. (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial. ( Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].) Where leave is sought to add entirely new claims, the court may grant leave to amend if the new claims are based on the same general set of facts, and the amendment will not prejudice the opposing party. ( Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-602; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 777 [holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting amendment of complaint, which originally alleged constructive eviction, to allege retaliatory eviction where the new claim was based on the same general set of facts].) Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. ( Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488 [leave properly denied where plaintiff sought leave on the eve of trial, nearly two years after the complaint was originally filed and gave no explanation for the delay which prejudiced defendant who did not discover or depose many of the witnesses who would support the new allegations and had not marshaled evidence in opposition of the new allegations].) Procedurally, a motion for leave to amend must state with particularity what allegations are to be amended. Namely, it must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted and/or added, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(2)-(3).) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration specifying: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(b).) The motion must also be accompanied by the proposed amended pleading, numbered to differentiate it from the prior pleadings or amendments. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(1).) It is within the courts discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. ( Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.) Analysis Defendants/Cross-Complainants Floyd Mitchell and Keith Turkowski move for leave to amend to file a proposed Fourth Amended Cross-Complaint (4ACC). (Chapman Decl., Ex. 1.) The 4ACC states causes of action for: 1. Breach Of Oral Contract, 2. False Promise, 3. Breach Of Fiduciary Duty, 4. Conversion, 5. Violation Of Californias Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 3426 Et Seq.), 6. Unfair Competition, 7. Negligent Misrepresentation, 8. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, 9. Unjust Enrichment, 10. Request For Declaratory Relief (Intellectual Property Ownership), 11. Request For Involuntary Dissolution, and 12. Accounting. The Court notes that Cross-Complainants do not provide with particularity what allegations are to be amended, i.e., the proposed deletions and/or additions, by page, paragraph, and line number. Despite this failure, the Court still has discretion to grant leave to amend. Cross-Complainants provide the facts and circumstances that led to this amendment. The current, operative pleading is the Second Amended Cross-Complaint filed on June 9, 2023, which was filed following the sustained demurrer to the FACC on May 30, 2023. On October 27, 2023, Chapman Law Group, A.P.C. substituted in as Cross-Complainants counsel. To informally resolve the dispute, on November 22, 2023, the parties jointly stipulated to stay this action pending mediation for April 2024. Following the unsuccessful mediation on April 1, 2024, the parties subsequently met and conferred regarding Cross-Defendants intention to file a demurrer to the SACC. (Chapman Decl., ¶ 4.) The parties stipulated on April 26, 2024, to Cross-Complainants filing a Third Amended Cross-Complaint (TACC) to correct factual omissions and legal deficiencies in the SACC. Cross-Complainants filed the TACC on May 22, 2024, pursuant to stipulation. Cross-Complainants withdrew the TACC on June 6, 2024. Apparently, the parties had a misunderstanding as to the scope of stipulation and contemplated amendments, as the TACC provided new facts and causes of action. The proposed 4ACC arises from the same general set of facts as the prior cross-complaints but presents new allegations and claims. The proposed 4ACC seeks to allege the fraud claims with increased specificity and add claims regarding Turkowskis creation and ownership of the intellectual property at issue. This expands the claims stated in the SACC, which only stated five causes of action for breaches of fiduciary duty (direct and derivative), conversion, fraud and negligence. Cross-Complainants explain that they did not bring any new facts or claims earlier because former counsel failed to advise Cross-Complainants to plead the causes of action. The 4ACC seeks to correct these omissions. Cross-Complainants do not explain when any of the specific new allegations were discovered or whether any such facts could have been brought earlier. Moreover, the record demonstrates some unexplained delay in bringing the newly asserted claims and allegations. Cross-Complainants admit that they did not bring the claims because their prior counsel neglected to do so in the initial or amended pleadings. They do not explain whether the new facts or claims are based on newly discovered information. As such, they concede that they delayed bringing this motion since the filing of their initial cross-complaint. That said, any delay is partly mitigated by the stipulated stay of proceedings and the subsequent meet and confer efforts. Further, the parties met and conferred on these amendments in April 2024, leading to the filing of the TACC. Therefore, Cross-Complainants delayed bringing this motion for approximately 15 months (August 11, 2022, through November 22, 2023). Cross-Defendants oppose, claiming that the proposed amendments will cause further delays, increase the scope and complexity of the action, and increase the cost of litigation to Plaintiff. The Court observes no substantial prejudice to Cross-Defendants resulting from this delay. Notably, the trial date has not been set. Thus, it is unlikely that amendment will cause significant delays in trial. There will be sufficient time for discovery regarding any new claims or facts before trial, if any is even necessary. The Court disagrees that these amendments significantly expand the scope of the litigation, since the amendments pertain to the same basic facts and legal issues contemplated by the Complaint and SACC. Moreover, allowing an amendment will avoid forfeiture of Cross-Complainants claims. Cross-Defendants argue that the 4ACC substantively fails for various reasons, including that any new claims will be barred by the statute of limitations, and that the 4ACC includes contradictory sham allegations. The Court will address these arguments when presented in a procedurally proper challenge to the substance of the 4ACC, such as a demurrer or motion to strike. However, the Court concurs that the request for attorneys fees in the 4ACC would violate this Courts prior order striking the fee request. Cross-Complainants do not explain what basis there is for attorneys fees. As such, Cross-Complainant must omit the request in the 4ACC. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED, except as to the request for attorneys fees which remains stricken pursuant to the courts May 30, 2023, order. The 4ACC shall be filed within 10 days.

Case Number: 20STCV48002 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER 20STCV48002 MOTIONS Consolidate MOVING PARTY Defendants Fatameh Shamie and Mohammed Shamie OPPOSING PARTY None BACKGROUND On February 21, 2024, Defendants Fatameh Shamie and Mohammed Shamie (Defendants) moved the Court to consolidate this case with the following for all purposes: McGlew v. Carriger (Case No. 20STCV48811) ( Carriger ) and McGlew v. Coxwell (Case No. 21STCV16214) ( Coxwell ). The Court denied the motion. On May 23, 2024, Defendants again moved to consolidate. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 states: When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.350, subdivision (a)(1), a notice of motion to consolidate must: (A) List all named parties in each case, the names of those who have appeared, and the names of their respective attorneys of record; (B) Contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, with the lowest numbered case shown first; and (C) Be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. (2) The motion to consolidate: (A) Is deemed a single motion for the purpose of determining the appropriate filing fee, but memorandums, declarations, and other supporting papers must be filed only in the lowest numbered case; (B) Must be served on all attorneys of record and all non-represented parties in all of the cases sought to be consolidated; and (C) Must have a proof of service filed as part of the motion. ¿Cases may not be consolidated unless they are in the same department. A motion to consolidate two or more cases may be noticed and heard after the cases, initially filed in different department, have been¿related¿into a single department, or if the cases were already assigned to that department. (LASC Local Court Rules, Rule 3.3(g)(1).) The purpose of consolidation is to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, avoid duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both action, and avoid inconsistent results by hearing and deciding common issues together. (See Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485.) The granting or denial of a motion to consolidate rests in the trial court's sound discretion, and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. ( Feliner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.) Each case presents its own facts and circumstances, but the court generally considers the following: (1) timeliness of the motion: i.e., whether granting consolidation would delay the trial of any of the cases involved; (2) complexity: i.e., whether joining the actions involved would make the trial too confusing or complex for a jury; and (3) prejudice: i.e, whether consolidation would adversely affect the rights of any party. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 430431.) DISCUSSION As an initial matter, the three cases have not been deemed related. A Notice of Related Actions was filed on June 3, 2024 (after this motion was filed), which the Court denied. Defendants argue that these cases involve motor vehicle accidents that occurred from December 18, 2018 to May 2019, involving the same Plaintiff but different defendants. Defendants contend that Plaintiff was treated by the same medical providers and is represented by the same counsel in all cases. Although Defendants seek to consolidate on the basis of purportedly similar issues involving damages, as Defendants acknowledge, all three cases involve separate automobile accidents. (Motion at p. 8.) Because the cases have not been deemed related and are not pending in this department, the motion to consolidate is denied. (LASC Local Court Rules, Rule 3.3(g)(1).) CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Consolidate is DENIED. Defendants shall provide notice of this order and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 20STLC05341 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 25 Hearing Date: Wednesday, July 10, 2024 Case Name: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Latrise Simpson, et al . Case No.: 20STLC05341 Motion: Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment Moving Party: Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Recommended Ruling: Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment is GRANTED. BACKGROUND On June 25, 2020, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint alleging a single cause of action for Subrogation against Defendants Latrise Simpson (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10. The Complaint arises from Defendant colliding with the vehicle of Plaintiffs insured. On December 3, 2020, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint. On July 12, 2022, a Notice of Settlement was filed. On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Stipulation for Dismissal with Reservation to Vacate and Enter Judgment Upon Breach (the Stipulation). The Stipulation provides the following: this action shall be dismissed without prejudice. (Stipulation, ¶ 1.) Defendant shall pay $6,467.95, which is the settlement amount, in full settlement of this action. (Stipulation, ¶ 2.) According to the Stipulation [a]n initial payment of $4,667.95 shall be made by September 1, 2022 by Defendants insurance carrier, Progressive Insurance; then, beginning November 1, 2022, monthly payments of $50.00; then beginning May 1, 2023, monthly payments of $75.00; then beginning November 1, 2023, payments of $100.00 shall be made with all subsequent payments being due on the same day of each month thereafter until the settlement amount is paid in full. (Stipulation, ¶ 2.) The Stipulation provides that the parties stipulate that the Court retain jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to CCP § 664.6. (Stipulation, ¶ 3.) If Defendant fails to make a timely payment, then such failure is a material breach. (Stipulation, ¶ 3.) Any costs are capped at $500.00 pursuant to the Stipulation. (Stipulation, ¶ 3.) On August 24, 2022, the Court entered an Order for Dismissal with Reservation to Vacate and Enter Judgment Upon Breach (the Order), which dismissed this action without prejudice in its entirety but allowed the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the Stipulation pursuant to CCP § 664.6. (08/24/22 Order.) On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the instant unopposed Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment. As of July 5, 2024, the motion is unopposed. Any opposition to the motion was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. (CCP § 1005(b).) MOVING PARTY POSITION Plaintiff contends that Defendant breached the Stipulation by failing to bring payments current, and it is entitled to have the dismissal vacated and judgment entered. OPPOSITION None filed as of July 9, 2024. REPLY None filed as of July 9, 2024. ANALYSIS I. Enforcing the Stipulation A. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides a summary procedure to enforce a settlement agreement by entering judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182 . [I]f the parties to pending litigation enter into a settlement either in writing signed by the parties or orally before the court, the court, upon a motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. Ibid . The court retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement under the statute even after a dismissal, but only if the parties requested such a retention of jurisdiction before the dismissal. Ibid . Such a request must be made either in writing signed by the parties or orally before the court. Ibid . A court ruling on a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. Ibid . A settlement is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to all material settlement terms. Ibid . The court ruling on the motion may consider the parties declarations and other evidence in deciding what terms the parties agreed to. Ibid . If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. Ibid . Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 expressly provides for the court to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. Id. at p. 1183 . It is widely recognized that the courts are not at liberty to revise an agreement under the guise of construing it. Series AGI Est Linn of Appian Group Investors DE, LLC v. Eves (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156, 164 . A prevailing party is entitled to its costs in any action or proceeding. (CCP § 1032(b).) A prevailing party is a party with a net monetary recovery. (CCP § 1032(a)(4).) Except as attorneys fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties. (CCP § 1021.) B. Discussion In support of the motion, Plaintiffs counsel, Harlan M. Reese, Esq. (Reese), provides a declaration. Counsel declares that: on August 17, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the Stipulation. (Reese Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A.) On August 24, 2022, this action was ordered dismissed with reservation to vacate and enter judgment upon breach. (Reese Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. B.) Defendants insurance carrier made a one-time payment of $4,667.95. (Reese Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant made monthly payments pursuant to the Stipulation totaling $375.00; however, Defendant has since defaulted on payments. (Reese Decl., ¶ 5.) Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, on or about March 14, 2024, Plaintiff mailed Defendant a letter regarding the missed payments; however, Defendant failed to cure the default. (Reese Decl., ¶¶ 6-7; Ex. C.) Plaintiff seeks to set aside the dismissal and enter judgment in the amount of $6,467.95, less the later payments of $5,042.95, plus court costs of $500.00, which amounts to total judgment in the amount of $1,925.00. (Reese Decl., ¶ 8.) The court costs consist of $370.00 for filing the Complaint, a $79.50 service of process fee, and a $60.00 motion fee. (Reese Decl., ¶ 7.) The Court finds that it has authority to enforce the Stipulation pursuant to Hines v. Lukes, supra , 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182 . Plaintiff and Defendant signed the Stipulation. The Court also has jurisdiction to enforce the Stipulation as the parties explicitly requestedand furthermore agreedthat the Court would retain jurisdiction to enforce such agreement. The Court furthermore determines that the parties entered into a valid and binding agreement. The declaration of Plaintiffs counsel sets forth the terms of the Stipulation and indicates that Defendant has breached the Stipulation. The Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment is therefore GRANTED. II. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion is GRANTED. Moving party is ordered to give notic

Case Number: 22STCV26196 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 22STCV26196 MOTIONS : Motion to be Relieved from Waiver of Objections to Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: Cross-Defendant A.J. Molino & Associates, Inc. BACKGROUND Defendant/Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (Cross-Complainant), moves for relief from waiver of objections to Cross-Defendant A.J. Molino & Associates, Inc.s (Cross-Defendant) Request for Production, Set One and Request for Admission, Set One. Cross-Defendant opposes and Cross-Complainant replies. LEGAL STANDARD A party who fails to serve a timely response to a demand for inspection (or request for admission) waives any objection to the demand, including based on privilege or work product, unless the court finds that the party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance and the partys failure was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.300 (a), 2033.280(a).) The Civil Discovery Act does not include a definition of substantial compliance, and few cases have addressed the circumstances under which a response will be deemed not in substantial compliance. (See St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 778 ( St. Mary ).) Substantial compliance means actual compliance with respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. ( Id . at 779.) However, substantial compliance should not be understood as requiring actual compliance with every specific statutory requirement. ( Ibid .)¿¿ ¿ A court may not find that only some portions of a document containing responses are code- compliant, but must instead determine whether the document as whole substantially complies. ( St. Mary , supra , 223 Cal.App.4th at 77980 [this position is supported by the fact that there is an effective statutory vehicle to compel a responding party to cure unsatisfactory responses].)¿ The statutory language mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect in the discovery statute should be interpreted using the same general principles developed in application of the identical language in section 473, subdivision (b). ( Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 275.) Although the party moving for relief under section 473 has the burden to show that the mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was excusable, any doubts as to that showing must be resolved in favor of the moving party. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420.)¿¿ DISCUSSION Cross-Defendant served Request for Production, Set One and Request for Admission, Set One on Cross-Complainant on March 5, 2024. The responses were originally due April 5, 2024. (Sohrabian Decl. ¶ 2-3.) These responses were served on prior counsel. During this time, Cross-Complainant changed representation and the case file was being transferred to current counsel (who moved to a different firm). Current counsel substituted into this case on April 22, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 5.) However, the file still had not been transferred. As a result, Cross-Complainant requested an extension to May 31, 2024, which Cross-Defendant granted. However, [o]n Friday, May 31, 2024, our office experienced technical issues with the file, so our office emailed Cross-Defendants counsel in the evening that we would have responses by Monday morning, June 3, 2024. On June 3, 2024, Cross-Defendants counsel indicated that he had not granted the extension and therefore objections were waived. ( Id. ¶ 10-11.) Cross-Complainants counsel, Tiffany E. Sohrabian, declares that because of the technical issue, she could not access the Request for Production, Set One and Request for Admission, Set One. ( Id. ¶ 14.) Cross-Defendant then re-served the discovery on June 6, 2024, and Cross-Complainant provided responses on June 10, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 15-16.) In opposition, Cross-Defendant confirms that extensions were granted until May 31, 2024. However, when Cross-Complainant asked to serve responses by June 3, 2024, it does not appear that Cross-Defendant agreed. (Opp., 3; Kim Decl. ¶ 24.) Instead, Cross-Defendant demanded responses without objections. Cross-Defendant argues that counsel acted negligently by attempting to complete the responses at the end of the day when they were due. (Opp., 5.) It also argues that the responses are not substantially compliant. Cross-Complainant describes the technical issues with the file with limited detail and asserts in reply, without a supporting declaration, that when Defendant Foot Lockers counsel attempted to open the discovery documents on May 31, 2024, in order to complete the responses, she discovered that the files were corrupted and she was unable to open them. Further, she was unable to obtain another copy of the discovery documents on May 31, 2024, because she did not realize this until after the end of the business day. (Reply, 2.) However, it appears that when Cross-Complainant did receive the re-served electronic versions of discovery on June 6, Cross-Complainant did not complete the responses on the same day, and did not provide them until June 10. Cross-Complainant does not explain the further untimeliness or otherwise provide a basis for the Court to find excusable neglect. This delay undermines Cross-Complainants argument that a technical issue resulted in delay. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc.s Motion to be Relieved from Waiver of Objections to Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents is DENIED. Moving party to provide notice and file a proof of service of such .