Party Statement: PENNSYLVANIA STATE EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION vs LOPEZ, et al.

Case Number: 21SMCV01145 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: I The court is inclined to GRANT the motion for a continuance of both motions. First, these motions, if granted, will not only lead to dismissal of the case, but also seven figures worth of sanctions against Fuller and prior counsel. This is not a motion where the stakes are relatively low. And it is clear that Fullers prior counsel withdrew. The court is aware that defendants conditionally opposed the motion to withdraw and the court had sympathy for their position. However, the court must look at the case as a whole. With a seven figure sanctions motion facing prior defense counsel if counsel did not withdraw (for that may be the effect of the safe harbor), defendants exerted substantial pressure on counsel. Counsel ultimately withdrew for reasons not fully fleshed out. It could be because counsel was convinced that defendants were right and the whole case was a sham so they withdrew while they could do so within the safe harbor. Or it could be because, although they believed the case had merit, they did not want to risk sanctions. Or it could be because, although they thought the case had merit, they were at loggerheads with Fuller as to how to go forward or legal tactics. Or it could be because Fuller and former counsel simply had gotten to a point where the interpersonal relationship was so bad as to be untenable. The court will not speculate. But the fundamental fact remains. The sanctions motion certainly put pressure on counsel to withdraw when they did. And the two motions are case dispositive and then some (a lot). Further, the court has read both motions. Neither is frivolous on its face or the sort of motion that will easily fail out of hand such that the court can reject the request for a continuance on the ground that it is unnecessary. The request for a continuance does not jeopardize the trial date. To the contrary, the trial date will remain. This case was filed over three years ago. The court does not currently anticipate continuing that date. However, moving the hearings by three weeks, putting them both in September, does not jeopardize the December trial date. The court is also a bit concerned that McCourt has not been deposed even though her declaration is a cornerstone of the motions. Therefore, and even recognizing that defendants telegraphed this concern when Fullers counsel sought to withdraw, the court believes that the ends of justice are far better served by allowing the three week continuance sought of each motion. The court will discuss the specific dates. Assuming that defendants are forthcoming in discovery, including the McCourt deposition, the court does not anticipate any further motions to continue, and such a motion will be looked at by the court with some not insignificant degree of skepticism.

Case Number: 23VECV01030 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: T HART v LASALLE 23VECV01030 (TENTATIVE) RULINGS ON MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER SET FOR HEARING ON 7/26/2024 Please note: The court requested that defense counsel provide notebooks with all discovery served by any party to any other party in advance of the hearing so that the court could see what discovery has been served by each party, whether discovery has been duplicated, the subject matter of the discovery, whether or not the discovery seeks relevant, harassing, privileged, or burdensome information, and the amount of discovery served. These notebooks were provided to the court and have been reviewed. Ms. Hart was given the opportunity to obtain a copy of these notebooks at her expense even though she already has a copy of all of the documents. Ms. Hart reviewed these notebooks at court on 7/23/2024. The court intends to file the copies of discovery served which are in these notebooks and they will be a part of the court's record once filed. Pursuant to CCP section 2019.030, the court may limit the number of requests, the frequency of requests, or the extent of such requests if the discovery requests: (a) are unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (b) can be obtained from another more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive source; or (c) the discovery requests are unduly burdensome or expensive in light of the case, amount in controversy, and importance of the issues. Here, plaintiff has served over 1000 RFAs and several hundred each of RFPs and SROGS. While the total number is not controlling per se, it does show a significant amount of discovery has already been served by Ms. Hart in a case which has limited issues. It is plaintiff's responsibility to assure she is not repeating the same questions or request for production or RFAs when propounding discovery. One of the reasons the court requested the notebooks of propounded discovery from all parties is so that the court can see clearly "the big picture" in the discovery that has been served and see the nature of the discovery requests, what they seek, and their relationship to this case. As noted below, as stated in the court's analysis and as based also on the authority and arguments set forth in the moving papers, the court grants a substantial number of the requests sought by the motions for protective order and found (see below) that the discovery referenced in the motions was (1) argumentative, (2) irrelevant, (3) seeks attorney client privileged material, (4) duplicates previously served discovery, (5) seeks privileged financial data, (6) seeks discovery as to the unrelated action between the parties, and (7) which is burdensome, harassing, or oppressive to the responding parties. The court finds that merely serving a declaration for additional discovery is insufficient here as it has not prevented the service of discovery which is improper. Therefore, pursuant to CCP section 2019.030, the court orders that plaintiff may serve an 10 additional RFAs, 10 additional SROGs, and 10 additional RFPs from plaintiff to each defendant Legacy, Sapp, Dupree, and O'Brien (the moving parties in these seven motions). Plaintiff should carefully consider whether future discovery served meets the requirements for proper discovery (that is, discovery which is not argumentative, which is relevant to this case, which does not seek attorney client privileged material, which does not duplicate previously served discovery, which doesn't seek privileged financial data, which is not intended to obtain discovery applicable to the unrelated action between the parties, which is not burdensome, harassing, or oppressive), as the court has found were not complied with here in the discovery subject to the motions. Upon a showing of good cause by noticed motion, plaintiff can seek additional discovery beyond the 10 additional RFAs, 10 additional SROGs, and 10 additional RFPs from plaintiff to each defendant Legacy, Sapp, Dupree, and O'Brien. Good cause must be established by declaration and the motion must attach the proposed discovery. __________________________________________________________________ 1. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER BY LEGACY PARTNERS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS SET 3 AND FORM INTERROGATORIES SET 4. MOTION FILED ON 4/5/2024. Grant in Part. The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. Here, the total number of Requests for Admission (RFAs) served by plaintiff on this defendant is 290. Some are argumentative. Some seek information that is irrelevant to plaintiff's claims. Some duplicate the essence of others. Some seek attorney client privileged information. Plaintiff has served this defendant 224 Special Interrogatories (SROGs), 290 RFAs, and 290 Requests for Production (RFPs) of Documents, She has served employees of defendant 70 SROGs, 243 RFAs and 182 RFPs. It is clear from reviewing the discovery served that there is cumulative discovery, repetitive discovery, irrelevant discovery, privileged discovery mixed in with proper and relevant discovery. Having reviewed the matters, and in keeping with the applicable law which allows the court to may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense, and finding that justice requires the court to make a protective order to protect responding party, from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense, the court agrees with moving parties that there are a number of RFAs for which protection should be granted. According to Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020, the court can limit the scope of discovery requests if it finds that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness . . . clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant's brief accurately states the law which the court incorporates here and which is applicable as well to Motions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and & 7 in this ruling. It is well-established that a trial court has wide discretion to control the procession of discovery in a matter. Code of Civil Procedure §2033.080(b) authorizes the Court to issue protective orders restricting the use of interrogatories and other discovery methods where the Court determines that a selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case. A Court has the discretion to limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civ. Proc., §2017.020(a); see also Code of Civ. Proc. §2033.080(b). With respect to interrogatories, Code of Civil Procedure §2025.420(b) provides that [t]he court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. A protective order may be granted on the Courts determination that justice so requires. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 379-381. Accordingly, the grant or denial of relief lies within the sound discretion of the law and this Court and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Ibid. The Court may order that answers to written discovery need not be provided, the number of discovery requests is unwarranted, and that discovery be had in a different manner. Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2030.090(b) and 2033.080(b). Code of Civil Procedure § 2017.010 permits discovery of any unprivileged matter that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. A court may limit inquiry into ostensibly relevant matters if the party seeking discovery cannot show that the information sought will provide some practical benefit to the party in preparing its case. Covell v. Superior Ct. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 39, 4243; see, e.g., Shaffer v. Superior Ct. (1994) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 100003 (limiting discovery, on relevance grounds, of defendant law firm's profit margin in action alleging unconscionability of attorney's fees charged). Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.030 requires the court to limit the frequency or extent of a discovery method if the discovery is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030(a)(1). Moreover, a litigant may not obtain through a second discovery request what has been requested and lost by untimely prosecution of a first request. Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 494. Trial courts are required to limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code Civ. Proc. §¿2017.020(a); see Calcor v. Superior Ct. (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 223. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. Code Civ. Proc. §¿2017.020(a); see Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Ct. (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355, 38384. Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure § 2019.030 requires the court to limit the frequency or extent of a discovery method if the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030(a)(2). The primary purpose of requests for admissions is to set at rest triable issues so that they will not have to be tried; they are aimed at expediting trial. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 267-266 The court finds that the discovery for which the protective order is sought in this motion is unduly burdensome and expensive, taking into account the needs of this particular case. The court also finds that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court finds that the discovery is (a) unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (b) can be obtained from another more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive source; or (c) the discovery requests are unduly burdensome or expensive in light of the case, amount in controversy, and importance of the issues. Finally, the court finds that the primary purpose of the following requests are not to set at rest triable issues so that they will not have to be tried. The court grants the protective order as to the following RFAs and defendant is not required to answer them nor may plaintiff seek an order compelling answers or further answers or responses including corresponding FROG17.1: 205, 208, 209, 211, 215, 216, 218, 220, 226, 227, 228, 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 257, 259, 262, 263, 265, 267, 268, 270, 273, 278, 279, 282, 283. Concerning the Form Interrogatories, plaintiff may serve Form Interrogatory (FROG) 17.1 in connection with any RFAs. Defendant is in error when it states that FROG 2.1, 2.9 and 2.10 are in FROG3. They are not. The court does find that plaintiff has asked FROG 13.1 and 15.1 twice, once in FROG 1 and once in FROG2 and defendant is not required to answer the second set, nor may plaintiff seek an order compelling further responses to FROG2 13.1 and 15.1. At this time, it is apparent that there are many RFAs being asked which no reasonable person would expect a defendant to answer and that the motivation seems to be harassment as they are argumentative. Plaintiff has deliberately asked RFAs which are invasive of attorney client privilege. Many are accusatory. Many are related to issues not a part of this case. Some relate to another unrelated case. FROGs 13.1 and 15.1 were served twice. Sanctions have been waived by moving party in the reply. _________________________________________________________________ 2. KYLE DUPREES NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AS TO PLAINTIFF'S RFP SET TWO, NOS. 52 - 55, 57, 59 65, 84, 85 - 90, 91- 94. MOTION FILED ON 4/8/2024. The requests on this motion fall into five general categories: (1) Plaintiffs own emails; (2) irrelevant confidential, financial information; (3) irrelevant property issues; (4) vague requests for documents drafted concerning conversations about Plaintiff; and (5) irrelevant proprietary documents and communications. These requests are unduly burdensome and Mr. Dupree should not have to respond to them. C.C.P. §2017.020(a). The court grants the motion for protective order that RFP Set Two nos. 52 - 55, 57, 59 65, 84, 85 - 90, 91- 94 need not be answered, nor may a motion to compel further response to these be filed or heard. No sanctions were requested by moving party. _________________________________________________________________ 3. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER BY KYLE DUPREE AS TO PLAINTIFF'S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO. MOTION FILED ON 4/8/2024. Ruling: The court grants the motion for protective order. Dupree is not required to answer SROGs 75, 77-87. If they have already been responded to, no motion to compel may be filed or heard as a result of those responses. The interrogatories are generally categorized by moving party as (1) LPF Trianas business tax certificate and dealings with the Franchise Tax Board; and (2) hypotheticals related to triggering of the termination provision of the property management agreement. The court agrees that these interrogatories are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. C.C.P. § 2030.040(b). Second, the court agrees that the interrogatories constitute an unwarranted annoyance and are oppressive. C.C.P. 2030.090. And third, the court agrees the unwarranted annoyance and oppression of the interrogatories outweighs the likelihood that they will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. C.C.P. 2017.020(a) Nos. 75, 77, 78: These interrogatories seek to invade LaSalle Defendants financial privacy because they seek information about LPF Trianas business tax certificate and dealings with the franchise tax board. Dupree asserts LPF Trianas right to financial privacy as an employee of LPF Triana. H&M Associates v. City of El Centro (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 399, 410 (In the commercial world, businesses, regardless of their legal form, have zones of privacy which may not be legitimately invaded.) citing People v. Ramsey (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 302, 309 and G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States (1977) 429 U.S. 338. No. 79: This interrogatory is an unwarranted annoyance and oppressive because it seeks to create evidence from a separate case into this case. It is oppressive because it is unnecessarily duplicative. If the allegation existed in another, then that allegation alone would serve as evidence. Here, the interrogatory asks for a confirmation of the allegation which simply duplicates the same evidence. The interrogatory is oppressive because it seeks cumulative evidence. Nos. 80 87: These interrogatories are an unwarranted annoyance and oppressive. They are argumentative and accuse Dupree of misconduct. They do not seek information from Duprees personal view but attempt to force him to accept Plaintiffs conclusion that the property management agreement should have been terminated. They also attempt to force an improper expert, legal opinion from a lay witness. These questions and line of questioning would be improper at a deposition and are similarly improper as written interrogatories. No sanctions were requested by moving party. _________________________________________________________________ 4. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER BY DEFENDANT LEGACY PARTNERS, INC. AS TO PLAINTIFFS FORM INTERROGATORIES - SET 4, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF. MOTION FILED ON 5/6/2024. The court grants this motion as FROG 15.1 was previously asked. The answer is identical in that the affirmative defenses are exactly the same and there has been no change except to add additional facts. There was no basis to serve FROG 15.1 again. 17.1 can be served with any RFAs, there is no prohibition on the number of times it can be served in conjunction with a set of RFAs. Sanctions have been waived by moving party in the reply. ________________________________________________________________ 5. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER BY DEFENDANT STEVEN SAPP AS TO PLAINTIFFS FORM INTERROGATORIES - SET 2, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF. MOTION FILED ON 5/6/2024. The court grants this motion as FROG 15.1 was previously asked. The answer is identical in that the affirmative defenses are exactly the same and there has been no change except to add additional facts. There was no basis to serve FROG 15.1 again. 17.1 can be served with any RFAs, there is no prohibition on the number of times it can be served in conjunction with a set of RFAs. Sanctions have been waived by moving party in the reply. _________________________________________________________________ 6. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER BY DEFENDANT DEANNA O'BRIEN AS TO PLAINTIFFS FORM INTERROGATORIES - SET 2, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF. MOTION FILED ON 5/6/2024. The court grants this motion as FROG 15.1 was previously asked. The answer is identical in that the affirmative defenses are exactly the same and there has been no change except to add additional facts. There was no basis to serve FROG 15.1 again. 17.1 can be served with any RFAs, there is no prohibition on the number of times it can be served in conjunction with a set of RFAs. Sanctions have been waived by moving party in the reply. _________________________________________________________________ 7. KYLE DUPREES NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PLAINTIFFS REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, SET THREE SERVED ON KYLE DUPREE, AS TO REQUEST NOS. 152 157, 180, 185. MOTION FILED ON 5/2/2024. These requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because they seek evidence which falls outside of the scope of the time period and the allegations of the Complaint. These requests relate to leases signed by other tenants long after the Complaint was filed. They necessarily cannot support the allegations in the Complaint. Furthermore, they relate to the tenancies of other tenants. There are no allegations in the Complaint related to other tenants or tenancies. Nor is there any basis for Plaintiff recovering damages from these other tenancies. Without any relevance to the Complaint, these requests are unwarranted, lack probative value, and are an undue burden. C.C.P. § 2017.020. The court finds that the discovery for which the protective order is sought is unduly burdensome and expensive, taking into account the needs of the case. The court also finds that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court finds that the discovery is (a) unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (b) can be obtained from another more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive source; or (c) the discovery requests are unduly burdensome or expensive in light of the case, amount in controversy, and importance of the issues. Finally, the court finds that the primary purpose of the following requests are not to set at rest triable issues so that they will not have to be tried. The court grants the protective order as to the following RFAs and defendant is not required to answer them nor may plaintiff seek an order compelling answers or further answers or responses including corresponding FROG17.1 First, these additional requests cannot be justified because they are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. C.C.P. § 2030.040(b). Second, the requests constitute an unwarranted annoyance and are oppressive. C.C.P. 2030.090. And third, the unwarranted annoyance and oppression of the requests outweighs the likelihood that they will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. C.C.P. 2017.020(a) Moreover plaintiff has served 206 RFAs to Dupree 94 RFPs and 87 SROGs in a case which is generally not that complicated. While the total number is not controlling per se, it does should a significant amount of discovery has already been served. No sanctions were requested by moving party.

HG20063283: Fontanila VS R.V. Esau Development Co., Inc. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion for an Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt (CCP 1209) filed by Miguelito C Fontanila (Cross-Defendant) + in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/22/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Motion re: RE RV ESAUs INDIRECT CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER RENDERED OCTOBER 19 2022 FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES filed by Margaret Fontanila, Miguelito C Fontanila on 07/05/2024 is Denied. Plaintiffs’ motion for an order that Defendant is in contempt for violation of the Court’s October 19, 2022 order for payment of attorney fees is DENIED. The Court’s October 19, 2022 order awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs against Defendant in the amount of $4,622.83, but it did not set forth any date by which those fees and costs had to be paid. Therefore, Defendant’s failure to pay those fees and costs by any particular date is not amenable to contempt. Plaintiffs are free to seek to enforce the October 19, 2022 order the same way they would seek to enforce any monetary judgment. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615 and Lucky v. United Properties Investment Inc. v. Lee (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 125, 143- 144.)

C22-02419 CASE NAME: ZUBER LAWLER LLP, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP VS. ENLAN HE *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: FOR LEAVE TO FILE 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY: ZUBER LAWLER LLP, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP *TENTATIVE RULING:* Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is granted. The FAC must be filed and served, as a freestanding pleading, by August 2. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024

DAWODU vs Demurrer on Complaint for Breach of CVRI2400534 ABDOLHOSSEINI Contract/Warranty (Over $35,000) of TOYIN DAWODU by TINA ABDOLHOSSEINI Tentative Ruling: SUSTAIN the general demurrer for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for fraud with 30 days leave to amend; OVERRULE the general demurrer as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of oral contract and second cause of action for common counts. OVERRULE the special demurrer to Plaintiff’s entire complaint for uncertainty. FACTUAL / PROCEDURAL CONTEXT This action is brought by Plaintiff Toyin Dawodu (“Plaintiff”) against Tina Abdolhosseini (“Defendant”). The complaint utilizes Judicial Council Form Pleadings to assert the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract (Oral); (2) Common Counts; and (3) Fraud. The breach of contract cause of action alleges that in March of 2022, the parties entered into an oral contract when Plaintiff paid $3,500 for the services of Defendant Tina Abdolhosseini to expunge a lien on a property that Plaintiff was in the process of acquiring. The breach allegedly occurred in April 2022 when “Defendant went beyond the scope of Plaintiff’s instructions and authority and took it upon herself to perform unauthorized services.” According to the complaint, the lien was not expunged. It is unclear what the “scope of instructions” were or what “unauthorized services” were performed by Defendant. Because the lien was not expunged, Plaintiff alleges the real estate deal fell through and he suffered approximately $100,000 in damages. The common counts cause of action alleges that within the last two years, Defendant became indebted to Plaintiff for money had and received (the $3,500 payment to expunge the lien) by Defendant for the use and benefit of Plaintiff. A copy of the check is attached to the complaint as Exhibit A. Finally, the fraud cause of action alleges that on or about March 2022, Defendant promised to expunge the lien without any intention of performing said promise. Via the Judicial Counsel Form Pleading, Plaintiff alleges that the promise was made with the intent to defraud and induce Plaintiff to rely upon it and “act as described in item FR-5.” In item FR-5, Plaintiff states that he “relied upon Defendant Tina Abdolhosseini to perform the services she was paid to perform and expunge a lien on a property Plaintiff was in the process of acquiring.” Defendant brings a general demurrer against all three causes of action for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action. The general demurrer relies on two arguments. First, using a “Statement of Facts” and supporting declaration, Defendant argues that Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit concerning the same facts and the case was dismissed with prejudice. (Defendant’s Demurrer, p. 5, lines 4-5.) Defendant attaches the minute order from 12/18/2023 as Exhibit D to the demurrer. The order states the prior case was dismissed without prejudice. Defendant argues the minute order is incorrect and reasserts that the prior case was “unequivocally” dismissed with prejudice. (Defendant’s Demurrer, p. 5, lines 4-19.) Second, the general demurrer argues that each of the three causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. As to the breach of contract cause of action, Defendant argues there are “no factual allegations” and that the complaint “consists entirely of ‘conclusions’ with no supporting facts.” Similarly, as to the common counts cause of action, Defendant argues “there are no factual allegations whatsoever alleged under this cause of action.” For the fraud cause of action, Defendant points out the higher pleading standard required for fraud and argues that Plaintiff fails to specify what detrimental action was taken by Plaintiff to cause damage. For these same reasons, Defendant also brings a special demurrer for uncertainty. Plaintiff’s opposition first addresses the dismissal of the prior case and states it was dismissed without prejudice. The opposition also generally reasserts the facts in the complaint, arguing that the Judicial Council Pleading Forms adequately allege sufficient facts to support each cause of action. Defendant filed a “Declaration in Objection to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Demurrer 2” making a single argument that she received the opposition on July 17, 2024 in the mail. She argues the opposition was thus served late. Defendant further objects to not receiving the opposition via email. ANALYSIS A. Meet & Confer Requirement CCP §430.41 and §435.5 require a meet and confer process via phone or in person before filing a demurrer or motion to strike five days before the responsive pleading is due. The meet and confer process requires the moving party to identify the causes of action or allegations subject to attack and the plaintiff must provide legal support for its position. (CCP §430.41(a)(1), 435.5(a)(1).) The demurring party must file a declaration stating the means by which the parties met and conferred, or the responding party failed to respond or meet and confer in good faith. (CCP §430.41(a)(3).) Defendant indicates she attempted to call Plaintiff to meet and confer but he did not answer. (Decl. of Tina Abdolhosseini in Support of Defendant’s Demurrer, ¶ 3.) She was unable to leave a message as Plaintiff’s voicemail box was full. (Id.) Defendant’s declaration states she has been “unsuccessful in reaching Plaintiff to meet and confer prior to submitting this demurrer.” (Id.) Defendant has thus satisfied the meet and confer requirement. B. General Demurrer for Failure to State Facts Sufficient to Constitute a Cause of Action (CCP § 430.10(e)) A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal. th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) i. Plaintiff’s Prior Lawsuit and Defendant’s Failure to Request Judicial Notice For her first argument, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit concerning the same facts, multiple demurrers were filed, and the case was ultimately dismissed with prejudice. Thus, Defendant argues the entire action is subject to a general demurrer. To support this argument, Defendant provides extrinsic evidence in the form of both exhibits and her declaration. This extrinsic evidence impermissibly goes beyond the four corners of the complaint and cannot be considered. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) While the 12/18/2023 Court order dismissing the prior lawsuit is judicially noticeable (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d).), there is no such request included with Defendant’s demurrer. Even if Defendant had requested judicial notice of the 12/18/2023 Court order, it dismisses the prior lawsuit without prejudice. (See Exhibit D to Defendant’s Demurrer.) 2 Plaintiff’s opposition included a proof of service which states the opposition was sent via overnight mail on July 10, 2024. This is timely (nine court days plus two days for overnight delivery per CCP § 1005(b).) The date Defendant received the opposition is irrelevant. (CCP § 1013.) First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract The elements of a breach of oral contract are the same as those for a breach of written contract: a contract, its performance or excuse for nonperformance, breach and damages. (Careau & Co. v. Security Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388). An oral contract may be pleaded generally as to its effect because it is rarely possible to allege the exact words. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Here, via the Judicial Counsel Pleading Form, Plaintiff pleads that on or about March 2022, Plaintiff entered into an oral contract with Defendant to expunge a lien. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, p.3, ¶ BC-1.) Paragraphs BC-2, BC-3, and BC-4 satisfy the other requirement elements in pleading that there was breach, Plaintiff performed his obligations under the oral agreement, and damages. The general demurrer as to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is OVERRULED. ii. Second Cause of Action for Common Counts A general demurrer that a common count does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action will usually be overruled nor is a complaint in the form of a common count subject to a special demurrer on the ground of uncertainty. (Moya v. Northrup (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 276, 279.) The only essential allegations of a common count are “(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment.” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460.) Here, Plaintiff has met this low burden. Via the Judicial Counsel Pleading Form, it is alleged that Defendant became indebted to Plaintiff within the last two years for money had and received by defendant for the use and benefit of the Plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 4, ¶ CC-1.) It is also alleged that the amount due and unpaid, despite Plaintiff’s demand, is $3,500 as of March 2022. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 4, ¶ CC-2.) Nothing further is required. The general demurrer as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is OVERRULED. iii. Third Cause of Action for Fraud Plaintiff’s fraud claim is for “promissory fraud.” Under Civil Code § 1709, promissory fraud occurs when someone “willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk.” Civil Code § 1710 defines deceit for the purposes of Civil Code § 1709 as “[a] promise, made without any intention of performing it.” The elements of promissory fraud are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) A plaintiff must allege what was said, by whom, in what manner (i.e., oral or in writing), when, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, under what authority to bind the corporation. (See Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772, 782.) Each element must be alleged with particularity.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060.) Using the Judicial Council Form Pleading for fraud “does little to lighten the pleading burden” as it “contains only the skeleton of a fraud cause of action.” (Weil and Brown, The Rutter Group, Calif. Civil Procedure Before Trial (2024) Chapter 6 Pleadings, p. 6-56, § 6:146.) Plaintiff must still provide the details as to what representations were made, why they were false, and in what way plaintiff was induced to act. (Id.) Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the who, what, and when of the promissory fraud. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 6, ¶¶ FR-1 and FR-4.) But, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff fails to identify what detrimental course of action was taken as a result of his justifiable reliance on Defendant’s promise. (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) The complaint says that “Plaintiff Toyin Dawodu relied upon Defendant Tina Abdolhosseini to perform the service she was paid to perform and expunge a lien on a property Plaintiff was in the process of acquiring.” (Plaintiff’s Complaint at p.6, ¶ FR-5.) But there are no facts pleaded that state what, if anything, Plaintiff did or did not do because of Defendant’s promise to expunge the lien. The general demurrer as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is SUSTAINED. C. Special Demurrer for Uncertainty (CCP § 430.10(f)) Defendant argues that the complaint is uncertain as to what causes of action are being pleaded and what relief is being sought. Demurrers for uncertainty are generally disfavored. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811.) To that end, demurrers for uncertainty will only be sustained where the defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him; or where the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. (Khoury, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 616; Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3.) Demurrers for uncertainty are to be overruled when addressed to inconsequential matters, the facts are within the knowledge of the defendant or ascertainable in discovery, or not dispositive of one or more causes of action. (Khoury, supra, at p. 616.) To that end, “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures." (Id.) Here, Defendant fails to demonstrate that the allegations of the complaint are so uncertain that she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against her. While the complaint does utilize the Judicial Council Form Pleadings without adding a lot of his own facts, Defendant can still reasonably determine the crux of Plaintiff’s allegations. Moreover, additional facts would be within the knowledge of Defendant and ascertainable in discovery. Defendant’s special demurrer for uncertainty under CCP § 430.10(f) is OVERRULED.

Case Number: 23STCV22930 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT MICHELLE BRIONES, ADMINISTRATOR, ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF ROUGET BRIONES , Plaintiff, vs. MINA SIRKIN, ESQ.; GEORGE MARK SANTA-ANNA, ESQ.; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV22930 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT GEORGE MARK SANTA-ANNA, ESQ.S MOTION FOR ANTI-SLAPP ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $20,585.02 DEFENDANT MINA SIRKIN, ESQ.S MOTION FOR ANTI-SLAPP ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $44,855.74 Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Defendants MINA SIRKIN, ESQ. (Sirkin) and GEORGE MARK SANTA-ANNA, ESQ. (Santa-Anna) (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: None The Court has considered the moving papers. The motion is unopposed. BACKGROUND On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff Michelle Briones, Administrator on Behalf of the Estate of Rouget Briones (Plaintiff), filed a complaint (the Complaint) against attorneys Sirkin and Santa-Anna, for Intentional Misrepresentation (Fraud) pursuant to California Civil Code sections 1710 et seq . The action is related to Sirkin and Santa-Annas litigation activity in an underlying conservatorship matter. Sirkin and Santa-Anna each filed Anti-SLAPP motions aimed at striking Plaintiffs Complaint on December 9, 2023, and January 3, 2024, respectively. On February 22, 2024, the Court granted both Defendants Anti-SLAPP motions. On April 22, 2024, Defendants each filed their respective Motion for Anti-SLAPP Attorneys Fees and Costs (the Motion, or collectively, Motions). No opposition has been filed. DISCUSSION Legal Standard Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorneys fees and costs. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-1142.) Parties may seek attorney fees and costs in connection with a special motion to strike (1) in the moving papers, (2) in a subsequently filed motion, or (3) as part of a cost memorandum. ( Melbostad v. Fisher (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 987, 992.) A prevailing party may only recover for work related to the motion, not the entire suit. ( Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383 (These reports clearly show the Legislature intended that a prevailing defendant on a motion to strike be allowed to recover attorney fees and costs only on the motion to strike, not the entire suit. We conclude the trial court erred when it awarded the Chronicle fees for the entire suit.); S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 381.) However, compensable fees include fees incurred establishing the appropriate fee amount. ( 569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 433 (An award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion properly includes attorney fees incurred to litigate the special motion to strike (the merits fees) plus the fees incurred in connection with litigating the fee award itself (the fees on fees).); Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1133 (an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee.).) The California Supreme Court has upheld the lodestar method for determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees for a prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.] Under this method, a court assesses attorney fees by first determining the time spent and the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. The court next determines whether that lodestar figure should be adjusted based on various relevant factors. ( Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342; Frym v. 601 Main Street LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 613, 620 [It is well settled that the trial courts are to use the lodestar method when determining an award of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute.].) A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case. ( Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) The Court need not simply award the sum requested. To the contrary, ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial courts sound discretion. ( Ibid. ) The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. ( Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) The basis for the trial courts calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. ( Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsels declarations, without production of detailed time records. ( Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) [T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous. ( Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 396; City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785 [same].) Santa-Annas Motion Santa-Anna seeks to recover attorneys fees associated with work performed on the Anti-SLAPP motion and on the Motion by two attorneys at the law firm Nemecek & Cole, recognized as a specialist in the field of professional responsibility defense in defending attorneys in legal malpractice, malicious prosecution and other actions. (Declaration of Kyle R. Besa in support of Santa-Annas Motion (Besas Santa-Anna Decl., ¶ 6.) The Motion is supported by the declaration of attorney Kyle R. Besa as well as the billing records showing the time and work performed for which fees are sought. (Besas Santa-Anna Decl.; Exh. B.) Santa-Anna seeks a total of $20,585.02 in attorneys fees and costs, broken down as follows: · 34.80 hours by Kyle Besa, with an asserted hourly rate of $300, in connection with the Anti-SLAPP motion = $10,440; · 12 hours by Marta Alcumbrac, at an hourly rate of $650 in connection with the Anti-SLAPP motion = $7,800; · 7 hours by Kyle Besa, at an hourly rate of $300, in connection with the Motion = $2,100; and · 245.02 in filing fees for the Anti-SLAPP motion and the Motion. (Besas Santa-Anna Decl., ¶¶ 14-21; Exh. B.) The Court notes that Plaintiff has not opposed Santa-Annas Motion. A party who has not timely filed written opposition to a motion&may not be afforded an opportunity to offer oral argument at the hearing. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The failure to file opposition creates an inference that the motion or demurrer is meritorious. ( Id .) In such cases, the court may hear argument limited to a request for a continuance of the hearing in order to afford an opportunity for written opposition. ( Id .) [T]he rule is patently intended to prevent the introduction of legal theories without prior notice to opposing counsel and the court. ( Id. ) The Court finds that the hours expended and the asserted hourly rates are reasonable. In light of the lack of opposition, however, the hours spent on the Motion are reduced to 4 hours instead of 7 hours. (Besas Santa-Anna Decl., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff has not opposed the request in any manner. Accordingly, Santa-Annas Motion is GRANTED in part, in the reduced total amount of $19,685.02 in attorneys fees and costs. Sirkins Motion Similarly, Sirkin seeks to recover attorneys fees associated with work performed on the Anti-SLAPP motion and on the Motion by the same two attorneys at the law firm Nemecek & Cole. The Motion is also supported by the declaration of attorney Kyle R. Besa as well as the billing records showing the time and work performed for which fees are sought. (Declaration of Kyle R. Besa in support Sirkins Motion (Besas Sirkin Decl.; Exh. B.) Sirkin seeks a total of $44,855.74 in attorneys fees and costs, broken down as follows: · 58.10 hours by Kyle Besa, with an asserted hourly rate of $300, in connection with the Anti-SLAPP motion = $17,430; · 35.5 hours by Marta Alcumbrac, at an hourly rate of $650 in connection with the Anti-SLAPP motion = $23,075; · 10 hours by Kyle Besa, at an hourly rate of $300, in connection with the Motion = $3,000; and · $1,350.74 in filing fees for the Anti-SLAPP motion and the Motion. (Besas Sirkin Decl., ¶¶ 13-21; Exh. B.) Sirkins Motion is similarly unopposed. The Court finds that the hours expended and the asserted hourly rates are likewise reasonable. In the absence of opposition, however, and given the similarities in facts and legal arguments with Santa-Annas Motion, the Court reduces the time spent on Sirkins Motion from 10 hours to 2 hours. (Besas Sirkin Decl., ¶ 19.) Accordingly, Sirkins Motion is GRANTED in part, in the reduced total amount of $42,455.74 in attorneys fees and costs. Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 29th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Motion to Compel Defendant FCA US CVRI2400310 CHONG vs FCA US LLC LLC's Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) by MAYRA CHONG Motion to Compel Defendant FCA US LLC's Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) and for CVRI2400310 CHONG vs FCA US LLC Monetary Sanctions Against its Counsel in the Amount of $1,900.00 by MAYRA CHONG Motion to Compel for Order Establishing Admissions to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission (Set One), and for Monetary CVRI2400310 CHONG vs FCA US LLC Sanctions Against Defendant FCA US LLC and/or its Counsel in the Amount of $1,900.00 by MAYRA CHONG Motion to Compel Defendant FCA US LLC's Responses to Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and CVRI2400310 CHONG vs FCA US LLC for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant FCA LLC and/or its Counsel in the Amount of $1,900.00 by MAYRA CHONG Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff filed these motions on 5/14/2024 and served Defendant on 5/14/2024 by electronic mail. Any opposition would have to be filed and served 9 court days prior to the hearing date (CCP 1005). The Court has not received any opposition to any of the above-entitled motions. Accordingly, each motion is granted in its entirety. The Court has signed each proposed order. Moving party to give notice of ruling.

24CV059786: GUNDERSON vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by STEPHEN JOSEPH GUNDERSON (Plaintiff) in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses filed by STEPHEN JOSEPH GUNDERSON (Plaintiff) scheduled for 07/25/2024 is continued to 08/29/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 24 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents is CONTINUED to August 29, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 24. By no later than July 29, Plaintiff shall deliver courtesy copies of his moving and reply (if any) papers directly to Department 24, as required by Alameda County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 3.30(c). If the papers include exhibits, Plaintiff must use exhibit tabs. (See California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1110(f)(3).)