Preview
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
NORFOLK, SS. SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO.: &{$20/00477
DEBRA ROWELL AND
ALONZO POLK, SR., AS
es
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE nd
ESTATE OF ALONZO POLK, JR., Ss
m1
Plaintiffs =
Ea
Vv. mo
JAMES COUGHLIN,
LESLIE COUGHLIN,
LAURA CONNOLLY POWERS,
JOHN POWERS,
SEAN KELLEHER,
HARLY RAMIREZ
AMILYO GERONIMO
Defendants
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF REAL ESTATE ATTACHMENT
(Memorandum of Law Incorporated)
NOW COME Plaintiffs, Debra Rowell and Alonzo Polk, Sr. as the Personal
Representatives of the Estate of Alonzo Polk Jr. (the “Plaintiffs” or “the Estate”), and pursuant to
Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1, hereby move for approval of a writ of attachment of all right, title, and
interest in, real property owned by Defendants James Coughlin and Leslie Coughlin! and by
Defendants Laura Connolly Powers and John Powers? to secure Plaintiffs’ anticipated judgment
on their claims.? The property sought to be attached is the real estate owned by the Coughlin
' Defendants James Coughlin and Leslie Coughlin are collectively referred to as “the Coughlin Defendants.”
? Defendants John Powers and Laura Connolly Powers are collectively referred to as “the Powers Defendants.”
3 Defendants James Coughlin, Leslie Coughlin, John Powers, and Laura Connolly Powers are collectively referred to
as “the Party Host Defendants.”
{B2137247.3)
Defendants, located at 36 Netta Road, Dedham, Massachusetts (the “Coughlin Property”); the real
estate owned by the Powers Defendants located at 19 Netta Road, Dedham, Massachusetts (the
“Powers Property’); and the real estate owned by Leslie Coughlin and Laura Connolly Powers
located at 37 Carleton Drive, East Sandwich, Massachusetts (the “Coughlin/Powers Joint
Property”). See Quitclaim Deed, dated June 4, 1996, recorded at the Norfolk County Registry of
Deeds at Book 2654, page 274, attached hereto as Exhibit A; Quitclaim Deed, dated August 8,
2022, recorded at the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds at Book 40855, page 459, attached hereto
as Exhibit B; Quitclaim Deed, dated August 26, 2015, recorded at the Barnstable Registry of
Deeds at Book 1417, page 836, attached hereto as Exhibit C. For the reasons set out below,
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court approve an attachment against the
Coughlin Property in the amount of $1,000,000, an attachment against the Powers Property in the
amount of $1,000,000, and an attachment against the Coughlin/Powers Joint Property in the
amount of $1,000,000.
I BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
As a result of Alonzo Polk’s death at the Coughlin Property, the Coughlin Defendants were
charged with and pleaded guilty to furnishing alcohol to minors and admitted that there were
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt for reckless endangerment of a child. The following
facts were admitted by the Coughlin Defendants in a criminal hearing regarding charges arising
from the same incident.
The Coughlin Defendants hosted a graduation party for their daughter who had just
graduated from Dedham High School. See Exhibit D at pp. 7; 15.
The party was hosted at their home in Dedham Jd.
Several teenagers admitted to bringing alcohol to the party and were openly drinking
by the pool. Jd. at pp. 9518.
The Coughlin Defendants were present when the underage drinking occurred. /d.
{B2137247.3} 2
There are multiple photos and videos showing underage teenagers drinking alcohol
throughout the party. Jd. at pp. 10; 18.
Some teens were seen trying to push other guests into the pool. Jd.
Sometime before midnight, the Coughlin Defendants and other adults went inside,
leaving the teens alone in the pool area. /d. at p. 7; 15 — 16.
While the Coughlin Defendants were inside, Alonzo Polk entered the pool with two
other teens Jd. pp. 7-8; 15-16.
The two other teens emerged from the water. Jd. pp. 7; 16.
Sometime later, after noticing they had not seen Alonzo, the teens began looking for
him, and eventually found him in the deep end of the pool. Jd. pp. 8; 16.
Teens began performing CPR, called 911, and ran into the house for help, at which
point Defendant James Coughlin began performing CPR. Jd. at pp. 8, 16.
When officers arrived at the Coughlin residence in response to 911 calls regarding the
incident, they were confronted by several obviously intoxicated teenagers. Jd. at pp. 8;
16.
Officers had to use flashlights to navigate around the pool, which was dark and difficult
to see even with their flashlights. Jd. at pp. 8; 17.
An underwater light designed to illuminate the pool was outside the pool, face down
on the pool deck and was not operative. /d. at pp. 9; 17.
Defendant James Coughlin was aware the light was out. Jd.
Multiple witnesses recounted being unable to see the bottom of the pool throughout the
night and during the time that the incident occurred, and recounted having difficulty
seeing who was near them when they were in the pool. /d. at pp. 10;18.
The following facts have been discovered through review of the materials produced by
Norfolk District Attorney’s Office related to the investigation conducted by the Dedham Police
Department, attached hereto as Exhibit E. Based on information and belief, the report is a true and
accurate representation of the facts that occurred the night of the incident.
e The Party Host Defendants provided coolers filled with alcohol which lined a fence
on the property, and underage guests were allowed to freely take whatever they
wanted from the coolers, including alcohol. See Exhibit E. at pp. 6; 16.
At one point, Defendant James Coughlin told Defendant Amilyo Geronimo that he
was “cut off” because he was too intoxicated; Defendant James Coughlin allegedly
took a beer out of Defendant Amilyo Geronimo’s hand while doing so. Jd. at 7.
Party Host Defendants knew or should have known that their underage guests,
including Defendant Amilyo Geronimo, would continue to drink and were
continuing to become increasingly more intoxicated.
Decedent, Alonzo Polk, an invited guest, was pushed into the pool by Defendants
Harly Ramirez and Amilyo Geronimo. id. at p. 8
Since the pool did not have an operable light, and the water was already murky,
with dozens of intoxicated minors rough housing in the pool, guests at the party
482137247.3)
were unable to see into the water, and nobody noticed that Alonzo had sunk to the
bottom of the pool. /d. at 8 - 10.
Approximately 10-15 minutes after Alonzo Polk, Jr. entered the pool, he was
rescued by other intoxicated teens. /d. at p. 8.
Intoxicated minors began performing CPR on Alonzo Polk, Jr., until Defendant
James Coughlin intervened, performing CPR until paramedics arrived and
transported Alonzo Polk, Jr. to Faulkner Hospital, and eventually transferred him
to Boston Children’s Hospital. /d. at 8-9; 42.
On June 8, 2021, Alonzo Polk, Jr. passed away at Boston Children’s Hospital, due
to injuries sustained from drowning in the pool at the Coughlins’ home on June 6,
2021.
As stated above, as a result of Alonzo Polk’s death at the Coughlin Property, the Coughlin
Defendants were charged with and pleaded guilty to furnishing alcohol to minors and admitted
that there were sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt for reckless endangerment of a child.
Ti. ARGUMENT
A Legal Standard
“Subsequent to the commencement of any action under these rules,” real estate may “be
attached and held to satisfy the judgment for damages and costs which the plaintiff may recover.”
Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1(a). Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c), the court may approve an attachment upon
a finding “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment, including
interest and costs, in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment over and
above any liability insurance shown by the defendant to be available to satisfy the judgment.” See,
e.g., Kurker vy. Shoestring Properties Ltd. P’ship, No. 02362, 2009 WI: 3416237, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Aug. 8, 2009).
B The Court Should Approve an Attachment in the Amount of $1,000,000
Against Each Property Owned by The Coughlin Defendants, The Power:
Defendants, and Their Jointly Held Property Because there is a Reasonable
Likelihood of Success_on the Merits and_a Reasonable Likelihood that
(B2137247.3} 4
Plaintiffs Will_Recover_Judgment Exceeding Any Liability Insurance
‘ Maintained by Defendants
A plaintiff may demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits by
establishing the basic elements of the cause of action. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Rodco Autobody,
138 F.R.D. 328, 332 (D. Mass. 1991). While a plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits, certainty of success is not required. See Latorraca v. Centennial Techs.
Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 208, 211 (D. Mass. 2008). To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, that the defendant breached
this duty, that damage resulted, and that there was a causal relation between the breach of the duty
and the damage. See Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 849 N.E.2d 829 (2006). In Massachusetts, the
social host liability doctrine imposes a duty of care to social hosts who furnish alcohol to guests,
making hosts “liable for injuries to third parties where the [host] controlled the supply of alcohol.”
Lev v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 457 Mass. 234, 241-242, 929 N.E.2d 303 (2010).
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts recognizes the social host liability doctrine. See
Juliano v. Simpson, 461 Mass. 527, 962 N.E.2d 175 (2012). Under this doctrine “liability attaches
only where a social host either serves alcohol or exercises effective control over the supply of
alcohol.” Jd. In determining whether social host liability applies, the court must consider “whether
the social host unreasonably created a risk of injury to a person who the social host should
reasonably have foreseen might be injured as a result of the guest’s intoxication.” McGuiggan v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 398 Mass. 152, 161-62 (1986). While most case law applies social
host liability to instances where the intoxicated guest injured a third party in a motor vehicle
accident, there is no indication that social host liability only applies in those circumstances.
In this case, the Party Host Defendants willfully, wantonly, and recklessly furnished
alcohol that was consumed by underage guests on the night of the Party. The Party Host
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Defendants provided coolers full of alcohol which were openly available to the teenage guests.
Defendant James Coughlin was seen “shutting off’ Defendant Amilyo Geronimo because he
deemed Geronimo too intoxicated, evidencing Defendant James Coughlin’s control of the supply
of alcohol. Shortly after “cutting off’ Defendant Geronimo, Defendant James Coughlin, and the
rest of the Party Host Defendants, went inside, leaving the “obviously intoxicated” teens with
unfettered access to the alcohol in the coolers outside. See Exhibit D, at pp. 7 — 8. The Party Host
Defendants were furnishing the alcohol, controlling who drank, and controlling how much they
were able to drink. The Coughlin Defendants admitted to furnishing alcohol to minors at their
September 2023 sentencing hearing. See Jd. As social hosts who controlled the supply of alcohol
and knowingly furnished alcohol to obviously intoxicated minors who caused foreseeable harm to
a third-party, the Party Host Defendants are liable for the reasonably foreseeable harm caused to
Alonzo Polk, Jr. by overly intoxicated underage guests at the Party.
By willfully, wantonly, and recklessly supplying alcohol to overly intoxicated teens, the
Party Host Defendants created a risk of injuryto Alonzo Polk, Jr., and this risk was a reasonably
foreseeable result of the guests’ intoxication. When officers arrived at the scene of the incident,
they noticed cans of beer littered throughout the yard, and coolers and boxes filled with alcohol
lining the fence of the property. See Exhibit D, at pp. 9 - 10. It was plainly foreseeable that
Defendants Harly Ramirez and Amilyo Geronimo, then overly intoxicated, may accidentally push
Polk into the pool, where the underage intoxicated guests were roughhousing. With dozens of
drunk, unsupervised, teens in a pool with murky water, that does not have an operable light, it was
plainly foreseeable that an intoxicated teenager pushed into the dark pool could drown and that
nobody would notice because of the party environment.
“(N]egligent conduct is the proximate cause of an injury ... [if] the injury to the plaintiff
{B21372473}
was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligent conduct.” Delaney v. Reynolds, 63 Mass.
App. Ct. 239, 241, 825 N.E.2d 554, 556 (2005). An injury is foreseeable if “the actor realizes or
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the
other or a third person which is intended to cause harm” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B
(1965). Here, it was foreseeable that intoxicated minors, who are celebrating their high school
graduation, may get excited and engage in risky behavior, such as roughhousing and pushing
people into a pool. On at least one occasion during the party, the Party Host Defendants witnessed
guests trying to throw other guests into the deep end of the pool.
The Party Host Defendants’ condonation of excessive underage drinking at the Party
coupled with the Coughlin Defendants’ failure to properly light the pool area was the proximate
cause of Alonzo Polk’s death and conscious pain and suffering. When Police officers arrived on
the scene, they noted that the water was “pitch black” and they could not see the bottom of the
pool, even with the help of their flashlights. See Exhibit D, at p 8. Teens at the party noted that
the pool area was so dark that they could not see other people in the pool. Jd. at 9.
Here, it was plainly foreseeable that overly intoxicated teenagers swimming in a poorly lit
pool at night, unsupervised, could result in harm to one or more of them, Guests could have, and
would have, rescued Polk had they seen him struggling, but they could not see him, because the
pool light was disconnected. The Party Hosts knew that the area was dark but chose not to intervene
to stop the overly intoxicated guests from pushing each other into the pool.
The Plaintiffs suffered significant, irreversible harm due to the Party Host Defendants’
negligence. Alonzo Polk, Jr. drowned in the Coughlins’ pool for more than ten minutes, while
guests were mere feet away. But for the pool light being inoperable, guests could have and would
have rescued him had they seen him. When Alonzo Polk Jr. was rescued from the pool, he had
{821372473}
white foam coming out of his mouth and ears. Polk suffered significant trauma to his brain,
including swelling. Less than 48 hours after attending the Party at the Coughlin Property, Alonzo
Polk Jr. was pronounced dead, a mere two days after graduating high school, and merely ten days
before his eighteenth birthday. Debra Rowell and Alonzo Polk, Sr. lost their child. The Party Host
Defendants breached their duty of care as social hosts by allowing overly intoxicated guests to
continue to drink after the Party Host Defendants knew they were intoxicated, directly contributing
to Alonzo Polk, Jr.’s death.
Given the above, there is a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs will prevail on their
negligence claims. As social hosts who controlled the supply of alcohol, the Party Host Defendants
are liable for Alonzo Polk, Jr.’s death, which was caused by intoxicated minors that the Party Host
Defendants knowingly supplied alcohol to. The Party Host Defendants owed a duty of care to all
guests and third parties that could have been foreseeably harmed by an intoxicated guest. Party
Host Defendants breached this duty of care by failing to prevent the harm caused to Alonzo Polk,
Jr., who died because of injuries sustained after being pushed into the poo! at the Coughlins’ home
on June 6, 2021.
Cc There is a Reasonable Likelihood that the Estate Will Recover a Judgement
Equal to or Greater than the Amount of the Attachment Sought.
In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs request approval of an attachment in the amount of
$1,000,000 against each of the properties listed in the memorandum. As a result of The Party Host
Defendants’ willful, wanton, and reckless furnishment of alcohol to minor guests and removal of
the light in the deep end of the pool, Alonzo Polk Jr. drowned in The Coughlins’ pool and died a
few days later as a result of his injuries. In addition, Alonzo Polk Jr.’s family suffered
immeasurable pain and suffering after losing their son, brother, and friend just days before he was
to turn eighteen. The Estate requests that the attachment include an additional $1,925,000 as
(B2137247.3}
compensation for these intangible damages. See Plaintiff, Estate of v. Defendant, JVR No. 105156,
1993 WL 774072 (Mass. Super.) (Jury returned a verdict of $475,000 in favor of plaintiff's estate
after plaintiff drowned in a pool due to defendant’s negligence; after adjusting for inflation, the
award is equivalent to $1,188,748.79 in 2024.).
As provided by Mass. R. Civ. P. Rule 4.1(c), an order for attachment may be entered “upon
finding by the court that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment,
including interest and costs, in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment
over and above any liability insurance shown by the defendant to be available to satisfy the
judgmen oo Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c). In this case, the Coughlin Defendants have provided
documentation of a homeowner's insurance policy that has a $500,000 liability limit.4 The
Plaintiffs’ expected damages go beyond the homeowner’s liability insurance policy.
ll. CONCLUSION
WHEREFEORE, and for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this
Honorable Court approve an attachment of the Coughlin Property located at 36 Netta Road,
Dedham, Massachusetts in the amount of $1,000,000; an attachment of the Powers Property located
at 19 Netta Road, Dedham, Massachusetts in the amount of $1,000,000; and an attachment of the
Coughlin/Powers Joint Property located at 37 Carleton Drive, East Sandwich, Massachusetts in
the amount of $1,000,000.
Respectfully Submitted,
The Plaintiffs,
“Tt is presently unknown what insurance coverage is maintained for the Powers’ Property and Coughlin/Powers
Joint Property.
{B2137247.3}
DEBRA ROWELL AND
ALONZO POLK, SR., AS
PERONSAL REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE ESTATE OF ALONZO POLK, JR.,
By their attorneys,
Is! Gregory D. Henning
Gregory D. Henning, Esq. (BBO #663189)
Greg. Henning@henningstrategies.com
Henning Strategies
141 Tremont Street — 3 floor
Boston, MA 02111
Tel: (617) 293-6534
(821372473) 10
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This good cause requirement "serves as a barrier to excessive and unwarranted intrusions," however it "does not limit the number of examinations, but cumulative discovery is prohibited." (Sporich v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 422, 428.) Dr. Reader's physical evaluation is not "cumulative". Dr. Reader's examination will address the alleged vision issues. These alleged injuries were not evaluated by Dr. Forner. In fact, Dr. Forner, specifically stated in his report he defers to an ophthalmologist. Certainly, Dr. Reader's examination is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, i.e. plaintiff's alleged injuries. In fact, plaintiff's counsel initially agreed that the physical examination was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, hence the initial agreement to produce plaintiff for the Dr. Reader examination. Further, the prejudice to plaintiff is minimal. The physical examination by Dr. Reader will be limited to evaluating plaintiff's claimed vision injuries and therefore the evaluation will not be prolonged. Plaintiff may record the examination. Further, plaintiff is being compensated at the federal rate for travel. The court GRANTS defendant's Motion to Compel Physical Examination of Plaintiff Lazaro Nunez. Appearances required for any argument and if none to determine the date time and location for Dr. Reader's evaluation. WATERS 7/25/2024 Directions for Contesting or Arguing the Tentative Ruling: Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org. that they intend to appear remotely no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties, that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. To conduct a remote appearance, if applicable, follow the instructions below. There is a dedicated conference bridge lines for Dept. 11B. Call into dedicated conference bridge line at the time set for the hearing. To attend the remote hearing in Dept. 11B: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # 6941 and Pin # 5564. The courtroom clerk will make announcements and the Judge will call the calendar. Please mute your phones when you are not speaking, and remember to unmute your phone when you are speaking. At this time, we are not able to provide information over the phone. To communicate with the Courtroom Clerk of Dept. 11B, please email questions to civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org, indicating in the title of the email the Department, Case number, Case Name, and party’s name. A Courtroom Clerk will return your email. To ensure the Court has your most recent contact information, if you have not already done so, please register your email address and mobile number on the Court’s website under Online Services, Attorney Registration. (You do not have to be an attorney to register.) We thank you for your cooperation, assistance, patience and flexibility
Ruling
ELESHA WELCH vs. 49ER VILLIAGE RV RESORT et al
Jul 24, 2024 |
24CV13526
No appearances necessary. After review of the parties’ CMC statements, the matter is continued for further case management and trial setting to January 22, 2025 at 1:30 p.m. in Department 3. Updated CMC Statements must be filed and served at least 15 days prior to the CMC.
Ruling
GRISSOM vs PARKVIEW COMMUNITY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
Jul 25, 2024 |
CVRI2306299
DEMURRER ON 1ST AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR OTHER
PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY
GRISSOM VS PARKVIEW DAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORT
CVRI2306299 COMMUNITY HOSPITAL (OVER $25,000) OF GINA GRISSOM
MEDICAL CENTER BY PARKVIEW COMMUNITY
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, AHMC
HEALTHCARE INC., DOCTORS
HOSPITAL OF RIVERSIDE LLC
Tentative Ruling:
SUSTAIN, with 30 days leave to amend.
5.
MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT ON
1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
OTHER PERSONAL
INJURY/PROPERTY
GRISSOM VS PARKVIEW
DAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORT
CVRI2306299 COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
(OVER $25,000) OF GINA GRISSOM
MEDICAL CENTER
BY PARKVIEW COMMUNITY
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, AHMC
HEALTHCARE INC., DOCTORS
HOSPITAL OF RIVERSIDE LLC
Tentative Ruling:
GRANT, with 30 days leave to amend.
Ruling
Binghui Liu vs. Collect Access, LLC
Jul 22, 2024 |
C24-00022
C24-00022
CASE NAME: BINGHUI LIU VS. COLLECT ACCESS, LLC
DEFAULT HEARING IN RE: DEFAULTED DEFENDANT COLLECT ACCESS AND OFFER/ACCEPTANCE TO
COMPROMISE FOR ALL OTHER DEFENDANTS
FILED BY:
*TENTATIVE RULING:*
Appearance required.
Ruling
AGUILAR vs WINCO FOODS
Jul 23, 2024 |
CVRI2302916
HEARING RE: MOTION TO BE
AGUILAR VS WINCO
CVRI2302916 RELIEVED AS COUNSEL FOR ROSA
FOODS
HERLINDA AGUILAR
Tentative Ruling:
The Court grants Plaintiff counsel’s motion to be relieved, effective upon the filing of the proof of
service of a signed order upon the client.
Ruling
VIVERA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., ET AL. VS THOMAS GIRARDI, ET AL.
Jul 26, 2024 |
6/18/2022 |
21SMCV01627
Case Number:
21SMCV01627
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
I The matter is here for two reasons.
The first is the lien sought by judgment creditors.
They allege that they hold a judgment against Vivera and would like an order that any money paid by the defaulted defendants be paid to them as a credit against the judgment rather than to Vivera.
The second reason the case is here today is for the default prove-up.
The court is taking the somewhat unusual step of requiring a live prove up because the judgment seeks $7.5 million in damages against Girardi.
(The other defendants have settled.)
According to the supporting declaration from Viveras CEO, Edalat, Cervantes is a former advisor to Vivera.
He introduced Vivera to Salimour and Girardi for a potential business opportunity in 2017.
He also introduced the declarant to former Mayor Villaraigosa.
Villaraigosa allegedly said he could assist Vivera in getting a contract with Los Angeles for COVID-19 testing.
Edalat says that he became friends with Salimpour, who was to be an advisor.
But the relationship soured and the two parted ways in 2018.
Edalat claims that Girardi and Salimpour made a number of defamatory comments about him, Vivera, and Karpinski to various people and that Edalat learned of them in June 2020.
The statements were conveyed to Edalat by Cervantes.
Edalat reached out to Salimpour to ask about them, but he denied making them and denied Girardi had either.
Salimpour and Girardi then allegedly filed a frivolous complaint against Vivera (Girardi, the court thinks, as counsel) alleging employment related claims.
Edalat says that he kept hearing about defamatory statements allegedly made by Girardi continuing into 2020 and even early 2021.
In January 2021, Edalat says that he learned that Girardi continued to say defamatory things.
He thinks Girardi did that to get a favorable settlement in the other case.
The statements allegedly made by Girardi are that Edalat is a crook and in trouble with the feds; that there were demeaning sexual statements about Karpinski and that she was only employed due to her looks, and that Vivera was going nowhere.
Edalat claims that he learned from Villaraigosa that the statements were having a negative effect on prospective business relationships.
For example, Villaraigosa allegedly said he could not submit a bid to the City due to those statements.
Edalat says that the way government contracts work, they need to have political backing and that if Villaraigosa backed it, it was virtually guaranteed to succeed.
But, he claims, Girardis influence doomed that to failure.
Edalat claims that the entity that ultimately got the contract was paid $7.5 million according to a web site.
Edalat says that Girardi had a close relationship with Bluestonethe entity that got the contract.
Edalat also claims that Girardi was aware of another relationship Vivera had involving the Coushetta Tribe of Louisiana.
But that relationship went sour when the prospective client heard about the derogatory comments.
Edalat says that Cervantes said Girardi confirmed he made the defamatory statements.
There was a similar pattern with the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians.
Edalat has submitted a declaration stating that plaintiffs have dismissed all of the other defendants.
No money changed hands in any of those agreements, although there seems to have been some kind of consideration in the settlement with Pedram Salimpour and PPS Health (but the terms of that agreement are confidential).
The court has a number of problems with this.
First, the court is not inclined to believe, without more, that Los Angeles will simply award contracts to whomever former Mayor Villaraigosa endorses.
While the court is well aware that city government is not always pristine, the court is not prepared to say that it is wholly in Villaraigosas palm.
The same is true of the two Native American nations.
The evidence of the defamatory comments is not well established.
The court is not sure that there is any actual admissible evidence that the statements even were made.
The court is aware that the default essentially admits the truth of the accusations, but even so, the court takes this with a box of salt.
Finally, the alleged damages are not proven.
The fact that a contracts face value is $7.5 million does not mean (a) that Vivera would have received the same contract or (b) that the face value of the contract is the profit.
The contract was to provide COVID-19 testing.
The court has to presume that there would have been some costs incurred to perform, not only to develop the tests, but also to manufacture them and provide them to the City.
The fact is that the complaint smacks of piling on, at least as to the damages here.
Having said that, this is here for a prove-up.
If the matter is proven up, the court will award damages as appropriate.
The lien sought is proper, and when the prove-up occurs, the motion will be GRANTED.