Case Number: 21STCV21293 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/9/24 TRIAL DATE: 1/27/25 Case #21STCV21293 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Motion filed on 1/9/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Phyllis R. Ginolfi, by and through her Conservator, Christin C. Solis RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant HDL, Inc. dba Pacoima Adult Day Care RELIEF REQUESTED : A protective order preventing and continuing the deposition of key fact witness, Miriam Muwummuza. RULING : The motion is placed off calendar. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out of an alleged fall that occurred while Plaintiff Phyllis Ginolfi (Plaintiff) attended Defendant/Cross-Complainant HDL, Inc. dba Pacoima Adult Day Cares (HDL) adult day care facility on 8/20/19. On 8/20/19, Plaintiff was transported to and from HDLs facility by a paratransit van operated by Defendant/Cross-Defendant Keolis Transit America, Inc. (Keolis). On 6/7/21, Plaintiff filed this action against HDL and Defendant/Cross-Defendant Right Choice In-Home Care, Inc. for: (1) Dependent Adult/Elder Abuse and (2) Negligence. Keolis was later named in place of Doe 1. On 1/9/24, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion seeking a protective order preventing and continuing the deposition of key fact witness, Miriam Muwummuza, which was scheduled for 1/11/24. No opposition or other response to the motion has been filed. ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks the subject protective order due to the unavailability of Plaintiffs counsel on 1/11/24, the date of the deposition due to being engaged in trial in another matter on that date. ( See Gambardella Decl. ¶3). Plaintiffs attorney notes that the instant motion was set for the earliest available date, 7/9/24, and then states: Plaintiff subsequently make an ex parte application to advance the hearing date so that this important discovery can be taken in a timely manner and well before the MSC on April 18, 2024. (Gambardella Decl. ¶3). Plaintiff never made an ex parte application to advance the hearing date on this motion. Given that the date of the deposition has long since passed, the requested relief is moot. CONCLUSION The motion is placed off calendar.

Case Number: 24SMCV01139 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 JOSEPH ARIEL HAZANI, Plaintiff, v. USG CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.: 2 4 SMCV0 1139 Hearing Date: Ju ly 10, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT This hearing is on Plaintiff Joseph Ariel Hazani s motion to amend complaint . The motion is 46 pages long and exceeds the page limit of 15 for an opening memorandum . (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (d) ( Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages. ).) A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these¿rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (g).) [A] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers. ( Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker ¿(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262 .) Accordingly , a trial court also has discretion to reject oversize briefs . The Court exercises its discretion to disregard Plaintiffs motion to amend. Even if Plaintiffs motion were not oversize, it is moot . The Court sustained Defendant USG Corporations demurrer to the complaint and gave Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend . (June 14, 2024 Minute Order.) Accordingly , there is no need for a separate motion to amend . Plaintiff also failed to properly serve Defendant with its motion . Plaintiff filed his motion on June 18, 2024 . There is no proof of service showing the motion was served . Based on Plaintiffs failure to serve, the Court cannot properly consider the motion without depriving Defendant of its due process rights . Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10 , 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24PSCV00253 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: K Defendants Yeira Lisbeth Villas and Cuberto Munozs Demurrer to [First Amended] Complaint is SUSTAINED, with leave given to amend. Background Plaintiff Henrietta E. Anakwenze (Plaintiff) alleges that she sustained injury and damages in a January 20, 2022 motor vehicle accident. On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), asserting a cause of action against Yeira Lisbeth Villa, Cuberto Munoz (together, Defendants) and Does 1-10 for: 1. Motor Vehicle A Case Management Conference is set for July 12, 2024. Legal Standard A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) [A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge. ( S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].) Discussion Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to Plaintiffs FAC on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and is uncertain. The demurrer is sustained, with leave given to amend. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs FAC is barred by the two-year statute of limitations Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1, because Plaintiff filed her original complaint on January 24, 2024 and the date of injury alleged is January 20, 2022. Indeed, [a] complaint showing on its face the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations is subject to general demurrer. ( Iverson, Yoakum, Papiano & Hatch v. Berwald (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 990, 995.) Plaintiff concedes that her complaint was filed in excess of two years after the date of the incident (Opposition, 2:5-8) [The second anniversary of the lawsuit fell on Saturday, By operation of the law, the lawsuit was technically tolled to the Monday following the Saturday, January 22, 2024). The lawsuit was filed on January 24, 2024. . .].) Where a complaint does not reveal on its face that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a plaintiff has no obligation to plead around the defense. ( JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 678, 688.) It follows, then, that a plaintiff is obligated to plead around the defense when the complaint reveals on its face that it is time-barred. Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 351 (i.e., [i]f, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action). Plaintiff has alleged only that defendants live out of state and were not present in California at all times pertinent to the lawsuit. (FAC, ¶ MV-1; see also Id. [i.e., the allegation Defendants out of state].) Nothing more has been alleged. The court does not believe that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to invoke tolling pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 351.

MARQUEZ VS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CVSW2310812 TUTTOILMONDO SANCTIONS Tentative Ruling: The Motion is DENIED. There are no new facts or law. Plaintiff fails to set forth a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that she was not served with the motion to compel further responses. Plaintiff’s motion fails to set forth a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to determine that she was not served with the motion to compel further responses. Her declaration states that defendant’s counsel “false[ly] claimed to have mailed me their motion” (Marquez declaration, p. 4, ln. 19), but fails to provide any details regarding plaintiff’s practice of monitoring and reviewing her mail such that it could reasonably be concluded that she did not receive the motion, let alone that it was not sent. Meanwhile, there is a valid proof of service attached to the discovery motion and supplemental evidence in the Espinoza declaration submitted in opposition to this motion to support a finding that the motion was properly served. Plaintiff in her reply does not dispute that she was actually aware of the motion by the time of the hearing but provides no explanation for why she did not object or ask for a continuance if she had not received actual notice of the motion in time to file an opposition.

Case Number: 23VECV01532 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: T 23VECV01532 Farzan and Amin v Rodriguez Defendants motion to deem requests for admission admitted: Grant. No opposition was filed. The court deems the request for admissions admitted against plaintiffs Farzan and Amir as follows: 1. Admit that YOU have no EVIDENCE to support YOUR First Cause of Action for Breach of Written Contract. 2. Admit that YOU have no EVIDENCE to support YOUR Second Cause of Action for Fraud. 3. Admit that YOU have no EVIDENCE to support YOUR Third Cause of Action for Violation of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 4. Admit that YOU have no EVIDENCE to support YOUR prayers, numbers 1-6, inclusive. 5. Admit that YOU have no DOCUMENTS to support YOUR First Cause of Action for Breach of Written Contract. 6. Admit that YOU have no DOCUMENTS to support YOUR Second Cause of Action for Fraud. 7. Admit that YOU have no DOCUMENTS to support YOUR Third Cause of Action for Violation of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 8. Admit that YOU have no DOCUMENTS to support YOUR prayers, numbers 1-6, inclusive. Motion to compel answers to Form Interrogatories, Set 1, Special Interrogatories, Set 1, and Request for Production of Documents, Set 1 : Grant. No opposition was filed. Verified answers and production of documents without objections shall be served and produced by plaintiffs Farzan and Amin within 20 days. Request for Judicial Notice: Grant. The court takes judicial notice of the following documents: Exhibit "A"= substitution of attorney filed December 27, 2022 LASC Case No: 19STFL08928 Exhibit "B" = substitution of attorney filed January 24, 2023 LASC Case No: 19STFL08928 Exhibit "C" = minute order dated January 9, 2023 LASC Case No: 19STFL08928 Exhibit "D" = docket downloaded April 19, 2024, LASC Case No: 19STFL08928 Motion for judgment on the pleadings: Grant without leave to amend. No opposition was filed. The court finds that the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against defendant. Because no opposition was filed and no explanation was made how the complaint could be amended, the motion is granted without leave to amend. Defendant to submit a Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice for the courts signature, with a copy served on plaintiffs. Defendant to give notice of the courts rulings to plaintiffs.

Case Number: 21STCV18894 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the documents submitted in support of Plaintiffs' requests for default judgments, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On May 19, 2021, Plaintiffs Reina R. Garrett (Garrett) and William Q. Birky (Birky) filed this action against Defendants Daryl Scot Finley (Defendant) and Does 1-25 for motor vehicle tort and loss of consortium. On September 14, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a proof of service showing substituted service on Defendant of statements of damages sought by Garrett and Birky on May 20, 2022. On September 22, 2022, the clerk entered Defendants default. On August 4, 2023, the Court dismissed the Doe defendants without prejudice at Plaintiffs request. On May 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed requests for Court judgment. PLAINTIFFS REQUESTS Garrett asks the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and award Garrett $519,520.02, consisting of $500,000.00 in general damages, $18,679.06 in special damages, and $840.96 in costs. Birky asks the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and award Birky $250,325.26, consisting of $250,000.00 in general damages and $325.26 in costs. LEGAL STANDARD A. Default judgment [With exceptions that do not apply here,] [a] party seeking a default judgment on declarations must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) . . . The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk: (1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) Interest computations as necessary; (4) A memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) A proposed form of judgment; (7) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) Exhibits as necessary; and (9) A request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a).) B. Damages On a request for default judgment, [w]here a cause of action is stated in the complaint, plaintiff merely needs to introduce evidence establishing a prima facie case for damages. (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 5:213.1, p. 5-56, citing Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 [trial court erred in applying preponderance of the evidence standard].) The relief granted to a plaintiff upon entry of a defendant's default cannot exceed the amount demanded in the complaint or, for personal injury cases where damages may not be stated in the complaint, the amount listed in the statement of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, subd. (a), 585, subd. (b).) The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness. ( Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co . (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) The statute insures that defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them. [Citation.] If a judgment other than that which is demanded is taken against him, [the defendant] has been deprived of his day in courta right to a hearing on the matter adjudicated. ( Id . at p. 493.) A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction if it awards damages in excess of the amount specified in the complaint or statement of damages. ( Id . at p. 494.) DISCUSSION Plaintiffs have submitted complete default judgment applications with all required information. The Court grants the applications. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Reina R. Garrett s application for default judgment filed on May 16, 2024. The Court awards Plaintiff Reina R. Garrett $519,520.02 against Defendant Daryl Scot Finley. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff William Q. Birkys application for default judgment filed on May 16, 2024. The Court awards Plaintiff William Q. Birky $250,325.26 against Defendant Daryl Scot Finley. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 22STCV31274 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Case Name: Hernandez v. Sams Club, et al. Case No.: 22STCV31274 Matter: Application for Pro Hac Vice Admission Moving Party: Defendant Sport Diversions, Inc. Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Application is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant Sport Diversions, Inc. seeks pro hac vice admission for Heath Sherman. The Application is granted because it meets all requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 9.40. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 23STCV12253 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23STCV12253 MOTIONS Demurrer to First Amended Complaint MOVING PARTY Defendant Kelly Furie OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Russell Furie MOTION Plaintiff Russell Furie (Plaintiff) and Defendant Kelly Furie (Defendant) were married. The Furie v. Furie (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2009, No. PD048281) ( Furie v. Furie ) case culminated in the parties divorce. In this action, Plaintiff has sued Defendant for financial abuse and neglect of a dependent adult and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs first amended complaint, and Plaintiff opposes the motion. ANALYSIS [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In ruling on a demurrer, the court must liberally construe[] the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. ( Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) Defendant contends this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims. In the instant action, Plaintiff alleges he has been disabled and entitled to benefits from the Social Security Administration since 2003, and Defendant has been Plaintiffs representative payee for purposes of Social Security Administration (SSA) benefits and their childrens SSA representative payee for derivative payments (First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 13-15); when Defendant filed for divorce in 2009, Defendant did not inform Plaintiff his child support obligations would entitle Plaintiff to collateral benefits in the form of child support credits that would reduce the amount Plaintiff otherwise owed in child support ( id. , ¶ 24); in November, 2018, Plaintiff became aware of his right to have child support credits linked to the SSA derivative payments and Defendant had enriched herself at his expense by not having done so ( id. , ¶ 31); and the court in Furie v. Furie ruled Defendants actions were improper and sanctioned Defendant ( id. , ¶ 32.) In opposing Defendants motion, Plaintiff cites Nicholson v. Fazeli (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1091, which is not on point. In that case, the Court of Appeal ruled the plaintiff could maintain a malicious prosecution action based on the trust defendants cross-complaint. While the cross-complaint was joined in a dissolution proceeding, the cross-complaint did not involve family law issues and was simply a civil action for possession of personal property. ( Id. , at pp. 1096-1098.) In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims stem directly from child support obligations, unlike the claims at issue in Nicholson v. Fazeli , which existed independently of the dissolution proceedings. Defendant also argues collateral estoppel bars Plaintiffs claims. Res judicata describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. [Citation] Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of action. ( Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co . (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897.) As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges the court in Furie v. Furie ruled Defendants actions were improper and sanctioned Defendant. As such, this court cannot relitigate Defendants alleged misconduct regarding Plaintiffs child support allegations. Plaintiffs reliance on Boblitt v. Boblitt (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 603 in opposition is also misplaced. In that case, the Court of Appeal held a prior dissolution action did not bar a spouses subsequent tort action against her former spouse for domestic violence, even though she had asserted domestic violence as grounds for spousal support. ( Id. , at p. 606.) The court reasoned the tort action involved the primary right to be free from personal injury, whereas the dissolution action involved the primary right to receive spousal support. ( Id. , at p. 612.) In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims involve one primary right: the right to the correct determination of child support obligations. Plaintiffs claims in this action do not involve a separate primary right. That Plaintiff alleges the facts could also constitute elder abuse does not change the primary right at issue. The court concludes Neal v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 22, 25-26 ( Neal ) is more in line with the facts and circumstances of this case. In Neal , the husband and wife in a family matter had reached a stipulated agreement concerning how much the husband owed in the family law proceeding. ( Id. , at p. 24.) When the wife filed a motion to set aside the stipulation because the husband had not paid anything, the husband filed a separate civil action against the wife and a collection agency. ( Ibid. ) In ruling on the wifes demurrer to the husbands complaint, the Court of Appeal held the husband was not entitled to pursue the civil action because the husbands claims were based on the wifes alleged failure to comply with the terms of the family law judgment, statements the wife made in the family law proceedings, and a dispute in the family law case concerning whether the husband had paid what he was obligated to pay based on the judgment in the family law matter. ( Id. , at p. 26.) The court reasoned the husbands civil action was a family law OSC with civil headings. ( Ibid. ) The court noted, family law cases should not be allowed to spill over into civil law . . . . Almost all events in family law litigation can be reframed as civil law actions if a litigant wants to be creative with various causes of action. ( Id. , at p. 25.) The same logic applies to the instant case - - claims stemming from a family law case belong in family law court, even if the claims could be pleaded as civil causes of action. In particular, like the claims in Neal , Plaintiffs allegations in this matter all stem from Defendants alleged misconduct in the family law case regarding Plaintiffs child support obligations. As such, this case belongs in a family law court. [1] CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs first amended complaint is sustained without leave to amend. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service concerning it. [1] The court notes Defendant raises the statute of limitations as a defense for the first time in her reply brief. However, the court cannot consider arguments raised for the first time in reply, as Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to respond to such contentions. (See In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1171.) In any event, given the courts ruling on the motion, it is not necessary to reach this issue.