Proof of Service: U.S. Bank Trust Company, National Association, As Trustee For Velocity Commercial Capital Loan Trust 2023-3 v. Sugar Hill 473 Llc., Biagio Belmonte, John Doe #1- #50 And Jane Doe #1- #50, The Last Two Names Being Fictitious, It Being Intended To Name All Other Parties Who May Have Some Interest In Or Lien Upon The Premises Described In The Complaint

Case Number: 23SMCV04355 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 205 HEARING DATE: July 15 , 2024 JUDGE/DEPT: Moreton / Beverly Hills, 205 CASE NAME: JGR Mar Vista v. Tropez Marcel Aubour , et al. CASE NUMBER: 2 3 SMCV0 4355 COMP. FILED: September 18 , 2023 PROCEEDINGS: REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT MOVING PARTY: JGR Mar Vista RESP ONDING PARTY: Tropez Marcel Aubour dba Atmosphere Café and Ouizman LLC BACKGROUND This case a rises from a breach of a contract for commercial space located at 12034 Venice Blvd, Los Angeles, California (the Premises) . Plaintiff JGR Mar Vistas predecessor in interest entered into a written commercial lease agreement (Lease) with Defendants Aubour Tropez Marcel and Ouizman , LLC . Plaintiff acquired the Premises and was assigned all rights and interest in the Lease under an Assignment and Assumption of Lease . Defendants failed to pay rent . Plaintiff caused Defendants to be served with a 3 Day Notice to Pay or Quit . Defendants failed to comply with the Notice , and Plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action . That action resulted in a judgment for possession only . After regaining possession, Plaintiff was able to re- lease the Premises to a new tenant . However, the new tenants rent is less than Defendants rent . There is a shortfall of $1,533.02 per month . On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging a single claim for breach of Lease . The Complaint seeks $149,817.00 in damages, interest at the rate of 10% per annum, and costs of suit . Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing Ouizman was served by substitute service on September 26, 2023, and Tropez was served by publication on April 12, 2024 . Defendants were obligated to respond . They did not do so . Plaintiff successfully requested the entry of Defendants default, which was entered by the Clerks Office on June 12, 2024 and June 13, 2024 . Plaintiff requested a default judgment on July 1, 2024 . Plaintiff served Defendants by mail with both the Request for Entry of Default and Request for Default Judgment . Defendants have not appeared. RELIEF REQUESTED Default judgment against Defendants for a total of $ 130,853.96 , which is comprised of: (1) $ 130, 044.55 , for damages, and (2) $ 809.41 , for costs. ANALYSIS Code Civ . Proc . § 585 sets forth the two options for obtaining a default judgment. First, where the plaintiff s complaint¿seeks compensatory damages only, in a sum certain which is readily ascertainable from the allegations of the complaint or statement of damages, the clerk may enter the default judgment for that amount. However, if the relief requested in the complaint is more complicated, consisting of either nonmonetary relief, or monetary relief in amounts which require either an accounting, additional evidence, or the exercise of judgment to ascertain , the plaintiff must request entry of judgment by the court. In such cases, the plaintiff must affirmatively establish his entitlement to the specific judgment requested .¿ ( Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 287.) Section 585 also allows for interest , costs and attorney fees, where otherwise allowed by law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 585(a).) Multiple specific documents are required, such as : (1) form CIV 100, (2) a brief summary of the case; (3) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (4) interest computations as necessary; (5) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under C ode C iv. P roc. § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (CRC Rule 3.1800.) Here, Plaintiff has properly complied with all the substantive and procedural requirements for a default judgment . Substantively, Plaintiff declares via declaration that there have been damages in the amount of $ 1 30,853.96 , which includes (1) back rent due of $111,648.31 and (2) the difference in Defendants rent and the new tenants rent of $18,396.24 . A memorandum of costs in the amount of $ 80 9.41 is set forth in Item 7 of the CIV-10 0 form . The evidence (including the accounting statement) is authenticated by declaration . Procedurally, Plaintiff properly served Defendant s more than 30 days prior to requesting entry of default and default judgment, correctly completed JC Form CIV-10 0 in a manner that would not void or put at issue the entry of default, provided a declaration of non-military status, requested dismissal of the fictitious defendants, requested damages in amounts supported by the filings and not in excess of the amount stated in the Complaint , and filed a proposed judgment (JUD-100). As default has already been entered and there has been no appearance or filing whatsoever from Defendant s , default judgment is appropriate here . CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff JGR Mar Vistas Request for Default Judgment is GRANTED as to Defendant s Tropez Marcel Aubour dba Atmosphere Café and Ouizman LLC . Default judgment in the amount of $ 130,853.96 is awarded in favor of Plaintiff.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 12, 2024 line 6. DEFENDANT BARCELINO CONTINENTAL CORP . is OFF CALENDAR. Dismissal on file. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 9, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT JUSTIN LUU, XIAO WU DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend to allege facts in support of each element of each cause of action as to the moving defendants. Plaintiff must also allege tender or facts supporting an exception from the tender rule. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23NWCV02916 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: C FABER v. 2018-1 IH BORROWER LP CASE NO.: 23NWCV02916 HEARING: 07/11/24 #5 I. Defendants 2018-1 IH BORROWER LP and INVITATION HOMES REALTY CALIFORNIA, INC.s Demurrer to Plaintiffs; Complaint is OVERRULED . II. Defendants 2018-1 IH BORROWER LP and INVITATION HOMES REALTY CALIFORNIA, INC.s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs; Complaint is DENIED . Opposing Party to give notice. This action was filed by Plaintiffs TIFFANY FABER; KAREEM KELLY; SARAI HILL; SHILOH HARRIS; and ELIJAHALI KELLY (collectively Plaintiffs) on September 14, 2023 concerning their tenancy at the Subject Property. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiffs allege that [t]hroughout Plaintiffs tenancies, the Subject Property lacked basic characteristics necessary for human habitation& and would be considered a substandard unit as described in Heath & Safety Code §17920.3. (Complaint ¶14.) The Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) Breach of Covenant/Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment/Warranty of Habitability; (2) Tortious Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability; (3) Negligence; (4) Violation of Unfair Business Practices; and (5) IIED Defendants 2018-1 IH BORROWER LP and INVITATION HOMES REALTY CALIFORNIA, INC. (collectively Defendants) generally demur to the fifth cause of action for IIED. Demurrer The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. ( Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1376.) The conduct alleged must be so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. ( Coleman v. Republic Indemnity Ins. Co . (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 403, 416.) Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs constantly and consistently complained to the Defendants& about& slum-housing and untenable conditions including: inadequate plumbing; inadequate ventilation; dampness and mold; health and safety code violations; unsanitary conditions; and the failure to maintain the premises in a good and safe condition. (Complaint ¶15.) Plaintiffs further allege that [d]ue to the untenable conditions at the Subject Property which Defendants have allowed to persist unabated, Plaintiffs have developed serious health issues&. Plaintiffs have all suffered from, and continue to suffer from severe emotional distress. (Id. ¶21.) The Complaint alleges that Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, and have caused Plaintiffs severe emotional distress. These allegations are sufficient to support claims for IIED at this stage in the litigation. The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages. A motion to strike lies either when (1) there is irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court. (CCP §436.) Punitive damages must be pled with specificity. Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendants conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious. ( Smith v. Sup. Ct . (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-42.) For corporations, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Cal. Civ. Code §3294(b).) In a personal injury action the notion of conscious disregard of the safety of others logically may be substituted for that of disregard of the rights of others& [C]onscious disregard of safety as an appropriate description of the animus malus which may justify an exemplary damage award when nondeliberate injury is alleged. ( G.D. Searle & Co. v. Sup. Ct . (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges that Defendants were aware of but failed to cure severe mold infestations and plumbing leaks for years, which caused physical harm to Plaintiffs. (See Complaint ¶¶17-22.) The motion to strike punitive damages is DENIED. The Complaint pleads sufficient facts to support a recovery of punitive damages at this stage in a litigation.

23CV02548 SHAW v. SHAW (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT PARTITION REFEREE The unopposed motion is granted. Mr. Singer will be appointed as the partition referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Case No. 19CV02702 RHOADS v. BECKLEY APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR SALE OF DWELLING/OSC FOR SALE OF DWELLING This application is continued as discussed below. The original application, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.740 through 704.850, was filed on January 26, 2023. For a variety of reasons, the application was continued and not ruled upon. When the application was filed, Mr. Beckley was without counsel and the court noted procedural as well as notice issues with the application, resulting in continuances. Mr. Beckley then retained counsel, Thornton Davidson, on June 29, 2023. Mr. Davidson sought to be relieved as counsel on May 8, 2024. The declaration in support of Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved noted the next court date as June 11, 2024. The court issued a tentative ruling the day before the June 11 hearing, tentatively granting the motion to be relieved and specifically continuing the application for sale of dwelling to allow defendant to either retain new counsel or participate in a pro per capacity. The parties were ordered to appear. At the June 11 hearing, attended by Mr. Davidson and plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Eschen, Page 1 of 2 the court granted Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved and set July 11, 2024 as the next hearing date. Mr. Beckley did not attend the June 11, 2024 hearing, nor is there evidence before the court that he was notified of the July 11, 2024 date. The order prepared by Mr. Davidson after the hearing and served on Mr. Beckley stated that the tentative ruling became the order of the court. While the order attached the tentative ruling, there is no mention in either the order or the tentative ruling of the July 11, 2024 hearing date for the application. The tentative ruling specified that the application hearing would be set at the next court date. The court will issue an order to show cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 704.770, subdivision (a). “After the judgment creditor has filed an application for an order for sale, the court sets a time and place for hearing and must order the judgment debtor to show cause why an order for sale should not be made in accordance with the application. The hearing must be set no later than 45 days after the application is filed, or such later time as the court orders on a showing of good cause.” (2 MB Practice Guide: CA Debt Collection 17.36 (2024).) After the OSC is set, Mr. Rhoads must serve on the judgment debtor, Mr. Beckley, a copy of the OSC, a copy of the application, and a copy of the notice of hearing in the form required by the Judicial Council. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.770, subd. (b).) Page 2 of 2

Case Number: 23STCV28088 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 39 May 20 July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV28088 MOTION : Motion for Attorneys Fees MOVING PARTY: Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC OPPOSING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC MOTIONS Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC (Plaintiffs) dismissed their claims against Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC (Defendant). Now, Defendant seeks attorney fees . Plaintiff opposes the motion. ANALYSIS The parties disagree as to whether this case is a contract or tort action. In a contract action, [w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed . . . , there shall be no prevailing party . . . . (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2).) Plaintiffs complaint in this action is for unlawful detainer. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint on February 21, 2024. As such, Plaintiffs argue Defendant is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to attorney fees. However, Plaintiffs claims do not constitute an action on the contract. [T]he unlawful detainer statute encompasses breach of lease (arguably contract-type matters) and holdover possession after expiration of the lease (arguably a noncontract issue). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp . (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074.) In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims are based on Defendants holdover possession and are, therefore, noncontractual. Plaintiffs claim Defendant failed to surrender the premises after Plaintiffs served Defendant with a notice to quit. The 30-day notice to quit attached to the complaint does not identify any breach of the lease, rather it informs Defendant the month-to-month tenancy is terminated, and Defendant is required to quit and surrender possession of the premises. (See Complaint, filed November 13, 2023, Exhibit 2.) As such, Plaintiffs claims did not sound in contract. Thus, the prohibition on an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1777 for the voluntary dismissal of the complaint does not apply. The court determines Defendant is a prevailing party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1077.) The prevailing party must seek an award of attorney fees through the filing of a noticed motion and bears the burden of proof to justify the amount sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5)(A).) Defendant seeks an award of $50,000 in attorney fees. Defendant has not, however, advanced any billing records to support this amount. The court considers a request for attorney fees based on careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 626, fn. 6, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Without such evidence, the court cannot grant Defendants request for attorney fees. Defendant cites Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, which is not on point. In that case, the Court of Appeal stated, An attorney's testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. ( Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.) The court also noted the attorneys declaration in that case included detailed evidence of hours spent, tasks concluded, and billing rates. ( Ibid. ) In the instant case, Defendant does not present any evidence of the number of hours Defendants attorneys billed on the matter, the specific nature of the services they provided, or the specific tasks that were completed. Defendant advances a declaration of its attorney, Navi Signh Dhillon (Dhillon) who simply states, I reviewed the billing records for this matter and I am confident that the number of hours billed are commensurate with the tasks performed. (Declaration of Navi Singh Dhillon, ¶ 7.) Dhillon does not aver to the number of hours he and/or any other attorney worked on this case nor the specific tasks that were performed. Although Dhillon suggests he has discounted the number of hours worked by as much as a half of the hours expended in the case and is, therefore, seeking only $50,000 for 50 hours of work at $1,000 an hour, that is not a sufficient accounting. Moreover, he has not established a billing rate of $1000 an hour in an unlawful detainer action is a reasonable hourly rate that is in keeping with the industry standard in Los Angeles. Defendant fails to present evidence to support the requested fees. Accordingly, the motion for attorney fees is denied without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.

WAGNER VS. LLOYD Case Number: CVCV21-0198602 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of counsel. At the last hearing on May 20, 2024, both parties represented that they were trying to obtain counsel. There was also a question of whether Plaintiff was acting in her capacity as a Trustee. An appearance by both parties is required on today’s calendar. Plaintiff should be prepared to address whether the property is held by a trust or as individuals.

JENSEN VS. WELLS FARGO REALTY SERVICES INC Case Number: 22CV-0200623 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. Defendant has been defaulted in this case. A default prove-up hearing has not occurred. At the prior hearing on April 8, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel appeared to inform the Court she was speaking with a bond company and to request a continuance. The matter was continued to today but no status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss the status of the case and, if appropriate, to re-set this mater for a default prove-up hearing.