Motion for Summary Adjudication in Lema, Luz Z vs Karadsheh, Yezen N| Trellis.Law

On February 27, 2023 a Motion,Ex Parte was filed involving a dispute between Lema, Luz Z, and Geico Casualty Company, Karadsheh, Yezen N, for Civil in the District Court of Hillsborough County.

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Filing # 198972140 E-Filed 05/22/2024 04:42:05 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION

LUZ Z. LEMA,

Plaintiff,
CASE NO: 23-CA-001727
vs.

YEZEN N. KARADSHEH AND
GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants.
___________________________________/

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY
AND ON DEFENDANT’S, YEZEN KARADSHEH, FIRST, SECOND, TENTH,
ELEVENTH, AND TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AS WELL AS
DEFENDANT’S, GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, FIRST AND SECOND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES WITH MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, LUZ Z. LEMA (“LEMA”), by and through her counsel of

record, and pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 hereby files this Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Liability and on Defendant’s, YEZEN KARADSHEH

(“KARADSHEH”), First, Second, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Affirmative Defenses, as well

as Defendant’s, GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY (“GEICO”), First and Second Affirmative

Defenses with Memorandum of Law in Support and in support states as follows:

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

On January 15, 2022, Defendant, KARADSHEH, while operating a 2020 Genesis G70,

northbound on US-19, in Pinellas County, Florida, took a left turn crossing 3 South-bound lanes.

KARADSHEH violated the south-bound right away of non-party, Robert Brady, who was

driving a 2021 Toyota 4Runner Southbound in the far right south-bound lane, causing a

collision. KARADSHEH’s vehicle then collided with the Plaintiff’s 2009 Mercedez C300, which

was lawfully stopped off US-19, waiting to enter. This violent collision caused permanent

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injuries to the Plaintiff, LEMA. A diagram of the crash from the Florida Highway Patrol crash

report is shown below1:

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiff is moving the Court for two findings: that KARADSHEH was negligent and that

Defendants’ liability defenses are improper. Defendant’s, KARADSHEH, First, Second, Tenth,

Eleventh, and Twelfth Affirmative Defenses, as well as Defendant’s, GEICO, First and Second

Affirmative Defenses pertain to the absence of liability of Defendants or Plaintiff’s comparative

negligence. See, DIN 18 and 28. As set forth, infra, the subject defenses are not factually

supported by the evidence and are merely conclusory in nature. Plaintiff is entitled to partial

summary judgment on liability against KARADSHEH given that there is no genuine dispute of

material fact disproving KARADSHEH’s negligence. Concurrently, Plaintiff should be granted

summary judgment on each identified defense because there is no evidence supporting their

1
Vehicle 1 is KARADSHEH’s 2020 Genesis G70. Vehicle 2 is Brady’s 2021 Toyota 4Runner.
Vehicle 3 is the Plaintiff’s 2009 Mercedez C300.

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application to the facts of this case.

III. THE LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (as amended) (e.s.). Rule 1.510 adopts the summary

judgment principles established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Electric

Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) and the overall body of case law

interpreting federal rule 56 (together, the “federal summary judgment standard”). In re:

Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No. SC20-1490 (April 29, 2021).

Summary judgment is designed to test the sufficiency of the evidence to determine if

there is sufficient evidence at issue to justify a trial or formal hearing on the issues raised in the

pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, the movant’s burden is met by demonstrating that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case or that the evidence does

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. Id. at 325; see also Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.510(c)(1)(B) as amended.2 Instead, the correct test for the existence of a genuine factual

dispute is whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

This standard is similar to the directed verdict standard. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251

2
Further, a party opposing summary judgment is no longer able to argue that “‘the existence of
any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial or
trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the ‘slightest doubt’ is
raised. [citation omitted]” In re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No.
SC20-1490 (April 29, 2021); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (a party opposing summary judgment
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).

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(noting that “the inquiry under each is the same”). Both standards focus on “whether the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Id. at 251-52.

Therefore, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt

that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). (e.s.).3

As to affirmative defenses, any defense that asserts a bare, unsubstantiated legal defenses

without factual support is therefore improperly asserted under Florida law. See, Zito v.

Washington Fed. S&L Ass’n. of Miami Beach, Inc., 318 So.2d 175, 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975);

Cady v. Chevy Chase S&L, Inc., 528 So.2d 136, 137-138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

IV. UNDISPUTED FACTS

The following facts are undisputed:

• On January 15, 2022, KARADSHEH operated a motor vehicle on US-19 near the

intersection of CR-39, Palm Harbor, Pinellas County, Florida, when he made a left

turn, as he pulled across the south-bound lanes of US-19, his vehicle was hit by a

southbound vehicle.

3
These changes to the Rule are intended to “improve the fairness and efficiency of Florida’s
civil justice system, to relieve parties from the expense and burden of meritless litigation, and to
save the work of juries for cases where there are real factual disputes that need resolution.” In
re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No. SC20-1490, p. 5 (Dec. 31, 2020).
Granting summary judgment where there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact,
thereby avoiding a trial or formal hearing, serves the interest of judicial economy and meets the
stated objection of the rules of civil procedure which is to secure the “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010; see also In re: Amendments to
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No. SC20-1490, pp. 5-6 (Dec. 31, 2020).

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See: Defendant’s, KARADSHEH, Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, DIN 28, paras. 7,

attached as Exhibit “A.” See: Defendant’s, KARADSHEH, deposition dated July 25, 2023,

Pages 16, line 22 through page 17, line 3, attached as Exhibit “B.”

• The collision happened in the furthest right, south-bound lane on US-19. See:

Exhibit B, Page 22, lines 22-25. See: Deposition of Robert Brady dated May 8, 2024, Page

27, lines 17-19, attached as Exhibit “C.” See Deposition of Luz Lema dated July 25, 2024,

Page 28, lines 13-15, attached as Exhibit “D.”

• There was no traffic light governing the area where the Defendant took his left-hand

turn. See Exhibit C, Page 33, Line 21, through Page 34, Line 1. See Exhibit D, page 86,

Lines 8-21.

• The traffic on South-Bound US-19 was busy as KARADSHEH crossed, and his view

may have been blocked by traffic. He could only see 6 or 7 feet to his right into the third

or fourth right hand lanes of US-19 South before he entered those lanes. See Exhibit B,

Page 50, line 15 through Page 51, line 11.

• Defendant, KARADSHEH, did not see Mr. Brady’s vehicle prior to the impact.

Exhibit B, Page 19, lines 3-5.

• Defendant, KARADSHEH, believes that Mr. Brady’s vehicle was traveling 20-30

miles per hour in a lane zoned for 45 miles per hour. See Exhibit A, Page 24, Lines 22-23.

• Plaintiff’s, LEMA, vehicle was stopped in the Tint World parking lot, when her

vehicle was impacted by KARADSHEH’s vehicle. See Exhibit D, page 86, Line 25

through Page 87, line 4.

• Defendant, KARADSHEH, does not believe Plaintiff, LEMA, caused or contributed

to the crash in any way. See Exhibit A, Page 36, Lines 8-10.

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• Defendant, KARADSHEH, does not believe road conditions caused or contributed

to the crash in any way. See Exhibit A, Page 38, Line 24, through Page 39, Line 1.

• Plaintiff had her seat belt on when the collision occurred, and Defendant,

KARADSHEH, does not have information to dispute the same. See Exhibit D, Page 31,

Lines 18-19.

• At the time of the subject crash, Plaintiff, LEMA was insured with

uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with Defendant GEICO CASULTY

COMPANY. See Defendant’s, GEICO CASULTY COMPANY, Answer and Affirmative

Defenses (BIN 17), as Exhibit E.

V. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

A. Negligence law

“Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care, which is the care that a reasonably careful

person would use under like circumstances. Negligence is doing something that a reasonably

careful person would not do under like circumstances or failing to do something that a

reasonably careful person would do under like circumstances.” 401.4, Florida Standard Civil

Jury Instructions. The legal elements of a negligence cause of action are duty, breach of duty,

causation and damages. Miller by and through Miller v. Foster, 686 So.2nd 783 (Fla. 4th DCA

1997). “The duty element of negligence focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably

crated a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general threat of harm to others.” McCain v. Florida

Power Corp., 593 So.2nd 500, 502 (Fla. 1992). The violation of a traffic statute may also be

considered evidence of negligence together with the other facts and circumstances of the

collision. 401.9, Florida Standard Civil Jury Instructions. (e.s.).

Given that the subject crash involved a left turn across the roadway by KARADSHEH, at

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least two (2) Florida traffic statutes apply to KARADSHEH’s actions for the purpose of

considering whether KARADSHEH violated either and whether a violation should be considered

evidence of negligence. Those statutes, summarized in pertinent part, are:

1. 316.122 Vehicle turning left.—The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left
within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, or vehicles lawfully
passing on the left of the turning vehicle, which is within the intersection or so close
thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard… ;

2. 316.1925 Careless driving.—
(1) Any person operating a vehicle upon the streets or highways within the state shall
drive the same in a careful and prudent manner, having regard for the width, grade,
curves, corners, traffic, and all other attendant circumstances, so as not to endanger the
life, limb, or property of any person

Florida common law also provides a guidepost to support summary judgment in this case.

In Walters v. McQueen, 292 So.2nd 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), the Defendant stopped at a stop sign

at an intersecting street where Plaintiff was approaching on his motorcycle. As the Plaintiff’s

motorcycle approached closer to the intersection, the Defendant pulled in front of the Plaintiff

and gave the Plaintiff no time to avoid a collision between the vehicles. Plaintiff filed a motion

for summary judgment as to liability. The lower court found that there was no genuine issue as to

any material fact relating to liability and that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the

negligence of Defendant in entering the intersection from a side street and not yielding the right

of way to appellee's vehicle, which was approaching the intersection, so as to constitute a hazard.

The court also found there was no obstruction to appellant's view. The trial judge entered

summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff as to the issue of liability. Id.

In supporting the trial court’s ruling, the First District referred to §316.123 (which does

not technically apply here but which is similar in purpose to §316.122, which does potentially

apply here) and noted that §316.123 requires that a driver that has stopped at an intersection

“shall yield the right of way to any vehicle…which is approaching so closely on said highway as

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to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when the driver is moving across or within the

intersection.” The First District compared this statute to the fact in that case that there was “no

evidence that [the Plaintiff] could have reasonably avoided the accident” in upholding the trial

court’s ruling.

In London v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 689 So.2nd 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), Plaintiff

testified that as he was driving, he neared an intersection where he saw a car approach the stop

sign for the intersecting street. According to the plaintiff, the defendant, who was the driver of

that car, ran the stop sign, causing plaintiff's car to strike the left rear of defendant's car. The

plaintiff claimed that he was driving within the speed limit and that he had no time to avoid the

collision. The defendant's version of the accident differed from that of the plaintiff in that the

defendant testified he had stopped at the intersection before pulling out and the defendant could

not say how far away the plaintiff was when he first saw him. There was no other evidence as to

the negligence of either party.

Plaintiff there sought a directed verdict on the defendant’s negligence, which was denied

and after which the jury found no negligence on behalf of the Defendant. In reviewing the facts

above, the 4th DCA held In London that the Plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict should have

been granted, noting that “there was no way that this accident could have occurred without

defendant being negligent.” Id. at 425.

VI. Application of the facts to the law

The following is a description of how the collision unfolded from Plaintiff’s perspective:

Q.· ·So in your own words, can you tell us how this accident
occurred?

A.· ·I stopped to see if I could make a right. I looked to the left and I saw a
dark truck coming on the lane that I was going to take, so I waited. All of
a sudden, I see the darker car crossing the other lanes and the truck hit the
car.

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See Exhibit D (LEMA Deposition), Page 27, Lines 18-25

“Q:· ·In your own words, describe what happened in the crash.·

A:· ·I was coming to make a left turn. All the car stopped, waived me
through. I pull across the lanes, and someone then some was coming down.
I guess there as a fourth lane, a right only turn lane or something and then
he hit the back of my car.

See Exhibit A (KARADSHEH Deposition), Page 15, Line 22 through
Page 16, Line 3.

“Q.· ·If you could go back, what would you have done differently?

A.· ·I would have went further down that road to the next turn, which I
think was a light, and just would have just done it from there.

Q.· ·Why would you have done that??

A.· ·Because just making a left turn across three, four lanes probably - - I
could have avoided all this nonsense. Let’s just put it that way.

See Exhibit A (KARADSHEH Deposition), Page 15, Line 22 through
Page 16, Line 3.

The foregoing testimony dovetails with the facts present in Walter and London; there is

certainly evidence here that KARADSHEH violated the Plaintiff’s right of way in violation of

§316.122 and §316.1925 and simply no evidence that Plaintiff could have done anything to avoid

the crash. Again, KARADSHEH has provided no basis to create a genuine dispute here, nor does

any exist from any other source. A tractor trailer turned in front of a motorcycle on a roadway

and caused a collision. Florida statutes, common law and common sense each dictate that

KARADSHEH’s actions were undeniably negligent and any alternative conclusion could only be

based on speculation or conjecture.

As to Defendants’ affirmative defenses, and under the new rule, where a defendant

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asserts affirmative defenses, summary judgment may be properly granted where the plaintiff

asserts that the defendant is unable to submit the evidence necessary to establish the defense(s)

or plaintiff establishes the legal insufficiency of the defense(s). In re: Amendments to Florida

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No. SC20-1490, pp. 5-6 (Apr. 27, 2021) (a moving party that

does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial can obtain summary judgment without disproving

the nonmovant’s case); Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 915 F. 3d 987, 997 (5th Cir.

2019) (“a movant for summary judgment need not set forth evidence when the nonmovant bears

the burden of persuasion at trial”); Bedford v. Doe, 880 F. 3d 993, 996-97 (8th Cir. 2018) (“if the

nonmoving party must prove X to prevail [at trial], the moving party at summary judgment can

either produce evidence that X is not so or point out that the nonmoving party lacks the evidence

to prove X”).

In this matter, Defendant’s, YEZEN KARADSHEH (“KARADSHEH”), First, Second,

Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Affirmative Defenses, as well as Defendant’s, GEICO

CASUALTY COMPANY (“GEICO”), First and Second Affirmative Defenses pertain to the

absence of liability of Defendants or Plaintiff’s comparative negligence, yet there is no evidence

that supports any of these defenses. As such, the subject defenses are inappropriate and Plaintiff

is subject to summary judgment in her favor as to each.

CONCLUSION

The evidence in this case is straightforward; a truck turned in front of a motorcycle at an

intersection and caused a collision. The driver of the truck was aware of Plaintiff’s approaching

motorcycle but mistakenly assumed that there was enough time to get across the intersection and

cannot genuinely identify anything that Plaintiff did or did not do to contribute to the collision,

nor is there any other independent evidence pointing to the contribution of Plaintiff to the

collision. Therefore, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the Defendants.

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As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability against

KARADSHEH and GEICO in addition to partial summary judgment finding that Defendant’s,

YEZEN KARADSHEH (“KARADSHEH”), First, Second, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth

Affirmative Defenses, as well as Defendant’s, GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY (“GEICO”),

First and Second Affirmative Defenses are improperly asserted and unsupported by the evidence.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, LUZ LEMA, respectfully requests that this Court grant her

motion for summary judgment and enter an Order finding that Defendant, YEZEN

KARADSHEH, was the sole proximate cause of the January 15, 2022 collision and that both

YEZEN KARADSHEH and GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, are legally liable therefore, in

addition to finding that Defendant’s, YEZEN KARADSHEH (“KARADSHEH”), First, Second,

Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Affirmative Defenses, as well as Defendant’s, GEICO

CASUALTY COMPANY (“GEICO”), First and Second Affirmative Defenses are improperly

asserted and unsupported by the evidence, together with such other and further findings and

relief that are appropriate under the circumstances.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been provided via
electronic mail to Kevin M. Griffith, Law Office of Ellen H. Ehrenpreis, 4300 W. Cypress St.,
Suite 900, Tampa, FL 33607, tampageico@geico.com
Kenneth E. Amos, Jr., Esq., Miles H. Hickamn, Esq., Chadwick A. Manausa, Esq., Vernis &
Bowling of St. Petersburg, P.A., 696 1st Avenue N. 1st Floof, Saint Petersburg, FL 33701,
stpfiling@florida-law.com;MHickman@florida-law.com; David R. Fuller, Esq., The Fran
Haasch Law Group, 1275 Nebraska Ave., Palm Harbor, FL 34683, david@lawfran.com this
22nd day of May, 2024.

/s/ Adam D. Rieth
Stephen A. Barnes, 005177
Adam D. Rieth, 91986
BARNES TRIAL GROUP
1104 N. Howard Avenue, 3rd FL
Tampa, FL 33607
Telephone: (813) 251-0777
Facsimile: (813) 254-1829
btgservice@barnestrialgroup.com

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Attorneys for Plaintiff

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Exhibit A

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Filing # 169738068 E-Filed 03/27/2023 04:44:47 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA, CIVIL DIVISION

LUZ Z. LEMA,
Case No.: 23-CA-001727
Plaintiff,

YEZEN N. KARADSHEH AND
GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendants.
_____________________________________/

DEFENDANT YEZEN N. KARADSHEH’S ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Defendant, YEZEN N. KARADSHEH, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby

responds to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and states as follows:

1. Admitted only that this is a case that purports to meet the $50,000.00 in controversy

necessary for jurisdictional purposes and denied for any other reasons.

2. Without knowledge, therefore, denied.

3. Admitted.

4. Without knowledge, therefore, denied.

COUNT I

5. Defendant reasserts and incorporate all responses to the allegations above as though

fully set forth herein.

6. Admitted.

7. Admitted.

8. Denied.

LAW OFFICES
VERNIS & BOWLING OF St. Petersburg, P.A.

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9. Denied.

WHEREFORE, Defendant, YEZEN N. KARADSHEH, hereby requests judgment be

entered in his favor and that Defendant be awarded a judgment for his taxable costs incurred in

this litigation, and for any such further relief as available under applicable law that the Court deems

fair and just.

COUNT II

10-17. This cause of action is not directed at the responding Defendant; therefore, no

response is required. To the extent that it is directed at the responding Defendant, then denied.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

By way of separate and distinct Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant

states as follows:

First Affirmative Defense

Defendant states that Plaintiff is guilty of negligence, which negligence constituted either

the sole proximate cause of the damages described in the Complaint, or in the alternative

contributed thereto, and Plaintiff is therefore either barred of recovery, or in the alternative, any

damages awarded to Plaintiff against Defendant should be reduced pursuant to the Rule of

Comparative Negligence.

Second Affirmative Defense

Defendant states that in the event Plaintiff is awarded damages in this action, the court

should enter judgment against Defendant on the basis of each party’s percentage of fault and not

on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability, to the extent and in the manner provided

by Section 768.81, Florida Statutes.

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Third Affirmative Defense

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any, that have contributed to the alleged

injuries.

Fourth Affirmative Defense

Defendant affirmatively alleges exemption from damages in accordance with section

627.737, of the Florida Statutes.

Fifth Affirmative Defense

Defendant is entitled to a set-off for any benefits that have been or should have been, paid

to Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s alleged medical providers under personal injury protection coverage.

Sixth Affirmative Defense

The damages alleged in the Complaint are barred, or in the alternative, are subject to

reduction to the extent that such injuries and damages were compensated or are subject to

compensation by “collateral sources” as that term is used in section 768.76, Florida Statutes.

Seventh Affirmative Defense

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s injuries are due to a superseding or supervening cause, or

otherwise not causally related to the accident in question, or to the alleged negligence of this

Defendant.

Eighth Affirmative Defense

To the extent Plaintiff’s damages or injuries, if any, were not caused or related to the subject

accident, but were pre-existing or caused by other events and/or accidents that occurred before or

after the accident in question, Plaintiff should not be entitled to recover for said damages or

injuries.

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Ninth Affirmative Defense

Defendant avers that the medical bills that Plaintiff has allegedly incurred as a result of the

subject accident have been paid, either in whole or in part, by health insurance, Medicaid, and/or

other insurers, or Plaintiff has otherwise received the benefit of contractual discounts or write-offs

directly from their providers such that their past medical expenses have been partially or wholly

satisfied. To the extent that Plaintiff did not directly owe any past medical expenses, Defendant is

not liable for those medical expenses.

Tenth Affirmative Defense

The vehicle involved in the subject accident may have been equipped with a fully

operational seatbelt, and Plaintiff may not have been using the seatbelt at the time of the accident,

and such failure to use the seatbelt may have contributed to Plaintiffs’ alleged damages.

Eleventh Affirmative Defense

Defendant affirmatively alleges that the negligence causing the Plaintiff’s injuries, if any,

was the result of negligence practiced by third parties who are not before this Court. Accordingly,

this defense and the Defendant is entitled to the benefits of the Fabré/Messmer doctrine in any

verdict submitted to the jury.

Twelfth Affirmative Defense

The Defendant affirmatively alleges that the Plaintiff’s vehicle suddenly and arbitrarily

stopped in a position it could not have reasonably expected, contributing as a cause to this accident.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendant demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right before a jury.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that the foregoing document has been furnished by electronic transmission to
all counsel of record via Florida Courts E-Filing Portal pursuant to Florida Supreme Court
Administrative Order AOS13-49, this 27th day of March 2023.

/s/ Chadwick A. Manausa
KENNETH E. AMOS, JR., ESQUIRE
Florida Bar No.: 717983
MILES H. HICKMAN, ESQUIRE
Florida Bar No.: 1002465
CHADWICK A. MANAUSA, ESQUIRE
Florida Bar No.: 1039266
VERNIS & BOWLING OF ST. PETERSBURG, P.A.
696 1st Avenue N., 1st Floor
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
Tel: (727) 443-3377
Fax: (727) 443-6828
Attorneys for the Defendants
DESIGNATED E-MAIL ADDRESS:
stpfiling@florida-law.com
MHickman@florida-law.com

KEA/MHH/CAM

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Exhibit B

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Luz Z. Lema v. Yezen N. Karadsheh
Yezen N. Karadsheh and GEICO July 25, 2023
Page 1 Page 2
1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 1 APPEARANCES:
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY
2 CIVIL DIVISION 2 ADAM RIETH, ESQUIRE
Barnes Trial Group
3 3 1104 North Howard Avenue
Luz Z. Lema, Tampa, Florida 33607
4 4 813.251.0777
Plaintiff, Attorney for Plaintiff
5 5
vs. Case No. SKYLER TRETTIS, ESQUIRE
6 23-CA-001727 6 Vernis & Bowling
Yezen N. Karadsheh and GEICO 696 1st Avenue North, Suite 100
7 Casualty Company, 7 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
727.443.3377
8 Defendants. 8 Attorney for Defendant Karadsheh
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ /
9 9 KEVIN GRIFFITH, ESQUIRE
Law Office of Ellen H. Eherenpreis
10 DEPOSITION OF: YEZEN N. KARADSHEH 10 4300 West Cypress Street, Suite 900
Tampa, Florida 33607
11 DATE: JULY 25, 2023 11 813.373.7800
Attorney for Defendant GEICO
12 TIME: 1:01 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. 12
13 PLACE: Via Zoom Videoconference 13
I N D E X
14 14 PAGE NO.
PURSUANT TO: Notice by counsel for
15 Plaintiff for purposes of 15 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RIETH 3
discovery, use at trial CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. GRIFFITH 51
16 or such other purposes 16 CERTIFICATE OF OATH 53
as are permitted under REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 54
17 the Florida Rules 17 READ AND SIGN LETTER 55
of Civil Procedure ERRATA SHEET 56
18 18
BEFORE: KIM E. GEORGE, RPR
19 Notary Public, State of 19 PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NUMBER 1 - Photograph 21
Florida at Large
20 20
21 Pages 1 to 56 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25

Page 3 Page 4

1 YEZEN N. KARADSHEH 1 A. Yep.
2 the witness herein, being first duly sworn on oath, was 2 Q. Okay. We're doing this via Zoom so sometimes
3 examined and deposed as follows: 3 there's a lag, and it can get conversational at times. So
4 THE WITNESS: Correct. 4 you may predict what I'm going to be asking the sentence
5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 5 and start answering, and then we'll be talking over each
6 BY MR. RIETH: 6 other, which will, again, make the court reporter's job
7 Q. Hello, sir. My name is Adam Rieth. I represent 7 very difficult. So we need to speak one at a time.
8 the plaintiff in this case, Mr. Luz Lema. I'm going to be 8 Is that fair?
9 asking you a series of questions today. 9 A. Yep. That works.
10 Have you ever been deposed before? 10 Q. If you get confused by any of my questions at
11 A. No. 11 any time, please state that you're confused so I can
12 Q. Okay. I'm going to go over what are called some 12 rephrase my question. Otherwise, if you provide an
13 ground rules. Your attorney may have already told you 13 answer, I'll assume you understood the question.
14 these, but I want to make sure we're on the same page 14 Is that fair?
15 today. 15 A. Yep. That's fair.
16 I'm going to ask you questions today. I'm going 16 Q. Today is not meant to be a torture session or go
17 to ask for a clear verbal response, so that's a yes, a no, 17 on too long. If you need a break at any time, let me
18 or a verbal explanation of your answer. That's as opposed 18 know, and we'll take a break. It's not an endurance
19 to the shaking or nodding of the head. That's because 19 contest. The only caveat to is if I've asked a question,
20 Ms. George, who you just talked to, is typing everything 20 I would ask that you answer the pending question before we
21 down, and nonresponsive answers such as shaking or nodding 21 take a break.
22 of the head or hun-uhs or huh-uhs aren't clear. So if you 22 Is that fair?
23 do that, I'll say is that a yes? Is that a no? I'm not 23 A. That's fair.
24 trying to be rude. I just need a clear answer. 24 Q. Okay. And today none of my questions are meant
25 Does that make sense? 25 to elicit anything that you and your attorney talked about

Min-U-Script® Carolyn Louden & Associates, Inc. (1) Pages 1 - 4

5/22/2024 4:42 PM Electronically Filed: Hillsborough County/13th Judicial Circuit Page 21
Luz Z. Lema v. Yezen N. Karadsheh
Yezen N. Karadsheh and GEICO July 25, 2023
Page 5 Page 6

1 between each other. That's protected by the 1 Q. Have you ever gone by any other names or
2 attorney/client privilege. 2 aliases?
3 So if you think I'm asking for that, I'm not. 3 A. No.
4 Don't tell me what you two talked about. Okay? 4 Q. What's your current address?
5 A. Okay. 5 A.
6 Q. Keeping that in mind, did you do anything to 6 Q. Is that a house or apartment?
7 prepare for today's deposition? 7 A. House.
8 A. I mean, I just talked with Colton for five 8 Q. How long have you lived there?
9 minutes. 9 A. Three years, two years.
10 Q. Okay. 10 Q. Do you live there with anyone?
11 A. And he told me to -- 11 A. My wife and kid.
12 Q. Okay. Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. 12 Q. What's your wife's name?
13 So you talked with Colton for five minutes. 13 A. Denise.
14 That's all I need to know. 14 Q. Denise?
15 Did you Zoom with him prior to that or meet with 15 A. Yep.
16 him prior to that? 16 Q. Same last name?
17 A. No. 17 A. Tavarez.
18 Q. Okay. Did you look at any documents, 18 Q. Can you spell that?
19 photographs? 19 A. T-A-V-A-R-E-Z.
20 A. Nope. 20 Q. And does she work?
21 Q. Okay. What's your name for the record? 21 A. Yep.
22 A. Yezen. 22 Q. What does she do?
23 Q. Can you spell your first and last name? 23 A. She's a pharmacist.
24 A. First name is Y-E-Z-E-N, last name is 24 Q. Okay. And you said you had a son; is that
25 K-A-R

Case Info

Judge

Gabbard, Jennifer. X Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

May 22, 2024

Case Filing Date

February 27, 2023

County

Parties

AMOS , KENNETH E., Jr Attorney for the Defendant
BRIDWELL , MAEGAN FAY Attorney for the Defendant
Geico Casualty Company Defendant
GRIFFITH , KEVIN MICHAEL Attorney for the Defendant
Karadsheh, Yezen N Defendant
Lema, Luz Z Plaintiff
RIETH , ADAM DAVID Attorney for the Plaintiff
David Fuller Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Stephen Barnes Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DAVID ROBERTS Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Skyler Trettis Attorneys for Defendants
Jeffrey Rothwell Attorney
Mia Tolliver Attorneys for Defendants
Miles Hickman Attorneys for Defendants
Victor Berg Attorney
Kenneth Ehrlich Attorney
John Trujillo Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Motion,Ex Parte: Lema, Luz Z vs Karadsheh, Yezen N

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