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1 LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO, APC
David L. Cello (SBN: 305559)
2 601 Carolina Street
Vallejo, CA 94590
3 Tel.: 707-646-9160
Fax: 707-638-0427
4 Email: info@cellolaw.com
5 Attorneys for Plaintiff(s)
STEPHEN JUVE
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 COUNTY OF NAPA
9 STEPHEN JUVE, an individual; Case No. __________________________
10 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES;
Plaintiff(s),
11 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL:
vs. 1. Negligence/Reckless Conduct;
12
2. Strict Liability;
13 THERESA JOHNSTON, an individual;
14 MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, a business
entity form unknown; MARIA ARTLE, an JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
15 individual; and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE;
[UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE]
16 Defendant(s).
17
18 COMES NOW, plaintiff who, by his attorney LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO,
19 APC, complains of defendants, and alleges, upon information and belief, as follows:
20 i.
21 THE PARTIES
22 1. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was, and still is, a
23 resident of the State of California, County of Napa.
24 2. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant THERESA JOHNSTON was, and
25 still is, a resident of the State of California, County of Napa.
26 3. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE is
27 a business entity form unknown, and a business concern operating in, and doing substantial
28 business in, the State of California, County of Solano.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 1 OF 17
1 4. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant MARIA ARTLE was, and still is, a
2 resident of the State of California, County of Solano.
3 5. The true names and/or capacities whether individual, corporate, associate or
4 otherwise, of defendants DOES 1-50 INCLUSIVE are unknown to plaintiffs who therefore sue
5 said defendants by such fictitious names. Said DOE defendants may include, but do not
6 necessarily include, individuals, businesses, corporations, partnerships, associations, joint
7 ventures, trusts, L.P.s, LLCs, LLPs, defendants that are governmental in nature, as well as
8 product manufacturers, medical providers, professionals, contractors, estates, administrators of
9 estates, trusts and/or all other types of entities and/or individuals, as discovery in this matter
10 may reveal. Regardless, plaintiff(s) allege that each of the defendant(s) designated herein as a
11 DOE is legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to,
12 and legally caused injury and damages proximately thereby to plaintiff(s) as herein alleged. At
13 least one DOE defendant is an individual defendant and resident of the State of California, and
14 County wherein this action is filed.
15 6. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiffs will show, according to proof, that
16 defendants were the agents, servants, employees, associates, partners, in a conspiracy with, co-
17 conspirators of, and/or joint venturers of, each other, and were as such, acting within the scope
18 and authority of said agency, employment, association, conspiracy and/or joint venture, and
19 with the permission and consent of their co-defendants and/or that all of said acts were
20 subsequently performed with the knowledge, acquiescence, ratification, and consent of the
21 respective principals, and the benefits thereof were accepted by said principals, and that
22 defendants also conducted themselves through acts and/or omissions on their part, so as to cause
23 all others to believe the remaining defendants to be their agents.
24 7. At all times hereinafter mentioned, all of the acts and conduct hereinafter
25 described of each and every corporate defendant was duly authorized, ordered and/or directed
26 by the respective defendant's corporate employees, and the officers and management-level
27 employees of said corporate defendant and that said corporate defendant participated in the acts
28 and conduct of their said employees, agents and representatives and each of them, and upon
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 2 OF 17
1 completion of the aforesaid acts and conduct of said corporate employees, agents and
2 representatives, the defendant corporation, individually and collectively, ratified, accepted the
3 benefits of, condoned, lauded, acquiesced, approved and consented to each and every one of the
4 said acts and conduct of the aforesaid corporate employees, managing agents, directors,
5 executives, and representatives.
6 8. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendants retained the ability to exercise,
7 and in fact exercised, substantial control, whether contractual, actual, implied or otherwise, over
8 the means and manner in which the remaining defendants conducted their business and at all
9 times hereinafter mentioned.
10 9. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff(s) will show, according to proof, that
11 defendants were, and remain, the alter egos, successors, and/or successors in interest, of the
12 remaining defendants.
13 10. As to "alter ego liability" defendants, it is alleged, upon information and belief,
14 that as to those defendants, that at all times there existed such a unity of interest and ownership
15 among those defendants such that any separateness ceased to exist, that one was a mere shell or
16 instrumentality through which the other carried out their business, and that each defendant
17 exercised such complete control over the other, and so dominated it, to achieve individual goals
18 and so ignored business formalities that any separateness was merely a fiction, and did not in
19 fact exist, and should be deemed not to exist, and as such, if acts are alleged as against one
20 defendant in this complaint, it is alleged that that defendant acted for itself, as well as on behalf
21 of its alter egos. Among other things, those defendants did one or more of the following acts
22 supporting its alter ego liability: (1) commingled corporate funds; (2) failed to observe corporate
23 formalities including maintaining minutes and failure to contribute sufficient capital; (3)
24 commingled funds or other assets; (4) used corporate funds for something other than corporate
25 uses; (5) failed to maintain adequate corporate records; (6) deliberately confused the records of
26 the separate entities; (7) had the same directors and officers of the two or more corporations; (8)
27 used the same office or business location; (9) utilized the same employees and/or attorney; (10)
28 failed to adequately capitalize the corporation; (11) used the corporation as a mere shell,
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 3 OF 17
1 instrumentality or conduit for a single venture; (12) failed to maintain an arm's length
2 relationship among related entities; and/or (13) used a corporate entity to procure labor, services
3 or merchandise for another entity. Moreover, injustice would result but for the finding of alter
4 ego liability as to these defendants, and, as such, this Court should pierce the corporate veil.
5 Further, since alter ego applies here, a corporation's shareholders are treated as "partners, and
6 are held jointly and severally liable for its debts and plaintiffs note that ownership of even one
7 share is sufficient to impose alter ego liability, and it is thus alleged, upon information and
8 belief, that various defendants as alter egos, are also active shareholders in the remaining
9 defendants, influenced and governed the remaining corporate defendants and as such can, and
10 should, be held liable as an alter ego of each and every remaining defendant.
11 11. As to those defendants liable under theories of "successor liability and/or
12 successor in interest liability," it is alleged that, as to those defendants, one or more of the
13 following factors exists: (1) there is a mere continuation on the part of defendants; (2) a
14 common identity of directors, officer and shareholders from predecessor corporations to
15 successor corporations; (3) that assets were purchased; (4) that the defendants are successors
16 and successors in interest of both assets and liabilities of the others; and (5) that, among other
17 things, one or more of the following facts exist and/or are in play, particularly given various
18 documented mergers on record with the State of California Office of the Secretary of State: (a) a
19 continuation of the enterprise, i.e., that key people of the predecessor are involved in the new
20 entity, the same name, location, facilities or product is used, the assets were bought by the new
21 entity and the operations are the same; (b) the seller dissolved or ceased doing business after the
22 sale; (c) the purchaser assumed the liabilities and obligations ordinarily necessary to continue
23 doing business; and/or (d) the new entity holds itself out as an effective continuation of the
24 seller. Moreover, to the extent this case involves products liability, the "product line" theory is
25 implicated and focuses on the similarity of the finished manufactured product by the new
26 company and the old entity and, thus, plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege,
27 that (1) most or all of the assets of various defendants were acquired by other defendants which,
28 upon information and belief, leaves nothing but a corporate shell of the predecessor company
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 4 OF 17
1 defendants; (2) that the new entity holds itself out to the public as a continuation of the
2 predecessor by producing some of the product line under a similar name; and (3) the successor
3 company is benefiting from the goodwill (i.e., reputation) of the predecessor and, as such, there
4 is just cause to hold each defendant liable as a successor and/or as a successor in interest to
5 remaining defendants regardless of the date of an entity's creation or subsequent corporate
6 transfers.
7 ii.
8 VENUE & JURISDICTION
9 12. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of this complaint, which
10 involves serious personal injuries sustained in California as a result of defendants' wrongdoing.
11 This Court also has jurisdiction over each defendant, as the occurrences alleged herein
12 happened in California. Venue is proper in this Court because at least one defendant is
13 domiciled in the County in which this action is filed and/or because some, or all, of the
14 violations of law which form the basis for this action occurred in the County in which this
15 action is filed.
16 iii.
17 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
18 13. On or about December 18, 2023, at or about the corner of Donaldson Way and
19 Eucalyptus Drive, American Canyon, Napa County, California 94503 (hereinafter
20 “LOCATION”), plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was viciously attacked by a Pit Bull dog (hereinafter
21 “DOG”). The DOG was known to defendants THERESA JOHNSTON, MARTINA ANIMAL
22 RESCUE, MARIA ARTLE, and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE, to be vicious, but this fact was
23 concealed from said plaintiff. In the attack, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE’s finger was bitten off
24 and he was left severely scarred and disfigured. He also sustained other injuries including severe
25 emotional distress, pain and suffering, and incurred, and will incur, medical and other bills and
26 economic losses. Defendant THERESA JOHNSTON, MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE,
27 MARIA ARTLE, and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE, were on notice that the DOG was vicious
28 and prone to attacking, but consciously and deliberately chose to place plaintiffs in harm's way
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 5 OF 17
1 and in the zone of danger; in contrast, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE, on public property was not in
2 any manner negligent and assumed no risks. Defendants THERESA JOHNSTON, MARTINA
3 ANIMAL RESCUE, MARIA ARTLE, and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE, negligently kept,
4 harbored, sheltered, owned, managed, and controlled a dangerous DOG, and were well aware of
5 its past, which most probably included abuse and/or confinement to kennels with other abused
6 dogs, that escalated the DOG's bad temperament - all facts concealed from the public and
7 plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE. Accordingly, these defendants have long placed the public at risk of
8 the dangerous dogs that in connection with their business endeavors they continue to harbor and
9 expose to the public. All of the defendants were working together in a joint enterprise,
10 partnership and conspiracy, sharing funds, ownership, profits, losses, and gains, both monetary
11 and otherwise, in connection with the collection of dangerous dogs, including the one that
12 attacked plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE. All defendants exposed the public to the risks of such
13 animals, making them liable for negligence, violation of statute, premises liability,
14 misrepresentation, and otherwise. All defendants co-owned, kept, harbored, managed,
15 controlled and presented the aforementioned DOG. Had plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE known of
16 the danger of the DOG concealed by the defendants' activities, he would not have come into
17 close proximity of the DOG. In such an event, the incident would not have happened. It also
18 appears that there may be a lack of compliance with licensing and other rules applicable to the
19 facility or place where the DOG was kept, harbored, or sheltered as discovery may show, which
20 also upon information and belief, caused or contributed to the dangerous conditions involving
21 the dangerous DOG that bit STEPHEN JUVE at the LOCATION. This suit seeks both
22 compensatory and punitive damages for the plaintiff in excess of the jurisdiction of all lower
23 courts and is thus filed as an unlimited civil case. A trial by jury is demanded on all causes of
24 action.
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27
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 6 OF 17
1 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
2 BY PLAINTIFF STEPHEN JUVE
3 AS AGAINST
4 THERESA JOHNSTON, an individual; MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, a business entity
5 form unknown; MARIA ARTLE, an individual; and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE
6 FOR NEGLIGENCE/RECKLESS CONDUCT
7 14. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation
8 set forth in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more
9 fully set forth at length herein.
10 15. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all relevant times
11 hereinafter mentioned, defendants controlled, maintained, harbored, trained, supervised, owned,
12 and/or kept a certain DOG.
13 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the LOCATION was
14 and is, public property in the County of Napa, in the State of California.
15 17. On or about December 18, 2023, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was on public
16 property, the LOCATION, when he was attacked and bitten by defendants' aforementioned
17 DOG, sustaining very severe injuries, including but not limited to, severe trauma to his hand
18 and body, lacerations, scarring, disfigurement and emotional distress.
19 18. Upon information and belief, at the time of the incident, the aforementioned
20 DOG was controlled, maintained, harbored, owned, and/or otherwise kept by defendants and
21 each of them in a negligent, careless and reckless manner so as to proximately cause the
22 aforementioned incident.
23 19. Upon information and belief, the DOG was possessed of dangerous propensities
24 likely to cause injury to persons, which defendants were, or had they exercised reasonable
25 diligence, should have been, well aware of, and defendants should never have allowed their dog
26 off leash. Nevertheless, defendants allowed the DOG off leash and un-muzzled at the time in
27 question.
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 7 OF 17
1 20. Upon information and belief, as such, defendants and each of them were in
2 violation of law, including, inter alia, Napa County Code §§ 6.04.190, 6.16.010 and/or et seq.
3 21. These codes provide as follows:
4 Napa County Code § 6.04.190. DOGS AT LARGE PROHIBITED
5 It is unlawful for any person who owns, harbors or keeps, or who has possession,
6 charge, care, custody or control of any dog over the age of four months in the county to
7 permit the dog to run at large upon any public street, highway or other place, or to
8 permit such dog to run upon the property of another without the consent of the property
9 owner. Within thirty days of a second violation of this section, the animal shall be
10 micro-chipped and spayed/neutered.
11 Napa County Code § 6.16. POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND VICIOUS
12 ANIMALS
13 Napa County Code § 6.16.010. PURPOSE OF PROVISIONS–SCOPE.
14 A. The maintenance of animals which are potentially dangerous or vicious and
15 involve a threat to property and the health and safety of those on streets, sidewalks and
16 private property where the animals are not maintained constitutes a serious hazard
17 within the county. The increasing tendency to maintain animals, especially dogs, which
18 by virtue of breeding or training have a propensity to attack others, compounds the
19 hazard. Specific injuries to persons and animals resulting from attacks by such animals
20 illustrates the need for regulation.
21 B. Every owner of an animal is held strictly accountable for the exercise of such
22 control over the animal as necessary to insure that the animal does not destroy the
23 property of other persons or injure human beings or other animals who are not on the
24 premises where the animal is maintained. Such strict accountability is imposed whether
25 or not the damage or injury results from the negligence or other fault of the owner, and
26 regardless of the degree of precaution or control exercised by the owner.
27 C. Further, within the county there are potentially dangerous and vicious animals
28 which constitute a public nuisance which should be abated. The provisions of this
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 8 OF 17
1 chapter provide an expedited, alternative administrative procedure by which animals
2 found to be potentially dangerous or vicious may be abated and their owners or keepers
3 appropriately penalized and otherwise held responsible for injury or damage caused by
4 their animals. This chapter is intended to supplement rather than supplant any other
5 remedy available either under state law or county ordinance, including but not limited to
6 Section 6.04.250 of this code, as specifically allowed by California Civil Code Section
7 3342.5(e), and Food and Agriculture Sections 31601 et seq.
8 D. This chapter does not apply to commercial kennels, veterinarians, or
9 to dogs utilized by the sheriff, police department, or any law enforcement officer in the
10 performance of police work.
11 22. Additional codes believed applicable provide as follows:
12 Napa County Code § 6.04.010. DEFINITIONS
13 "Kennel" means (1) any facility where the commercial business of breeding,
14 buying, selling or boarding dogs or cats is conducted, or (2) any noncommercial facility
15 utilized for animal rescue operations for more than four dogs or cats.
16 Napa County Code § 6.08.030. KENNEL PERMIT—REQUIRED WHEN—
17 PLAN REVIEW CONDITIONS.
18 A. No person shall, without first obtaining a permit therefor from the animal
19 shelter, operate a dog kennel in the county. The term "dog kennel" shall not include a
20 veterinary hospital.
21 B. No person shall construct or remodel a kennel without first submitting the
22 plans therefor to the animal shelter to determine their compliance with Section 6.08.110
23 of this chapter, and with regulations adopted pursuant to Section 6.08.010 hereof.
24 C. Before seeking a permit from the animal shelter in accordance with subsection
25 (A) of this section or submitting plans in accordance with subsection (B) of this section,
26 a person who wishes to operate, construct, or remodel a kennel, shall consult with the
27 planning and building divisions of the planning, building and environmental services
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 9 OF 17
1 department and the public works department, and obtain any additional permits and
2 review as may be required by the county.
3 Napa County Code § 6.08.110. OPERATION OF KENNELS.
4 A. All kennels or other places where dogs are kept in the county for breeding,
5 training, treatment, sale or other purposes shall be so constructed to prevent dogs
6 confined therein from running at large off the premises where the kennel is maintained,
7 and shall be maintained and operated and constructed in a sanitary and proper manner so
8 that the same will not become a nuisance to the neighborhood thereof.
9 B. No dog shall at any time be taken from the premises whereon such kennel is
10 operated unless the dog has a county license tag attached, and the owner, the owner's
11 agents or employees, who shall run or take dogs off the premises of the kennel, or permit
12 them to be run or taken therefrom without a license tag attached, shall be guilty of a
13 misdemeanor.
14 Cal Food & Agr Code § 17006
15 Animals that are irremediably suffering from a serious illness or severe injury
16 shall not be held for owner redemption or adoption. Except as provided in subdivision
17 (b) of Section 31108 and subdivision (c) of Section 31752, newborn animals that need
18 maternal care and have been impounded without their mothers may be euthanized
19 without being held for owner redemption or adoption.
20 Cal Food & Agr Code § 31108
21 (a) (I) The required holding period for a stray dog impounded pursuant to this
22 division shall be six business days, not including the day of impoundment, except as
23 follows: (A) If the public or private shelter has made the dog available for owner
24 redemption on one weekday evening until at least 7 p.m. or one weekend day, the
25 holding period shall be four business days, not including the day of impoundment. (B) If
26 the public or private shelter has fewer than three full-time employees or is not open
27 during all regular weekday business hours, and if it has established a procedure to enable
28 owners to reclaim their dogs by appointment at a mutually agreeable time when the
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 10 OF 17
1 public or private shelter would otherwise be closed, the holding period shall be four
2 business days, not including the day of impoundment. (2) Except as provided in Section
3 17006, stray dogs shall be held for owner redemption during the first three days of the
4 holding period, not including the day of impoundment, and shall be available for owner
5 redemption or adoption for the remainder of the holding period. (b) (1) Except as
6 provided in Section 17006, any stray dog that is impounded pursuant to this division
7 shall, before the euthanasia of that animal, be released to a nonprofit, as defined in
8 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, animal rescue or adoption organization
9 if requested by the organization before the scheduled euthanasia of that animal. The
10 public or private shelter may enter into cooperative agreements with any animal rescue
11 or adoption organization. In addition to any required spay or neuter deposit, the public or
12 private shelter, at its discretion, may assess a fee, not to exceed the standard adoption
13 fee, for animals adopted or released. (2) A puppy under eight weeks of age that is
14 reasonably believed to be unowned and is impounded in a public or private shelter may,
15 before the euthanasia of that animal, be made immediately available for release to a
16 nonprofit, as defined in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, animal rescue
17 or adoption organization if requested by the organization. (c) During the holding period
18 required by this section and before the adoption or euthanasia of dog impounded
19 pursuant to this division, a public or private shelter shall scan the dog for a microchip
20 that identifies the owner of that dog and shall make reasonable efforts to contact the
21 owner and notify him or her that his or her dog is impounded and is available for
22 redemption. (d) As used in this division, a "business day" includes any day that a public
23 or private shelter is open to the public for at least four hours, excluding state holidays.
24 Cal Food & Agr Code § 31754
25 (a) Except as provided in Section 17006, any animal relinquished by the
26 purported owner that is of a species impounded by public or private shelters shall be
27 held for the same holding periods, with the same requirements of care, applicable to
28 stray dogs and cats in Section 31108 and 31752, and shall be available for owner
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 11 OF 17
1 redemption or adoption for the entire holding period. (b) Notwithstanding subdivision
2 (a), kittens or puppies relinquished by the purported owner, or brought in by any other
3 person with authority to relinquish them, to public or private shelters, may be available
4 immediately for adoption. (c) This section shall become operative on July 1, 2002.
5 Cal Food & Agr Code § 30503
6 (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), no public animal control
7 agency or shelter, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals shelter, humane
8 society shelter, or rescue group shall sell or give away to a new owner any dog that has
9 not been spayed or neutered. (2) For the purposes of this section a “rescue group” is
10 a for-profit or not-for-profit entity, or a collaboration of individuals with at least one of
11 its purposes being the sale or placement of dogs that have been removed from a public
12 animal control agency or shelter, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals shelter,
13 or humane shelter or that have been previously owned by any person other than the
14 original breeder of that dog. (b)(1) If a veterinarian licensed to practice veterinary
15 medicine in this state certifies that a dog is too sick or injured to be spayed or neutered,
16 or that it would otherwise be detrimental to the health of the dog to be spayed or
17 neutered, the adopter or purchaser shall pay the public animal control agency or shelter,
18 society for the prevention of cruelty to animals shelter, humane society shelter, or rescue
19 group a deposit of not less than forty dollars ($40), and not more than seventy-five
20 dollars ($75). (2) The entity shall establish the amount of the deposit at the level it
21 determines is necessary to encourage the spaying or neutering of dogs. (3) The deposit
22 shall be temporary, and shall only be retained until the dog is healthy enough to be
23 spayed or neutered, as certified by a veterinarian licensed to practice veterinary medicine
24 in this state. (4) The dog shall be spayed or neutered within 14 business days of that
25 certification. (5) The adopter or purchaser shall obtain written proof of spaying or
26 neutering from the veterinarian performing the operation. (6) If the adopter or purchaser
27 presents proof of spaying or neutering to the entity from which the dog was obtained
28 within 30 business days of obtaining the proof, the adopter or purchaser shall receive a
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 12 OF 17
1 full refund of the deposit. (c) Public animal control agencies or shelters, society for the
2 prevention of cruelty to animals shelters, humane society shelters, and rescue groups
3 may enter into cooperative agreements with each other and with veterinarians in lieu of
4 requiring spaying and neutering deposits to carry out this section. (d) Any funds from
5 unclaimed deposits made pursuant to this section, as it read on January 1, 1999, and any
6 funds from deposits that are unclaimed after January 1, 2000, may be expended only for
7 programs to spay or neuter dogs and cats, including agreements with a society for the
8 prevention of cruelty to animals or a humane society or licensed veterinarian to operate a
9 program to spay or neuter dogs and cats. (e) This section only applies to a county that
10 has a population exceeding 100,000 persons as of January 1, 2000, and to cities within
11 that county.
12 23. Upon information and belief, one or more of the foregoing statues applies and
13 was violated by defendants as the proof may show.
14 24. Upon information and belief, defendants and each of them had also been
15 informed and/or otherwise knew that their dog was a problem animal, and should not be
16 allowed in the presence of guests, and should have been restrained, but defendants carelessly
17 and negligently allowed the DOG in a common area with guests and allowed the DOG to be off
18 leash and unrestrained, and as such permitted a dangerous premises condition for guests such as
19 plaintiff.
20 25. In acting and in failing to act as aforementioned, the defendants acted in a
21 negligent, careless, negligent and improper manner, and that defendants were otherwise careless
22 and negligent in the instance. In addition, it is alleged that each and every defendant which will
23 be found to have controlled, maintained, trained, owned, inspected, cared for, and/or harbored
24 the aforementioned DOG was/were also otherwise careless and negligent in the instance.
25 26. Moreover, as aforestated, defendants' DOG was possessed of dangerous
26 propensities likely to cause injury to persons, which defendants were, or had they exercised
27 reasonable diligence, should have been, well aware of, and defendants should never have
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 13 OF 17
1 allowed their DOG off leash. Nevertheless, defendants allowed the DOG off leash and un-
2 muzzled at the time in question.
3 27. In contrast to defendants' negligent behavior, at the aforesaid said time and place,
4 plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any
5 way contribute to, or cause the incident and/or injuries as described hereinafter.
6 28. As a proximate result of said acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and
7 each of them, plaintiff was hurt and physically injured, suffering deep lacerations, muscle and
8 tissue damage, resulting in nerve damage, leaving him with continuing discomfort and
9 disability, and that plaintiff also incurred medical bills, loss of earnings/earnings capacity, and
10 experienced pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other associated charges and damages,
11 and will continue to sustain such damages in the future.
12 29. In addition, since defendants acted in an intentional, reckless, malicious,
13 despicable, wanton manner, and with conscious disregard for the safety of the public, including
14 plaintiff, placing profits before safety, defendants, and each of them, acted with malice, fraud,
15 and oppression as those terms are defined by the pertinent statutory and case law, including
16 Civil Code Section 3294 and as such plaintiff is entitled to punitive and/or exemplary damages
17 as against defendants, and each of them, in order to, among other things, punish the defendants
18 and deter the defendants and others from pursuing similar conduct in the future. To the extent a
19 corporation, and as to defendant MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, each said corporate
20 defendant, via its officers and managers and managing agents, including but not limited to,
21 defendant MARIA ARTLE, had advance notice of the unfitness of its employees and the
22 dangers of the aforementioned DOG as well as the DOG's vicious propensities and past history
23 together with all other facts alleged hereinabove, both prior to and subsequent to the incident
24 and that said corporate defendants via their managing agents and officers ratified, approved, and
25 accepted the benefits of the wrongful conduct by, among other things, failing to take any
26 remedial action against those employees and managing agents responsible for the behavior
27 following notice of all the relevant factors and following their investigation of the incident
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 14 OF 17
1 which resulted in these corporate defendants acquiring proof and complete knowledge of what
2 had occurred and why.
3 30. By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiff has been damaged in a sum which
4 exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction,
5 and is entitled to compensatory damages and to punitive and/or exemplary damages from
6 defendants and each of them, which will be shown according to proof at time of trial.
7 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
8 BY PLAINTIFF STEPHEN JUVE
9 AS AGAINST
10 THERESA JOHNSTON, an individual; MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, a business entity
11 form unknown; MARIA ARTLE, an individual; and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE
12 FOR STRICT LIABILITY
13 31. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation
14 set forth in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more
15 fully set forth at length herein.
16 32. California Civil Code § 3342 states:
17 "(a) The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten
18 by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property
19 of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's
20 knowledge of such viciousness. A person is lawfully upon the private property of such
21 owner within the meaning of this section when he is on such property in the performance
22 of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal
23 regulations of the United States, or when he is on such property upon the invitation,
24 express or implied, of the owner."
25 33. In this instance, the defendants co-owned a DOG which bit, attacked, and
26 otherwise caused damages to plaintiff while plaintiff was lawfully in a public place when the
27 vicious attack occurred.
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 15 OF 17
1 34. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was acting with due
2 caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to, or cause the incident and/or
3 injuries as described herein.
4 35. As a proximate result of said acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and
5 each of them, plaintiff was hurt and physically injured, suffering deep lacerations, muscle and
6 tissue damage, resulting in nerve damage and disfigurement, leaving him with continuing
7 discomfort and disability, and that plaintiff also incurred medical bills, loss of earnings/earnings
8 capacity, and experienced pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other associated charges
9 and damages, and will continue to sustain such damages in the future.
10 36. In addition, since defendants acted in an intentional, reckless, malicious,
11 despicable, wanton manner, and with conscious disregard for the safety of the public, including
12 plaintiff, placing profits before safety, defendants, and each of them, acted with malice, fraud,
13 and oppression as those terms are defined by the pertinent statutory and case law, including
14 Civil Code Section 3294 and as such plaintiff is entitled to punitive and/or exemplary damages
15 as against defendants, and each of them, in order to, among other things, punish the defendants
16 and deter the defendants and others from pursuing similar conduct in the future. To the extent a
17 corporation, and as to defendant MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, each said corporate
18 defendant, via its officers and managers and managing agents, including but not limited to,
19 defendant MARIA ARTLE, had advance notice of the unfitness of its employees and the
20 dangers of the aforementioned DOG as well as the DOG's vicious propensities and past history
21 together with all other facts alleged hereinabove, both prior to and subsequent to the incident
22 and that said corporate defendants via their managing agents and officers ratified, approved, and
23 accepted the benefits of the wrongful conduct by, among other things, failing to take any
24 remedial action against those employees and managing agents responsible for the behavior
25 following notice of all the relevant factors and following their investigation of the incident
26 which resulted in these corporate defendants acquiring proof and complete knowledge of what
27 had occurred and why.
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 16 OF 17
1 37. By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiff has been damaged in a sum which
2 exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction,
3 and is entitled to compensatory damages and to punitive and/or exemplary damages from
4 defendants and each of them, which will be shown according to proof at time of trial.
5 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
6 WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as against each and every defendant, jointly
7 and severally, on each and every cause of action, according to proof, as follows:
8 1. General “non-economic” damages according to proof;
9 2. Special “economic” damages, according to proof;
10 3. Punitive and/or exemplary damages;
11 4. Medical bills, past and future, according to proof;
12 5. Loss of earnings/earnings capacity, past and future, according to proof;
13 6. Property damage, according to proof;
14 7. Costs of suit and interest;
15 8. Such other and further relief as the court deems proper.
16 April 23, 2024
Dated: ________________ LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO, APC
17
18 _____________________________
19 DAVID L. CELLO
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff(s)
20 STEPHEN JUVE
21 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
22 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues and causes of action so triable.
23 April 23, 2024
Dated: ________________ LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO, APC
24
25
_____________________________
26 DAVID L. CELLO
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff(s)
27 STEPHEN JUVE
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 17 OF 17
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1 LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO, APC David L. Cello (SBN: 305559) 2 601 Carolina Street Vallejo, CA 94590 3 Tel.: 707-646-9160 Fax: 707-638-0427 4 Email: info@cellolaw.com 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff(s) STEPHEN JUVE 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 COUNTY OF NAPA 9 STEPHEN JUVE, an individual; Case No. __________________________ 10 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; Plaintiff(s), 11 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL: vs. 1. Negligence/Reckless Conduct; 12 2. Strict Liability; 13 THERESA JOHNSTON, an individual; 14 MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, a business entity form unknown; MARIA ARTLE, an JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 15 individual; and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE; [UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE] 16 Defendant(s). 17 18 COMES NOW, plaintiff who, by his attorney LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO, 19 APC, complains of defendants, and alleges, upon information and belief, as follows: 20 i. 21 THE PARTIES 22 1. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was, and still is, a 23 resident of the State of California, County of Napa. 24 2. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant THERESA JOHNSTON was, and 25 still is, a resident of the State of California, County of Napa. 26 3. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE is 27 a business entity form unknown, and a business concern operating in, and doing substantial 28 business in, the State of California, County of Solano. COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 1 OF 17 1 4. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendant MARIA ARTLE was, and still is, a 2 resident of the State of California, County of Solano. 3 5. The true names and/or capacities whether individual, corporate, associate or 4 otherwise, of defendants DOES 1-50 INCLUSIVE are unknown to plaintiffs who therefore sue 5 said defendants by such fictitious names. Said DOE defendants may include, but do not 6 necessarily include, individuals, businesses, corporations, partnerships, associations, joint 7 ventures, trusts, L.P.s, LLCs, LLPs, defendants that are governmental in nature, as well as 8 product manufacturers, medical providers, professionals, contractors, estates, administrators of 9 estates, trusts and/or all other types of entities and/or individuals, as discovery in this matter 10 may reveal. Regardless, plaintiff(s) allege that each of the defendant(s) designated herein as a 11 DOE is legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to, 12 and legally caused injury and damages proximately thereby to plaintiff(s) as herein alleged. At 13 least one DOE defendant is an individual defendant and resident of the State of California, and 14 County wherein this action is filed. 15 6. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiffs will show, according to proof, that 16 defendants were the agents, servants, employees, associates, partners, in a conspiracy with, co- 17 conspirators of, and/or joint venturers of, each other, and were as such, acting within the scope 18 and authority of said agency, employment, association, conspiracy and/or joint venture, and 19 with the permission and consent of their co-defendants and/or that all of said acts were 20 subsequently performed with the knowledge, acquiescence, ratification, and consent of the 21 respective principals, and the benefits thereof were accepted by said principals, and that 22 defendants also conducted themselves through acts and/or omissions on their part, so as to cause 23 all others to believe the remaining defendants to be their agents. 24 7. At all times hereinafter mentioned, all of the acts and conduct hereinafter 25 described of each and every corporate defendant was duly authorized, ordered and/or directed 26 by the respective defendant's corporate employees, and the officers and management-level 27 employees of said corporate defendant and that said corporate defendant participated in the acts 28 and conduct of their said employees, agents and representatives and each of them, and upon COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 2 OF 17 1 completion of the aforesaid acts and conduct of said corporate employees, agents and 2 representatives, the defendant corporation, individually and collectively, ratified, accepted the 3 benefits of, condoned, lauded, acquiesced, approved and consented to each and every one of the 4 said acts and conduct of the aforesaid corporate employees, managing agents, directors, 5 executives, and representatives. 6 8. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendants retained the ability to exercise, 7 and in fact exercised, substantial control, whether contractual, actual, implied or otherwise, over 8 the means and manner in which the remaining defendants conducted their business and at all 9 times hereinafter mentioned. 10 9. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff(s) will show, according to proof, that 11 defendants were, and remain, the alter egos, successors, and/or successors in interest, of the 12 remaining defendants. 13 10. As to "alter ego liability" defendants, it is alleged, upon information and belief, 14 that as to those defendants, that at all times there existed such a unity of interest and ownership 15 among those defendants such that any separateness ceased to exist, that one was a mere shell or 16 instrumentality through which the other carried out their business, and that each defendant 17 exercised such complete control over the other, and so dominated it, to achieve individual goals 18 and so ignored business formalities that any separateness was merely a fiction, and did not in 19 fact exist, and should be deemed not to exist, and as such, if acts are alleged as against one 20 defendant in this complaint, it is alleged that that defendant acted for itself, as well as on behalf 21 of its alter egos. Among other things, those defendants did one or more of the following acts 22 supporting its alter ego liability: (1) commingled corporate funds; (2) failed to observe corporate 23 formalities including maintaining minutes and failure to contribute sufficient capital; (3) 24 commingled funds or other assets; (4) used corporate funds for something other than corporate 25 uses; (5) failed to maintain adequate corporate records; (6) deliberately confused the records of 26 the separate entities; (7) had the same directors and officers of the two or more corporations; (8) 27 used the same office or business location; (9) utilized the same employees and/or attorney; (10) 28 failed to adequately capitalize the corporation; (11) used the corporation as a mere shell, COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 3 OF 17 1 instrumentality or conduit for a single venture; (12) failed to maintain an arm's length 2 relationship among related entities; and/or (13) used a corporate entity to procure labor, services 3 or merchandise for another entity. Moreover, injustice would result but for the finding of alter 4 ego liability as to these defendants, and, as such, this Court should pierce the corporate veil. 5 Further, since alter ego applies here, a corporation's shareholders are treated as "partners, and 6 are held jointly and severally liable for its debts and plaintiffs note that ownership of even one 7 share is sufficient to impose alter ego liability, and it is thus alleged, upon information and 8 belief, that various defendants as alter egos, are also active shareholders in the remaining 9 defendants, influenced and governed the remaining corporate defendants and as such can, and 10 should, be held liable as an alter ego of each and every remaining defendant. 11 11. As to those defendants liable under theories of "successor liability and/or 12 successor in interest liability," it is alleged that, as to those defendants, one or more of the 13 following factors exists: (1) there is a mere continuation on the part of defendants; (2) a 14 common identity of directors, officer and shareholders from predecessor corporations to 15 successor corporations; (3) that assets were purchased; (4) that the defendants are successors 16 and successors in interest of both assets and liabilities of the others; and (5) that, among other 17 things, one or more of the following facts exist and/or are in play, particularly given various 18 documented mergers on record with the State of California Office of the Secretary of State: (a) a 19 continuation of the enterprise, i.e., that key people of the predecessor are involved in the new 20 entity, the same name, location, facilities or product is used, the assets were bought by the new 21 entity and the operations are the same; (b) the seller dissolved or ceased doing business after the 22 sale; (c) the purchaser assumed the liabilities and obligations ordinarily necessary to continue 23 doing business; and/or (d) the new entity holds itself out as an effective continuation of the 24 seller. Moreover, to the extent this case involves products liability, the "product line" theory is 25 implicated and focuses on the similarity of the finished manufactured product by the new 26 company and the old entity and, thus, plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, 27 that (1) most or all of the assets of various defendants were acquired by other defendants which, 28 upon information and belief, leaves nothing but a corporate shell of the predecessor company COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 4 OF 17 1 defendants; (2) that the new entity holds itself out to the public as a continuation of the 2 predecessor by producing some of the product line under a similar name; and (3) the successor 3 company is benefiting from the goodwill (i.e., reputation) of the predecessor and, as such, there 4 is just cause to hold each defendant liable as a successor and/or as a successor in interest to 5 remaining defendants regardless of the date of an entity's creation or subsequent corporate 6 transfers. 7 ii. 8 VENUE & JURISDICTION 9 12. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of this complaint, which 10 involves serious personal injuries sustained in California as a result of defendants' wrongdoing. 11 This Court also has jurisdiction over each defendant, as the occurrences alleged herein 12 happened in California. Venue is proper in this Court because at least one defendant is 13 domiciled in the County in which this action is filed and/or because some, or all, of the 14 violations of law which form the basis for this action occurred in the County in which this 15 action is filed. 16 iii. 17 GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 18 13. On or about December 18, 2023, at or about the corner of Donaldson Way and 19 Eucalyptus Drive, American Canyon, Napa County, California 94503 (hereinafter 20 “LOCATION”), plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was viciously attacked by a Pit Bull dog (hereinafter 21 “DOG”). The DOG was known to defendants THERESA JOHNSTON, MARTINA ANIMAL 22 RESCUE, MARIA ARTLE, and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE, to be vicious, but this fact was 23 concealed from said plaintiff. In the attack, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE’s finger was bitten off 24 and he was left severely scarred and disfigured. He also sustained other injuries including severe 25 emotional distress, pain and suffering, and incurred, and will incur, medical and other bills and 26 economic losses. Defendant THERESA JOHNSTON, MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, 27 MARIA ARTLE, and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE, were on notice that the DOG was vicious 28 and prone to attacking, but consciously and deliberately chose to place plaintiffs in harm's way COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 5 OF 17 1 and in the zone of danger; in contrast, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE, on public property was not in 2 any manner negligent and assumed no risks. Defendants THERESA JOHNSTON, MARTINA 3 ANIMAL RESCUE, MARIA ARTLE, and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE, negligently kept, 4 harbored, sheltered, owned, managed, and controlled a dangerous DOG, and were well aware of 5 its past, which most probably included abuse and/or confinement to kennels with other abused 6 dogs, that escalated the DOG's bad temperament - all facts concealed from the public and 7 plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE. Accordingly, these defendants have long placed the public at risk of 8 the dangerous dogs that in connection with their business endeavors they continue to harbor and 9 expose to the public. All of the defendants were working together in a joint enterprise, 10 partnership and conspiracy, sharing funds, ownership, profits, losses, and gains, both monetary 11 and otherwise, in connection with the collection of dangerous dogs, including the one that 12 attacked plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE. All defendants exposed the public to the risks of such 13 animals, making them liable for negligence, violation of statute, premises liability, 14 misrepresentation, and otherwise. All defendants co-owned, kept, harbored, managed, 15 controlled and presented the aforementioned DOG. Had plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE known of 16 the danger of the DOG concealed by the defendants' activities, he would not have come into 17 close proximity of the DOG. In such an event, the incident would not have happened. It also 18 appears that there may be a lack of compliance with licensing and other rules applicable to the 19 facility or place where the DOG was kept, harbored, or sheltered as discovery may show, which 20 also upon information and belief, caused or contributed to the dangerous conditions involving 21 the dangerous DOG that bit STEPHEN JUVE at the LOCATION. This suit seeks both 22 compensatory and punitive damages for the plaintiff in excess of the jurisdiction of all lower 23 courts and is thus filed as an unlimited civil case. A trial by jury is demanded on all causes of 24 action. 25 // // 26 27 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 6 OF 17 1 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 2 BY PLAINTIFF STEPHEN JUVE 3 AS AGAINST 4 THERESA JOHNSTON, an individual; MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, a business entity 5 form unknown; MARIA ARTLE, an individual; and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE 6 FOR NEGLIGENCE/RECKLESS CONDUCT 7 14. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation 8 set forth in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more 9 fully set forth at length herein. 10 15. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all relevant times 11 hereinafter mentioned, defendants controlled, maintained, harbored, trained, supervised, owned, 12 and/or kept a certain DOG. 13 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the LOCATION was 14 and is, public property in the County of Napa, in the State of California. 15 17. On or about December 18, 2023, plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was on public 16 property, the LOCATION, when he was attacked and bitten by defendants' aforementioned 17 DOG, sustaining very severe injuries, including but not limited to, severe trauma to his hand 18 and body, lacerations, scarring, disfigurement and emotional distress. 19 18. Upon information and belief, at the time of the incident, the aforementioned 20 DOG was controlled, maintained, harbored, owned, and/or otherwise kept by defendants and 21 each of them in a negligent, careless and reckless manner so as to proximately cause the 22 aforementioned incident. 23 19. Upon information and belief, the DOG was possessed of dangerous propensities 24 likely to cause injury to persons, which defendants were, or had they exercised reasonable 25 diligence, should have been, well aware of, and defendants should never have allowed their dog 26 off leash. Nevertheless, defendants allowed the DOG off leash and un-muzzled at the time in 27 question. 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 7 OF 17 1 20. Upon information and belief, as such, defendants and each of them were in 2 violation of law, including, inter alia, Napa County Code §§ 6.04.190, 6.16.010 and/or et seq. 3 21. These codes provide as follows: 4 Napa County Code § 6.04.190. DOGS AT LARGE PROHIBITED 5 It is unlawful for any person who owns, harbors or keeps, or who has possession, 6 charge, care, custody or control of any dog over the age of four months in the county to 7 permit the dog to run at large upon any public street, highway or other place, or to 8 permit such dog to run upon the property of another without the consent of the property 9 owner. Within thirty days of a second violation of this section, the animal shall be 10 micro-chipped and spayed/neutered. 11 Napa County Code § 6.16. POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND VICIOUS 12 ANIMALS 13 Napa County Code § 6.16.010. PURPOSE OF PROVISIONS–SCOPE. 14 A. The maintenance of animals which are potentially dangerous or vicious and 15 involve a threat to property and the health and safety of those on streets, sidewalks and 16 private property where the animals are not maintained constitutes a serious hazard 17 within the county. The increasing tendency to maintain animals, especially dogs, which 18 by virtue of breeding or training have a propensity to attack others, compounds the 19 hazard. Specific injuries to persons and animals resulting from attacks by such animals 20 illustrates the need for regulation. 21 B. Every owner of an animal is held strictly accountable for the exercise of such 22 control over the animal as necessary to insure that the animal does not destroy the 23 property of other persons or injure human beings or other animals who are not on the 24 premises where the animal is maintained. Such strict accountability is imposed whether 25 or not the damage or injury results from the negligence or other fault of the owner, and 26 regardless of the degree of precaution or control exercised by the owner. 27 C. Further, within the county there are potentially dangerous and vicious animals 28 which constitute a public nuisance which should be abated. The provisions of this COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 8 OF 17 1 chapter provide an expedited, alternative administrative procedure by which animals 2 found to be potentially dangerous or vicious may be abated and their owners or keepers 3 appropriately penalized and otherwise held responsible for injury or damage caused by 4 their animals. This chapter is intended to supplement rather than supplant any other 5 remedy available either under state law or county ordinance, including but not limited to 6 Section 6.04.250 of this code, as specifically allowed by California Civil Code Section 7 3342.5(e), and Food and Agriculture Sections 31601 et seq. 8 D. This chapter does not apply to commercial kennels, veterinarians, or 9 to dogs utilized by the sheriff, police department, or any law enforcement officer in the 10 performance of police work. 11 22. Additional codes believed applicable provide as follows: 12 Napa County Code § 6.04.010. DEFINITIONS 13 "Kennel" means (1) any facility where the commercial business of breeding, 14 buying, selling or boarding dogs or cats is conducted, or (2) any noncommercial facility 15 utilized for animal rescue operations for more than four dogs or cats. 16 Napa County Code § 6.08.030. KENNEL PERMIT—REQUIRED WHEN— 17 PLAN REVIEW CONDITIONS. 18 A. No person shall, without first obtaining a permit therefor from the animal 19 shelter, operate a dog kennel in the county. The term "dog kennel" shall not include a 20 veterinary hospital. 21 B. No person shall construct or remodel a kennel without first submitting the 22 plans therefor to the animal shelter to determine their compliance with Section 6.08.110 23 of this chapter, and with regulations adopted pursuant to Section 6.08.010 hereof. 24 C. Before seeking a permit from the animal shelter in accordance with subsection 25 (A) of this section or submitting plans in accordance with subsection (B) of this section, 26 a person who wishes to operate, construct, or remodel a kennel, shall consult with the 27 planning and building divisions of the planning, building and environmental services 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 9 OF 17 1 department and the public works department, and obtain any additional permits and 2 review as may be required by the county. 3 Napa County Code § 6.08.110. OPERATION OF KENNELS. 4 A. All kennels or other places where dogs are kept in the county for breeding, 5 training, treatment, sale or other purposes shall be so constructed to prevent dogs 6 confined therein from running at large off the premises where the kennel is maintained, 7 and shall be maintained and operated and constructed in a sanitary and proper manner so 8 that the same will not become a nuisance to the neighborhood thereof. 9 B. No dog shall at any time be taken from the premises whereon such kennel is 10 operated unless the dog has a county license tag attached, and the owner, the owner's 11 agents or employees, who shall run or take dogs off the premises of the kennel, or permit 12 them to be run or taken therefrom without a license tag attached, shall be guilty of a 13 misdemeanor. 14 Cal Food & Agr Code § 17006 15 Animals that are irremediably suffering from a serious illness or severe injury 16 shall not be held for owner redemption or adoption. Except as provided in subdivision 17 (b) of Section 31108 and subdivision (c) of Section 31752, newborn animals that need 18 maternal care and have been impounded without their mothers may be euthanized 19 without being held for owner redemption or adoption. 20 Cal Food & Agr Code § 31108 21 (a) (I) The required holding period for a stray dog impounded pursuant to this 22 division shall be six business days, not including the day of impoundment, except as 23 follows: (A) If the public or private shelter has made the dog available for owner 24 redemption on one weekday evening until at least 7 p.m. or one weekend day, the 25 holding period shall be four business days, not including the day of impoundment. (B) If 26 the public or private shelter has fewer than three full-time employees or is not open 27 during all regular weekday business hours, and if it has established a procedure to enable 28 owners to reclaim their dogs by appointment at a mutually agreeable time when the COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 10 OF 17 1 public or private shelter would otherwise be closed, the holding period shall be four 2 business days, not including the day of impoundment. (2) Except as provided in Section 3 17006, stray dogs shall be held for owner redemption during the first three days of the 4 holding period, not including the day of impoundment, and shall be available for owner 5 redemption or adoption for the remainder of the holding period. (b) (1) Except as 6 provided in Section 17006, any stray dog that is impounded pursuant to this division 7 shall, before the euthanasia of that animal, be released to a nonprofit, as defined in 8 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, animal rescue or adoption organization 9 if requested by the organization before the scheduled euthanasia of that animal. The 10 public or private shelter may enter into cooperative agreements with any animal rescue 11 or adoption organization. In addition to any required spay or neuter deposit, the public or 12 private shelter, at its discretion, may assess a fee, not to exceed the standard adoption 13 fee, for animals adopted or released. (2) A puppy under eight weeks of age that is 14 reasonably believed to be unowned and is impounded in a public or private shelter may, 15 before the euthanasia of that animal, be made immediately available for release to a 16 nonprofit, as defined in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, animal rescue 17 or adoption organization if requested by the organization. (c) During the holding period 18 required by this section and before the adoption or euthanasia of dog impounded 19 pursuant to this division, a public or private shelter shall scan the dog for a microchip 20 that identifies the owner of that dog and shall make reasonable efforts to contact the 21 owner and notify him or her that his or her dog is impounded and is available for 22 redemption. (d) As used in this division, a "business day" includes any day that a public 23 or private shelter is open to the public for at least four hours, excluding state holidays. 24 Cal Food & Agr Code § 31754 25 (a) Except as provided in Section 17006, any animal relinquished by the 26 purported owner that is of a species impounded by public or private shelters shall be 27 held for the same holding periods, with the same requirements of care, applicable to 28 stray dogs and cats in Section 31108 and 31752, and shall be available for owner COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 11 OF 17 1 redemption or adoption for the entire holding period. (b) Notwithstanding subdivision 2 (a), kittens or puppies relinquished by the purported owner, or brought in by any other 3 person with authority to relinquish them, to public or private shelters, may be available 4 immediately for adoption. (c) This section shall become operative on July 1, 2002. 5 Cal Food & Agr Code § 30503 6 (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), no public animal control 7 agency or shelter, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals shelter, humane 8 society shelter, or rescue group shall sell or give away to a new owner any dog that has 9 not been spayed or neutered. (2) For the purposes of this section a “rescue group” is 10 a for-profit or not-for-profit entity, or a collaboration of individuals with at least one of 11 its purposes being the sale or placement of dogs that have been removed from a public 12 animal control agency or shelter, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals shelter, 13 or humane shelter or that have been previously owned by any person other than the 14 original breeder of that dog. (b)(1) If a veterinarian licensed to practice veterinary 15 medicine in this state certifies that a dog is too sick or injured to be spayed or neutered, 16 or that it would otherwise be detrimental to the health of the dog to be spayed or 17 neutered, the adopter or purchaser shall pay the public animal control agency or shelter, 18 society for the prevention of cruelty to animals shelter, humane society shelter, or rescue 19 group a deposit of not less than forty dollars ($40), and not more than seventy-five 20 dollars ($75). (2) The entity shall establish the amount of the deposit at the level it 21 determines is necessary to encourage the spaying or neutering of dogs. (3) The deposit 22 shall be temporary, and shall only be retained until the dog is healthy enough to be 23 spayed or neutered, as certified by a veterinarian licensed to practice veterinary medicine 24 in this state. (4) The dog shall be spayed or neutered within 14 business days of that 25 certification. (5) The adopter or purchaser shall obtain written proof of spaying or 26 neutering from the veterinarian performing the operation. (6) If the adopter or purchaser 27 presents proof of spaying or neutering to the entity from which the dog was obtained 28 within 30 business days of obtaining the proof, the adopter or purchaser shall receive a COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 12 OF 17 1 full refund of the deposit. (c) Public animal control agencies or shelters, society for the 2 prevention of cruelty to animals shelters, humane society shelters, and rescue groups 3 may enter into cooperative agreements with each other and with veterinarians in lieu of 4 requiring spaying and neutering deposits to carry out this section. (d) Any funds from 5 unclaimed deposits made pursuant to this section, as it read on January 1, 1999, and any 6 funds from deposits that are unclaimed after January 1, 2000, may be expended only for 7 programs to spay or neuter dogs and cats, including agreements with a society for the 8 prevention of cruelty to animals or a humane society or licensed veterinarian to operate a 9 program to spay or neuter dogs and cats. (e) This section only applies to a county that 10 has a population exceeding 100,000 persons as of January 1, 2000, and to cities within 11 that county. 12 23. Upon information and belief, one or more of the foregoing statues applies and 13 was violated by defendants as the proof may show. 14 24. Upon information and belief, defendants and each of them had also been 15 informed and/or otherwise knew that their dog was a problem animal, and should not be 16 allowed in the presence of guests, and should have been restrained, but defendants carelessly 17 and negligently allowed the DOG in a common area with guests and allowed the DOG to be off 18 leash and unrestrained, and as such permitted a dangerous premises condition for guests such as 19 plaintiff. 20 25. In acting and in failing to act as aforementioned, the defendants acted in a 21 negligent, careless, negligent and improper manner, and that defendants were otherwise careless 22 and negligent in the instance. In addition, it is alleged that each and every defendant which will 23 be found to have controlled, maintained, trained, owned, inspected, cared for, and/or harbored 24 the aforementioned DOG was/were also otherwise careless and negligent in the instance. 25 26. Moreover, as aforestated, defendants' DOG was possessed of dangerous 26 propensities likely to cause injury to persons, which defendants were, or had they exercised 27 reasonable diligence, should have been, well aware of, and defendants should never have 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 13 OF 17 1 allowed their DOG off leash. Nevertheless, defendants allowed the DOG off leash and un- 2 muzzled at the time in question. 3 27. In contrast to defendants' negligent behavior, at the aforesaid said time and place, 4 plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any 5 way contribute to, or cause the incident and/or injuries as described hereinafter. 6 28. As a proximate result of said acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and 7 each of them, plaintiff was hurt and physically injured, suffering deep lacerations, muscle and 8 tissue damage, resulting in nerve damage, leaving him with continuing discomfort and 9 disability, and that plaintiff also incurred medical bills, loss of earnings/earnings capacity, and 10 experienced pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other associated charges and damages, 11 and will continue to sustain such damages in the future. 12 29. In addition, since defendants acted in an intentional, reckless, malicious, 13 despicable, wanton manner, and with conscious disregard for the safety of the public, including 14 plaintiff, placing profits before safety, defendants, and each of them, acted with malice, fraud, 15 and oppression as those terms are defined by the pertinent statutory and case law, including 16 Civil Code Section 3294 and as such plaintiff is entitled to punitive and/or exemplary damages 17 as against defendants, and each of them, in order to, among other things, punish the defendants 18 and deter the defendants and others from pursuing similar conduct in the future. To the extent a 19 corporation, and as to defendant MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, each said corporate 20 defendant, via its officers and managers and managing agents, including but not limited to, 21 defendant MARIA ARTLE, had advance notice of the unfitness of its employees and the 22 dangers of the aforementioned DOG as well as the DOG's vicious propensities and past history 23 together with all other facts alleged hereinabove, both prior to and subsequent to the incident 24 and that said corporate defendants via their managing agents and officers ratified, approved, and 25 accepted the benefits of the wrongful conduct by, among other things, failing to take any 26 remedial action against those employees and managing agents responsible for the behavior 27 following notice of all the relevant factors and following their investigation of the incident 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 14 OF 17 1 which resulted in these corporate defendants acquiring proof and complete knowledge of what 2 had occurred and why. 3 30. By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiff has been damaged in a sum which 4 exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, 5 and is entitled to compensatory damages and to punitive and/or exemplary damages from 6 defendants and each of them, which will be shown according to proof at time of trial. 7 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 8 BY PLAINTIFF STEPHEN JUVE 9 AS AGAINST 10 THERESA JOHNSTON, an individual; MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, a business entity 11 form unknown; MARIA ARTLE, an individual; and DOES 1 TO 50 INCLUSIVE 12 FOR STRICT LIABILITY 13 31. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation 14 set forth in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more 15 fully set forth at length herein. 16 32. California Civil Code § 3342 states: 17 "(a) The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten 18 by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property 19 of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's 20 knowledge of such viciousness. A person is lawfully upon the private property of such 21 owner within the meaning of this section when he is on such property in the performance 22 of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal 23 regulations of the United States, or when he is on such property upon the invitation, 24 express or implied, of the owner." 25 33. In this instance, the defendants co-owned a DOG which bit, attacked, and 26 otherwise caused damages to plaintiff while plaintiff was lawfully in a public place when the 27 vicious attack occurred. 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 15 OF 17 1 34. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff STEPHEN JUVE was acting with due 2 caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to, or cause the incident and/or 3 injuries as described herein. 4 35. As a proximate result of said acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and 5 each of them, plaintiff was hurt and physically injured, suffering deep lacerations, muscle and 6 tissue damage, resulting in nerve damage and disfigurement, leaving him with continuing 7 discomfort and disability, and that plaintiff also incurred medical bills, loss of earnings/earnings 8 capacity, and experienced pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other associated charges 9 and damages, and will continue to sustain such damages in the future. 10 36. In addition, since defendants acted in an intentional, reckless, malicious, 11 despicable, wanton manner, and with conscious disregard for the safety of the public, including 12 plaintiff, placing profits before safety, defendants, and each of them, acted with malice, fraud, 13 and oppression as those terms are defined by the pertinent statutory and case law, including 14 Civil Code Section 3294 and as such plaintiff is entitled to punitive and/or exemplary damages 15 as against defendants, and each of them, in order to, among other things, punish the defendants 16 and deter the defendants and others from pursuing similar conduct in the future. To the extent a 17 corporation, and as to defendant MARTINA ANIMAL RESCUE, each said corporate 18 defendant, via its officers and managers and managing agents, including but not limited to, 19 defendant MARIA ARTLE, had advance notice of the unfitness of its employees and the 20 dangers of the aforementioned DOG as well as the DOG's vicious propensities and past history 21 together with all other facts alleged hereinabove, both prior to and subsequent to the incident 22 and that said corporate defendants via their managing agents and officers ratified, approved, and 23 accepted the benefits of the wrongful conduct by, among other things, failing to take any 24 remedial action against those employees and managing agents responsible for the behavior 25 following notice of all the relevant factors and following their investigation of the incident 26 which resulted in these corporate defendants acquiring proof and complete knowledge of what 27 had occurred and why. 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 16 OF 17 1 37. By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiff has been damaged in a sum which 2 exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, 3 and is entitled to compensatory damages and to punitive and/or exemplary damages from 4 defendants and each of them, which will be shown according to proof at time of trial. 5 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 6 WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as against each and every defendant, jointly 7 and severally, on each and every cause of action, according to proof, as follows: 8 1. General “non-economic” damages according to proof; 9 2. Special “economic” damages, according to proof; 10 3. Punitive and/or exemplary damages; 11 4. Medical bills, past and future, according to proof; 12 5. Loss of earnings/earnings capacity, past and future, according to proof; 13 6. Property damage, according to proof; 14 7. Costs of suit and interest; 15 8. Such other and further relief as the court deems proper. 16 April 23, 2024 Dated: ________________ LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO, APC 17 18 _____________________________ 19 DAVID L. CELLO Attorney(s) for Plaintiff(s) 20 STEPHEN JUVE 21 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 22 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues and causes of action so triable. 23 April 23, 2024 Dated: ________________ LAW OFFICE OF DAVID L. CELLO, APC 24 25 _____________________________ 26 DAVID L. CELLO Attorney(s) for Plaintiff(s) 27 STEPHEN JUVE 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL PAGE 17 OF 17