Motion,Ex Parte: VILLAS AT EMERALD LAKE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC vs. ROYAL OAK HOMES LLC

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                                Filing # 171373848 E-Filed 04/19/2023 04:57:06 PM


                                                        IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 9TH
                                                        JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
                                                        OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA

                                                        CASE NO.: 2020-CA-002942-ON

        VILLAS         AT       EMERALD     LAKE
        HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a
        Florida not for profit corporation,

             Plaintiff,
        v.

        ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida
        limited liability company; ADVANCED
        WRAPPING            AND       CONCRETE
        SOLUTIONS OF CENTRAL FLORIDA,
        INC., a Florida corporation; DON KING’S
        CONCRETE, INC., a Florida corporation;
        HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION,
        INC., a Florida corporation; IMPERIAL
        BUILDING CORPORATION, a Florida
        corporation; PREMIER PLASTERING OF
        CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC. n/k/a TGK
        STUCCO, INC., a Florida corporation;
        WEATHERMASTER                  BUILDING
        PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida corporation;
        WEINTRAUB            INSPECTIONS       &
        FORENSICS, INC. n/k/a WEINTRAUB
        ENGINEERING AND INSPECTIONS,
        INC, a Florida corporation; THE DIMILLO
        GROUP, LLC, a Florida limited liability
        company; WOLF’S IRRIGATION &
        LANDSCAPING,          INC.,   A   Florida
        corporation; SUMMERPARK HOMES,
        INC., a Florida corporation; BROWN +
        COMPANY ARCHITECTURE, INC., a
        Florida corporation;

             Defendant.
                                                    /

        ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida
        limited liability company;

              Crossclaim Plaintiff,
    v.

ADVANCED             WRAPPING         AND
CONCRETE SOLUTION OF CENTRAL
FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation; DON
KING’S CONCRETE, INC., a Florida
corporation;      HUGH        MACDONALD
CONSTRUCTION,           INC.,   a   Florida
corporation;     IMPERIAL        BUILDING
CORPORATION, a Florida corporation;
PREMIER PLASTERING OF CENTRAL
FLORIDA, INC. n/k/a TGK STUCCO, INC., a
Florida corporation; WEATHERMASTER
BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida
corporation; WEINTRAUB INSPECTIONS &
FORENSICS, INC. n/k/a WEINTRAUB
ENGINEERING AND INSPECTIONS, INC.,
a Florida corporation; WOLF'S IRRIGATION
& LANDSCAPING, INC., a Florida
corporation;      BROWN+        COMPANY
ARCHITECTURE,           INC.,   a   Florida
corporation;

     Crossclaim Defendants

____________________________________/

      DEFENDANT/CROSSCLAIM DEFENDANT, BROWN + COMPANY
   ARCHITECTURE, INC.’s, MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS TWENTY-EIGHT,
    TWENTY-NINE, AND THIRTY OF ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’s SECOND
 AMENDED CROSSCLAIM COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIMS FOR
                       PREJUGMENT INTEREST

         COMES     NOW,     Defendant/    Crossclaim    Defendant,    BROWN    +   COMPANY

ARCHITECTURE, INC., (“Brown”), by an through the undersigned counsel and pursuant to

Rules 1.110 and 1.140 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and respectfully moves this Court

for entry of an Order to dismiss Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, ROYAL OAK HOMES LLC’s

(“ROH”) Second Amended Crossclaim Complaint, and for the entry of an Order striking ROH’s

claims for pre-judgment interest, and in support thereof states as follows:
                                        INTRODUCTION

       In the underlying operative Complaint, Plaintiff, Villas at Emerald Lake Homeowners

Association, Inc. (“Association”), alleges construction and design defects against numerous

defendants at the townhouse community known as the Villas at Emerald Lake, located in

Kissimmee, Osceola County, Florida (hereinafter, the “Property”). One of the defendants, the

developer/owner of the Property, ROH, has now brought forth a Second Amended Crossclaim

Complaint against numerous of the named defendants. Each of these claims by ROH are derivative

of the claims being made by the Association against ROH and the now Crossclaim Defendants,

with the exception of the claims for breach of contractual duty to defend Royal Oak. Second

Amended Cross-Compl. ¶ 3. According to ROH, Brown . . . was hired by ROH to design certain

townhome units at the Subject Property.” Cross-Compl. ¶ 14. ROH has brought three causes of

action against Brown related to Brown’s design services provided in connection with the Property.

The three causes of action are for breach of contract (Count 28), professional negligence (Count

29) and a statutory cause of action for violation of Fla. Stat. § 553.84 (Count 30). Each of these

causes of action should be dismissed.

                                SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

       To begin, Count 28 should be dismissed because the contract upon which ROH bases its

breach of contract claim, and attached to ROH’s Second Amended Crossclaim Complaint, has a

void and unenforceable indemnification provision because it lacks a monetary limitation, and

further, ROH is not a party to the contract and therefore the contract cannot be enforced by ROH.

Count 29 should be dismissed because ROH fails to allege all necessary elements to support a

cause of action for professional negligence, and specifically, fails to allege a duty and breach, and

specifically, any wrongdoing by Brown that fell within Brown’s scope of services. Finally, Count
30 should be dismissed because Florida Statute 553.84 does not apply to design professionals such

as Brown, and therefore Brown cannot be found statutorily liable for a violation under this statute.

With regard to ROH’s claims for prejudgment interest, all alleged damages are unliquidated, and

ROH fails to allege any legal basis for entitlement to prejudgment interest, thus, such claims should

be stricken.

                                      LEGAL STANDARD

       A motion to dismiss tests whether the plaintiff has sufficiently stated a cause of action.

Rohatynsky v. Kalogiannis, 763 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). When determining the

merits of a motion to dismiss, the trial court's consideration is limited to the four corners of the

complaint, the allegations of which must be accepted as true and considered in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Bell v. Indian River Memorial Hosp., 778 So. 2d 1030, 1032

(Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Alvarez v. E & A Produce Corp., 708 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

A complaint fails to set forth a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that it is

entitled to relief, and therefore warrants dismissal, when it contains a mere mechanical recitation

of the elements of the cause of action and conclusory allegations that a defendant was engaged in

wrongdoing. Turnberry Vill. N. Tower Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Turnberry Vill. S. Tower Condo. Ass'n,

Inc., 224 So. 3d 266 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2017).

       To survive such a motion, the complaint must allege a prima facia case upon which liability

and damages can be proven. Alvarez, 708 So. 2d at 999. Whether a prima facie case has been pled

depends on the sufficiency of the claimant’s allegations of fact, excluding all bare conclusions.

Frank v. Lurie, 157 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). Further, a complaint must contain

sufficient allegations to allow a defendant to intelligently answer. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v.

Walters, 246 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 1971). A court must construe a complaint or pleading against
the pleader/drafter thereof when a defendant asks the court to determine whether the necessary

allegations have been stated. Matthews v. Matthews, 122 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).

                                      LEGAL ARGUMENT
   I.      COUNT TWENTY-EIGHT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT MUST BE
           DISMISSED BECAUSE ROH IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT AND
           THE CLAUSE THAT ROH IS RELYING UPON IS VOID AND
           UNENFORCEABLE UNDER FLORIDA LAW.

   ROH’s claim for breach of contract in Count 28 of the Crossclaim Complaint must be

dismissed because ROH does not have standing to enforce the contract that it relies upon. In

support of ROH’s claim for breach of contract, ROH has attached to its Second Amended

Crossclaim Complaint a contract as Exhibit “J.” However, this contract is not between ROH and

Brown, but rather, is between Brown and another entity, Avatar Properties, Inc. (“Avatar”).

Although ROH has alleged that Avatar is ROH’s parent company, and the ROH is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of Avatar, ROH is not itself a party to the contract and does not have standing to assert

a claim for breach of contract against Brown. “Standing depends on whether a party has a sufficient

stake in a justiciable controversy, with a legally cognizable interest which would be affected by

the outcome of the litigation.” Weiss v. Johansen, 898 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)

(citing Nedeau v. Gallagher, 851 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). Most importantly, “the

interest cannot be conjectural or merely theoretical,” and the claim must be brought on behalf of

the one who is recognized in the law as the ‘real party in interest,’ that is the person in whom rests,

by substantive law, the claim sought to be enforced. Johansen, 898 So.2d at 1011; Kumar Corp.

v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462 So.2d 1178, 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 476 So.2d 675 (Fla.

1985).

   Here, on the face of the Complaint and the attachments thereto, there are no grounds for which

ROH could be the real party in interest for the contract attached as Exhibit “J.” ROH does not
allege how, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avatar, it has the ability to enforce the contract that

Avatar entered into. Because ROH has not pled that it is the ‘real party in interest’ with sufficient

ultimate facts for readers to understand the legal connection between it and Avatar, ROH has not

established that it has standing to enforce any provision contained within the attached contract.

   Even if ROH did have standing and was the real party in interest to enforce the contract

attached as Exhibit “J” to the Second Amended Crossclaim Complaint (which it does not), the

contractual provision upon which ROH alleges that Brown breached is void and unenforceable.

Specifically, ROH alleges that Brown agreed to defend ROH and indemnify and hold it harmless

from Plaintiff’s claims, and that Brown’s failure to do so constitutes a material breach of contract.

Second Amended Cross-Compl. ¶ 232. However, the indemnification provision included within

Exhibit “J” does not include a monetary limitation, as required by Fla. Stat. § 725.06(1), which

reads as follows:

               Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection with . . . construction,
               . . ., between an owner of real property and an architect, . . . wherein any party . . .
               promises to indemnify or hold harmless the other party to the agreement, . . . for
               liability for damages to persons or property caused in whole or in part by any act,
               omission, or default of the indemnitee arising from the contract or its performance,
               shall be void and unenforceable unless the contract contains a monetary
               limitation on the extent of the indemnification that bears a reasonable
               commercial relationship to the contract and is a part of the project specification
               or bid documents, if any.

Looking at the indemnification provision found in Paragraph 7 of Exhibit “J,” the clause is

completely devoid of any monetary limitation, and reads, in whole, as follows:

               Independent Contractor shall be solely responsible for and shall protect, defend,
               indemnify, save and hold harmless AV homes, and its agents, servants, attorneys,
               officers, directors, employees and insurers, harmless against any and all damages,
               claims, all suits, actions, costs, losses, expenses (including attorneys’ fees) and
               other liabilities (“Costs”) arising from or in connection with (a) Independent
               Contractor’s active negligence or willful misconduct; or (b) the breach of a
               statutory, regulatory or common law duty or obligation on the part of Independent
               Contractor.
Thus, the indemnification provision that ROH relies upon is void and unenforceable, and any cause

of action brought against ROH for breach of this contractual provision must be dismissed.

   II.     COUNT TWENTY-NINE FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE MUST BE
           DISMISSED BECAUSE ROH FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON
           WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

   ROH fails to properly allege the necessary element of duty and breach of duty to support its

claim for professional negligence and therefore, Count 29 must be dismissed. To state a cause of

action for negligence, the following elements are required: (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of this

duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) some actual

loss or damage flowing to the plaintiff's legally protected interest because of the alleged breach of

the legal duty. “Further, where the negligent party is a professional, the law imposes a duty to

perform the requested services in accordance with the standard of care used by similar

professionals in the community under similar circumstances.” Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d

973, 975–76 (Fla. 1999). The plaintiff must consider that, although its claim against the design

professional may sound in negligence, the “duty” is generally defined by the scope of the design

professional's performance under the contract; thus, the design professional's negligence should

arise from something it was hired to do. Shepard v. City of Palatka, 414 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 5th DCA

1981).

   Within Count 29, ROH alleges that the Association alleges that Brown failed to ensure that its

plans were sufficiently detailed, including a failure to sufficiently detail the windows,

waterproofing elements around the windows, and the exteriors of the buildings, resulting in

roofing, waterproofing, building envelope and site defects and deficiencies. However, ROH has

not alleged that Brown was retained to provide details of the windows, waterproofing elements

around the windows, and the exteriors of the building. Instead, ROH has simply alleged that Brown
served as a professional consultant retained by ROH’s parent company, Avatar Properties, Inc., to

provide architectural services for the construction of certain townhomes and the Property. Second

Amended Cross-Compl. ¶ 238. Thus, ROH has not pled the necessary facts or elements to support

a claim of professional negligence, and dismissal of Count 29 is proper.

   III.    COUNT THIRTY FOR A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION PURSUANT TO
           553.84, FLA. STAT. MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THIS STATUTE IS NOT
           APPLICABLE TO DESIGN PROFESSIONALS SUCH AS BROWN.

   Although Florida Statute § 553.84 creates a cause of action for violation of the Florida Building

Code (“FBC”), Brown’s scope of services for the Property was limited to providing professional

design services, and therefore Brown cannot be found liable for violations of the FBC. While the

interpretation of the FBC is a question of law to be determined by the court, and “any conflicts in

interpretation [are] for the court to resolve. . .”, the FBC controls the “technical aspects” of

construction. Edward J. Siebert, A.I.A. Architect & Planner, P.A. v. Bayport Beach & Tennis Club

Ass’n, Inc., 573 So. 2d 889, 892 (Fla.2d DCA 1990).

   The FBC provisions “are restricted to the requirements related to the types of materials used

and construction methods and standards employed in order to meet the criteria specified in the

Florida Building Code.” Section 553.73(2), Fla. Stat. Meanwhile, Section 553.84 of the FBC

provides a statutory civil action against a party who commits a violation of the FBC. An action

under this section can only be brought “against the person or party who commits the violation” of

the FBC. Sec. 553.84, Fla. Stat. This section has never been interpreted by a Florida court to apply

to design professionals. See H. Hugh McConnell, Diminished Capacity-Owners' Ability to Sue for

Construction Defects in Florida, Fla. B.J., June 1997, at 64, 68; See Lanham, Larry vs T Scholten

Builder LLC, et al., 11-2019-CA-002752-0001-XX(L-300-1020851). Furthermore, numerous

Florida Circuit County Courts have recently held that design professionals cannot be found liable
for violation of Fla. Stat. 553.84. See Court Orders, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”. Thus, ROH’s

Count 30 against Brown must be dismissed.

    IV.     ROH’S CLAIMS FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MUST BE STRICKEN FOR
            ALL THREE COUNTS BROUGHT AGAINST BROWN

    Within the WHEREFORE clauses of Counts 28, 29 and 30, ROH alleges entitlement to pre-

judgment interest. Such a claim for prejudgment interest is improper and must be stricken from all

three counts. Specifically, prejudgment interest is generally only allowed on liquidated damages. Cioffe

v. Morris, 676 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1982); Burkhart v. Kroeger Concrete Products, Inc., 468 So. 2d 469

(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985). A claim is unliquidated if the amount due is contested; only becoming certain

and therefore unliquidated when finally fixed and determined by the trier of fact. Hurley v. Slingerland,

480 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985). As it pertains to Count 29 for Professional Negligence, “[t]ort

claims are generally excepted from the rule allowing prejudgment interest because tort damages are

generally too speculative to liquidate before final judgment.” Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Percefull,

653 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1995). Moreover, the causes of action found in Counts 28 and 30 either sound in

tort, or the damages are unliquidated and have not been determined by the trier of fact. Therefore, ROH

fails to allege any legal basis for entitlement to prejudgment interest. Accordingly, ROH’s claims for

prejudgment interest against Brown should be stricken.

    WHEREFORE, Defendant/Crossclaim Defendant, Brown + COMPANY ARCHITECTURE,

INC., respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order dismissing Counts 28, 29 and 30 from Royal

Oak Homes, LLC Second Amended Crossclaim Complaint, and also striking the claims for

prejudgment interest, and for any further relief this Court deems just and proper.
                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been electronically

served via the Florida E-Filing Portal to counsel of record for the parties on the attached Service

List, this 19th day of April 2023.

                                             MILBER MAKRIS PLOUSADIS & SEIDEN, LLP
                                             Attorneys for Defendant, Brown + Company
                                             Architecture, Inc.
                                             1900 NW Corporate Blvd., East Tower, Suite 440
                                             Boca Raton, Florida 33431
                                             bcalderon@milbermakris.com
                                             azgross@milbermakris.com
                                             breisch@milbermakris.com
                                             Telephone:         561-994-7310
                                             Facsimile:         561-994-7313

                                             By: S:/ Barri A. Reisch
                                             Bruce R. Calderon
                                             Florida Bar No. 50448
                                             Barri A. Reisch
                                             Florida Bar No. 107052
                                             Alicia Z. Gross
                                             Florida Bar No. 0103210




                       [SERVICE LIST IS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE]
                                       SERVICE LIST

Phillip E. Joseph, Esq.
Evan J. Small, Esq.
Jeffrey A. Widelitz Esq.
Christopher S. Tribbey, Esq.
Kacey L. Joyce, Esq.
BALL JANIK, LLP
201 East Pine Street – Suite 600bet
Orlando, FL 32801
pjoseph@balljanik.com
esmall@balljanik.com
jwidelitz@balljanik.com
ctribbey@balljanik.com
dtodd@balljanik.com
bburton@balljanik.com
rhansch@balljanik.com
kjoyce@balljanik.com
Counsel for Plaintiff, Villas at Emerald
Lake Homeowners Association, Inc.

Thamir A. R. Kaddouri, Jr., Esq.
Beth A. Tobey, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF THAMIR A.R.
KADDOURI, JR., P.A.
3220 West Cypress Street
Tampa, FL 33607
thamir.kaddouri@tampalaw.org
beth.tobey@tampalaw.org
Jessica.Ayala@Tampalaw.org
Counsel for Defendant, Imperial Building Corporation

Peter J. Kapsales, Esq.
Margaret M. Efta, Esq.
MILNE LAW GROUP, P.A.
301 East Pine Street – Suite 525
Orlando, FL 32801
pkapsales@milnelawgroup.com
mefta@milnelawgroup.com
eservice@milnelawgroup.com
Counsel for Defendant, Weathermaster Building Products, Inc.


Luis Prats, Esq.
Robin H. Leavengood, Esq.
Lannie D. Hough, Jr., Esq.
James Michael Wells, Esq.
CARLTON FIELDS, P.A.
4221 W. Boy Scout Boulevard
Tampa, FL 33607-5780
rleavengood@carltonfields.com
lhough@carltonfields.com
nbonilla@carltonfields.com
ejohnson@carltonfields.com
mramos@carltonfields.com
mwalls@carltonfields.com
krick@carltonfields.com
lprats@carltonfields.com
Counsel for Defendant, Royal Oak Homes, LLC

Ashley Mattingly, Esq.
Denise M. Anderson, Esq.
BUTLER WEIHMULLER KATZ CRAIG
400 North Ashley Drive – Suite 2300
Tampa, FL 33602
amattingly@butler.legal
dandersom@butler.legal
kreick@butler.legal
rjorge@butler.legal
Counsel for Defendant, Hugh MacDonald Construction, Inc. (HMC)

Denise M. Anderson, Esq.
David Mercer, Esq.
BUTLER WEIHMULLER KATZ CRAIG LLP
400 North Ashley Drive – Suite 2300
Tampa, FL 33602
danderson@butler.legal
dmercer@butler.legal
jjacobs@butler.legal
mmilligan@butler.legal
Counsel for Defendant, Don King’s Concrete, Inc.

Jayne Ann Pittman, Esq.
Natalie Fischer, Esq.
CONROY SIMBERG
Two South Orange Avenue – Suite 300
Orlando, FL 32801
eserviceorl@conroysimberg.com
jpittman@conroysimberg.com
nfischer@conroysimberg.com
mmaitland@conroysimberg.com
Counsel for Defendant, Advanced Wrapping and Concrete Solutions Of Central Florida, Inc.
William M. Woods, Esq.
Joseph M. Cline, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM WOODS
100 S. Missouri Avenue – Suite 201
Clearwater, FL 33756
wwoods@willwoodslaw.com
josephC@willwoodslaw.com
MaritaL@willwoodslaw.com
pleadings@willwoodslaw.com
Counsel for All Glass Installation Corp.

Monal Zipper, Esq.
Jennifer Shippole, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER L. SHIPPOLE
14050 NW 14th Street, Suite 180
Sunrise, Florida 33323
jshippole@fednat.com
mzipper@fednat.com
pleadings@fednat.com
Counsel for Atlantic Concrete Systems, Inc.

Richard L. Russo, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD L. RUSSO
505 Maitland Ave., Suite 1000
Altamonte Springs, FL 32701
rrusso@wfmblaw.com

and

Cole J. Copertino, Esq.
WRIGHT, FULFORD, MOOREHEAD & BROWN, P.A.
505 Maitland Avenue, Suite 1000
Alamonte Springs, Florida 32701
ccopertino@wfmblaw.com
cbraungart@wfmblaw.com
lwilliams@wfmblaw.com
Counsel for Well Hung Windows & Doors, LLC


Chelsey “Chet” G. Moody, Jr., Esq.
Mai M. Le, Esq.
MOODY & GRAF, P.A.
1101 N. Lake Destiny Rd., Suite 200
Maitland, FL 32751
cmoody@moodygraf.com
mle@moodygraf.com
kbraund@moodygraf.com
iperera@moodygraf.com
Counsel for Wolf’s Irrigation & Landscaping, Inc.

Joseph L. Zollner, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF J. CHRISTOPHER NORRIS
P.O. Box 7217
London, KY 40742
joseph.zollner@libertymutual.com
FloridaCDLegalMail@LibertyMutual.com
Counsel for Lois Concrete Corp.

Andrew E. Hollway, Esq.
Tim Ford, Esq.
HILL WARD HENDERSON
101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 3700
Tampa, FL 33602
andrew.holway@hwhlaw.com
tim.ford@hwhlaw.com
rocco.cafaro@hwhlaw.com
ron.espinal@hwhlaw.com
kathy.wernsing@hwlaw.com
tracy.coale@hwlaw.com
derrick.calandra@hwlaw.com
jill.kuty@hwhlaw.com
Counsel for Weintraub Inspections & Forensics, Inc. n/k/a Weintraub Engineering and
Inspections, Inc.

Phillip S. Howell, Esq.
Brendan C. Collins, Esq.
GALLOWAY JOHNSON TOMPKINS BURR & SMITH
400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 1000
Tampa, FL 33602
bcollins@gallowaylawfirm.com
tampaservice@gallowaylawfirm.com
phowell@gallowaylawfirm.com
Counsel for Casey Hawkins Glass, Inc.

Andrew T. Marshall, Esq.
HAMILTON PRICE
2400 Manatee Ave. West,
Bradenton, FL 34205
andrew@hamiltonpricelaw.com
nancy@hamiltonpricelaw.com
kelsey@hamiltonpricelaw.com
and

William M. Woods, Esq.
Joseph M. Cline, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM WOODS
100 S. Missouri Avenue, Suite 201
Clearwater, Florida 33756
Wwoods@willwoodslaw.com
Pleadings@willwoodslaw.com
JosephC@willwoodslaw.com
MaritaL@willwoodslaw.com
Counsel for T&M Construction of Sanford, Inc.

Scott Ross, Esq.
Mary O’Brien, Esq.
GROELLE & SALMON, P.A.
1715 N. Westshore Blvd., #320
Tampa, FL 33607
gstcourtdocs@gspalaw.com
sross@gspalaw.com
cebanks@gspalaw.com
Counsel for Helberg Enterprises, LLC

Todd M. Ladouceur, Esq.
Jerrilynn Hadley, Esq.
GALLOWAY, JOHNSON, TOMPKINS, BURR AND SMITH, PLC
118 E. Garden Street
Pensacola, FL 32502
TMLConstruction@gallowaylawfirm.com
Counsel for Hobbit Windows, LLC

Jennifer Miller Brooks, Esq.
Kira Tsiring, Esq.
HAMILTON, MILLER & BIRTHISEL, LLP
150 Southeast Second Avenue, Suite 1200
Miami, Florida 33131
ktsiring@hamiltonmillerlaw.com
jmiller@hamiltonmillerlaw.com
jcasaccio@hamiltonmillerlaw.com
Counsel for TGK Stucco, Inc.

Wayne M. Alder, Esq.
FISHER BROYLES, LLP
7668 NW 125th Way
Pompano Beach, FL 33076
Wayne.alder@fisherbroyles.com
wmalder@bellsouth.net
Counsel for E.R.O. Construction, Inc.




                     [EXHIBIT A IS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE]
EXHIBIT A