Preview
Bryan M. Geoulla (SBN:345412)
1 SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC
2
10700 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 214
Los Angeles, California 90025
3 Telephone: (310) 525-2244
Facsimile: (310) 525-2234
4 Bryan@sevenlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
5 Yesnia Portillo Sanchez
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7
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN
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METROPOLITAN DIVISION
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YESNIA PORTILLO SANCHEZ, Case No.: BCV-23-103825
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Plaintiff,
13 vs. PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT
10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO
14 GENERAL MOTORS, LLC.; and DOES 1 COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
through 10, inclusive, PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR
SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC
LOS ANGELES, CA 90025
15 Defendants. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET
ONE
16
17 [Filed concurrently with Plaintiff’s Notice of
Motion and Motion to Compel Further
18 Responses and Memorandum of Point and
Authorities, Declaration of Bryan M. Geoulla
19 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel]
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Date: May 10, 2024
21 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Judge: Hon. Thomas S. Clark
22 Dept.: 17
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TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Plaintiff Yesenia Portillo Sanchez hereby files the
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attached separate statement in connection with Plaintiff’s motion for an order compelling
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Defendant General Motors LLC to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s first set of requests to
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inspect and copy documents, electronically stored information, and other tangible things.
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 Separate Statement [Requests For Production] Definitions
2 1. The term “YOU”, “YOUR”, and “DEFENDANT” shall mean Defendant GENERAL
3 MOTORS LLC, and any and all agents, representatives, assigns, successors, dealerships,
4 individuals, and/or businesses who represent themselves to be affiliated with, or work for,
5 GENERAL MOTORS LLC.
6 2. The term “DOCUMENT” shall be interpreted in accordance with California Evidence Code
7 § 250 and also to include electronic mails and (ESI) electronically stored information in native
8 format.
9 3. The term “PERSON” means and includes natural persons, corporations, partnerships,
10 associations, or any type of entity, and agents, servants, employees and representatives
11 thereof.
12 4. The term “SUBJECT VEHICLE” means the 2021 Chevrolet Trax [VIN:
13 KL7CJLSB9MB337526], purchased and/or leased by Plaintiff.
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14 5. The term “CHEVROLET VEHICLES” refers to all Chevrolet Trax vehicles with a 1.4L I4
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LOS ANGELES, CA 90025
15 DOHC 16V turbocharged LUV engine manufactured and/or distributed by YOU.
16 6. The term “ENGINE DEFECT(S)” shall be understood to mean and refer to any defect(s),
17 problem(s), condition(s), complaint(s), or other issue(s) reported by Plaintiff to YOU or and
18 of YOUR authorized service and repair facilities concerning the SUBJECT VEHICLE,
19 including but not limited to, illumination of the check engine warning light, loss of power,
20 vehicle shutting off while in operation, faulty engine knock sensor, engine knock sensor
21 replacement, faulty battery, battery replacement, faulty throttle position, throttle body internal
22 failure, throttle body replacement, overheating, coolant leak, faulty water outlet, faulty
23 radiator, faulty degas bottle, faulty water pump, water outlet replacement, radiator
24 replacement, degas bottle replacement, water pump replacement, and/or any other similar
25 concern identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.
26 7. The term “A/C DEFECT(S)” shall be understood to mean and refer to any defect(s),
27 problem(s), condition(s), complaint(s), or other issue(s) reported by Plaintiff to YOU or and
28 of YOUR authorized service and repair facilities concerning the SUBJECT VEHICLE,
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 including but not limited to, HVAC system not blowing cold air, HVAC system not blowing
2 any air, compressor leak, compressor replacement, faulty blower motor, faulty blower motor
3 controller, faulty blower motor wiring, blower motor replacement, blower motor controller
4 replacement, blower motor wiring replacement, and/or any other similar concern identified in
5 the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:
2 All DOCUMENTS concerning field reports, dealer contacts, warranty claims, customer
3 complaints, claims, reported failures regarding ENGINE DEFECT(S) in CHEVROLET
4 VEHICLE(S), including any DOCUMENTS concerning YOUR response to each field report,
5 customer complaint, reported failure, and warranty claim. [This request shall be understood to
6 also include communications and/or reports, which Defendant is required to maintained
7 pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Section 579.21. This Request requires
8 Defendant to produce these DOCUMENTS in their entirety and with all fields, columns, tables,
9 rows, attachments, and/or datapoints, and all available information (other than any identifying
10 customer contact information) including field names, codes, symptom codes, part numbers,
11 claim numbers, and/or all other information that exists. This request requires that the responding
12 party produce such DOCUMENTS in Excel or Microsoft Access format with only the customer
13 contact information and the last 6 digits of the VIN redacted.]
10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214
14 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:
SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC
LOS ANGELES, CA 90025
15 GM objects to this Request on grounds the terms "concerning," "customer complaints,"
16 "claims," and "ENGINE DEFECT(S)" are vague and ambiguous. GM also objects to this
17 Request on grounds it improperly assumes that there are alleged defects with respect to the
18 SUBJECT VEHICLE, or GM VEHICLES, generally. GM also objects to this Request on
19 grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to
20 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at
21 issue in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and
22 oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the
23 needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
24 litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request
25 violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61
26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly
27 Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of
28 this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 trade secret information. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information
2 protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work- product doctrine. No documents will be
3 produced.
4 STATEMENT OF INSUFFICIENCY:
5 1. Good Cause Exists To Compel Further Responses
6 “Good cause” justifies the discovery sought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §
7 2031.310(b)(1) because the documents are both relevant to the subject matter of this action and
8 because there are specific facts that justify the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010;
9 Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Greyhound
10
Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 389.) Importantly, “[G]ood cause may be found
in the pleadings theretofore filed in the action.” (56 Cal.2d 389.) “[T]he party who seeks to
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compel production has met his burden of showing good cause simply by a fact-specific showing
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of relevance.” (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)
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Preliminarily, in seeking similar vehicle discovery for “Chevrolet vehicles” Plaintiff
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defines these similar vehicles the same way Defendant identifies similar vehicles in its own part
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573 reports to the NHTSA: by make, model, and engine type. Further, Plaintiff is not requesting
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any more information than what the Defendant has already compiled and submitted to the
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NHTSA. As such, the burden associated with producing these documents is relatively none-
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existent as Defendant has already compiled and produced them in accordance with Defendant’s
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reporting requirements under 49 CFR § 579.21.
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Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that on March 9, 2021, Plaintiff purchased the vehicle
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which is the subject of this action, that the vehicle contains a number of irreparable defects, and
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that Defendant was unable to repair the defects despite multiple repair attempts. The Complaint
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alleges that Defendant had an affirmative duty to repurchase or replace the vehicle under the
24 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and that Defendant willfully failed to comply with that
25 obligation. Defendant has denied these allegations, and has also alleged as an affirmative
26 defense that the defects were caused by third parties and/or abuse of the vehicle.
27 Generally, courts agree with GM that the evidence required to prove liability under
28 Song-Beverly focuses on records concerning the specific vehicle at issue. (See Krotin v.
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 303 (1995) (‘An automobile manufacturer
2 need not read minds to determine which vehicles are defective; it need only read its dealers’
3 service records.”). However, Plaintiff is also seeking civil penalties. Under Song-Beverly, “[i]f
4 the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer is entitled to receive a
5
civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c); Oregel
v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1104 (2001). “Willfulness” requires a
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showing that defendant knew of its obligations under Song-Beverly but declined to fulfill them.
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Bishop v. Hyundai Motor Am., 44 Cal. App. 4th 750, 759, (1996). In connection with Plaintiff's
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Song-Beverly claims, Plaintiff needs "other vehicle" discovery to demonstrate Defendant's
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willful violations of the Song-Beverly Act. Critical to the analysis of “willfulness” is whether
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the defendant was previously aware of a defect. To the extent a defendant was aware of a defect
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but nevertheless refused to promptly repurchase a buyer‘s vehicle, the defendant willfully
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violated the Act. This awareness can be established by various means, including, for instance,
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evidence that the buyer‘s vehicle had not been repaired after a reasonable number of attempts;
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internal investigations that show that the defendant was aware of the defect in other vehicles;
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and warranty records showing that other consumers were also affected by the defect. See
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Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 35 Cal. App. 4th 112, 136 (1995); Oregel v. American Isuzu
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Motors, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1104-05 (2001); Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc.,
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175 Cal. App. 3d 218, 226 (1985). These are exactly the category of documents and information
19 that Plaintiff seeks. “Certainly, evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited
20 conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide relevant support for an
21 argument that strong medicine is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law.” BMW
22 of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996)
23 They are also relevant to rebut any claim by Defendant that the problems are not
24 genuine, that the particular repairs Defendant performed were successful, that no other repairs
25 are available, or that Defendant is unaware of such problems in its mass produced vehicles.
26 (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1162 [Evidence of similar past
27 conduct is relevant and directly admissible at trial to establish liability for punitive damages,
28 and to prove some fact such as motive, intent, plan, knowledge or absence of mistake or
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 accident.].)
2 2. Plaintiffs Request Is Narrow In Scope and Breadth
3 With respect to similar vehicle discovery for consumer complaints, warranty claims, and
4 field reports matching Plaintiff’s definitions of “Engine Defect(s)” and “A/C Defect(s).”
5 Although Defendant posits that “[our] definitions of the alleged defects are so general and
6 lacking in specificity that it would be practically impossible for GM to meaningfully search for
7 and collect potentially relevant documents.” A quick review of GM’s obligations under 49 CFR
8 § 579.21 will surely reveal that Plaintiff’s definitions (which Plaintiff has specially crafted these
9 definitions by looking directly to the Subject Vehicles repair orders and the issues reported
10 therein) are actually far narrower and more specific than the vehicle component definitions with
11 which GM must contend under 49 CFR § 579.21(b)(2). For example, therein the definitions of
12 ‘Engine and Engine Cooling’ is: “Engine and engine cooling means the component (e.g., motor)
13 of a motor vehicle providing motive power to the vehicle, and includes the exhaust system
10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214
14 (including the exhaust emission system), the engine control unit, engine lubrication system, and
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15 the underhood cooling system for that engine. This term also includes all associated switches,
16 control units, connective elements (such as wiring harnesses, hoses, piping, etc.), and mounting
17 elements (such as brackets, fasteners, etc.).” Accordingly, Defendant assertion that Plaintiff
18 definitions of the alleged defects make no attempt to narrow the scope of the responsive
19 documents is misplaced. Furthermore, Defendant’s unfounded assertion that this request will
20 pose an “insurmountable burden on GM to produce ‘[a]ll DOCUMENTS, including ESI and
21 emails’ related to any potential cause of these generic system issues in any 2021 Chevrolet Trax
22 regardless of whether they have any relation to Plaintiff’s vehicle” is equally specious.
23 Plaintiff’s categorization of the generic systems issue involved in this case directly mirror the
24 categorization of generic system issues with which GM must comport its legal obligation under
25 49 CFR § 579.21(b)(2).
26 In fact, Defendant never provided a factual basis to support its assertion that it would
27 pose an insurmountable burden to produce GM’s 49 CFR § 579.21(C) reports for Chevrolet
28 Trax vehicles with a 1.4 liter inline-4 dual overhead cam 16-valve turbocharged light utility
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 vehicle engine coded as “engine and engine cooling system.” The whole purpose of the
2 requested similar vehicle discovery is to support Plaintiff’s contention that the Subject Vehicle
3 has safety-related defects and/or is in noncompliance in GM’s warranty of Trax vehicles.
4 Indeed, “[t]he purpose of [49 CFR §579.2] is to enhance motor vehicle safety by specifying
5 information and documents that manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment
6 must provide to NHTSA with respect to possible safety-related defects and noncompliances in
7 their products. . .” (See., Title 49 CRF § 579.2, Purpose). Accordingly, these documents could
8 provide crucial support to Plaintiff’s contention that GM has breached affirmative duty to
9 promptly repurchase the Subject Vehicle. Moreover, the scope of information included in these
10 reports is specifically limited to “identify defects related to motor vehicle safety and
11 noncompliances with Federal motor vehicle safety standards. . .” (See., Title 49 CFR § 579.1
12 Scope). Which also happens to be the scope of requested discovery in this instance. Thus, the
13 scope and purpose GM’s internal communications, reports, financial information, investigations
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14 and analysis of other vehicles, other lawsuits, communications with government agencies, and
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15 design and development issues, is explicitly relevant to whether GM willfully breached its duty
16 to repurchase the subject vehicle, and thereby beholds a tendency in reason to prove a disputed
17 fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.
18 Accordingly, Defendant should produce documents responsive to Plaintiff definition of
19 Engine Defect(s) or A/C Defect(s) since Plaintiff definitions of the alleged defects are
20 exponentially narrower in scope than the coded definitions under 49 CFR § 579.21(b)(2), with
21 which Defendant must comply and regularly does.
22 3. Privilege Log Missing
23 Defendant’s March 19, 2024, response to Plaintiff’s initial meet and confer letter states
24 that “GM will provide a privilege log for any documents withheld as privileged.” (Exhibit 5, Pg.
25 1). However, Defendant has not yet served a privilege log for documents it withheld.
26 Accordingly, Defendant should produce a privilege log for documents withheld.
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 4. Insufficiency of Objections
2 a) Defendant’s boilerplate vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome
3 objection lacks merit.
4 Defendant’s “vague and ambiguous” objection lacks merit. A party objecting to discovery
5 requests as vague and ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity and, in
6 responding to discovery requests, should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary
7 definitions to terms and phrases utilized in the discovery sought. “[W]here the question is
8 somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is
9 to provide an appropriate response.” Deyo v. Kilbourne, 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 (1978). Courts
10 disfavor the use of boilerplate objections, such as “vague and ambiguous,” and will typically
11 decline to sustain such objections. See Standon Co., Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 901
12 (1990) (noting that an objection of “vague, ambiguous and unintelligible” to a request for “any
13 and all bills, statements and invoices” may be treated as a “nuisance” objection subject to
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14 sanctions). See also Manzetti v. Sup. Ct., 21 Cal. App. 4th 373, 377 (1993).
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15 Notably, the ‘ENGINE DEFECT(S)’ and ‘A/C DEFECT(S)’ (collectively the “Defects”)
16 definitions at the outset of Plaintiff’s requests are carefully drafted based on the symptoms, issues,
17 or problems experienced by Plaintiffs with the Subject Vehicle, as well as the language used by
18 Defendant’s authorized repair facilities in assessing customer concerns and in Defendant’s own
19 repair procedures. Moreover, Plaintiff’s requests, generally, seek information concerning
20 Defendant’s knowledge and awareness of the widespread Defects plaguing the Subject Vehicle;
21 the nature, scope, and extent of the Defects in 2021 Chevrolet Trax vehicles, including the Subject
22 Vehicle; and Defendant’s attempts to analyze, assess, understand, and cure said Defects. The
23 Request specifically seeks information pertaining directly to the Subject Vehicle. Indeed, nothing
24 about Plaintiff’s Requests is vague or ambiguous.
25 Without any explanation or basis, Defendant, in an utterly blanket and conclusory fashion,
26 asserts Plaintiff’s request is overbroad. Not so. Indeed, the vast majority of the requests only seeks
27 documents that pertain directly to with the Subject Vehicle, defined as the 2021 Chevrolet Trax,
28 Vehicle Identification Number KL7CJLSB9MB337526, purchased by Plaintiff. Nothing about
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 these Requests is overbroad and, as the objection ignores the plain scope of the Requests,
2 Defendant’s objection should be found unmeritorious.
3 Further, Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s requests are “unduly burdensome” is
4 equally specious. “[An] objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the
5 quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some
6 showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the
7 burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles, 56
8 Cal. 2d 407, 417-418 (1963) (noting that some burden is inherent in all demands for discovery
9 and a trial court is not empowered to sustain an objection predicated on burden unless “such is
10 the only method of rendering substantial justice”). See also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Sup.
11 Ct., 263 Cal. App. 2d 12, 19 (1968) (“in the exercise of its discretion the court should weigh the
12 relative importance of the information sought against the hardship which its production might
13 entail”). A responding party is required to make more than a conclusory statement of burden or
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14 expense. Coriell v. Sup. Ct., 39 Cal. App. 3d 487, 492-93 (1974) (noting that the burden lies on
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15 the responding party to factually establish why the propounding party is not entitled to an answer)
16 (emphasis added).
17 Defendant’s response does not even attempt to explain how, why, or to what extent the
18 work and/or expense involved in responding to the Requests poses an “undue burden.” In fact,
19 the documents pertaining to the Subject Vehicle are discrete documents that Defendant has a legal
20 right to obtain.
21 Therefore, Defendant’s objections are wholly conclusory and improperly shift the burden
22 on the asking party to establish why it is entitled to the information sought.
23 b) Defendant’s boilerplate relevance objections lack merit.
24 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Requests seek information that is neither relevant nor
25 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and/or that Plaintiff’s
26 allegations, claims, and/or causes of action are unproportional of the requests at issue.
27 Conveniently, Defendant forgets that the scope of discovery in this jurisdiction is broad. See Cal.
28 Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010. Generally, a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 relevant and not privileged. Id. For purposes of discovery, information is considered “relevant to
2 the subject matter involved in the pending action” if it might reasonably assist a party in
3 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof. Gonzalez v. Sup. Ct., 33
4 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 (1995). See also Lipton v. Sup. Ct., 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611 (1996).
5 The scope of discovery is one of reason, logic, and common sense. Lipton at 1611.
6 Admissibility does not control the scope of discovery; rather, the test is whether the
7 information sought might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
8 §2017.010. Any doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting
9 discovery. Colonial Life and Acc. Ins. Co.v. Sup Ct., 31 Cal.3d 785, 790 (1982). See also
10 Greyhound Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 56 Cal.2d 355, 376 (1961) (the expansive scope of discovery is a
11 deliberate attempt to take the game element out of trial preparation and to do away with the
12 sporting theory of litigation; namely, the surprise at trial). Further, objections based on
13 “irrelevancy and immateriality to the issues of the case…cannot be used to deny discovery.” Coy
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14 v. Sup. Ct., 58 Cal.2d 210, 217 (1962).
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15 Moreover, these documents can support the civil penalty claim by showing Defendant was
16 aware of a prevalent defect which neither it nor its dealerships could repair. After all,
17 “computerized recordkeeping at dealership service departments could easily facilitate [a
18 manufacturer’s awareness of every failed repair attempt], even without any direct contact from
19 the consumer to the manufacturer or any request for replacement or reimbursement…” Krotin v.
20 Porsche, 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 303 (1995). See also Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 35
21 Cal.App.4th 112, 136 (1995) (in assessing whether a violation is willful, the jury is entitled to
22 consider, among other things, whether “the manufacturer knew the vehicle had not been repaired
23 within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of attempts.”). As such, evidence that
24 Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, of a prevalent, unrepairable defect could be
25 introduced to establish that Defendant willfully failed to abide by its obligations under the Song-
26 Beverly Act by either turning a blind eye to such evidence or adopting internal policies to avoid
27 discovery of such facts.
28 Accordingly, the requested documents are relevant to the issues related to Defendant’s
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 good faith compliance with the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (i.e. the “Song-Beverly
2 Act”), including breach of the express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability. Civil
3 Code §§1791.1, 1793.2, 1794. See e.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 35 Cal.4th 1191, 1198-1199
4 (2005) (court in Song-Beverly Act litigation admitted evidence of Ford’s corporate policies and
5 practices regarding reacquisition of vehicles and issuance of credits for trade-ins) and Oregel v.
6 American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104-1105 (2001) (internal company policies
7 that demonstrate hidden obstacles for consumer to obtain redress are admissible).
8 Given the plain relevance of these Requests, Defendant’s evasive response is completely
9 perplexing. The use of boilerplate objections falls short of the standards articulated by the
10 California Code of Civil Procedure, which requires (1) that a party respond separately to each
11 item or category of item sought and (2) if there are objections that they be made with respect to
12 the particular demand to which the objection applies. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§2031.210
13 (a response to document requests requires a party to “respond separately to each item or category”
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14 in one of three ways, including “an objection to the particular demand”) (emphasis added) and
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15 2031.240(b) (if there is objection to producing “an item,” the response must “identify with
16 particularity any document ... to which an objection is being made” and “set forth clearly the
17 extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection” (emphasis added). See also Scottsdale Ins.
18 Co. v. Sup. Ct., 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 274.
19 As discussed above, the requested documents are plainly relevant to the subject matter of
20 the present action.
21 c) Defendant’s boilerplate privilege and work-product objections lack merit.
22 “If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is
23 protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties
24 to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
25 §2031.240(c)(1).
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Further, if any documents are withheld pursuant to a claimed privilege, the responding
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party must "(A) identify with particularity [the] document ..., and (B) set forth clearly the extent
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PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
1 of, and the specific ground for, the objection ...., the particular privilege ... [and] [i]f an
2 objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product [under
3 Section 2018.010], that claim shall be expressly asserted." Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(b). The
4 purpose of this requirement to provide a specific factual description of documents in aid of
5 substantiating a claim of privilege in connection with a request for document production is to
6 permit a judicial evaluation of the claim of privilege. Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112
7 Cal.App.4th 285, 292. In fact, the requirement of providing the information about withheld
8 documents in the body of a response, or service of a privilege log at the time responses are
9 served, was recently codified. Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c).
10 Here, Defendant fails to provide any factual information whatsoever
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Bryan M. Geoulla (SBN:345412) 1 SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC 2 10700 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 214 Los Angeles, California 90025 3 Telephone: (310) 525-2244 Facsimile: (310) 525-2234 4 Bryan@sevenlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff, 5 Yesnia Portillo Sanchez 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN 10 METROPOLITAN DIVISION 11 YESNIA PORTILLO SANCHEZ, Case No.: BCV-23-103825 12 Plaintiff, 13 vs. PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO 14 GENERAL MOTORS, LLC.; and DOES 1 COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO through 10, inclusive, PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 Defendants. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE 16 17 [Filed concurrently with Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Further 18 Responses and Memorandum of Point and Authorities, Declaration of Bryan M. Geoulla 19 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel] 20 Date: May 10, 2024 21 Time: 8:30 a.m. Judge: Hon. Thomas S. Clark 22 Dept.: 17 23 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Plaintiff Yesenia Portillo Sanchez hereby files the 25 attached separate statement in connection with Plaintiff’s motion for an order compelling 26 Defendant General Motors LLC to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s first set of requests to 27 inspect and copy documents, electronically stored information, and other tangible things. 28 1 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 Separate Statement [Requests For Production] Definitions 2 1. The term “YOU”, “YOUR”, and “DEFENDANT” shall mean Defendant GENERAL 3 MOTORS LLC, and any and all agents, representatives, assigns, successors, dealerships, 4 individuals, and/or businesses who represent themselves to be affiliated with, or work for, 5 GENERAL MOTORS LLC. 6 2. The term “DOCUMENT” shall be interpreted in accordance with California Evidence Code 7 § 250 and also to include electronic mails and (ESI) electronically stored information in native 8 format. 9 3. The term “PERSON” means and includes natural persons, corporations, partnerships, 10 associations, or any type of entity, and agents, servants, employees and representatives 11 thereof. 12 4. The term “SUBJECT VEHICLE” means the 2021 Chevrolet Trax [VIN: 13 KL7CJLSB9MB337526], purchased and/or leased by Plaintiff. 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 5. The term “CHEVROLET VEHICLES” refers to all Chevrolet Trax vehicles with a 1.4L I4 SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 DOHC 16V turbocharged LUV engine manufactured and/or distributed by YOU. 16 6. The term “ENGINE DEFECT(S)” shall be understood to mean and refer to any defect(s), 17 problem(s), condition(s), complaint(s), or other issue(s) reported by Plaintiff to YOU or and 18 of YOUR authorized service and repair facilities concerning the SUBJECT VEHICLE, 19 including but not limited to, illumination of the check engine warning light, loss of power, 20 vehicle shutting off while in operation, faulty engine knock sensor, engine knock sensor 21 replacement, faulty battery, battery replacement, faulty throttle position, throttle body internal 22 failure, throttle body replacement, overheating, coolant leak, faulty water outlet, faulty 23 radiator, faulty degas bottle, faulty water pump, water outlet replacement, radiator 24 replacement, degas bottle replacement, water pump replacement, and/or any other similar 25 concern identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE. 26 7. The term “A/C DEFECT(S)” shall be understood to mean and refer to any defect(s), 27 problem(s), condition(s), complaint(s), or other issue(s) reported by Plaintiff to YOU or and 28 of YOUR authorized service and repair facilities concerning the SUBJECT VEHICLE, 2 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 including but not limited to, HVAC system not blowing cold air, HVAC system not blowing 2 any air, compressor leak, compressor replacement, faulty blower motor, faulty blower motor 3 controller, faulty blower motor wiring, blower motor replacement, blower motor controller 4 replacement, blower motor wiring replacement, and/or any other similar concern identified in 5 the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE. 6 /// 7 /// 8 /// 9 /// 10 /// 11 /// 12 /// 13 /// 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 /// SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 3 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: 2 All DOCUMENTS concerning field reports, dealer contacts, warranty claims, customer 3 complaints, claims, reported failures regarding ENGINE DEFECT(S) in CHEVROLET 4 VEHICLE(S), including any DOCUMENTS concerning YOUR response to each field report, 5 customer complaint, reported failure, and warranty claim. [This request shall be understood to 6 also include communications and/or reports, which Defendant is required to maintained 7 pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Section 579.21. This Request requires 8 Defendant to produce these DOCUMENTS in their entirety and with all fields, columns, tables, 9 rows, attachments, and/or datapoints, and all available information (other than any identifying 10 customer contact information) including field names, codes, symptom codes, part numbers, 11 claim numbers, and/or all other information that exists. This request requires that the responding 12 party produce such DOCUMENTS in Excel or Microsoft Access format with only the customer 13 contact information and the last 6 digits of the VIN redacted.] 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 GM objects to this Request on grounds the terms "concerning," "customer complaints," 16 "claims," and "ENGINE DEFECT(S)" are vague and ambiguous. GM also objects to this 17 Request on grounds it improperly assumes that there are alleged defects with respect to the 18 SUBJECT VEHICLE, or GM VEHICLES, generally. GM also objects to this Request on 19 grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to 20 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at 21 issue in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and 22 oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the 23 needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the 24 litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request 25 violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly 27 Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of 28 this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and 4 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 trade secret information. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information 2 protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work- product doctrine. No documents will be 3 produced. 4 STATEMENT OF INSUFFICIENCY: 5 1. Good Cause Exists To Compel Further Responses 6 “Good cause” justifies the discovery sought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 7 2031.310(b)(1) because the documents are both relevant to the subject matter of this action and 8 because there are specific facts that justify the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; 9 Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Greyhound 10 Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 389.) Importantly, “[G]ood cause may be found in the pleadings theretofore filed in the action.” (56 Cal.2d 389.) “[T]he party who seeks to 11 compel production has met his burden of showing good cause simply by a fact-specific showing 12 of relevance.” (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) 13 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 Preliminarily, in seeking similar vehicle discovery for “Chevrolet vehicles” Plaintiff 14 defines these similar vehicles the same way Defendant identifies similar vehicles in its own part SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 573 reports to the NHTSA: by make, model, and engine type. Further, Plaintiff is not requesting 16 any more information than what the Defendant has already compiled and submitted to the 17 NHTSA. As such, the burden associated with producing these documents is relatively none- 18 existent as Defendant has already compiled and produced them in accordance with Defendant’s 19 reporting requirements under 49 CFR § 579.21. 20 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that on March 9, 2021, Plaintiff purchased the vehicle 21 which is the subject of this action, that the vehicle contains a number of irreparable defects, and 22 that Defendant was unable to repair the defects despite multiple repair attempts. The Complaint 23 alleges that Defendant had an affirmative duty to repurchase or replace the vehicle under the 24 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, and that Defendant willfully failed to comply with that 25 obligation. Defendant has denied these allegations, and has also alleged as an affirmative 26 defense that the defects were caused by third parties and/or abuse of the vehicle. 27 Generally, courts agree with GM that the evidence required to prove liability under 28 Song-Beverly focuses on records concerning the specific vehicle at issue. (See Krotin v. 5 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 303 (1995) (‘An automobile manufacturer 2 need not read minds to determine which vehicles are defective; it need only read its dealers’ 3 service records.”). However, Plaintiff is also seeking civil penalties. Under Song-Beverly, “[i]f 4 the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer is entitled to receive a 5 civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c); Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1104 (2001). “Willfulness” requires a 6 showing that defendant knew of its obligations under Song-Beverly but declined to fulfill them. 7 Bishop v. Hyundai Motor Am., 44 Cal. App. 4th 750, 759, (1996). In connection with Plaintiff's 8 Song-Beverly claims, Plaintiff needs "other vehicle" discovery to demonstrate Defendant's 9 willful violations of the Song-Beverly Act. Critical to the analysis of “willfulness” is whether 10 the defendant was previously aware of a defect. To the extent a defendant was aware of a defect 11 but nevertheless refused to promptly repurchase a buyer‘s vehicle, the defendant willfully 12 violated the Act. This awareness can be established by various means, including, for instance, 13 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 evidence that the buyer‘s vehicle had not been repaired after a reasonable number of attempts; 14 internal investigations that show that the defendant was aware of the defect in other vehicles; SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 and warranty records showing that other consumers were also affected by the defect. See 16 Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 35 Cal. App. 4th 112, 136 (1995); Oregel v. American Isuzu 17 Motors, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1104-05 (2001); Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 18 175 Cal. App. 3d 218, 226 (1985). These are exactly the category of documents and information 19 that Plaintiff seeks. “Certainly, evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited 20 conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide relevant support for an 21 argument that strong medicine is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law.” BMW 22 of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996) 23 They are also relevant to rebut any claim by Defendant that the problems are not 24 genuine, that the particular repairs Defendant performed were successful, that no other repairs 25 are available, or that Defendant is unaware of such problems in its mass produced vehicles. 26 (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1162 [Evidence of similar past 27 conduct is relevant and directly admissible at trial to establish liability for punitive damages, 28 and to prove some fact such as motive, intent, plan, knowledge or absence of mistake or 6 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 accident.].) 2 2. Plaintiffs Request Is Narrow In Scope and Breadth 3 With respect to similar vehicle discovery for consumer complaints, warranty claims, and 4 field reports matching Plaintiff’s definitions of “Engine Defect(s)” and “A/C Defect(s).” 5 Although Defendant posits that “[our] definitions of the alleged defects are so general and 6 lacking in specificity that it would be practically impossible for GM to meaningfully search for 7 and collect potentially relevant documents.” A quick review of GM’s obligations under 49 CFR 8 § 579.21 will surely reveal that Plaintiff’s definitions (which Plaintiff has specially crafted these 9 definitions by looking directly to the Subject Vehicles repair orders and the issues reported 10 therein) are actually far narrower and more specific than the vehicle component definitions with 11 which GM must contend under 49 CFR § 579.21(b)(2). For example, therein the definitions of 12 ‘Engine and Engine Cooling’ is: “Engine and engine cooling means the component (e.g., motor) 13 of a motor vehicle providing motive power to the vehicle, and includes the exhaust system 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 (including the exhaust emission system), the engine control unit, engine lubrication system, and SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 the underhood cooling system for that engine. This term also includes all associated switches, 16 control units, connective elements (such as wiring harnesses, hoses, piping, etc.), and mounting 17 elements (such as brackets, fasteners, etc.).” Accordingly, Defendant assertion that Plaintiff 18 definitions of the alleged defects make no attempt to narrow the scope of the responsive 19 documents is misplaced. Furthermore, Defendant’s unfounded assertion that this request will 20 pose an “insurmountable burden on GM to produce ‘[a]ll DOCUMENTS, including ESI and 21 emails’ related to any potential cause of these generic system issues in any 2021 Chevrolet Trax 22 regardless of whether they have any relation to Plaintiff’s vehicle” is equally specious. 23 Plaintiff’s categorization of the generic systems issue involved in this case directly mirror the 24 categorization of generic system issues with which GM must comport its legal obligation under 25 49 CFR § 579.21(b)(2). 26 In fact, Defendant never provided a factual basis to support its assertion that it would 27 pose an insurmountable burden to produce GM’s 49 CFR § 579.21(C) reports for Chevrolet 28 Trax vehicles with a 1.4 liter inline-4 dual overhead cam 16-valve turbocharged light utility 7 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 vehicle engine coded as “engine and engine cooling system.” The whole purpose of the 2 requested similar vehicle discovery is to support Plaintiff’s contention that the Subject Vehicle 3 has safety-related defects and/or is in noncompliance in GM’s warranty of Trax vehicles. 4 Indeed, “[t]he purpose of [49 CFR §579.2] is to enhance motor vehicle safety by specifying 5 information and documents that manufacturers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 6 must provide to NHTSA with respect to possible safety-related defects and noncompliances in 7 their products. . .” (See., Title 49 CRF § 579.2, Purpose). Accordingly, these documents could 8 provide crucial support to Plaintiff’s contention that GM has breached affirmative duty to 9 promptly repurchase the Subject Vehicle. Moreover, the scope of information included in these 10 reports is specifically limited to “identify defects related to motor vehicle safety and 11 noncompliances with Federal motor vehicle safety standards. . .” (See., Title 49 CFR § 579.1 12 Scope). Which also happens to be the scope of requested discovery in this instance. Thus, the 13 scope and purpose GM’s internal communications, reports, financial information, investigations 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 and analysis of other vehicles, other lawsuits, communications with government agencies, and SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 design and development issues, is explicitly relevant to whether GM willfully breached its duty 16 to repurchase the subject vehicle, and thereby beholds a tendency in reason to prove a disputed 17 fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. 18 Accordingly, Defendant should produce documents responsive to Plaintiff definition of 19 Engine Defect(s) or A/C Defect(s) since Plaintiff definitions of the alleged defects are 20 exponentially narrower in scope than the coded definitions under 49 CFR § 579.21(b)(2), with 21 which Defendant must comply and regularly does. 22 3. Privilege Log Missing 23 Defendant’s March 19, 2024, response to Plaintiff’s initial meet and confer letter states 24 that “GM will provide a privilege log for any documents withheld as privileged.” (Exhibit 5, Pg. 25 1). However, Defendant has not yet served a privilege log for documents it withheld. 26 Accordingly, Defendant should produce a privilege log for documents withheld. 27 /// 28 /// 8 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 4. Insufficiency of Objections 2 a) Defendant’s boilerplate vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome 3 objection lacks merit. 4 Defendant’s “vague and ambiguous” objection lacks merit. A party objecting to discovery 5 requests as vague and ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity and, in 6 responding to discovery requests, should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary 7 definitions to terms and phrases utilized in the discovery sought. “[W]here the question is 8 somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is 9 to provide an appropriate response.” Deyo v. Kilbourne, 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 (1978). Courts 10 disfavor the use of boilerplate objections, such as “vague and ambiguous,” and will typically 11 decline to sustain such objections. See Standon Co., Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 901 12 (1990) (noting that an objection of “vague, ambiguous and unintelligible” to a request for “any 13 and all bills, statements and invoices” may be treated as a “nuisance” objection subject to 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 sanctions). See also Manzetti v. Sup. Ct., 21 Cal. App. 4th 373, 377 (1993). SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 Notably, the ‘ENGINE DEFECT(S)’ and ‘A/C DEFECT(S)’ (collectively the “Defects”) 16 definitions at the outset of Plaintiff’s requests are carefully drafted based on the symptoms, issues, 17 or problems experienced by Plaintiffs with the Subject Vehicle, as well as the language used by 18 Defendant’s authorized repair facilities in assessing customer concerns and in Defendant’s own 19 repair procedures. Moreover, Plaintiff’s requests, generally, seek information concerning 20 Defendant’s knowledge and awareness of the widespread Defects plaguing the Subject Vehicle; 21 the nature, scope, and extent of the Defects in 2021 Chevrolet Trax vehicles, including the Subject 22 Vehicle; and Defendant’s attempts to analyze, assess, understand, and cure said Defects. The 23 Request specifically seeks information pertaining directly to the Subject Vehicle. Indeed, nothing 24 about Plaintiff’s Requests is vague or ambiguous. 25 Without any explanation or basis, Defendant, in an utterly blanket and conclusory fashion, 26 asserts Plaintiff’s request is overbroad. Not so. Indeed, the vast majority of the requests only seeks 27 documents that pertain directly to with the Subject Vehicle, defined as the 2021 Chevrolet Trax, 28 Vehicle Identification Number KL7CJLSB9MB337526, purchased by Plaintiff. Nothing about 9 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 these Requests is overbroad and, as the objection ignores the plain scope of the Requests, 2 Defendant’s objection should be found unmeritorious. 3 Further, Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s requests are “unduly burdensome” is 4 equally specious. “[An] objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the 5 quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some 6 showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the 7 burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles, 56 8 Cal. 2d 407, 417-418 (1963) (noting that some burden is inherent in all demands for discovery 9 and a trial court is not empowered to sustain an objection predicated on burden unless “such is 10 the only method of rendering substantial justice”). See also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Sup. 11 Ct., 263 Cal. App. 2d 12, 19 (1968) (“in the exercise of its discretion the court should weigh the 12 relative importance of the information sought against the hardship which its production might 13 entail”). A responding party is required to make more than a conclusory statement of burden or 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 expense. Coriell v. Sup. Ct., 39 Cal. App. 3d 487, 492-93 (1974) (noting that the burden lies on SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 the responding party to factually establish why the propounding party is not entitled to an answer) 16 (emphasis added). 17 Defendant’s response does not even attempt to explain how, why, or to what extent the 18 work and/or expense involved in responding to the Requests poses an “undue burden.” In fact, 19 the documents pertaining to the Subject Vehicle are discrete documents that Defendant has a legal 20 right to obtain. 21 Therefore, Defendant’s objections are wholly conclusory and improperly shift the burden 22 on the asking party to establish why it is entitled to the information sought. 23 b) Defendant’s boilerplate relevance objections lack merit. 24 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Requests seek information that is neither relevant nor 25 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and/or that Plaintiff’s 26 allegations, claims, and/or causes of action are unproportional of the requests at issue. 27 Conveniently, Defendant forgets that the scope of discovery in this jurisdiction is broad. See Cal. 28 Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010. Generally, a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is 10 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 relevant and not privileged. Id. For purposes of discovery, information is considered “relevant to 2 the subject matter involved in the pending action” if it might reasonably assist a party in 3 evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof. Gonzalez v. Sup. Ct., 33 4 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 (1995). See also Lipton v. Sup. Ct., 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611 (1996). 5 The scope of discovery is one of reason, logic, and common sense. Lipton at 1611. 6 Admissibility does not control the scope of discovery; rather, the test is whether the 7 information sought might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 8 §2017.010. Any doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting 9 discovery. Colonial Life and Acc. Ins. Co.v. Sup Ct., 31 Cal.3d 785, 790 (1982). See also 10 Greyhound Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 56 Cal.2d 355, 376 (1961) (the expansive scope of discovery is a 11 deliberate attempt to take the game element out of trial preparation and to do away with the 12 sporting theory of litigation; namely, the surprise at trial). Further, objections based on 13 “irrelevancy and immateriality to the issues of the case…cannot be used to deny discovery.” Coy 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 v. Sup. Ct., 58 Cal.2d 210, 217 (1962). SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 Moreover, these documents can support the civil penalty claim by showing Defendant was 16 aware of a prevalent defect which neither it nor its dealerships could repair. After all, 17 “computerized recordkeeping at dealership service departments could easily facilitate [a 18 manufacturer’s awareness of every failed repair attempt], even without any direct contact from 19 the consumer to the manufacturer or any request for replacement or reimbursement…” Krotin v. 20 Porsche, 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 303 (1995). See also Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 35 21 Cal.App.4th 112, 136 (1995) (in assessing whether a violation is willful, the jury is entitled to 22 consider, among other things, whether “the manufacturer knew the vehicle had not been repaired 23 within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of attempts.”). As such, evidence that 24 Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, of a prevalent, unrepairable defect could be 25 introduced to establish that Defendant willfully failed to abide by its obligations under the Song- 26 Beverly Act by either turning a blind eye to such evidence or adopting internal policies to avoid 27 discovery of such facts. 28 Accordingly, the requested documents are relevant to the issues related to Defendant’s 11 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 good faith compliance with the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (i.e. the “Song-Beverly 2 Act”), including breach of the express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability. Civil 3 Code §§1791.1, 1793.2, 1794. See e.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 35 Cal.4th 1191, 1198-1199 4 (2005) (court in Song-Beverly Act litigation admitted evidence of Ford’s corporate policies and 5 practices regarding reacquisition of vehicles and issuance of credits for trade-ins) and Oregel v. 6 American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104-1105 (2001) (internal company policies 7 that demonstrate hidden obstacles for consumer to obtain redress are admissible). 8 Given the plain relevance of these Requests, Defendant’s evasive response is completely 9 perplexing. The use of boilerplate objections falls short of the standards articulated by the 10 California Code of Civil Procedure, which requires (1) that a party respond separately to each 11 item or category of item sought and (2) if there are objections that they be made with respect to 12 the particular demand to which the objection applies. See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§2031.210 13 (a response to document requests requires a party to “respond separately to each item or category” 10700 SANTA MONICA BLVD., SUITE 214 14 in one of three ways, including “an objection to the particular demand”) (emphasis added) and SEVEN LAW GROUP, APC LOS ANGELES, CA 90025 15 2031.240(b) (if there is objection to producing “an item,” the response must “identify with 16 particularity any document ... to which an objection is being made” and “set forth clearly the 17 extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection” (emphasis added). See also Scottsdale Ins. 18 Co. v. Sup. Ct., 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 274. 19 As discussed above, the requested documents are plainly relevant to the subject matter of 20 the present action. 21 c) Defendant’s boilerplate privilege and work-product objections lack merit. 22 “If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is 23 protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties 24 to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 25 §2031.240(c)(1). 26 Further, if any documents are withheld pursuant to a claimed privilege, the responding 27 party must "(A) identify with particularity [the] document ..., and (B) set forth clearly the extent 28 12 PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1 of, and the specific ground for, the objection ...., the particular privilege ... [and] [i]f an 2 objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product [under 3 Section 2018.010], that claim shall be expressly asserted." Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(b). The 4 purpose of this requirement to provide a specific factual description of documents in aid of 5 substantiating a claim of privilege in connection with a request for document production is to 6 permit a judicial evaluation of the claim of privilege. Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 7 Cal.App.4th 285, 292. In fact, the requirement of providing the information about withheld 8 documents in the body of a response, or service of a privilege log at the time responses are 9 served, was recently codified. Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(c). 10 Here, Defendant fails to provide any factual information whatsoever