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Filing # 194695569 E-Filed 03/25/2024 09:39:14 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
VILLAS AT EMERALD LAKE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida not for profit
corporation;
Plaintiff, Case No.: 2020-CA-002942
v.
ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company; ADVANCED WRAPPING AND
CONCRETE SOLUTIONS OF CENTRAL
FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation; DON
KING’S CONCRETE, INC., a Florida corporation;
HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
Florida corporation; IMPERIAL BUILDING
CORPORATION, a Florida corporation; PREMIER
PLASTERING OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC.
N/K/A TGK STUCCO, INC., a Florida corporation;
WEATHERMASTER BUILDING PRODUCTS,
INC., a Florida corporation; WEINTRAUB
INSPECTIONS & FORENSICS, INC. N/K/A
WEINTRAUB ENGINEERING AND
INSPECTIONS, INC., a Florida corporation; THE
DIMILLO GROUP, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company; WOLF’S IRRIGATIONS &
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Florida corporation;
SUMMERPARK HOMES, INC., a Florida
corporation; BROWN + COMPANY
ARCHITECTURE, INC., a Florida corporation,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company,
Crossclaim Plaintiff,
v.
ADVANCED WRAPPING AND CONCRETE
SOLUTIONS OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC. a
Florida corporation; DON KING’S CONCRETE,
INC., a Florida corporation; HUGH MACDONALD
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Florida corporation;
IMPERIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, a Florida
corporation; PREMIER PLASTERING OF
CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC. N/K/A TGK STUCCO,
INC., a Florida corporation; WEATHERMASTER
BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida
corporation; WEINTRAUB INSPECTIONS &
FORENSICS, INC. N/K/A WEINTRAUB
ENGINEERING AND INSPECTIONS, INC., a
Florida corporation; WOLF’S IRRIGATIONS &
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Florida corporation;
EXPERT PAINTING & WASHING, INC., a Florida
corporation
Crossclaim Defendants.
_________________________________________/
WEATHERMASTER BUILDING PRODUCTS,
INC., a Florida Corporation
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
ALL GLASS INSTALLATION CORP., a Florida
corporation; CASEY HAWKINS GLASS, INC., a
Florida corporation; HELBERG ENGERPRISES,
LLC a Florida limited liability company; HOBBIT
WINDOWS, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company; T&M CONSTRUCTION OF SANFORD,
INC., a Florida corporation; WEATHERMASTER
BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida limited
liability company; WELL DONE WINDOWS &
DOORS, LLC., a Florida limited liability company;
WELL HUNG WINDOWS & DOORS, LLC., a
Florida limited liability company,
Third-Party Defendants.
_________________________________________/
DEFENDANT/CROSS CLAIM DEFENDANT’S, HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION,
INC., RESPONE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT/ CROSS CLAIM PLAINTIFF, ROYAL
OAK HOMES, LLC’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY ROYAL OAK AND THE
BREACH OF THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO DEFEND AGAINST HUGH MACDONALD
CONSTRUCTION, INC.
COMES NOW, Defendant/ Cross Claim Defendant, HUGH MACDONALD
CONSTRUCTION, INC. (“HMC”), by and through its undersigned counsel and pursuant to
Fla. R. Civ. P 1.1510, as amended effective May 1, 2021, the Florida Rules of Evidence, as
well as the additional legal authorities cited herein, respectfully files this Response in
Opposition (“Response”) to Defendant/ Cross Claim Plaintiff, ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’s
(“Royal Oak”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the contractual duties to defend
and indemnify Royal Oak and the breach of the contractual duty to defend against HMC
and states as follows:
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. This matter arises from the construction of the Project known as the Villas at
Emerald Lakes Townhomes located in Osceola County, Florida (the “Project”)
operated by the Villas at Emerald Lakes Homeowners Association, Inc.
(“Association”).
2. Royal Oak served as the developer and general contractor for the
construction of 10 buildings at the Project.
3. HMC served as a roofing subcontractor to Royal Oak for the construction of
10 buildings at the Project.
4. On November 23, 2020, the Association filed a Complaint against Royal Oak,
HMC, and other subcontractors asserting claims arising from alleged defects
in the construction of the Project. Specifically, Royal Oak has been sued for
negligence and vicarious liability and breach of the Florida Building Code.
5. The Association’s complaint against Royal Oak includes multiple averments
of Royal Oak’s own active fault, including, but not limited to:
Negligently developing, inspecting, supervising, certifying, and approving the
construction of the Project.
Directly supervising and influencing the manner in which all of the work was
performed and/or negligently creating and/or negligently approving conditions
that were in violations of the Florida Building Code.
(See Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 70, 76).
6. Royal Oak has filed Cross Claims against the subcontractors who worked on
the Project including HMC.
7. Royal Oak’s current Cross Claim against HMC alleges counts for breach of
contract, negligence, and statutory cause of action pursuant to §553.84, Fla. Stat.
8. Royal Oak now moves for summary judgment against HMC as to its cross
claim for breach of contract.
9. Royal Oak argues that HMC has breached Article 18 of the subcontract
agreement by failing to defend and indemnify Royal Oak as to the
Association’s suit against it.
10. Royal Oak’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied as the
allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint (and any amendments thereto) to not
trigger HMC’s alleged duty to defend based on the terms and provision of the
relevant Subcontract, and any determination of indemnification is premature.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Under Florida’s current summary judgment standard, the moving party still “…bears
the burden of identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the lack of a genuinely
disputed issue of material fact.” Brevard County v. Waters Mark Development Enterprises,
LC, 350 So. 2d 395, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). Only if the movant does so, does the burden shift to the non-movant. Id.
Here, the language of the subcontract agreement coupled with the language of the
Association’s complaint warrants denial of summary judgment on Royal Oak’s breach of
duty to defend and indemnify claim against HMC.
B. Summary Judgment on HMC’s Duty to Indemnify Royal Oak is premature.
Royal Oak’s indemnity claim against HMC is premature until liability is determined.
See Fitzpatrick v. Meredith, 248 So.3d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); see also Rea v.
Barton Protective Servs., Inc., 660 So.2d 772, 773-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Since liability
has not been determined in the instant matter, Royal Oak’s Motion for Summary Judgment
as to HMC’s duty to indemnify Royal Oak must be denied.
C. The indemnification provision in the HMC/ Royal Oak is unenforceable
pursuant to Florida Statute §725.06.
Florida Statute §725.06 imposes certain limitations and requirements on indemnity
provisions contained within construction-related contracts. The relevant portion of Florida
Statute §725.06 states as follows:
(1) Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection with, or any
guarantee of or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or
demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance, including moving
and excavating associated therewith, between an owner of real property and an
architect, engineer, general contractor, subcontractor, sub-subcontractor, or
materialman or any combination thereof wherein any party referred to herein
promises to indemnify or hold harmless the other party to the agreement,
contract, or guarantee for liability for damages to persons or property caused in
whole or in part by any act, omission, or default of the indemnitee arising from
the contract or its performance, shall be void and unenforceable unless the
contract contains a monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification
that bears a reasonable commercial relationship to the contract and is part
of the project specifications or bid documents, if any.
See Fla. Stat. §725.06 (emphasis added).
In the instant matter, the subcontract between Royal Oak and HMC requires HMC to
indemnify Royal Oak for Royal Oak’s own negligence and the provision does not contain a
monetary limitation as required by Fla. Stat. §725.06 and it is therefore void and
unenforceable. See also Griswold Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Tony Reddick, and Pumpco,
Inc., 134 So.3d 985, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). While Royal Oak claims that it is not seeking
indemnity for its own negligence, the Plaintiff has alleged that Royal Oak: (1) negligently
developed, inspected, supervised, certified, and approved the construction of the Project;
and (2) directly supervised and influenced manner in which all of the work was performed
and/or negligently creating and/or negligently approving conditions that were in violations of
the Florida Building Code. See Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 70, 76. Royal
Oak is now seeking to subvert the clear intent of Florida Statute §725.06 by demanding a
defense on claims for which indemnity is prohibited by statute. Accordingly, Royal Oak’s
Motion should be denied.
D. Royal Oak is Not Entitled to a Defense under the Subcontract Agreement
between HMC and Royal Oak.
While Royal Oak cites case law that discusses the duty to defend in an insurance
context (i.e., when an insurer has a duty to defend its own insured), those cases are
completely inapplicable to the instant matter. It must be emphasized that in construing an
indemnity provision not given by one in the insurance business but only as an incident to a
contract, the main purpose of which was not indemnity, the indemnity provision must be
strictly construed in favor of the indemnitor. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America, 547 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989 Here, as Royal Oak has been
sued for its own active fault, Royal Oak is not entitled to a defense as the duty to defend is
contained within the same sentence as the unenforceable indemnification provision
discussed above. In Barton Malow Co. v. Grunau Co., the Second District Court of Appeal
held that Barton-Malow was not recovery of its attorneys’ fees because the duty to defend
was not severable from the remainder of the indemnity provision in Barton-Malow’s
subcontract agreement that was determined to be invalid. Barton Malow Co. v. Grunau
Co., 835 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA). The facts in Barton Malow are nearly analogous
to the instant matter. In Barton Malow, Barton Malow served as the general contractor of
the construction of the Polk County Courthouse and Barton Malow was sued by numerous
courthouse employees shortly after completion of construction for health problems
allegedly caused by the negligent construction of the courthouse. Id at 1165. In turn, Barton
Malow sued its subcontractors for both common law and contractual indemnity. Id. Barton
Malow settled the claims of the courthouse employees and all but six of its subcontractors
and the matter proceeded to trial solely on the third-party contractual indemnity claims
against the six remining subcontractors. Id. Prior to trial, the trial court found that the
indemnity provision in the Barton Malow subcontracts was unenforceable, however, the trial
court found that the “duty to defend” portion of the indemnity provision was severable from
the remainder of the provision. Id. Similar to the instant matter, the relevant language in the
subcontract agreements in Barton Malow required the subcontractors to “protect, defend,
indemnify an save harmless…Barton-Malow Company…from and against all losses,
claims, demands, payments, damages, suits, actions, attorney’s fees, recoveries and
judgments of every nature and description brought or recovered against…Barton-Malow
Company.” Barton Malow at 1167. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal held that
nothing in the subcontract language indicated that the parties intended the duty to defend
to be severable from the remainder of the duties in the indemnity provision and the
structure of the indemnity provision did not support Barton Malow’s argument or the trial
court’s interpretation that the provision was severable. Id. Because the indemnity provision
that was contained in the same sentence as the duty to defend was invalid and no other
contractual provision imposed a duty to defend, the Second District Court of Appeal held
that the subcontractors had no contractual obligation to indemnify Barton Marlow for its
defense costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. In the instant matter, the indemnification clause in
the Royal Oak/HMC subcontract reads as follows:
18. Indemnification. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Contractor agrees to
indemnify, defend and hold harmless Builder, and each of its shareholders,
members, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees,
representatives and invitees from all claims, demands, suits, actions, liens, liability,
losses, expenses, damages or injuries of any kind or nature whatsoever (including
all expenses of litigation, court costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs)
caused wholly or in part by any act, omission, or negligence of Contractor, its
Subcontractors, employees, agents, suppliers, servants or any other persons directly
or indirectly controlled, employed or engaged by Contractor, regardless of whether
such act, omission or negligence occurs in connection with the Work or is within the
scope of any of their duties under this Agreement (collectively, “Claims”). “Claims”
shall also specifically include, but are not limited to, the following:
…(b) Claims of injuries to property or persons, including death (regardless of
whether contributed to by acts or negligence of Builder);…
….(d) Claims arising from a breach of this Agreement by Contractor;…
…IT IS THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT THAT
THE INDEMNITY SET FORTH IN THIS SECTION IS, TO THE FULLEST EXENT
PERMITTED BY LAW, AN INDEMNITY PROVIDED BY CONTRACTOR TO
INDEMNIFY AND PROTECT BUILDER FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF
BUILDERS’ OWN NEGLIGENCE (BUT NOT ITS SOLE OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE
OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT), REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ANY SUCH
NEGLIGENCE IS A CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE OF THE RESULTANT INJURY,
DEATH OR DAMAGE,…
See Article 18 of the Royal Oak/HMC Subcontract Agreement (emphasis added).
Like the subcontract in Barton Malow, the duty to defend provision in the HMC
subcontract is not severable from the remainder of the duties in the indemnity provision and
is contained within the exact same sentence as the indemnification provision and is not
severable.1 The duties are inextricably intertwined and HMC’s alleged defense obligation
does not exist independent of HMC’s alleged indemnification obligation. As much as Royal
Oak may try to interpret otherwise, precent supports that the duty to defend in this case is
not a sand-alone obligation that can be enforced without a finding of underlying liability,
pursuant to the clear terms and provisions of the HMC/Royal Oak Subcontract.
Additionally, HMC Subcontract does not require HMC to defend claims being made
against Royal Oak unrelated to HMC’s scope of work, which is what Royal Oak is seeking
in the instant mater. The Association’s original Complaint, as well as the Association’s
Amended and Second Amended Complaint assert a large number of claims against Royal
Oak and various subcontractors for alleged construction defects completely unrelated to
HMC’s scope of work on the Project. See ¶49 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defense and
indemnity agreements are “subject to the general rule of contractual construction” and
consequently are “construed based on the intentions of the parties.” Dade County Sch. Bd.
V. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 643 (Fla. 1999). When contract terms are clear
and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the contract. Church &
Tower of Fla., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecoms., Inc., 936 So.2d 40, 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). In
1 While Royal Oak cites to Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc. v. Devereau Foundation, Inc., 366 So.3d 1154 (Fla.
2d DCA 2023) to somehow stand for the proposition that Barton Malow is no longer good law, the Second
District Court of Appeal noted in their decision that their appeal turned on a limited issue, which was
“…whether Eckerd’s letters sufficiently invoked Devereux’s duty to provide a defense pursuant to the
indemnity provision contract” and not whether the indemnity provision was ambiguous and thus
unenforceable. The Appellate Court specifically notes that argument was not properly before the Court on
appeal.
cases involving contractual indemnity, the terms of the agreement will determine whether
the indemnitor is obligated to reimburse the indemnitee for a particular claim. Camp,
Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 853 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In
the instant matter, Royal Oak is seeking that HMC defend it from claims being made Royal
Oak unrelated to HMC’s scope of work where there is no duty for HMC to defend and
indemnify for same. For all the foregoing reasons, Royal Oak’s motion as to its claims for
breach of the duty to defend and indemnify should be denied.
Generally, a motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits.
See Redland Ins. Co. v. Cem Site Constructors, Inc., 86 So.3d 1259, 1261 (Fla. 2d 2012).
Contrary to what Royal Oak contends, the court cannot interpret the alleged duty to defend
in a vacuum with consideration of the language in Article 18 of the Subcontract between
HMC and Royal Oak. Because the duty to defend is not severable from the duty to
indemnify, the indemnification provision requires a finding of liability, and liability has not
been entered against HMC. As such, no duty to defend is owed at this time. To grant Royal
Oak summary judgment on the alleged duty to defend would be a substitution for trial on
the merits because determination of whether an indemnification obligation has been
triggered, i.e. who is liable for the underlying allegations/damages, has not been made and
Royal Oak has failed to meet its burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact as to HMC’s alleged liability. For all the foregoing reasons, Royal Oak’s motion
as to its claims for breach of the duty to defend should be denied.
II. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the reasons in the opposition stated above, along with
the undisputed facts and plain language of the HMC/Royal Oak Subcontract,
Defendant/Cross Claim Defendant, HUGH MADCONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
respectfully requests the entry of an Order denying Defendant/ Cross Claim Plaintiff,
ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’S Motion for Summary Judgment as to HMC’s contractual duty
to indemnify and defend, and any and all further relief as the Court deems just and proper
under the circumstances.
BUTLER WEIHMULLER KATZ CRAIG LLP
DENISE M. ANDERSON, ESQ.
Florida Bar No.: 0029602
danderson@butler.legal
ASHLEY M. MATTINGLY, ESQ.
Florida Bar No.: 106094
amattingly@butler.legal
Secondary: bryan@butler.legal
rjorge@butler.legal
400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 2300
Tampa, Florida 33602
Telephone: (813) 281-1900
Facsimile: (813) 281-0900
Secondary: bryan@butler.legal
rjorge@butler.legal
Attorneys for Defendant/ Cross Claim Defendant,
Hugh MacDonald Construction, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 25, 2024, the foregoing was electronically filed
with the Clerk of the Court by using E-Filing Portal, which will electronically serve this
document to all registered counsel of record.
Phillip E. Joseph, Esq. Lannie D. Hough Jr., Esq.
Evan J. Small, Esq. James Michael Walls, Esq.
Allana D.E. Smith, Esq. Brian C. Porter, Esq.
Jeffery A, Widelitz, Esq. Carlton Fields, P.A.
Ball Janik, LLP 4221 W. Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 1000
201 E. Pine Street, Suite 600 Tampa, Florida 33607
Orlando, Florida 32801 mwalls@carltonfields.com
pjoseph@balljanik.com lhough@carltonfields.com
esmall@balljanik.com bporter@carltonfields.com
jwidelitz@balljanik.com ejohnson@carltonfields.com
asmith@balljanik.com nbonilla@carltonfields.com
ypalmer@balljanik.com bwoolard@carltonfields.com
cbetancourt@balljanik.com
bburton@balljanik.com Counsel for Royal Oak Homes, LLC
dmiksell@balljanik.com
orlandodocket@balljanik.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
Paul Sidney Elliott, Esq. Peter J. Kapsales, Esq.
P.O. Box 274204 Margaret M. Efta, Esq.
Tampa, FL 33688-4204 Milne Law Group, P.A.
pse@psejd.com 301 E. Pine Street, Suite 525
Orlando, FL 32801
Counsel for Hugh MacDonald pkapsales@milnelawgroup.com
Construction, Inc. mefta@milnelawgroup.com
mmilne@milnelawgroup.com
eservice@milnelawgroup.com
Counsel for Weathermaster Building
Products, Inc.
Thamir A.R. Kaddouri Jr., Esq. Timothy C. Ford, Esq.
Penelope T. Rowlett, Esq. Andrew E. Holway, Esq.
Beth Ann Tobey, Esq. Rocco Cafaro, Esq.
Law Office of Thamir A.R. Kaddouri, Jr., Hill Ward Henderson
P.A. 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 3700
3220 West Cypress Street Tampa, Florida 33602
Tampa, FL 33607 tim.ford@hwhlaw.com
Thamir.Kaddouri@tampalaw.org andrew.holway@hwhlaw.com
Service@TampaLaw.org rocco.cafaro@hwhlaw.com
Beth.Tobey@tampalaw.org tracy.coale@hwhlaw.com
Penelope.rowlett@tampalaw.org kathy.wernsing@hwhlaw.com
derrick.calandra@hwhlaw.com
Counsel for Imperial Building
Corporation Counsel for Weintraub Inspections &
Forensics, Inc. f/k/a Weintraub
Engineering and Inspections, Inc.
Jayne Ann Pittman, Esq. Bruce R. Calderon, Esq.
Natalie C. Fischer, Esq. Alicia Z. Gross, Esq.
Conroy Simberg Barri A. Reisch, Esq.
Two South Orange Ave, Suite 300 Michael Lynott, Esq.
Orlando, Florida 32801 Milber Makris Plousadis & Seiden, LLP
eserviceorl@conroysimberg.com 1900 NW Corporate Blvd, East Tower,
jpittman@conroysimberg.com Suite 440
mmaitland@conroysimberg.com Boca Raton, Florida 33431
nfischer@conroysimberg.com bcalderon@milbermakris.com
agross@milbermakris.com
Counsel for Advanced Wrapping and breisch@milbermakris.com
Concrete Solutions of Central Florida, kmcdowell@milbermakris.com
Inc. sskowronski@milbermakris.com
Counsel for Brown + Company
Architecture, Inc.
Scott Ross, Esq. M. Austin Moretz, Esq.
Groelle & Salmon, P.A. Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr and
1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 320 Smith, PLC
Tampa, FL 33607 21 E. Garden Street First Floor
gstcourtdocs@gspalaw.com Pensacola, FL 32502
sross@gspalaw.com jmgservice@gallowaylawfirm.com
cebanks@gspalaw.com moretzservice@gallowaylawfirm.com
Counsel for Helberg Enterprises, LLC Counsel for Hobbit Windows, LLC
Cole J. Copertino, Esq. Phillip S. Howell, Esq.
James Michael Moorhead, Esq. Brenden C. Collins, Esq,
Wright, Fulford, Moorhead & Brown, P.A. Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr &
505 Maitland Avenue, Suite 1000 Smith, P.L.C.
Altamonte Springs, FL 32701 400 N. Ashley Dr., Suite 1000
ccopertino@wfmblaw.com Tampa, Florida 33602
mmoorhead@wfmblaw.com tampaservice@gallowaylawfirm.com
cbraungart@wfmblaw.com phowell@gallowaylawfirm.com
jgarcia@wfbmlaw.com bcollins@gallowaylawfirm.com
Counsel for Well Hung Windows & Counsel for Casey Hawkins Glass, Inc.
Doors, LLC
Jennifer Shippole, Esq. Andrew T. Marshall, Esq.
Monal O. Zipper, Esq. Sara W. Mapes, Esq.
Law Office of Jennifer L. Shippole Hamilton, Price & Marshall, P.A.
14050 NW 14th Street, Suite 180 2400 Manatee Ave. W.
Sunrise, FL 33323 Bradenton, FL 34205
pleadings@fednat.com Andrew@hamiltonpricelaw.com
mzipper@fednat.com Nancy@hamiltonpricelaw.com
jshippole@fednat.com Kelsey@hamiltonpricelaw.com
Sara@hamiltonpricelaw.com
Counsel for Atlantic Concrete Systems, atmservice@hamiltonpricelaw.com
Inc.
Counsel for T&M Construction of
Sanford, Inc.
Wayne M. Alder, Esq. Chesley G. Moody, Jr. Esq.
Fisher Broyles, LLP Mai M. Lee, Esq.
7668 NW 125th Way Moody & Graf, P.A.
Pompano Beach, FL 33076 1101 N. Lake Destiny Road, Suite 200
wayne.alder@fisherbroyles.com Maitland, FL 32751
wmalder@bellsouth.net cmoody@moodygraf.com
mle@moodygraf.com
cbuhler@moodygraf.com
Counsel for E.R.O. Construction, Inc. kbraund@moodygraf.com
iperera@moodygraf.com
Counsel for L & Jim Painting, Inc. and
Wolfs Irrigation & Landscaping, Inc.
Eric J. Netcher, Esq. William M. Woods, Esq.
Walker, Revels, Greninger & Netcher, PLLC Joseph M. Cline, Esq.
189 S. Orange Ave., Suite 1830 Woods Law Group
Orlando, FL 32801 100 S. Missouri Avenue, Suite 201
enetcher@wrgn-law.com Clearwater, FL 33756
hpaymayesh@wrgn-law.com wwoods@woodslawgroupfl.com
josephC@woodslawgroupfl.com
Counsel for All Glass Installation Corp. marital@woodslawgroupfl.com
shronmg@woodslawgroupfl.com
Pleadings@woodslawgroupfl.com
Co-Counsel for T&M Construction of
Sanford, Inc. and All Glass Installation
Corp.
Jackeline Rodriguez, Esq. Kieran F. O'Connor, Esq.
Kira Tsiring, Esq. Elizabeth Droz-Stolinas, Esq.
Hamilton, Miller & Birsthisel, LLP Gregory E. Blackwell, Esq.
150 Southeast Second Ave., Suite 1200 O’Connor & Stolinas Law Group, PLLC
Miami, FL 33131-2332 800 North Magnolia Avenue, Ste 1350
jrodriguez@hamiltonmillerlaw.com Orlando, FL 32803
ktsiring@hamiltonmillerlaw.com koconnor@oconlaw.com
mprieto@hamiltonmillerlaw.com edroz-stolinas@oconlaw.com
vbain@hamiltonmillerlaw.com gblackwell@oconlaw.com
rps@oconlaw.com
Counsel for TGK Stucco, Inc. tclark@oconlaw.com
Counsel For Expert Painting &
Pressure Washing, Inc.
ASHLEY M. MATTINGLY, ESQ.
15
Preview
Filing # 194695569 E-Filed 03/25/2024 09:39:14 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA VILLAS AT EMERALD LAKE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida not for profit corporation; Plaintiff, Case No.: 2020-CA-002942 v. ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; ADVANCED WRAPPING AND CONCRETE SOLUTIONS OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation; DON KING’S CONCRETE, INC., a Florida corporation; HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Florida corporation; IMPERIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, a Florida corporation; PREMIER PLASTERING OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC. N/K/A TGK STUCCO, INC., a Florida corporation; WEATHERMASTER BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida corporation; WEINTRAUB INSPECTIONS & FORENSICS, INC. N/K/A WEINTRAUB ENGINEERING AND INSPECTIONS, INC., a Florida corporation; THE DIMILLO GROUP, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; WOLF’S IRRIGATIONS & LANDSCAPING, INC., a Florida corporation; SUMMERPARK HOMES, INC., a Florida corporation; BROWN + COMPANY ARCHITECTURE, INC., a Florida corporation, Defendants. _________________________________________/ ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, Crossclaim Plaintiff, v. ADVANCED WRAPPING AND CONCRETE SOLUTIONS OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC. a Florida corporation; DON KING’S CONCRETE, INC., a Florida corporation; HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Florida corporation; IMPERIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, a Florida corporation; PREMIER PLASTERING OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC. N/K/A TGK STUCCO, INC., a Florida corporation; WEATHERMASTER BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida corporation; WEINTRAUB INSPECTIONS & FORENSICS, INC. N/K/A WEINTRAUB ENGINEERING AND INSPECTIONS, INC., a Florida corporation; WOLF’S IRRIGATIONS & LANDSCAPING, INC., a Florida corporation; EXPERT PAINTING & WASHING, INC., a Florida corporation Crossclaim Defendants. _________________________________________/ WEATHERMASTER BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida Corporation Third-Party Plaintiff, v. ALL GLASS INSTALLATION CORP., a Florida corporation; CASEY HAWKINS GLASS, INC., a Florida corporation; HELBERG ENGERPRISES, LLC a Florida limited liability company; HOBBIT WINDOWS, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; T&M CONSTRUCTION OF SANFORD, INC., a Florida corporation; WEATHERMASTER BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC., a Florida limited liability company; WELL DONE WINDOWS & DOORS, LLC., a Florida limited liability company; WELL HUNG WINDOWS & DOORS, LLC., a Florida limited liability company, Third-Party Defendants. _________________________________________/ DEFENDANT/CROSS CLAIM DEFENDANT’S, HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC., RESPONE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT/ CROSS CLAIM PLAINTIFF, ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY ROYAL OAK AND THE BREACH OF THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO DEFEND AGAINST HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC. COMES NOW, Defendant/ Cross Claim Defendant, HUGH MACDONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC. (“HMC”), by and through its undersigned counsel and pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P 1.1510, as amended effective May 1, 2021, the Florida Rules of Evidence, as well as the additional legal authorities cited herein, respectfully files this Response in Opposition (“Response”) to Defendant/ Cross Claim Plaintiff, ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’s (“Royal Oak”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the contractual duties to defend and indemnify Royal Oak and the breach of the contractual duty to defend against HMC and states as follows: I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1. This matter arises from the construction of the Project known as the Villas at Emerald Lakes Townhomes located in Osceola County, Florida (the “Project”) operated by the Villas at Emerald Lakes Homeowners Association, Inc. (“Association”). 2. Royal Oak served as the developer and general contractor for the construction of 10 buildings at the Project. 3. HMC served as a roofing subcontractor to Royal Oak for the construction of 10 buildings at the Project. 4. On November 23, 2020, the Association filed a Complaint against Royal Oak, HMC, and other subcontractors asserting claims arising from alleged defects in the construction of the Project. Specifically, Royal Oak has been sued for negligence and vicarious liability and breach of the Florida Building Code. 5. The Association’s complaint against Royal Oak includes multiple averments of Royal Oak’s own active fault, including, but not limited to: Negligently developing, inspecting, supervising, certifying, and approving the construction of the Project. Directly supervising and influencing the manner in which all of the work was performed and/or negligently creating and/or negligently approving conditions that were in violations of the Florida Building Code. (See Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 70, 76). 6. Royal Oak has filed Cross Claims against the subcontractors who worked on the Project including HMC. 7. Royal Oak’s current Cross Claim against HMC alleges counts for breach of contract, negligence, and statutory cause of action pursuant to §553.84, Fla. Stat. 8. Royal Oak now moves for summary judgment against HMC as to its cross claim for breach of contract. 9. Royal Oak argues that HMC has breached Article 18 of the subcontract agreement by failing to defend and indemnify Royal Oak as to the Association’s suit against it. 10. Royal Oak’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied as the allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint (and any amendments thereto) to not trigger HMC’s alleged duty to defend based on the terms and provision of the relevant Subcontract, and any determination of indemnification is premature. MEMORANDUM OF LAW A. Standard for Summary Judgment Under Florida’s current summary judgment standard, the moving party still “…bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the lack of a genuinely disputed issue of material fact.” Brevard County v. Waters Mark Development Enterprises, LC, 350 So. 2d 395, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Only if the movant does so, does the burden shift to the non-movant. Id. Here, the language of the subcontract agreement coupled with the language of the Association’s complaint warrants denial of summary judgment on Royal Oak’s breach of duty to defend and indemnify claim against HMC. B. Summary Judgment on HMC’s Duty to Indemnify Royal Oak is premature. Royal Oak’s indemnity claim against HMC is premature until liability is determined. See Fitzpatrick v. Meredith, 248 So.3d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); see also Rea v. Barton Protective Servs., Inc., 660 So.2d 772, 773-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Since liability has not been determined in the instant matter, Royal Oak’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to HMC’s duty to indemnify Royal Oak must be denied. C. The indemnification provision in the HMC/ Royal Oak is unenforceable pursuant to Florida Statute §725.06. Florida Statute §725.06 imposes certain limitations and requirements on indemnity provisions contained within construction-related contracts. The relevant portion of Florida Statute §725.06 states as follows: (1) Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection with, or any guarantee of or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance, including moving and excavating associated therewith, between an owner of real property and an architect, engineer, general contractor, subcontractor, sub-subcontractor, or materialman or any combination thereof wherein any party referred to herein promises to indemnify or hold harmless the other party to the agreement, contract, or guarantee for liability for damages to persons or property caused in whole or in part by any act, omission, or default of the indemnitee arising from the contract or its performance, shall be void and unenforceable unless the contract contains a monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification that bears a reasonable commercial relationship to the contract and is part of the project specifications or bid documents, if any. See Fla. Stat. §725.06 (emphasis added). In the instant matter, the subcontract between Royal Oak and HMC requires HMC to indemnify Royal Oak for Royal Oak’s own negligence and the provision does not contain a monetary limitation as required by Fla. Stat. §725.06 and it is therefore void and unenforceable. See also Griswold Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Tony Reddick, and Pumpco, Inc., 134 So.3d 985, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). While Royal Oak claims that it is not seeking indemnity for its own negligence, the Plaintiff has alleged that Royal Oak: (1) negligently developed, inspected, supervised, certified, and approved the construction of the Project; and (2) directly supervised and influenced manner in which all of the work was performed and/or negligently creating and/or negligently approving conditions that were in violations of the Florida Building Code. See Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 70, 76. Royal Oak is now seeking to subvert the clear intent of Florida Statute §725.06 by demanding a defense on claims for which indemnity is prohibited by statute. Accordingly, Royal Oak’s Motion should be denied. D. Royal Oak is Not Entitled to a Defense under the Subcontract Agreement between HMC and Royal Oak. While Royal Oak cites case law that discusses the duty to defend in an insurance context (i.e., when an insurer has a duty to defend its own insured), those cases are completely inapplicable to the instant matter. It must be emphasized that in construing an indemnity provision not given by one in the insurance business but only as an incident to a contract, the main purpose of which was not indemnity, the indemnity provision must be strictly construed in favor of the indemnitor. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 547 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989 Here, as Royal Oak has been sued for its own active fault, Royal Oak is not entitled to a defense as the duty to defend is contained within the same sentence as the unenforceable indemnification provision discussed above. In Barton Malow Co. v. Grunau Co., the Second District Court of Appeal held that Barton-Malow was not recovery of its attorneys’ fees because the duty to defend was not severable from the remainder of the indemnity provision in Barton-Malow’s subcontract agreement that was determined to be invalid. Barton Malow Co. v. Grunau Co., 835 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA). The facts in Barton Malow are nearly analogous to the instant matter. In Barton Malow, Barton Malow served as the general contractor of the construction of the Polk County Courthouse and Barton Malow was sued by numerous courthouse employees shortly after completion of construction for health problems allegedly caused by the negligent construction of the courthouse. Id at 1165. In turn, Barton Malow sued its subcontractors for both common law and contractual indemnity. Id. Barton Malow settled the claims of the courthouse employees and all but six of its subcontractors and the matter proceeded to trial solely on the third-party contractual indemnity claims against the six remining subcontractors. Id. Prior to trial, the trial court found that the indemnity provision in the Barton Malow subcontracts was unenforceable, however, the trial court found that the “duty to defend” portion of the indemnity provision was severable from the remainder of the provision. Id. Similar to the instant matter, the relevant language in the subcontract agreements in Barton Malow required the subcontractors to “protect, defend, indemnify an save harmless…Barton-Malow Company…from and against all losses, claims, demands, payments, damages, suits, actions, attorney’s fees, recoveries and judgments of every nature and description brought or recovered against…Barton-Malow Company.” Barton Malow at 1167. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal held that nothing in the subcontract language indicated that the parties intended the duty to defend to be severable from the remainder of the duties in the indemnity provision and the structure of the indemnity provision did not support Barton Malow’s argument or the trial court’s interpretation that the provision was severable. Id. Because the indemnity provision that was contained in the same sentence as the duty to defend was invalid and no other contractual provision imposed a duty to defend, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the subcontractors had no contractual obligation to indemnify Barton Marlow for its defense costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. In the instant matter, the indemnification clause in the Royal Oak/HMC subcontract reads as follows: 18. Indemnification. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Contractor agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless Builder, and each of its shareholders, members, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, agents, employees, representatives and invitees from all claims, demands, suits, actions, liens, liability, losses, expenses, damages or injuries of any kind or nature whatsoever (including all expenses of litigation, court costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs) caused wholly or in part by any act, omission, or negligence of Contractor, its Subcontractors, employees, agents, suppliers, servants or any other persons directly or indirectly controlled, employed or engaged by Contractor, regardless of whether such act, omission or negligence occurs in connection with the Work or is within the scope of any of their duties under this Agreement (collectively, “Claims”). “Claims” shall also specifically include, but are not limited to, the following: …(b) Claims of injuries to property or persons, including death (regardless of whether contributed to by acts or negligence of Builder);… ….(d) Claims arising from a breach of this Agreement by Contractor;… …IT IS THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT THAT THE INDEMNITY SET FORTH IN THIS SECTION IS, TO THE FULLEST EXENT PERMITTED BY LAW, AN INDEMNITY PROVIDED BY CONTRACTOR TO INDEMNIFY AND PROTECT BUILDER FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUILDERS’ OWN NEGLIGENCE (BUT NOT ITS SOLE OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT), REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ANY SUCH NEGLIGENCE IS A CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE OF THE RESULTANT INJURY, DEATH OR DAMAGE,… See Article 18 of the Royal Oak/HMC Subcontract Agreement (emphasis added). Like the subcontract in Barton Malow, the duty to defend provision in the HMC subcontract is not severable from the remainder of the duties in the indemnity provision and is contained within the exact same sentence as the indemnification provision and is not severable.1 The duties are inextricably intertwined and HMC’s alleged defense obligation does not exist independent of HMC’s alleged indemnification obligation. As much as Royal Oak may try to interpret otherwise, precent supports that the duty to defend in this case is not a sand-alone obligation that can be enforced without a finding of underlying liability, pursuant to the clear terms and provisions of the HMC/Royal Oak Subcontract. Additionally, HMC Subcontract does not require HMC to defend claims being made against Royal Oak unrelated to HMC’s scope of work, which is what Royal Oak is seeking in the instant mater. The Association’s original Complaint, as well as the Association’s Amended and Second Amended Complaint assert a large number of claims against Royal Oak and various subcontractors for alleged construction defects completely unrelated to HMC’s scope of work on the Project. See ¶49 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defense and indemnity agreements are “subject to the general rule of contractual construction” and consequently are “construed based on the intentions of the parties.” Dade County Sch. Bd. V. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 643 (Fla. 1999). When contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the contract. Church & Tower of Fla., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecoms., Inc., 936 So.2d 40, 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). In 1 While Royal Oak cites to Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc. v. Devereau Foundation, Inc., 366 So.3d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) to somehow stand for the proposition that Barton Malow is no longer good law, the Second District Court of Appeal noted in their decision that their appeal turned on a limited issue, which was “…whether Eckerd’s letters sufficiently invoked Devereux’s duty to provide a defense pursuant to the indemnity provision contract” and not whether the indemnity provision was ambiguous and thus unenforceable. The Appellate Court specifically notes that argument was not properly before the Court on appeal. cases involving contractual indemnity, the terms of the agreement will determine whether the indemnitor is obligated to reimburse the indemnitee for a particular claim. Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 853 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In the instant matter, Royal Oak is seeking that HMC defend it from claims being made Royal Oak unrelated to HMC’s scope of work where there is no duty for HMC to defend and indemnify for same. For all the foregoing reasons, Royal Oak’s motion as to its claims for breach of the duty to defend and indemnify should be denied. Generally, a motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits. See Redland Ins. Co. v. Cem Site Constructors, Inc., 86 So.3d 1259, 1261 (Fla. 2d 2012). Contrary to what Royal Oak contends, the court cannot interpret the alleged duty to defend in a vacuum with consideration of the language in Article 18 of the Subcontract between HMC and Royal Oak. Because the duty to defend is not severable from the duty to indemnify, the indemnification provision requires a finding of liability, and liability has not been entered against HMC. As such, no duty to defend is owed at this time. To grant Royal Oak summary judgment on the alleged duty to defend would be a substitution for trial on the merits because determination of whether an indemnification obligation has been triggered, i.e. who is liable for the underlying allegations/damages, has not been made and Royal Oak has failed to meet its burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to HMC’s alleged liability. For all the foregoing reasons, Royal Oak’s motion as to its claims for breach of the duty to defend should be denied. II. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, based upon the reasons in the opposition stated above, along with the undisputed facts and plain language of the HMC/Royal Oak Subcontract, Defendant/Cross Claim Defendant, HUGH MADCONALD CONSTRUCTION, INC., respectfully requests the entry of an Order denying Defendant/ Cross Claim Plaintiff, ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’S Motion for Summary Judgment as to HMC’s contractual duty to indemnify and defend, and any and all further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances. BUTLER WEIHMULLER KATZ CRAIG LLP DENISE M. ANDERSON, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 0029602 danderson@butler.legal ASHLEY M. MATTINGLY, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 106094 amattingly@butler.legal Secondary: bryan@butler.legal rjorge@butler.legal 400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 2300 Tampa, Florida 33602 Telephone: (813) 281-1900 Facsimile: (813) 281-0900 Secondary: bryan@butler.legal rjorge@butler.legal Attorneys for Defendant/ Cross Claim Defendant, Hugh MacDonald Construction, Inc. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 25, 2024, the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court by using E-Filing Portal, which will electronically serve this document to all registered counsel of record. Phillip E. Joseph, Esq. Lannie D. Hough Jr., Esq. Evan J. Small, Esq. James Michael Walls, Esq. Allana D.E. Smith, Esq. Brian C. Porter, Esq. Jeffery A, Widelitz, Esq. Carlton Fields, P.A. Ball Janik, LLP 4221 W. Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 1000 201 E. Pine Street, Suite 600 Tampa, Florida 33607 Orlando, Florida 32801 mwalls@carltonfields.com pjoseph@balljanik.com lhough@carltonfields.com esmall@balljanik.com bporter@carltonfields.com jwidelitz@balljanik.com ejohnson@carltonfields.com asmith@balljanik.com nbonilla@carltonfields.com ypalmer@balljanik.com bwoolard@carltonfields.com cbetancourt@balljanik.com bburton@balljanik.com Counsel for Royal Oak Homes, LLC dmiksell@balljanik.com orlandodocket@balljanik.com Counsel for Plaintiff Paul Sidney Elliott, Esq. Peter J. Kapsales, Esq. P.O. Box 274204 Margaret M. Efta, Esq. Tampa, FL 33688-4204 Milne Law Group, P.A. pse@psejd.com 301 E. Pine Street, Suite 525 Orlando, FL 32801 Counsel for Hugh MacDonald pkapsales@milnelawgroup.com Construction, Inc. mefta@milnelawgroup.com mmilne@milnelawgroup.com eservice@milnelawgroup.com Counsel for Weathermaster Building Products, Inc. Thamir A.R. Kaddouri Jr., Esq. Timothy C. Ford, Esq. Penelope T. Rowlett, Esq. Andrew E. Holway, Esq. Beth Ann Tobey, Esq. Rocco Cafaro, Esq. Law Office of Thamir A.R. Kaddouri, Jr., Hill Ward Henderson P.A. 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 3700 3220 West Cypress Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Tampa, FL 33607 tim.ford@hwhlaw.com Thamir.Kaddouri@tampalaw.org andrew.holway@hwhlaw.com Service@TampaLaw.org rocco.cafaro@hwhlaw.com Beth.Tobey@tampalaw.org tracy.coale@hwhlaw.com Penelope.rowlett@tampalaw.org kathy.wernsing@hwhlaw.com derrick.calandra@hwhlaw.com Counsel for Imperial Building Corporation Counsel for Weintraub Inspections & Forensics, Inc. f/k/a Weintraub Engineering and Inspections, Inc. Jayne Ann Pittman, Esq. Bruce R. Calderon, Esq. Natalie C. Fischer, Esq. Alicia Z. Gross, Esq. Conroy Simberg Barri A. Reisch, Esq. Two South Orange Ave, Suite 300 Michael Lynott, Esq. Orlando, Florida 32801 Milber Makris Plousadis & Seiden, LLP eserviceorl@conroysimberg.com 1900 NW Corporate Blvd, East Tower, jpittman@conroysimberg.com Suite 440 mmaitland@conroysimberg.com Boca Raton, Florida 33431 nfischer@conroysimberg.com bcalderon@milbermakris.com agross@milbermakris.com Counsel for Advanced Wrapping and breisch@milbermakris.com Concrete Solutions of Central Florida, kmcdowell@milbermakris.com Inc. sskowronski@milbermakris.com Counsel for Brown + Company Architecture, Inc. Scott Ross, Esq. M. Austin Moretz, Esq. Groelle & Salmon, P.A. Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr and 1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 320 Smith, PLC Tampa, FL 33607 21 E. Garden Street First Floor gstcourtdocs@gspalaw.com Pensacola, FL 32502 sross@gspalaw.com jmgservice@gallowaylawfirm.com cebanks@gspalaw.com moretzservice@gallowaylawfirm.com Counsel for Helberg Enterprises, LLC Counsel for Hobbit Windows, LLC Cole J. Copertino, Esq. Phillip S. Howell, Esq. James Michael Moorhead, Esq. Brenden C. Collins, Esq, Wright, Fulford, Moorhead & Brown, P.A. Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & 505 Maitland Avenue, Suite 1000 Smith, P.L.C. Altamonte Springs, FL 32701 400 N. Ashley Dr., Suite 1000 ccopertino@wfmblaw.com Tampa, Florida 33602 mmoorhead@wfmblaw.com tampaservice@gallowaylawfirm.com cbraungart@wfmblaw.com phowell@gallowaylawfirm.com jgarcia@wfbmlaw.com bcollins@gallowaylawfirm.com Counsel for Well Hung Windows & Counsel for Casey Hawkins Glass, Inc. Doors, LLC Jennifer Shippole, Esq. Andrew T. Marshall, Esq. Monal O. Zipper, Esq. Sara W. Mapes, Esq. Law Office of Jennifer L. Shippole Hamilton, Price & Marshall, P.A. 14050 NW 14th Street, Suite 180 2400 Manatee Ave. W. Sunrise, FL 33323 Bradenton, FL 34205 pleadings@fednat.com Andrew@hamiltonpricelaw.com mzipper@fednat.com Nancy@hamiltonpricelaw.com jshippole@fednat.com Kelsey@hamiltonpricelaw.com Sara@hamiltonpricelaw.com Counsel for Atlantic Concrete Systems, atmservice@hamiltonpricelaw.com Inc. Counsel for T&M Construction of Sanford, Inc. Wayne M. Alder, Esq. Chesley G. Moody, Jr. Esq. Fisher Broyles, LLP Mai M. Lee, Esq. 7668 NW 125th Way Moody & Graf, P.A. Pompano Beach, FL 33076 1101 N. Lake Destiny Road, Suite 200 wayne.alder@fisherbroyles.com Maitland, FL 32751 wmalder@bellsouth.net cmoody@moodygraf.com mle@moodygraf.com cbuhler@moodygraf.com Counsel for E.R.O. Construction, Inc. kbraund@moodygraf.com iperera@moodygraf.com Counsel for L & Jim Painting, Inc. and Wolfs Irrigation & Landscaping, Inc. Eric J. Netcher, Esq. William M. Woods, Esq. Walker, Revels, Greninger & Netcher, PLLC Joseph M. Cline, Esq. 189 S. Orange Ave., Suite 1830 Woods Law Group Orlando, FL 32801 100 S. Missouri Avenue, Suite 201 enetcher@wrgn-law.com Clearwater, FL 33756 hpaymayesh@wrgn-law.com wwoods@woodslawgroupfl.com josephC@woodslawgroupfl.com Counsel for All Glass Installation Corp. marital@woodslawgroupfl.com shronmg@woodslawgroupfl.com Pleadings@woodslawgroupfl.com Co-Counsel for T&M Construction of Sanford, Inc. and All Glass Installation Corp. Jackeline Rodriguez, Esq. Kieran F. O'Connor, Esq. Kira Tsiring, Esq. Elizabeth Droz-Stolinas, Esq. Hamilton, Miller & Birsthisel, LLP Gregory E. Blackwell, Esq. 150 Southeast Second Ave., Suite 1200 O’Connor & Stolinas Law Group, PLLC Miami, FL 33131-2332 800 North Magnolia Avenue, Ste 1350 jrodriguez@hamiltonmillerlaw.com Orlando, FL 32803 ktsiring@hamiltonmillerlaw.com koconnor@oconlaw.com mprieto@hamiltonmillerlaw.com edroz-stolinas@oconlaw.com vbain@hamiltonmillerlaw.com gblackwell@oconlaw.com rps@oconlaw.com Counsel for TGK Stucco, Inc. tclark@oconlaw.com Counsel For Expert Painting & Pressure Washing, Inc. ASHLEY M. MATTINGLY, ESQ. 15