Preview
Filing # 193043102 E-Filed 02/29/2024 03:24:03 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA
COUNTY, FLORIDA
VILLAS AT EMERALD LAKE
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a
Florida not for profit corporation,
Plaintiff, Case No.: 2020-CA-002942
v.
ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida
limited liability company;
Defendants.
___________________________________/
And All Related Actions.
___________________________________/
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’S
OMNIBUS MOTION IN LIMINE
Plaintiff, Villas at Emerald Lake Homeowners Association, Inc. (the
“Association” or “Plaintiff”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, files this
Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Opposition”) to Defendant
Royal Oak Homes, LLC’s (“ROH”) Omnibus Motion in Limine [D.E. 956], and
states as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The instant case arises out of construction and design defects that exist
at the 10 buildings and 76 units developed and constructed by ROH and its
1
subcontractors the Villas at Emerald Lake townhome community located in Osceola
County, Florida (the “Townhomes” or “Community”).
2. The defective development, design, and construction work performed,
designed, coordinated, and sequenced by ROH, its designers, private inspectors, and
subcontractors at the Community failed to comply with the applicable Florida
Building Codes, contract documents, project plans, specifications, submittals, and
shop drawings, the Association began to experience widespread water intrusion
throughout the Townhomes and common areas of the Community.
3. The defective, non-conforming construction and resulting water
intrusion have caused significant damage to the Townhomes, which will require the
Association to undergo over $5,000,000 in repairs to correct.
4. The Association filed its operative Second Amended Complaint against
ROH, and others, alleging claims of Negligence and Violation of the Building Code
pursuant to § 553.84, Florida Statutes. See Complaint [D.E. 2]; see also Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [D.E. 506].
5. Pursuant to this Court’s case management order (“CMO”) deadlines
ROH filed its Omnibus Motion in Limine (“Motion”) [D.E. 956].
6. Plaintiff files this Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
the Motion.
2
II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW
A. Standard.
A motion in limine is a pre-trial motion designed to limit and or exclude
evidence and witnesses at trial. Fittipaldi v. Canstroneues, 905 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla.
3d DCA 2005). Further, motions in limine are intended to create efficiency at trial
by streamlining issues and evidence, eliminating prejudice to a party, and preventing
confusion of the jury. Id. Motions are decided by the judge outside the presence of
the jury. Id. Trial judges have discretion in deciding whether certain evidence or
witnesses should be limited or excluded at trial; however, this power is restricted to
what is allowed under the Florida Rules of Evidence. Id. All motions in limine must
clearly and explicitly indicate the reasoning evidence is prejudicial and as such,
provide why the limit or exclusion of the particular evidence is necessary. Id.
Properly utilized, motions in limine can create efficiency and fairness at trial.
Devoe v. W. Auto Supply Co., 537 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). But far more
often, overly broad, “boilerplate” motions are filed indiscriminately. Boyles v. A&G
Concrete Pools, Inc., 149 So. 3d 39, 43-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Those unnecessary
motions are detrimental to efficiency and often ask judges to rule in a vacuum
without the requisite information:
“Trial judges do not have to consider such motions well in advance of
trial. Many times they should not rule in advance. Evidentiary issues
often depend upon the context in which they are raised…”
3
Id. at 44; see also Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 802, 804
(Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“The judge deserves the opportunity to rule on the evidence
in the light of what is happening, the evidence previously admitted, and the specific
grounds for the objection.”).
B. General Statement and BCP Rules.
As discussed in greater detail herein, many of the subjects addressed in the
Motion are not proper for motions in limine. This action is before an experienced
Business Court Judge and involves counsel who have similarly extensive experience
trying cases. This Honorable Court knows the law, and motions in limine asking for
well-settled law to be followed are unnecessary. Fundamentally, counsel should
know proper courtroom procedure and should not require orders pursuant to motions
in limine to conduct themselves appropriately and in accordance with the law.
Further, there is no history to suggest that any counsel involved in the present
case will disregard settled law or practice. Conversely, putting such topics into court
orders as “bright lines” puts this Honorable Court in the difficult position of having
to police many in limine rulings, inviting more objections and adding unnecessary
complications to the trying of this already complex case.
Most importantly, this Court has a specific Business Court Procedure
regarding motions in limine. This Court’s Business Court Procedure 10.2 states:
10.2 - Motions in Limine. Motions in limine may be filed for the
purpose of seeking an advance ruling on the admissibility of specific
4
evidence at trial. The court typically does not consider motions in
limine for bench trials. Each motion in limine must attach, or specify
in detail, the document, item or statement at issue. The court may
strike as superfluous any motion in limine requesting a broad order that
a rule of evidence, procedure or professional conduct should be
followed at trial. Motions in limine shall not be used as a procedural
vehicle to circumvent the passing of the deadline to file dispositive
motions.
BCP 10.2 (emphasis added).
Additionally, motions in limine are disfavored for bench trials under the BCP.
Id. (“The court typically does not consider motions in limine for bench trials.”)
(emphasis included).1
Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court deny ROH’s
Motion, in part, to reserve ruling if during the course of trial, the evidence discussed
in the Motion becomes relevant or otherwise admissible pursuant to the applicable
rules of evidence.
C. ROH’s Motions.
1. Counsel’s Personal Opinions of Evidence.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make
any statement reflecting his or her personal belief in the merits of the case, the
credibility of the witnesses, the culpability of the parties, expression of personal
1
ROH and the Plaintiff have filed a Joint Stipulation to for Waiver of Jury Trial for All Claims Asserted by Plaintiff
Against Royal Oak Homes, LLC. [D.E. 972] and this Court entered an Agreed Order on the Joint Stipulation for
Waiver of Jury Trial. [D.E. 974; 977; 978; and 979]. While this Court has Ordered that the evidence presented against
ROH and the remaining subcontractors will be presented in front of a jury, it also Ordered, and Plaintiff and ROH
stipulated to the Court ruling on the Plaintiff’s claims against ROH after the jury renders a verdict. Id. at ¶¶ 1 and 3.
5
knowledge of the case, personal belief in the client nor in the justness of the case.
Plaintiff agrees that attorneys are not supposed to express their personal opinions
and, therefore, does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is
applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
2. Comments on Uncalled Witnesses.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make
any statement regarding ROH’s decision to call or not call any witness equally
available to all parties to call for trial. Plaintiff agrees that trial strategy and decisions
made by counsel on how to present each of their client’s cases should not be
discussed at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the
same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
3. Mediation, Settlement Offers, and Other Settlement Agreements.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make
any statement mentioning mediation, discussion of settlement negotiation,
settlement offers, and/or settlement agreements. Plaintiff agrees that settlement
communications, mediation communications, and settlement agreements are
confidential and should not be discussed at trial and does not have an objection to
the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
4. Use of Depositions.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not put
6
forth any evidence or testimony from prior depositions if the witness is available to
testify at trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330. Plaintiff objects and
notes that the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330 specifically allows for situations
where a deposition can be proffered as evidence at trial (i.e. (1) impeachment; (2)
deposition of an adverse party; (3) completeness of the testimonial record; or (4) if
the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; (B) that the witness is at a greater
distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state, unless
it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the
deposition; (C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; (D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable
to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; (E) upon application and
notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony
of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; or (F) the
witness is an expert or skilled witness.) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.330
5. Liability Insurance.
ROH seeks to preclude all parties from making any statement which reference
insurance, the existence or amount of insurance, or any issues relating to any parties’
insurance coverage. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the relief sought so long
as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
7
6. Other Lawsuits and Other Claims.
ROH seeks to preclude any mention of prior litigation or pending claims as to
the Defendants alleging that it will be prejudicial to the jury’s view of the facts
properly put before them. Plaintiff agrees to not mention prior litigation or pending
claims as to ROH in order to demonstrate any party’s litigiousness, so long as the
ROH is similarly bound by this restriction.
However, Plaintiff does not agree, and objects to, and ROH does not appear
to argue for, a blanket ruling precluding any mention of prior or pending litigation
under any circumstances. Such a ruling would be inappropriate at this stage of the
proceedings. Additionally, this blanket ruling would be prejudicial to the
Association as ROH and its subcontractors’ knowledge of the defective work is a
key element in the Association’s burden of to support its negligence claim against
ROH or the other subcontractors whose work is still at issue.
Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides:
“Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not
limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is
inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad
character or propensity.
7. Parties’ Financial Status.
Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to
what testimony, questioning, or evidence ROH seeks to preclude and how such
8
questioning, testimony, or evidence would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court
excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible
for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1
(M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
(affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence
was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior
to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that
questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in
proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1
(M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on
objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be
developed there.” Id.
8. Hearsay Statements by Unidentified Individuals.
Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to
what testimony, questioning, or evidence ROH seeks to preclude and how such
questioning, testimony, or evidence would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court
excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible
for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1
(M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
(affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence
9
was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior
to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that
questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in
proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1
(M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on
objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be
developed there.” Id. Plaintiff has no way of determining what evidence or testimony
may be subject to ROH’s request to preclude “hearsay statements by unidentified
individuals” ahead of a timely and specific objection to testimony proffered at trial.
Additionally, there are many hearsay rule exceptions under Florida law and Plaintiff
cannot anticipate what evidence the Court may or may not find admissible pursuant
to evidentiary rules and the circumstances of the objection made at the time of trial.
See, e.g., § 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2012).
9. Testimony of Unidentified Expert Witnesses.
ROH seeks to preclude any testimony from expert witnesses that have not
been disclosed from testifying at trial. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the
relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all undisclosed expert witnesses.
10. Ex Parte Interviews of Witnesses.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make
any statement or ask questions relating to information obtained by counsel in ex
10
parte interviews with a witness that was not subject to cross-examination by the
opposing party. Plaintiff agrees that this kind of introduction of testimony by counsel
should not be discussed at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought
so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
11. Stipulations by Counsel.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make
any statement regarding counsel for the Parties’ stipulations as to law or fact.
Plaintiff agrees that trial strategy and decisions made by counsel on how to present
each of their client’s cases should not be discussed at trial and does not have an
objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this
lawsuit.
12. Analogy to a Criminal Case.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make
any statement analogizing the present case to a criminal case. Plaintiff agrees that
such analogy in this context should not be discussed at trial and does not have an
objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this
lawsuit.
13. Testimony as to Veracity.
ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion precluding any attempt to question
any witness concerning the truth or falsity of testimony given by another witness.
11
Plaintiff agrees with the law set out regarding this practice at trial and does not have
an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this
lawsuit.
Notwithstanding, if ROH is attempting to preclude questioning or testimony
that would be impeachment evidence, Plaintiff objects. Plaintiff objects to this
motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to what testimony, questioning,
or evidence ROH seeks to preclude and how such questioning, testimony, or
evidence would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a
motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.”
Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see
also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's
grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible).
Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial,
“evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation,
relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel
Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the
better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility
substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id.
14. Improper Bolstering/Authoritative Texts and Post-Deposition
Opinions
ROH seeks to preclude any expert opinion not previously disclosed at
12
deposition or by written report. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the relief
sought so long as the same is applicable to all testifying expert witnesses. Plaintiff’s
lack of objection is subject to the caveat that not every expert has been deposed, and
that Plaintiff will only agree to limit testimony in regard to the completed
depositions. At present, not all of Plaintiff’s experts have yet been deposed or have
not completed their depositions.
Further, ROH requests to preclude any attempt by Plaintiff’s counsel or its
experts “to bolster opinions by reference to other experts, studies, tests, or other
authoritative texts.” Motion, p. 13. Plaintiff objects to this request as it is an improper
and hidden Daubert test of the bases of Plaintiff’s experts’ opinions and the mention
and/or introduction of information upon which Plaintiff’s expert relied is explicitly
allowed under Florida Evidence Rules and required by the terms of the case
management order. See §90.705, Fla. Stat. (1995) (“Unless otherwise required by
the court, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inferences and give reasons
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data. On cross-examination the
expert shall be required to specify the facts or data.”); see also § 90.706, Fla. Stat.
(1978):
Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science, art, or
specialized knowledge contained in a published treatise, periodical,
book, dissertation, pamphlet, or other writing may be used in cross-
examination of an expert witness if the expert witness recognizes the
author or the treatise, periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet, or other
writing to be authoritative, or, notwithstanding nonrecognition by the
13
expert witness, if the trial court finds the author or the treatise,
periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet, or other writing to be
authoritative and relevant to the subject matter.
Id.
Plaintiff further objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not
specific as to: (1) what testimony, questioning, evidence, or documentation ROH
seeks to preclude; and (2) testimony, questioning, evidence, or documentation would
prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine
“only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of
America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State,
521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in
limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this
high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary
rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and
potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products
Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice
is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends
upon what facts may be developed there.” Id
15. Inappropriate Legal Conclusions.
ROH seeks to preclude testimony regarding any expert providing
“inappropriate legal conclusions.” Motion, p. 14.
ROH is not specific as to what testimony would be a question of law in which
14
it is not the expert’s function to draw legal conclusions. However, Plaintiff generally
agrees this point, insofar as the requirements of the applicable building code are
generally “a question of law for the court,” where the disputed language consists of
‘ordinary words susceptible to being given plain effect consistent with their ordinary
meaning.’” Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency Inc., 645 So. 2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1st
DCA1994). An exception arises, however, where “a statute or ordinance contains
words of art or scientific and technical terms.” Id. Here, such exceptions may arise
as determined by the Court in evaluating the jury instructions on the Florida Building
Code’s requirements.
Again, ROH is not specific as to what kind of opinions and/or testimony it is
seeking to limit but, if it is referring to testimony regarding the existence of Florida
Building Code Violations, Florida’s Supreme Court held that expert testimony
regarding whether something complies with Code requirements (i.e., their
“character”) is absolutely permissible. See Noa v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 305 So.
2d 182, 186 (Fla. 1974) Florida’s First District Court of Appeals reiterated this
position in Heron’s Landing, where the plaintiff’s expert testified “in detail how the
stucco at issue did not meet the pertinent standards and the Florida Building Code.”
D.R. Horton, Inc. – Jacksonville v. Heron’s Landing, 266 So. 3d 1201, 1205 (Fla.
1st DCA 2019). Further, Seibert expressly recognized the admissibility of expert
testimony to determine whether an object complies with the applicable building
15
code, as opposed to what the code means: “The admission of such testimony has
been allowed to explain the character of an object in order to determine if it complies
with a statute, ordinance, or code.” Id. at 891 (citing Noa, 305 So. 2d 182; Grand
Union, 454 So. 2d 14; and Chimeno, 251 So. 2d 351).
There is no question: Florida law expressly permits expert testimony
regarding whether construction violated the requirements of the Florida Building
Code. See Seibert, 573 So. 2d at 890 (“such testimony has been allowed to explain
the character of an object in order to determine if it complies with a statute,
ordinance, or code.”); Chimeno, 251 So. 2d 353–54 (Permitting dueling expert
testimony on whether elevator met code requirements); Noa, 305 So. 2d 186
(Permitting expert testimony on whether “character” of pipeline came within
exception of regulation); Morowitz, 613 So.2d 495 (permitting expert testimony
regarding whether ramp met code requirements); Grand Union, 454 So. 2d 15 (Same
ruling as Morowitz); and Deehl, 191 So. 2d 606-07 (permitting plaintiff’s expert to
opine that the “South Florida Building Code was definitely not followed.”). Plaintiff
objects to a blanket in limine regarding this topic.
16. Referring to Defense Counsel as Anything Other than Counsel for
Defendant.
ROH seeks to preclude any mention of “defense lawyers” or “defense law
firm,” and asks the Court to instruct Plaintiff to only address counsel for ROH as
“Counsel for Defendant” or “Counsel for Royal Oak.” ROH alleges that such
16
verbiage is “irrelevant to the issues of the case.” This request is incredibly overbroad,
severely limiting to how Plaintiff’s counsel can address opposing counsel, and ROH
does not provide a legitimate reason as to why any other reference to ROH’s counsel
other than “Counsel for Defendant” or “Counsel for Royal Oak.” Would be
prejudicial to ROH. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff agrees and intends to follow the
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct and will treat opposing counsel with civility,
in and out of the presence of the jury.
17. Reference to Attorneys’ Fees and/or Costs.
ROH seeks to preclude any mention of attorney’s fees and costs, alleging that
it will be prejudicial to the jury’s view of the facts properly put before them and that
entitlement to fees and costs is an issue for the Judge to determine. At present,
Plaintiff is not seeking attorney’s fees from ROH within its Complaint and therefore,
does not object to this request so long as the ROH is similarly bound by this
restriction.
However, Plaintiff does not agree, objects to, and ROH does not appear to
argue for, a blanket ruling precluding any mention of attorney’s fees and
investigation costs (or the recovery thereof) under any circumstances. Such a ruling
would be inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings. Additionally, this blanket
ruling would be prejudicial to the Association as Plaintiff’s costs are recoverable and
are being sought. To preclude mention of the same would be prejudicial to the
17
Plaintiff in proving the damages portion of its case.
18. Allegations Limited to the Complaint.
ROH’s Motion asks the Court to instruct Plaintiff’s counsel “not to introduce
evidence concerning issues not framed by the pleadings.” Motion, p. 16. The
Association objects to this preclusion to the extent that ROH or the other Defendants
seek to argue that the list of defective conditions included in the Complaint is not
specific enough. Notwithstanding, if ROH and the subcontractors agree that the
Association’s Complaint is inclusive of the defects and issues listed out and
supported with evidentiary specificity, it does not object to the relief requested so
long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
19. Discovery History.
Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to
what commentary or testimony ROH seeks to preclude and how such commentary
or testimony would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a
motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.”
Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see
also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's
grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible).
Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial,
“evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation,
18
relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel
Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the
better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility
substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id.
Notwithstanding, the Association agrees to abide by the rules of evidence,
civil procedure, and BCP, and does not object to the relief requested as outlined in
the black letter law so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
20.Undisclosed Exhibits and/or Demonstrative Aids.
ROH’s Motion asks the Court to instruct Plaintiff’s counsel to make no
reference to, provide no identification of, or provide no publishing of any power
points, visual aids, demonstrative aids, or exhibits prior to allowing ROH to review
the same. Motion, p. 17.
Notwithstanding, the Association agrees to abide by the rules of evidence,
civil procedure, and BCP, and does not object to the relief requested as outlined in
the black letter law so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
21.Summary Judgment Rulings.
Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to
what commentary or testimony ROH seeks to preclude and how such commentary
or testimony would prejudice it. ROH cannot know what or how Plaintiff may
“reference” summary judgment rulings and neither does it define what it intends to
19
preclude by “reference” in its Motion. Additionally, summary judgment rulings may
have impact on the jury instructions provided by the Court, a draft of which is
submitted to the Court ahead of trial. Because ROH’s request is so broad, Plaintiff’s
ability to mention topics and evidence that prove its case would be prejudicial to the
Plaintiff.
Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if
the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America,
Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine
because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high
burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings
should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential
prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability
Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to
wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon
what facts may be developed there.” Id.
Notwithstanding, the Association agrees to abide by the rules of evidence,
civil procedure, and BCP, and does not object to the relief requested as outlined in
the black letter law so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit.
20
22.Statements Portraying Plaintiff as a “Victim.”
Plaintiff only objects to this request to preclude as overbroad and premature.
While Plaintiff can agree to not use the word “Victim” in referring to itself, Plaintiff
cannot know what commentary or testimony ROH seeks to preclude prior to a
specific objection at trial. Therefore, to the extent ROH wishes to preclude any
testimony that it believes prejudicial, the objections should be made at trial and in
context to the characterizations made, not as a blanket pre-trial order. To that end,
ROH’s motion is undefined, unfounded, and should be denied.
23. No Use of the Phrase “Life Safety;” Argument Invoking the
“Golden Rule;” and/or Conscience of the Community and Similar
Arguments.
ROH seeks to preclude testimony, statements, or evidence relating to any
“life-safety issue,” “conscience of the community, “Golden Rule,” or “sending a
message” type arguments. While ROH cites to cases that hold that highly prejudicial
and inflammatory comments are improper, and that commentary urging the jury to
place themselves in a party’s position, requesting the jury to consider how much they
would wish to receive is improper, the Motion provides no case law that calls out
specific testimony or commentary to be excluded for this set of facts. Further, the
Motion cites cases that merely state that “personal safety,” “community safety,”
“arousing sympathy from the jury,” and “sending a message” arguments and
testimony are akin to Golden Rule arguments prohibited under Florida Law. The
21
Motion cites these cases and make these arguments to exclude evidence without
specifically identifying what testimony, evidence, or commentary from witnesses in
the present case would fall under those categories.
As such, it is unclear what testimony, in particular, ROH is seeking to
preclude. For example, is the argument that ROH and its subcontractors owe a
responsibility to the Association and its members to construct a building free from
material construction defects a “sending a message” type argument? Does ROH’s
responsibility to adhere to the applicable Florida Building Codes to protect the
welfare and well-being of the community fall under ROH’s definition of conscience
of the community? Obligations, responsibilities, and resulting failures to properly
construct the Community are the basis of this lawsuit, and cannot, in any manner, be
considered prejudicial. Therefore, to the extent ROH wishes to preclude any
testimony that it believes prejudicial, the objections should be made at trial and in
context to the characterizations made, not as a blanket pre-trial order. To that end,
ROH’s motion is undefined, unfounded, and should be denied.
Plaintiff agrees, generally, with ROH’s request to follow the legal principles
applicable to the “Golden Rule” and “Conscience of the Community” argument and
commentary from counsel. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the relief sought
related to following the black letter law, so long as the same is applicable to all
parties in this lawsuit.
22
24. No Reference to the Surfside Condominium Collapse.
Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if
the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America,
Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine
because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high
burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings
should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential
prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability
Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to
wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon
what facts may be developed there.” Id. Plaintiff does not yet know what testimony
will be elicited at trial or how a mention of Surfside Condominiums may be
mentioned. Without more specificity, to the extent ROH wishes to preclude any
testimony that it believes prejudicial, the objections should be made at trial and in
context to the characterizations made, not as a blanket pre-trial order. To that end,
ROH’s motion is undefined, unfounded, and should be denied.
25. No Unit Owner Testimony as to Value of Unit.
Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if
the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America,
23
Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine
because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high
burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings
should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential
prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability
Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to
wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon
what facts may be developed there.” Id.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court rule consistent with the
arguments set forth above and further deny all the Motions, in part, to reserve ruling
if during the course of trial the evidence discussed in the Motions becomes relevant
or otherwise admissible pursuant to the applicable rules of evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
BALL JANIK LLP
By: /s/ Kasey L. Joyce
Phillip E. Joseph, FL Bar No. 1000368
Evan J. Small, FL Bar No. 57306
Jeffrey A. Widelitz FL Bar No. 105642
Christopher S. Tribbey, FL Bar No. 1003114
Kasey L. Joyce, FL Bar No. 1024705
201 E Pine Street, Suite 600
Orlando, FL 32801
Telephone: (407) 455-5664
Facsimile: (407) 902-2105
24
pjoseph@balljanik.com
esmall@balljanik.com
jwidelitz@balljanik.com
ctribbey@balljanik.com
kjoyce@balljanik.com
dtodd@balljanik.com
cbetancourt@balljanik.com
bburton@balljanik.com
orlandodocket@balljanik.com
Counsel for Plaintiff Villas at Emerald Lake
Homeowners Association, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing has been filed via the Florida Courts
E-Filing Portal on February 27, 2024.
/s/ Kasey L. Joyce
Kasey L. Joyce
SERVICE LIST
LUIS PRATS THAMIR A.R. KADDOURI, JR.
LANNIE D. HOUGH, JR. PENELOPE T. ROWLETT
JAMES MICHAEL WALLS BETH ANN TOBEY
ROBIN H. LEAVENGOOD Law Office of Thamir A.R. Kaddouri,
Carlton Fields, P.A. Jr. P.A.
4221 W. Boy Scout Boulevard 3220 West Cypress Street
Tampa, FL 33607-5780 Tampa, FL 33607
(813) 223-7000 (813) 879-5752
lprats@carltonfields.com thamir.kaddouri@tampalaw.org
lhough@carltonfields.com service@tampalaw.org
mwalls@carltonfields.com penelope.rowlett@tampalaw.org
rleavengood@carltonfields.com beth.tobey@tampalaw.org
mramos@carltonfields.com
nbonilla@carltonfields.com Counsel for Defendant, Imperial
ejohnson@carltonfields.com Building Corporation
25
krick@carltonfields.com
Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff,
Counsel for Defendant, Royal Oak Villas at Emerald Lake Homeowners
Homes, LLC Association, Inc. ONLY 12/8/2023
Dismissed with Prejudice by
Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal
Oak Homes, LLC, 12/12/2023
PAUL SIDNEY ELLIOTT PETER J. KAPSALES
P.O. Box 274204 MARGARET M. EFTA
Tampa, FL 33688-4204 Milne Law Group, P.A.
(813) 265-1314 301 E. Pine Street, Suite 525
pse@psejd.com Orlando, FL 32801
(321) 558-7700
Counsel for Defendant, Hugh pkapsales@milnelawgroup.com
MacDonald Construction, Inc. (HMC) mefta@milnelawgroup.com
eservice@milnelawgroup.com
DENISE M. ANDERSON
ASHLEY M. MATTINGLY Counsel for Defendant/Cross
DAVID E. BRADLEY, JR Defendant/ Third-Party Plaintiff,
Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP Weathermaster Building Products, Inc.
400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 2300
Tampa, FL 33602 Dismissed with Prejudice by
(813) 281-1900 Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal
danderson@butler.legal Oak Homes, LLC ONLY 12/21/2023
amattingly@butler.legal
dbradley@butler.legal
krieck@butler.legal
rjorge@butler.legal
Co-Counsel for Defendant, Hugh
MacDonald Construction, Inc.
DENISE M. ANDERSON ANDREW E. HOLWAY
DAVID A. MERCER J. ROCCO CAFARO
Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig, LLP Hill Ward Henderson
400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 2300 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 3700
Tampa, FL 33602 Tampa, FL 33602
26
danderson@butler.legal (813) 221-3900
dmercer@butler.legal andrew.holway@hwhlaw.com
krieck@butler.legal derrick.calandra@hwhlaw.com
rjorge@butler.legal jill.kuty@hwhlaw.com
tbarry@butler.legal kathy.wernsing@hwhlaw.com
rocco.cafaro@hwhlaw.com
Counsel for Defendant, Don King’s tracy.coale@hwhlaw.com
Concrete, Inc.
Counsel for Defendant/Cross
Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff, Defendant, Weintraub Inspections &
Villas At Emerald Lake Homeowners Forensics, Inc. n/k/a Weintraub
Association, Inc., ONLY 12/28/2023 Engineering and Inspections, Inc.
Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff,
ONLY 12/12/2023
Dismissed with Prejudice by
CrossClaim Plaintiff, 1/192024
JAYNE ANN PITTMAN BRUCE R. CALDERON
NATALIE C. FISCHER ALICIA Z. GROSS
Conroy Simberg BARRI A. REISCH
Two South Orange Avenue, Suite 300 Milber Makris Plousadis & Seiden,
Orlando, FL 32801 LLP
(407) 649-9797 1900 NW Corporate Blvd.
eserviceorl@conroysimberg.com East Tower, Suite 440
jpittman@conroysimberg.com Boca Raton, FL 33431
mmaitland@conroysimberg.com (561) 994-7310
nfischer@conroysimberg.com bcalderon@milbermakris.com
azgross@milbermakris.com
Counsel for Defendant/Cross-Claim breisch@milbermakris.com
Defendantt, Advanced Wrapping and kmcdowell@milbermakris.com
Concrete Solutions of Central Florida, sskowronski@milbermakris.com
Inc.
Counsel for Defendant/Cross-
Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff, Defendant, Brown + Company
ONLY 11/8/2023 Architecture, Inc.
Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff,
ONLY 11/8/2023
27
Dismissed with Prejudice by
Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal Dismissed with Prejudice by
Oak Homes, LLC, 12/12/2023 Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal
Oak Homes, LLC, 12/12/2023
JACKELINE RODRIGUEZ S. SCOTT ROSS
KIRA TSIRING Groelle & Salmon, P.A.
Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP 1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 320
150 Southeast Second Avenue, Suite Tampa, FL 33607
1200 (813) 849-7200
Miami, FL 33131-2332 gstcourtdocs@gspalaw.com
(305) 379-3686 sross@gspalaw.com
jrodriguez@hamiltonmillerlaw.com cebanks@gspalaw.com
ktsiring@hamiltonmillerlaw.com mcoleman@gspalaw.com
mprieto@hamiltonmillerlaw.com
vbain@hamiltonmillerlaw.com Counsel for Third-Party Defendant,
Helberg Enterprises, LLC
Counsel for Defendant/Cross-
Defendant, TGK Stucco, Inc.
VICKI LAMBERT ANDREW T. MARSHALL
ALEC MASSON SARA W. MAPES
Luks, Santaniello, Petrillo & Cohen Hamilton Price, P.A.
201 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 400 2400 Manatee Ave. W.
Orlando, FL 32801 Bradenton, FL 34205
(407) 540-9170 (941) 748-0550
luksorl-pleadings@ls-law.com andrew@hamiltonpricelaw.com
amason@insurancedefense.net sara@hamiltonpricelaw.com
jpestonit@insurancedefense.net nancy@hamiltonpricelaw.com
kelsey@hamiltonpricelaw.com
Counsel for Third-Party Defendant, atmservice@hamiltonpricelaw.com
Casey Hawkins Glass, Inc.
Counsel for Third-Party Defendant,
PHILLIP S. HOWELL T&M Construction of Sanford, Inc.
BRENDEN C. COLLINS
Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Dismissed with Prejudice by Third-
Smith, P.L.C. Party Plaintiff, Weathermaster
400 N. Ashley Dr., Suite 1000 Building Products, Inc. 1/11/2024
Tampa, FL 33602
(813) 977-1200 WILLIAM M. WOODS
28
tampaservice@gallowaylawfirm.com JOSEPH M. CLINE
phowell@gallowaylawfirm.com Woods Law Group
bcollinsl@gallowaylawfirm.com 100 S. Missouri Avenue, Suite 201
Clearwater, Fl 33756
Counsel for Third-Party Defendant, (727) 799-1229, Ext. 4072
Casey Hawkins Glass, Inc. wwoods@willwoodslaw.com
josephc@willwoodslaw.com
Dismissed with Prejudice by Third- marital@willwoodslaw.com
Party Plaintiff, Weathermaster sharonmg@woodslawgroupfl.com
Building Products, Inc. 1/11/2024 pleadings@willwoodslaw.com
Counsel for Third-Party Defendants,
T & M Construction of Sanford, Inc.
and All Glass Installation Corp.
T & M Construction of Sanford, Inc.
Dismissed with Prejudice by Third-
Party Plaintiff, Weathermaster
Building Products, Inc. 1/11/2024
All Glass Installation Corp. Dismissed
with Prejudice by Third-Party
Preview
Filing # 193043102 E-Filed 02/29/2024 03:24:03 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA VILLAS AT EMERALD LAKE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida not for profit corporation, Plaintiff, Case No.: 2020-CA-002942 v. ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; Defendants. ___________________________________/ And All Related Actions. ___________________________________/ PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO ROYAL OAK HOMES, LLC’S OMNIBUS MOTION IN LIMINE Plaintiff, Villas at Emerald Lake Homeowners Association, Inc. (the “Association” or “Plaintiff”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, files this Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Opposition”) to Defendant Royal Oak Homes, LLC’s (“ROH”) Omnibus Motion in Limine [D.E. 956], and states as follows: I. INTRODUCTION 1. The instant case arises out of construction and design defects that exist at the 10 buildings and 76 units developed and constructed by ROH and its 1 subcontractors the Villas at Emerald Lake townhome community located in Osceola County, Florida (the “Townhomes” or “Community”). 2. The defective development, design, and construction work performed, designed, coordinated, and sequenced by ROH, its designers, private inspectors, and subcontractors at the Community failed to comply with the applicable Florida Building Codes, contract documents, project plans, specifications, submittals, and shop drawings, the Association began to experience widespread water intrusion throughout the Townhomes and common areas of the Community. 3. The defective, non-conforming construction and resulting water intrusion have caused significant damage to the Townhomes, which will require the Association to undergo over $5,000,000 in repairs to correct. 4. The Association filed its operative Second Amended Complaint against ROH, and others, alleging claims of Negligence and Violation of the Building Code pursuant to § 553.84, Florida Statutes. See Complaint [D.E. 2]; see also Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [D.E. 506]. 5. Pursuant to this Court’s case management order (“CMO”) deadlines ROH filed its Omnibus Motion in Limine (“Motion”) [D.E. 956]. 6. Plaintiff files this Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion. 2 II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW A. Standard. A motion in limine is a pre-trial motion designed to limit and or exclude evidence and witnesses at trial. Fittipaldi v. Canstroneues, 905 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Further, motions in limine are intended to create efficiency at trial by streamlining issues and evidence, eliminating prejudice to a party, and preventing confusion of the jury. Id. Motions are decided by the judge outside the presence of the jury. Id. Trial judges have discretion in deciding whether certain evidence or witnesses should be limited or excluded at trial; however, this power is restricted to what is allowed under the Florida Rules of Evidence. Id. All motions in limine must clearly and explicitly indicate the reasoning evidence is prejudicial and as such, provide why the limit or exclusion of the particular evidence is necessary. Id. Properly utilized, motions in limine can create efficiency and fairness at trial. Devoe v. W. Auto Supply Co., 537 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). But far more often, overly broad, “boilerplate” motions are filed indiscriminately. Boyles v. A&G Concrete Pools, Inc., 149 So. 3d 39, 43-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Those unnecessary motions are detrimental to efficiency and often ask judges to rule in a vacuum without the requisite information: “Trial judges do not have to consider such motions well in advance of trial. Many times they should not rule in advance. Evidentiary issues often depend upon the context in which they are raised…” 3 Id. at 44; see also Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“The judge deserves the opportunity to rule on the evidence in the light of what is happening, the evidence previously admitted, and the specific grounds for the objection.”). B. General Statement and BCP Rules. As discussed in greater detail herein, many of the subjects addressed in the Motion are not proper for motions in limine. This action is before an experienced Business Court Judge and involves counsel who have similarly extensive experience trying cases. This Honorable Court knows the law, and motions in limine asking for well-settled law to be followed are unnecessary. Fundamentally, counsel should know proper courtroom procedure and should not require orders pursuant to motions in limine to conduct themselves appropriately and in accordance with the law. Further, there is no history to suggest that any counsel involved in the present case will disregard settled law or practice. Conversely, putting such topics into court orders as “bright lines” puts this Honorable Court in the difficult position of having to police many in limine rulings, inviting more objections and adding unnecessary complications to the trying of this already complex case. Most importantly, this Court has a specific Business Court Procedure regarding motions in limine. This Court’s Business Court Procedure 10.2 states: 10.2 - Motions in Limine. Motions in limine may be filed for the purpose of seeking an advance ruling on the admissibility of specific 4 evidence at trial. The court typically does not consider motions in limine for bench trials. Each motion in limine must attach, or specify in detail, the document, item or statement at issue. The court may strike as superfluous any motion in limine requesting a broad order that a rule of evidence, procedure or professional conduct should be followed at trial. Motions in limine shall not be used as a procedural vehicle to circumvent the passing of the deadline to file dispositive motions. BCP 10.2 (emphasis added). Additionally, motions in limine are disfavored for bench trials under the BCP. Id. (“The court typically does not consider motions in limine for bench trials.”) (emphasis included).1 Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court deny ROH’s Motion, in part, to reserve ruling if during the course of trial, the evidence discussed in the Motion becomes relevant or otherwise admissible pursuant to the applicable rules of evidence. C. ROH’s Motions. 1. Counsel’s Personal Opinions of Evidence. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make any statement reflecting his or her personal belief in the merits of the case, the credibility of the witnesses, the culpability of the parties, expression of personal 1 ROH and the Plaintiff have filed a Joint Stipulation to for Waiver of Jury Trial for All Claims Asserted by Plaintiff Against Royal Oak Homes, LLC. [D.E. 972] and this Court entered an Agreed Order on the Joint Stipulation for Waiver of Jury Trial. [D.E. 974; 977; 978; and 979]. While this Court has Ordered that the evidence presented against ROH and the remaining subcontractors will be presented in front of a jury, it also Ordered, and Plaintiff and ROH stipulated to the Court ruling on the Plaintiff’s claims against ROH after the jury renders a verdict. Id. at ¶¶ 1 and 3. 5 knowledge of the case, personal belief in the client nor in the justness of the case. Plaintiff agrees that attorneys are not supposed to express their personal opinions and, therefore, does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 2. Comments on Uncalled Witnesses. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make any statement regarding ROH’s decision to call or not call any witness equally available to all parties to call for trial. Plaintiff agrees that trial strategy and decisions made by counsel on how to present each of their client’s cases should not be discussed at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 3. Mediation, Settlement Offers, and Other Settlement Agreements. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make any statement mentioning mediation, discussion of settlement negotiation, settlement offers, and/or settlement agreements. Plaintiff agrees that settlement communications, mediation communications, and settlement agreements are confidential and should not be discussed at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 4. Use of Depositions. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not put 6 forth any evidence or testimony from prior depositions if the witness is available to testify at trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330. Plaintiff objects and notes that the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330 specifically allows for situations where a deposition can be proffered as evidence at trial (i.e. (1) impeachment; (2) deposition of an adverse party; (3) completeness of the testimonial record; or (4) if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; (B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; (C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; (D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; or (F) the witness is an expert or skilled witness.) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.330 5. Liability Insurance. ROH seeks to preclude all parties from making any statement which reference insurance, the existence or amount of insurance, or any issues relating to any parties’ insurance coverage. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 7 6. Other Lawsuits and Other Claims. ROH seeks to preclude any mention of prior litigation or pending claims as to the Defendants alleging that it will be prejudicial to the jury’s view of the facts properly put before them. Plaintiff agrees to not mention prior litigation or pending claims as to ROH in order to demonstrate any party’s litigiousness, so long as the ROH is similarly bound by this restriction. However, Plaintiff does not agree, and objects to, and ROH does not appear to argue for, a blanket ruling precluding any mention of prior or pending litigation under any circumstances. Such a ruling would be inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings. Additionally, this blanket ruling would be prejudicial to the Association as ROH and its subcontractors’ knowledge of the defective work is a key element in the Association’s burden of to support its negligence claim against ROH or the other subcontractors whose work is still at issue. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: “Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. 7. Parties’ Financial Status. Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to what testimony, questioning, or evidence ROH seeks to preclude and how such 8 questioning, testimony, or evidence would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id. 8. Hearsay Statements by Unidentified Individuals. Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to what testimony, questioning, or evidence ROH seeks to preclude and how such questioning, testimony, or evidence would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence 9 was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id. Plaintiff has no way of determining what evidence or testimony may be subject to ROH’s request to preclude “hearsay statements by unidentified individuals” ahead of a timely and specific objection to testimony proffered at trial. Additionally, there are many hearsay rule exceptions under Florida law and Plaintiff cannot anticipate what evidence the Court may or may not find admissible pursuant to evidentiary rules and the circumstances of the objection made at the time of trial. See, e.g., § 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2012). 9. Testimony of Unidentified Expert Witnesses. ROH seeks to preclude any testimony from expert witnesses that have not been disclosed from testifying at trial. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all undisclosed expert witnesses. 10. Ex Parte Interviews of Witnesses. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make any statement or ask questions relating to information obtained by counsel in ex 10 parte interviews with a witness that was not subject to cross-examination by the opposing party. Plaintiff agrees that this kind of introduction of testimony by counsel should not be discussed at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 11. Stipulations by Counsel. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make any statement regarding counsel for the Parties’ stipulations as to law or fact. Plaintiff agrees that trial strategy and decisions made by counsel on how to present each of their client’s cases should not be discussed at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 12. Analogy to a Criminal Case. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion finding that counsel shall not make any statement analogizing the present case to a criminal case. Plaintiff agrees that such analogy in this context should not be discussed at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 13. Testimony as to Veracity. ROH moves the Court to grant its Motion precluding any attempt to question any witness concerning the truth or falsity of testimony given by another witness. 11 Plaintiff agrees with the law set out regarding this practice at trial and does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. Notwithstanding, if ROH is attempting to preclude questioning or testimony that would be impeachment evidence, Plaintiff objects. Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to what testimony, questioning, or evidence ROH seeks to preclude and how such questioning, testimony, or evidence would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id. 14. Improper Bolstering/Authoritative Texts and Post-Deposition Opinions ROH seeks to preclude any expert opinion not previously disclosed at 12 deposition or by written report. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the relief sought so long as the same is applicable to all testifying expert witnesses. Plaintiff’s lack of objection is subject to the caveat that not every expert has been deposed, and that Plaintiff will only agree to limit testimony in regard to the completed depositions. At present, not all of Plaintiff’s experts have yet been deposed or have not completed their depositions. Further, ROH requests to preclude any attempt by Plaintiff’s counsel or its experts “to bolster opinions by reference to other experts, studies, tests, or other authoritative texts.” Motion, p. 13. Plaintiff objects to this request as it is an improper and hidden Daubert test of the bases of Plaintiff’s experts’ opinions and the mention and/or introduction of information upon which Plaintiff’s expert relied is explicitly allowed under Florida Evidence Rules and required by the terms of the case management order. See §90.705, Fla. Stat. (1995) (“Unless otherwise required by the court, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inferences and give reasons without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data. On cross-examination the expert shall be required to specify the facts or data.”); see also § 90.706, Fla. Stat. (1978): Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science, art, or specialized knowledge contained in a published treatise, periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet, or other writing may be used in cross- examination of an expert witness if the expert witness recognizes the author or the treatise, periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet, or other writing to be authoritative, or, notwithstanding nonrecognition by the 13 expert witness, if the trial court finds the author or the treatise, periodical, book, dissertation, pamphlet, or other writing to be authoritative and relevant to the subject matter. Id. Plaintiff further objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to: (1) what testimony, questioning, evidence, or documentation ROH seeks to preclude; and (2) testimony, questioning, evidence, or documentation would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id 15. Inappropriate Legal Conclusions. ROH seeks to preclude testimony regarding any expert providing “inappropriate legal conclusions.” Motion, p. 14. ROH is not specific as to what testimony would be a question of law in which 14 it is not the expert’s function to draw legal conclusions. However, Plaintiff generally agrees this point, insofar as the requirements of the applicable building code are generally “a question of law for the court,” where the disputed language consists of ‘ordinary words susceptible to being given plain effect consistent with their ordinary meaning.’” Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency Inc., 645 So. 2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA1994). An exception arises, however, where “a statute or ordinance contains words of art or scientific and technical terms.” Id. Here, such exceptions may arise as determined by the Court in evaluating the jury instructions on the Florida Building Code’s requirements. Again, ROH is not specific as to what kind of opinions and/or testimony it is seeking to limit but, if it is referring to testimony regarding the existence of Florida Building Code Violations, Florida’s Supreme Court held that expert testimony regarding whether something complies with Code requirements (i.e., their “character”) is absolutely permissible. See Noa v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 305 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. 1974) Florida’s First District Court of Appeals reiterated this position in Heron’s Landing, where the plaintiff’s expert testified “in detail how the stucco at issue did not meet the pertinent standards and the Florida Building Code.” D.R. Horton, Inc. – Jacksonville v. Heron’s Landing, 266 So. 3d 1201, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Further, Seibert expressly recognized the admissibility of expert testimony to determine whether an object complies with the applicable building 15 code, as opposed to what the code means: “The admission of such testimony has been allowed to explain the character of an object in order to determine if it complies with a statute, ordinance, or code.” Id. at 891 (citing Noa, 305 So. 2d 182; Grand Union, 454 So. 2d 14; and Chimeno, 251 So. 2d 351). There is no question: Florida law expressly permits expert testimony regarding whether construction violated the requirements of the Florida Building Code. See Seibert, 573 So. 2d at 890 (“such testimony has been allowed to explain the character of an object in order to determine if it complies with a statute, ordinance, or code.”); Chimeno, 251 So. 2d 353–54 (Permitting dueling expert testimony on whether elevator met code requirements); Noa, 305 So. 2d 186 (Permitting expert testimony on whether “character” of pipeline came within exception of regulation); Morowitz, 613 So.2d 495 (permitting expert testimony regarding whether ramp met code requirements); Grand Union, 454 So. 2d 15 (Same ruling as Morowitz); and Deehl, 191 So. 2d 606-07 (permitting plaintiff’s expert to opine that the “South Florida Building Code was definitely not followed.”). Plaintiff objects to a blanket in limine regarding this topic. 16. Referring to Defense Counsel as Anything Other than Counsel for Defendant. ROH seeks to preclude any mention of “defense lawyers” or “defense law firm,” and asks the Court to instruct Plaintiff to only address counsel for ROH as “Counsel for Defendant” or “Counsel for Royal Oak.” ROH alleges that such 16 verbiage is “irrelevant to the issues of the case.” This request is incredibly overbroad, severely limiting to how Plaintiff’s counsel can address opposing counsel, and ROH does not provide a legitimate reason as to why any other reference to ROH’s counsel other than “Counsel for Defendant” or “Counsel for Royal Oak.” Would be prejudicial to ROH. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff agrees and intends to follow the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct and will treat opposing counsel with civility, in and out of the presence of the jury. 17. Reference to Attorneys’ Fees and/or Costs. ROH seeks to preclude any mention of attorney’s fees and costs, alleging that it will be prejudicial to the jury’s view of the facts properly put before them and that entitlement to fees and costs is an issue for the Judge to determine. At present, Plaintiff is not seeking attorney’s fees from ROH within its Complaint and therefore, does not object to this request so long as the ROH is similarly bound by this restriction. However, Plaintiff does not agree, objects to, and ROH does not appear to argue for, a blanket ruling precluding any mention of attorney’s fees and investigation costs (or the recovery thereof) under any circumstances. Such a ruling would be inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings. Additionally, this blanket ruling would be prejudicial to the Association as Plaintiff’s costs are recoverable and are being sought. To preclude mention of the same would be prejudicial to the 17 Plaintiff in proving the damages portion of its case. 18. Allegations Limited to the Complaint. ROH’s Motion asks the Court to instruct Plaintiff’s counsel “not to introduce evidence concerning issues not framed by the pleadings.” Motion, p. 16. The Association objects to this preclusion to the extent that ROH or the other Defendants seek to argue that the list of defective conditions included in the Complaint is not specific enough. Notwithstanding, if ROH and the subcontractors agree that the Association’s Complaint is inclusive of the defects and issues listed out and supported with evidentiary specificity, it does not object to the relief requested so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 19. Discovery History. Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to what commentary or testimony ROH seeks to preclude and how such commentary or testimony would prejudice it. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, 18 relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id. Notwithstanding, the Association agrees to abide by the rules of evidence, civil procedure, and BCP, and does not object to the relief requested as outlined in the black letter law so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 20.Undisclosed Exhibits and/or Demonstrative Aids. ROH’s Motion asks the Court to instruct Plaintiff’s counsel to make no reference to, provide no identification of, or provide no publishing of any power points, visual aids, demonstrative aids, or exhibits prior to allowing ROH to review the same. Motion, p. 17. Notwithstanding, the Association agrees to abide by the rules of evidence, civil procedure, and BCP, and does not object to the relief requested as outlined in the black letter law so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 21.Summary Judgment Rulings. Plaintiff objects to this motion as premature, overbroad, and not specific as to what commentary or testimony ROH seeks to preclude and how such commentary or testimony would prejudice it. ROH cannot know what or how Plaintiff may “reference” summary judgment rulings and neither does it define what it intends to 19 preclude by “reference” in its Motion. Additionally, summary judgment rulings may have impact on the jury instructions provided by the Court, a draft of which is submitted to the Court ahead of trial. Because ROH’s request is so broad, Plaintiff’s ability to mention topics and evidence that prove its case would be prejudicial to the Plaintiff. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id. Notwithstanding, the Association agrees to abide by the rules of evidence, civil procedure, and BCP, and does not object to the relief requested as outlined in the black letter law so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 20 22.Statements Portraying Plaintiff as a “Victim.” Plaintiff only objects to this request to preclude as overbroad and premature. While Plaintiff can agree to not use the word “Victim” in referring to itself, Plaintiff cannot know what commentary or testimony ROH seeks to preclude prior to a specific objection at trial. Therefore, to the extent ROH wishes to preclude any testimony that it believes prejudicial, the objections should be made at trial and in context to the characterizations made, not as a blanket pre-trial order. To that end, ROH’s motion is undefined, unfounded, and should be denied. 23. No Use of the Phrase “Life Safety;” Argument Invoking the “Golden Rule;” and/or Conscience of the Community and Similar Arguments. ROH seeks to preclude testimony, statements, or evidence relating to any “life-safety issue,” “conscience of the community, “Golden Rule,” or “sending a message” type arguments. While ROH cites to cases that hold that highly prejudicial and inflammatory comments are improper, and that commentary urging the jury to place themselves in a party’s position, requesting the jury to consider how much they would wish to receive is improper, the Motion provides no case law that calls out specific testimony or commentary to be excluded for this set of facts. Further, the Motion cites cases that merely state that “personal safety,” “community safety,” “arousing sympathy from the jury,” and “sending a message” arguments and testimony are akin to Golden Rule arguments prohibited under Florida Law. The 21 Motion cites these cases and make these arguments to exclude evidence without specifically identifying what testimony, evidence, or commentary from witnesses in the present case would fall under those categories. As such, it is unclear what testimony, in particular, ROH is seeking to preclude. For example, is the argument that ROH and its subcontractors owe a responsibility to the Association and its members to construct a building free from material construction defects a “sending a message” type argument? Does ROH’s responsibility to adhere to the applicable Florida Building Codes to protect the welfare and well-being of the community fall under ROH’s definition of conscience of the community? Obligations, responsibilities, and resulting failures to properly construct the Community are the basis of this lawsuit, and cannot, in any manner, be considered prejudicial. Therefore, to the extent ROH wishes to preclude any testimony that it believes prejudicial, the objections should be made at trial and in context to the characterizations made, not as a blanket pre-trial order. To that end, ROH’s motion is undefined, unfounded, and should be denied. Plaintiff agrees, generally, with ROH’s request to follow the legal principles applicable to the “Golden Rule” and “Conscience of the Community” argument and commentary from counsel. Plaintiff does not have an objection to the relief sought related to following the black letter law, so long as the same is applicable to all parties in this lawsuit. 22 24. No Reference to the Surfside Condominium Collapse. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id. Plaintiff does not yet know what testimony will be elicited at trial or how a mention of Surfside Condominiums may be mentioned. Without more specificity, to the extent ROH wishes to preclude any testimony that it believes prejudicial, the objections should be made at trial and in context to the characterizations made, not as a blanket pre-trial order. To that end, ROH’s motion is undefined, unfounded, and should be denied. 25. No Unit Owner Testimony as to Value of Unit. Under Florida law, a court excludes evidence on a motion in limine “only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Stewart v. Hooters of America, 23 Inc., 2007 WL 1752843 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2007); see also Alvarado v. State, 521 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (affirming trial court's grant of a motion in limine because the proffered evidence was clearly inadmissible). Because of this high burden in precluding evidence prior to its introduction at trial, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” In re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 2009 WL 260989 at * 1 (M.D. Fla. 2009). As such, the better practice is “to wait until trial to rule on objections when admissibility substantially depends upon what facts may be developed there.” Id. III. CONCLUSION Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court rule consistent with the arguments set forth above and further deny all the Motions, in part, to reserve ruling if during the course of trial the evidence discussed in the Motions becomes relevant or otherwise admissible pursuant to the applicable rules of evidence. Respectfully submitted, BALL JANIK LLP By: /s/ Kasey L. Joyce Phillip E. Joseph, FL Bar No. 1000368 Evan J. Small, FL Bar No. 57306 Jeffrey A. Widelitz FL Bar No. 105642 Christopher S. Tribbey, FL Bar No. 1003114 Kasey L. Joyce, FL Bar No. 1024705 201 E Pine Street, Suite 600 Orlando, FL 32801 Telephone: (407) 455-5664 Facsimile: (407) 902-2105 24 pjoseph@balljanik.com esmall@balljanik.com jwidelitz@balljanik.com ctribbey@balljanik.com kjoyce@balljanik.com dtodd@balljanik.com cbetancourt@balljanik.com bburton@balljanik.com orlandodocket@balljanik.com Counsel for Plaintiff Villas at Emerald Lake Homeowners Association, Inc. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true copy of the foregoing has been filed via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal on February 27, 2024. /s/ Kasey L. Joyce Kasey L. Joyce SERVICE LIST LUIS PRATS THAMIR A.R. KADDOURI, JR. LANNIE D. HOUGH, JR. PENELOPE T. ROWLETT JAMES MICHAEL WALLS BETH ANN TOBEY ROBIN H. LEAVENGOOD Law Office of Thamir A.R. Kaddouri, Carlton Fields, P.A. Jr. P.A. 4221 W. Boy Scout Boulevard 3220 West Cypress Street Tampa, FL 33607-5780 Tampa, FL 33607 (813) 223-7000 (813) 879-5752 lprats@carltonfields.com thamir.kaddouri@tampalaw.org lhough@carltonfields.com service@tampalaw.org mwalls@carltonfields.com penelope.rowlett@tampalaw.org rleavengood@carltonfields.com beth.tobey@tampalaw.org mramos@carltonfields.com nbonilla@carltonfields.com Counsel for Defendant, Imperial ejohnson@carltonfields.com Building Corporation 25 krick@carltonfields.com Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff, Counsel for Defendant, Royal Oak Villas at Emerald Lake Homeowners Homes, LLC Association, Inc. ONLY 12/8/2023 Dismissed with Prejudice by Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal Oak Homes, LLC, 12/12/2023 PAUL SIDNEY ELLIOTT PETER J. KAPSALES P.O. Box 274204 MARGARET M. EFTA Tampa, FL 33688-4204 Milne Law Group, P.A. (813) 265-1314 301 E. Pine Street, Suite 525 pse@psejd.com Orlando, FL 32801 (321) 558-7700 Counsel for Defendant, Hugh pkapsales@milnelawgroup.com MacDonald Construction, Inc. (HMC) mefta@milnelawgroup.com eservice@milnelawgroup.com DENISE M. ANDERSON ASHLEY M. MATTINGLY Counsel for Defendant/Cross DAVID E. BRADLEY, JR Defendant/ Third-Party Plaintiff, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP Weathermaster Building Products, Inc. 400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 2300 Tampa, FL 33602 Dismissed with Prejudice by (813) 281-1900 Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal danderson@butler.legal Oak Homes, LLC ONLY 12/21/2023 amattingly@butler.legal dbradley@butler.legal krieck@butler.legal rjorge@butler.legal Co-Counsel for Defendant, Hugh MacDonald Construction, Inc. DENISE M. ANDERSON ANDREW E. HOLWAY DAVID A. MERCER J. ROCCO CAFARO Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig, LLP Hill Ward Henderson 400 N. Ashley Drive, Suite 2300 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 3700 Tampa, FL 33602 Tampa, FL 33602 26 danderson@butler.legal (813) 221-3900 dmercer@butler.legal andrew.holway@hwhlaw.com krieck@butler.legal derrick.calandra@hwhlaw.com rjorge@butler.legal jill.kuty@hwhlaw.com tbarry@butler.legal kathy.wernsing@hwhlaw.com rocco.cafaro@hwhlaw.com Counsel for Defendant, Don King’s tracy.coale@hwhlaw.com Concrete, Inc. Counsel for Defendant/Cross Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff, Defendant, Weintraub Inspections & Villas At Emerald Lake Homeowners Forensics, Inc. n/k/a Weintraub Association, Inc., ONLY 12/28/2023 Engineering and Inspections, Inc. Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff, ONLY 12/12/2023 Dismissed with Prejudice by CrossClaim Plaintiff, 1/192024 JAYNE ANN PITTMAN BRUCE R. CALDERON NATALIE C. FISCHER ALICIA Z. GROSS Conroy Simberg BARRI A. REISCH Two South Orange Avenue, Suite 300 Milber Makris Plousadis & Seiden, Orlando, FL 32801 LLP (407) 649-9797 1900 NW Corporate Blvd. eserviceorl@conroysimberg.com East Tower, Suite 440 jpittman@conroysimberg.com Boca Raton, FL 33431 mmaitland@conroysimberg.com (561) 994-7310 nfischer@conroysimberg.com bcalderon@milbermakris.com azgross@milbermakris.com Counsel for Defendant/Cross-Claim breisch@milbermakris.com Defendantt, Advanced Wrapping and kmcdowell@milbermakris.com Concrete Solutions of Central Florida, sskowronski@milbermakris.com Inc. Counsel for Defendant/Cross- Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff, Defendant, Brown + Company ONLY 11/8/2023 Architecture, Inc. Dismissed with Prejudice by Plaintiff, ONLY 11/8/2023 27 Dismissed with Prejudice by Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal Dismissed with Prejudice by Oak Homes, LLC, 12/12/2023 Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff, Royal Oak Homes, LLC, 12/12/2023 JACKELINE RODRIGUEZ S. SCOTT ROSS KIRA TSIRING Groelle & Salmon, P.A. Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP 1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 320 150 Southeast Second Avenue, Suite Tampa, FL 33607 1200 (813) 849-7200 Miami, FL 33131-2332 gstcourtdocs@gspalaw.com (305) 379-3686 sross@gspalaw.com jrodriguez@hamiltonmillerlaw.com cebanks@gspalaw.com ktsiring@hamiltonmillerlaw.com mcoleman@gspalaw.com mprieto@hamiltonmillerlaw.com vbain@hamiltonmillerlaw.com Counsel for Third-Party Defendant, Helberg Enterprises, LLC Counsel for Defendant/Cross- Defendant, TGK Stucco, Inc. VICKI LAMBERT ANDREW T. MARSHALL ALEC MASSON SARA W. MAPES Luks, Santaniello, Petrillo & Cohen Hamilton Price, P.A. 201 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 400 2400 Manatee Ave. W. Orlando, FL 32801 Bradenton, FL 34205 (407) 540-9170 (941) 748-0550 luksorl-pleadings@ls-law.com andrew@hamiltonpricelaw.com amason@insurancedefense.net sara@hamiltonpricelaw.com jpestonit@insurancedefense.net nancy@hamiltonpricelaw.com kelsey@hamiltonpricelaw.com Counsel for Third-Party Defendant, atmservice@hamiltonpricelaw.com Casey Hawkins Glass, Inc. Counsel for Third-Party Defendant, PHILLIP S. HOWELL T&M Construction of Sanford, Inc. BRENDEN C. COLLINS Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Dismissed with Prejudice by Third- Smith, P.L.C. Party Plaintiff, Weathermaster 400 N. Ashley Dr., Suite 1000 Building Products, Inc. 1/11/2024 Tampa, FL 33602 (813) 977-1200 WILLIAM M. WOODS 28 tampaservice@gallowaylawfirm.com JOSEPH M. CLINE phowell@gallowaylawfirm.com Woods Law Group bcollinsl@gallowaylawfirm.com 100 S. Missouri Avenue, Suite 201 Clearwater, Fl 33756 Counsel for Third-Party Defendant, (727) 799-1229, Ext. 4072 Casey Hawkins Glass, Inc. wwoods@willwoodslaw.com josephc@willwoodslaw.com Dismissed with Prejudice by Third- marital@willwoodslaw.com Party Plaintiff, Weathermaster sharonmg@woodslawgroupfl.com Building Products, Inc. 1/11/2024 pleadings@willwoodslaw.com Counsel for Third-Party Defendants, T & M Construction of Sanford, Inc. and All Glass Installation Corp. T & M Construction of Sanford, Inc. Dismissed with Prejudice by Third- Party Plaintiff, Weathermaster Building Products, Inc. 1/11/2024 All Glass Installation Corp. Dismissed with Prejudice by Third-Party