Motion for New Trial in GEICO COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCECOMPANY vs. KIMBERLY KAY CARSON, et al| Trellis.Law

On May 03, 2023 a Motion,Ex Parte was filed involving a dispute between Geico County Mutual Insurance Company, Geico County Mutual Insurancecompany, and Carson, Kimberly Kay, Sharpe, Danny Wilson, for CNTR CNSMR COM DEBT in the District Court of Dallas County.

Preview
FILED
2/13/2024 4:00 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Jenifer Trujillo DEPUTY

CAUSE NO. DC-23-05790

GEICO COUNTY MUTUAL § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
INSURANCE COMPANY
§
V. § 134th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
KIMBERLY KAY CARSON AND § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
DANNY WILSON SHARPE

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Defendant, Danny Sharpe, respectfully files this Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Default

Judgment and for New Trial. In support thereof, Defendant respectfully shows the Court the

following:

TIME PERIOD

This Motion is presented within the time limits prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure for a Motion for New Trial.

II.

FACTS

Plaintiff, Geico County Mutual Insurance Company, sued Defendant Danny Sharpe for

negligence alleging that Defendant’s negligent entrustment of his automobile to Defendant driver

Kimberly Kay Carson caused an automobile accident on or about December 17, 2021. Plaintiff

alleges this accident resulted in Plaintiff being entitled to a subrogation amount of $11,536.36.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 5, 2023. A copy of Plaintiff’s Original Petition is attached hereto

and incorporated herein as EXHIBIT “A.”

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 1
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgement on January 9, 2024 hereto and incorporated

herein as EXHIBIT “B.” Said Motion was granted on January 14, 2024, hereto and incorporated

herein as EXHIBIT “C.”

III.

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

In support of this Motion, Defendant submits and relies on the following evidence:

Exhibit A Plaintiff’ Original Petition

Exhibit B Original Citation

Exhibit C Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgement

Exhibit D Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgement

Exhibit E Affidavit of Danny Sharpe

Exhibit F Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report

Defendant moves this Court to take judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Texas

Rules of Evidence, of the foregoing exhibits (Exhibits “A” through “E”).

IV.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE
AND VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Defendant Sharpe is entitled to set aside the default judgment because his failure to answer

was not intentional, nor the result of conscious indifference, but was the result of mistake or

accident; Defendant Sharpe has a meritorious defense; and granting this motion for a new trial will

in no way delay or injure Plaintiff.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 2
A. Defendant is Entitled to a New Trial Based on Equitable Principles.

Defendant is entitled to set aside a default judgment and should be granted a new trial based

on equitable principles. Under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d

124 (1939), a trial court must set aside a default judgment and order a new trial if the defendant

shows: (1) the failure to answer before judgment was not intentional or the result of conscious

indifference, but was the result of mistake or accident; (2) the defendant has a meritorious defense

to the Plaintiffs’ claims, and (3) the defendant files its motion for new trial at a time when the

granting of a new trial will occasion no delay or otherwise injure plaintiff. Id. at 126; see also, Holt

Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. 1992); Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Moody,

830 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 (Tex. 1992); Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1966). Even if

Plaintiff presents contradictory testimony to rebut a motion for new trial, Defendant would still be

entitled to a new trial. See, Nat’l Rigging, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 657 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). As demonstrated below, Defendant Sharpe has

satisfied all the Craddock elements in this case and is entitled to a new trial.

1. Defendant Sharpe’s failure to answer prior to judgment was the result of
accident or mistake, not Defendant Sharpe’s conscious indifference.

Under Texas law, the Craddock standard must be liberally construed so that each defendant

will have his/her day in court. See e.g., Harold-Elliott Co. v. K.P./Miller Realty Growth Fund I,

853 S.W.2d 752, 755-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 193, no writ). As to the first element,

even a slight excuse will suffice to satisfy the first prong of the Craddock test. Id.; see also, Estate

of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex. 1993); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Mosharaf,

794 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The defendant does not

have to prove it acted reasonably or that it was free from negligence to obtain relief from a default

judgment; the test is whether the failure to answer was the result of accident or mistake. E.g.,

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 3
Harmon Truck Lines, Inc. v. Steele, 839 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, writ

dism’d). Texas courts liberally interpret this first prong of the Craddock test in favor of the movant.

See, K-Mart Corp. v. Armstrong, 944 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, writ denied).

In the present case, Defendant Sharpe did not consciously or intentionally fail to answer

this lawsuit. Defendant Sharpe mistakenly believed that his insurance company, State Farm, was

handling his defense for this claim, because it was also handling the defense of Co-Defendant

Carson arising from the same set of facts. Defendant Sharpe knew Co-Defendant Carson had been

working with State Farm as the driver of the vehicle and mistakenly believed he did not have to

report his receipt of service to State Farm. See Exhibit “E”, Affidavit of Danny Sharpe”.

The foregoing facts prove Defendant Sharpe’s failure to file an answer was not the result

of conscious disregard or indifference; rather, Defendant Sharpe’s failure resulted from a mistaken

belief that any and all of Plaintiff’s claims against him were being defended. As a result, Defendant

satisfies the first element of the Craddock test.

2. Defendant has a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs’ claims.

Next, under Craddock, a movant seeking to set aside a default judgment need only to set

up, but not prove, a meritorious defense. Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126; see also, Ivy, 407 S.W.2d

at 214. A meritorious defense is one that, if proven, would result in a different or less onerous

judgment than that rendered by default. Ivy, 407 S.W.2d at 214; Mosharaf, 794 S.W.2d at 584.

The defense need not establish a totally opposite result. See, Ferguson & Co. v. Roll, 776 S.W.2d

692, 698 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ).

In determining whether, under the Craddock test, the factual allegations contained in

Defendant’s pleadings and supporting affidavits or other evidence must be taken as true, despite

the existence of any disputed facts or controverting affidavits or testimony. Director, State Emp.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 4
Wrks.’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. 1994); Ivy, 407 S.W.2d at 214. Once the

defendant has established a meritorious defense by prima facie evidence, it is improper to try the

defensive issues raised by the motion and affidavits. Ivy, 407 S.W.2d at 214. In other words, a

motion for new trial cannot be denied based upon counter-affidavits or contradictory testimony

offered by the plaintiff. Id.; see, also, Ferguson & Co., 776 S.W.2d at 698. The elements of

negligent entrustment are well established as: (1) the entrustment of a vehicle by its owner or

custodian; (2) to an incompetent driver; (3) that the owner knew or should have known was an

unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (4) that the driver was negligent on the occasion in

question; and (5) the driver's negligence proximately caused the accident. Williams v. Steves

Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1985).

Defendant Sharpe has a meritorious defense in that he cannot be found liable for negligent

entrustment of his vehicle because he was in the process of selling his vehicle, thus transferring

ownership to Defendant Carson. Furthermore, Ms. Carson is a properly licensed driver (See

Exhibit “F”, Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report, reflecting Ms. Carson’s valid driver’s license)

with a driving record that would not rise to a level meeting negligence when entrusting a vehicle

to her.

Based on these facts, Defendant Sharpe disputes the negligence alleged against him, and

can and will present a meritorious defense. Additionally, Defendant Sharpe contests Plaintiff’s

alleged damages. As a result, Defendant satisfies the second element of the Craddock test.

3. Granting a new trial will not cause further delay or injure Plaintiff.

The third prong of the Craddock test requires a defendant to offer to reimburse the plaintiff

for costs incurred in obtaining the default judgment and to be ready, willing, and able to go to trial

almost immediately. Craddock, S.W.2d at 126; see also, Angelo v. Champion Rest. Equip. Co.,

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 5
713 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. 1984). This prevents an injustice to the defendant causing an injustice to

the plaintiff and further delay. Craddock, 133 S.W.3d at 126.

Defendant Sharpe hereby offers to expeditiously conduct discovery on this matter and to

proceed to trial as soon as possible. Defendant Sharpe asserts that Plaintiff will not suffer any

significant delay or injury from the granting of a new trial in this cause because Defendant Sharpe’s

offer to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable expenses related to the default judgment and to proceed to trial

on this matter as soon as possible alleviates any prejudice to the Plaintiff. As a result, Defendant

Sharpe satisfies the third element of the Craddock test.

The law favors giving all parties their day in court Harold-Elliott Co. v. K.P./Miller Realty

Growth Fund I, 853 S.W.2d at 755-56. Defendant Sharpe, by satisfying all three prongs of the

Craddock test, has demonstrated his entitlement under principles of equity to have its day in court

and this Court should set aside the default Judgment as to Liability and grant Defendant a new trial

on all claims asserted by Plaintiff against Defendant Sharpe.

B. Alternatively, Defendant Requests a New Trial in the Interests of Fairness and Justice

If this Court does not act on the legal or equitable grounds described above, Defendant

Sharpe moves this Court to grant it a new trial in the interests of fairness and justice. See, Owens

v. Neely, 866 S.W.2d 716, 719-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied). A trial

court can grant a new trial in the interest of justice as well as for errors of law. See, American

Motorists Ins. Co. v. Sells, 747 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, writ denied).

Defendant is entitled to his day in Court and wishes to be able to assert his defenses to Plaintiff’s

claims. Defendant Sharpe respectfully moves this Court to set aside the default Judgment as to

Liability and to grant it a new trial in the interests of fairness and justice.

VI.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 6
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant Sharpe respectfully prays that

this Court grant its Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Default Judgment and for New Trial as to

Liability and Damages for such other and further relief to which this Defendant Sharpe may show

himself to be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

THE LECRONE LAW FIRM, PC
Wall Street Plaza
123 North Crockett Street, Suite 200
Sherman, TX 75090
TEL: 903.813.1900
FAX: 903.813.1944

By: /s/ Mark A. Teague
MARK A. TEAGUE
State Bar No. 24003039
JOHN W. BREEZE
State Bar No. 00796248
BLAISE S. WILCOTT
State Bar No. 24086481
SELENE DOMINGUEZ PEÑA
State Bar No. 24106929
MARK C. HUMPHREY
State Bar No. 24132191
ASHANTI S. BAKER
State Bar No. 24128416
THOMAS R. NEEDHAM
State Bar No. 14855300
ASHLEE A. BRADSHAW
State Bar No. 24134560
KRISTEN N. JAMES
State Bar No. 24110046
ESERVICE@LECRONELAW.COM

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the 13th day of February, 2024, the foregoing instrument was
forwarded to the following counsel of record:

Ms. Jessica R. Lobes
RATHBONE GROUP, LLC
5930 Royal Lane, Suite E #515
Dallas, TX 75230-3896 /s/ Mark A. Teague
MARK A. TEAGUE

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

This is to certify that on the 12th day of February, 2024 the undersigned contacted counsel

for Plaintiff, Ms. Jessica R. Lobes, and she is opposed to this motion.

/s/ Mark A. Teague
MARK A. TEAGUE

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND/OR VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FOR NEW TRIAL
Page 8
EXHIBIT A
FILED
5/3/2023 11:00 AM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
2 CIT ESERVE DALLAS 00., TEXAS
Cynthia R Willis DEPUTY

DC-23-05790
CAUSE N O.

GEICO COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE § IN THE DALLAS DISTRICT
COURT 0F THE STATE 0F
COMPANY § TEXAS
Plaintiff, § 134th
§
VS. §
§ DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
KIMBERLY KAY CARSON and §
DANNY WILSON SHARPE, §
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION
Plaintiff GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company, a company which was at all times relevant
to this suit authorized to transact the business of auto insurance in the State of Texas, complains
of Defendants Kimberly Kay Carson (Defendant No. 1) and Danny Wilson Sharpe (Defendant No.
2) to this Court as follows:

Defendant No. 1, Kimberly Kay Carson, can be served at residence located at: 1018 Highland
Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 7 5051-3005, or wherever he/she may be found.

Defendant No. 2, Danny Wilson Sharpe, can be served at residence located at: 1018 Highland
Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 7 5051-3005, or wherever he/she may be found.

Plaintiff intends for discovery to be conducted under Level 1 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff only seeks monetary relief of less than $25 0,000.00.

II.

On or about December 17, 2021, about the area of Block 800 of Tom Landry Highway and Sylvan
Avenue in Dallas, Texas, a motor vehicle owned by Plaintiff s insured Kelly Danford, (hereinafter
“Insured”) and/or the occupants of Insured's vehicle were damaged by a vehicle negligently
operated by Defendant NO. 1, whose negligence proximately caused the collision and damages in
the amount of $11,536.36. Plaintiff compensated its insured for the loss, thereby becoming
subrogated in the amount of$11,536.36.

SuitTX-MVA.Doc-20211009
At the time of the collision, Defendant No. 2 was the owner of the motor vehicle driven by
Defendant No. 1, and the vehicle was operated with Defendant No. 2's consent and knowledge.
Upon information and belief, Defendant No. 2 wrongfully and/or negligently entrusted his/her
motor vehicle to an incompetent, reckless, unlicensed and uninsured driver.

Pursuant to Texas Transportation Code §601.335, it is requested that the Court, as part of its
judgment, allow the parties to enter into written installment payment agreements without further
order of the Court.

PRAYER
Plaintiff prays that Defendants be cited to answer and appear and after ﬁnal trial, Plaintiff have
judgment against Defendants for a sum of $11,536.36 with prejudgment and post judgment
interest, cost of suit and other relief which Plaintiff is entitled.

Respectfully submitted,
Rathbone Group, LLC

/s/ Jessica Lobes

Jessica R. Lobes / SBN 24083405
Jared B. Hall / SBN: 24055615
Jehaan “Gigi” Mattar / SBN: 24092774
5930 Royal Lane, Ste E #515
Dallas, TX 75230-3 896
800-870-5521
216-298-4495 [fax]
JLobes@Rathbonegroup.com
JHall@Rathbonegroup.com
GMattar@Rathbonegroup.com
RG File No. 3136708.001fKHM

DEFENDAN TS, YOU MUST DELIVER THIS IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR INSURER OR
THE INSURANCE COMPANY INSURING THE VEHICLE YOU WERE DRIVING. IF
YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY AND WISH TO DISCUSS
PAYMENT OF THE DAMAGES, CALL 1-800-870-5521, EXT: 3777.

5uitTX-MVA.Doc-20211009
EXHIBIT B
EXHIBIT C
FILED
1/9/2024 6:59 AM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Maricella Sarinana DEPUTY

3136708.001 / TH4

CAUSE NUMBER: DC-23-05790

GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company )
)
Plaintiff, ) DALLAS 134TH DISTRICT COURT OF
) THE STATE OF TEXAS
v. )
) Dallas County, Texas
Kimberly Kay Carson, et al. )
)
Defendants )

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT DANNY WILSON SHARPE

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

NOW COMES Plaintiff GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company, Movant
herein, and brings this Motion to Enter Judgment. In support hereof, Movant shows the
following:

A. Plaintiff sued Defendants for claims arising from an automobile accident which
occurred on or about December 17, 2021 about the area of Block 800 of Tom
Landry Highway and Sylvan Avenue in Dallas, Texas between Plaintiff’s insured
and a vehicle negligently operated by Defendant Kimberly Kay Carson, with the
knowledge and permission of the vehicle's owner, Danny Wilson Sharpe. As a
proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff’s insured vehicle, and the
occupant(s) thereof sustained damages in the amount of $11,536.36. Plaintiff,
pursuant to the insurance policy with its insured, compensated its insured for said
damages directly and proximately caused by Defendants and is now subrogated
to that amount.

B. Defendant, although duly served with process, have failed to file an answer.

C. Plaintiff supports its claims for damages in the amount of $11,536.36 by Plaintiff’s
affidavit and business records. These business records have been maintained in
the ordinary course of its business affairs and as part of the regular business
practice of Insurer to make such records. All such business records were made
at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters.

D. The Court has been presented with a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff,
GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company which is attached hereto and
incorporated as referenced as if set out in full.

TX MDJ Dallas Decl.Doc-20230801
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays this Court will GRANT
this motion and will enter judgment, attached hereto, in favor of Plaintiff, and for such
other and further relief that may be awarded at law or in equity.

Respectfully submitted:

/s/ Gigi Mattar
___________________________________
Jessica R. Lobes / SBN 24083405
Jared B. Hall / SBN: 24055615
Jehaan “Gigi” Mattar / SBN: 24092774
5930 Royal Lane, Ste E #515
Dallas, TX 75230-3896
800-870-5521
216-298-4495 [fax]
JLobes@Rathbonegroup.com
JHall@Rathbonegroup.com
GMattar@Rathbonegroup.com

TX MDJ Dallas Decl.Doc-20230801
3136708.001 / TH4

CAUSE NUMBER: DC-23-05790

GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company )
)
Plaintiff, ) DALLAS 134TH DISTRICT COURT OF
) THE STATE OF TEXAS
v. )
) Dallas County, Texas
Kimberly Kay Carson, et al. )
)
Defendants )

CERTIFICATE OF LAST KNOWN MAILING ADDRESS

I certify that the last known mailing address of each Defendant Danny Wilson
Sharpe against whom judgment is taken in the above-entitled and number cause is:

Danny Wilson Sharpe
1018 Highland Drive
Grand Prairie, TX 75051-3005

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gigi Mattar
_________________________________
Jessica R. Lobes / SBN 24083405
Jared B. Hall / SBN: 24055615
Jehaan “Gigi” Mattar / SBN: 24092774
5930 Royal Lane, Ste E #515
Dallas, TX 75230-3896
800-870-5521
216-298-4495 [fax]
JLobes@Rathbonegroup.com
JHall@Rathbonegroup.com
GMattar@Rathbonegroup.com

TX MDJ Dallas Decl.Doc-20230801
3136708.001 / TH4

CAUSE NUMBER: DC-23-05790

GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company )
)
Plaintiff, ) DALLAS 134TH DISTRICT COURT OF
) THE STATE OF TEXAS
v. )
) Dallas County, Texas
Kimberly Kay Carson, et al. )
)
Defendants )

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

CPRC § 132.001 DECLARATION
My name is Jehaan "Gigi" Mattar, my date of birth is July 9, 1988, and my
address is 5930 Royal Lane, Ste E #515, Dallas, TX 75230-3896, USA. I declare under
penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

My name is Jehaan "Gigi" Mattar. I am capable of making this declaration. I am
over the age of 21 and I am of sound mind. I am the attorney in charge of this case for
the Plaintiff. I have prepared and submitted the attached default judgment. The facts
stated within this declaration filed in support of the default judgment are within my
personal knowledge and are true and correct. The following facts are known to me:

1. Plaintiff, GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company, sued Defendant Danny
Wilson Sharpe for damages arising from an automobile accident;

2. Defendants were served on October 16, 2023 with Plaintiff's Petition.

3. Defendants have failed to file an answer in this court.

4. I, and other attorneys employed by Plaintiff's counsel's firm, have spent in excess
of 2.0 hours in preparing and filing the petition and summons, following for
serivce of process, and preparing this motion.

5. I am of the opinion that a fee award of $250.00 per hour, for a total award of at
least $500.00 is entirely reasonable in light of the novelty and difficulty of the
questions of law involved, the skill requisite to properly perform the legal services
called for herein, the fee customarily charged in this locality for similar services,
the amounts involved, and the experience, reputation, and ability of me and the
other attorneys at my firm who have performed the services referenced above.

My name is Jehaan "Gigi" Mattar, my date of birth is July 9, 1988, and my address
is 5930 Royal Lane, Ste E #515 , Dallas, TX 75230-3896, USA. I declare under penalty of
perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

TX MDJ Dallas Decl.Doc-20230801
TRAVIS 6th
Executed in _____________ County, State of Texas, on the ______ day of
_______________, 20___.
January 24

/s/ Gigi Mattar
_________________________________
Jehaan "Gigi" Mattar

TX MDJ Dallas Decl.Doc-20230801
§ 542.302. Recovery in Suit or Other Action, TX INS § 542.302

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Insurance Code
Title 5. Protection of Consumer Interests (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle C. Deceptive, Unfair, and Prohibited Practices
Chapter 542. Processing and Settlement of Claims
Subchapter G. Insurer's Recovery from Uninsured Third Party (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Insurance Code § 542.302

§ 542.302. Recovery in Suit or Other Action

Effective: September 1, 2007
Currentness

An insurer that brings suit or takes other action described by Section 542.202 against a responsible third party relating
to a loss that is covered under a private passenger automobile insurance policy issued by the insurer and for which the
responsible third party is uninsured is entitled to recover, in addition to payments made by the insurer or insured, the
costs of bringing the suit or taking the action, including reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.

Credits
Added by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 1074, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2007. Redesignated from V.A.T.S. Insurance Code, art.
21.79H(b) and amended by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 730, § 3B.020(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2007; Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 921,
§ 9.020(a), eff. Sept. 1, 2007.

V. T.C.A., Insurance Code § 542.302, TX INS § 542.302
Current through the end of the 2017 Regular and First Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature

TX MDJ
TX MDJ Dallas
Dallas Decl.Doc-20230801
3136708.001 / TH4

CAUSE NUMBER: DC-23-05790

)
GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company )
)
Plaintiff, ) DALLAS 134TH DISTRICT COURT OF
) THE STATE OF TEXAS
)
v. ) Dallas County, Texas
)
)
Kimberly Kay Carson, et al. )
)
Defendants )

MILITARY SERVICE DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Defendant Danny Wilson Sharpe is not engaged in active military service. As
shown in the attached results of a military verification search of the Department of
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) online database at https://scra.dmdc.osd.mil,
Defendants are not listed on active military service. Said report is incorporated by
reference into this affidavit.

Executed in _____________
TRAVIS County, State of Texas, on the ____
6th day of
____________,
January 20___.
24

_______________________________
/s/ Gigi Mattar
Jehaan "Gigi" Mattar

TX MDJ Dallas Decl.Doc-20230801
Department of Defense Manpower Data Center Results as of : Dec-27-2023 02:29:30 PM

SCRA 5.18

Status Report
Pursuant to Servicemembers Civil Relief Act

SSN: XXX-XX-8270
Birth Date: Apr-XX-1951
Last Name: SHARPE
First Name: DANNY
Middle Name: WILSON
Status As Of: Dec-27-2023
Certificate ID: ZK2J52J403FLDMQ

On Active Duty On Active Duty Status Date
Active Duty Start Date Active Duty End Date Status Service Component
NA NA No NA
This response reflects the individuals’ active duty status based on the Active Duty Status Date

Left Active Duty Within 367 Days of Active Duty Status Date

Active Duty Start Date Active Duty End Date Status Service Component

NA NA No NA
This response reflects where the individual left active duty status within 367 days preceding the Active Duty Status Date

The Member or His/Her Unit Was Notified of a Future Call-Up to Active Duty on Active Duty Status Date
Order Notification Start Date Order Notification End Date Status Service Component
NA NA No NA
This response reflects whether the individual or his/her unit has received early notification to report for active duty

Upon searching the data banks of the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center, based on the information that you provided, the above is the status of
the individual on the active duty status date as to all branches of the Uniformed Services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Space Force, NOAA, Public
Health, and Coast Guard). This status includes information on a Servicemember or his/her unit receiving notification of future orders to report for Active Duty.

BYP ousepgactel
Sam Yousefzadeh, Director
Department of Defense - Manpower Data Center
4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite 04E25
Alexandria, VA 22350
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) is an organization of the Department of Defense (DoD) that maintains the Defense Enrollment and Eligibility
Reporting System (DEERS) database which is the official source of data on eligibility for military medical care and other eligibility systems.

The DoD strongly supports the enforcement of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 USC App. § 3901 et seq, as amended) (SCRA) (formerly known as
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940). DMDC has issued hundreds of thousands of "does not possess any information indicating that the
individual is currently on active duty" responses, and has experienced only a small error rate. In the event the individual referenced above, or any family
member, friend, or representative asserts in any manner that the individual was on active duty for the active duty status date, or is otherwise entitled to the
protections of the SCRA, you are strongly encouraged to obtain further verification of the person's status by contacting that person's Service. Service contact
information can be found on the SCRA website's FAQ page (Q35) via this URL: https://scra.dmdc.osd.mil/scra/#/faqs. If you have evidence the person
was on active duty for the active duty status date and you fail to obtain this additional Service verification, punitive provisions of the SCRA may be invoked
against you. See 50 USC App. § 3921(c).

This response reflects the following information: (1) The individual's Active Duty status on the Active Duty Status Date (2) Whether the individual left Active
Duty status within 367 days preceding the Active Duty Status Date (3) Whether the individual or his/her unit received early notification to report for active
duty on the Active Duty Status Date.

More information on "Active Duty Status"
Active duty status as reported in this certificate is defined in accordance with 10 USC § 101(d) (1). Prior to 2010 only some of the active duty periods less
than 30 consecutive days in length were available. In the case of a member of the National Guard, this includes service under a call to active service
authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense under 32 USC § 502(f) for purposes of responding to a national emergency declared by the
President and supported by Federal funds. All Active Guard Reserve (AGR) members must be assigned against an authorized mobilization position in the
unit they support. This includes Navy Training and Administration of the Reserves (TARs), Marine Corps Active Reserve (ARs) and Coast Guard Reserve
Program Administrator (RPAs). Active Duty status also applies to a Uniformed Service member who is an active duty commissioned officer of the U.S.
Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA Commissioned Corps).

Coverage Under the SCRA is Broader in Some Cases
Coverage under the SCRA is broader in some cases and includes some categories of persons on active duty for purposes of the SCRA who would not be
reported as on Active Duty under this certificate. SCRA protections are for Title 10 and Title 14 active duty records for all the Uniformed Services periods.
Title 32 periods of Active Duty are not covered by SCRA, as defined in accordance with 10 USC § 101(d)(1).

Many times orders are amended to extend the period of active duty, which would extend SCRA protections. Persons seeking to rely on this website
certification should check to make sure the orders on which SCRA protections are based have not been amended to extend the inclusive dates of service.
Furthermore, some protections of the SCRA may extend to persons who have received orders to report for active duty or to be inducted, but who have not
actually begun active duty or actually reported for induction. The Last Date on Active Duty entry is important because a number of protections of the SCRA
extend beyond the last dates of active duty.

Those who could rely on this certificate are urged to seek qualified legal counsel to ensure that all rights guaranteed to Service members under the SCRA
are protected

WARNING: This certificate was provided based on a last name, SSN/date of birth, and active duty status date provided by the requester. Providing
erroneous information will cause an erroneous certificate to be provided.
FILED
FILED
10/16/2023 5:06
10/16/2023 5:06 PM
PM
FELICIA PITRE
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO.,
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
TEXAS
*63583516« Janieshia Reed
Janieshia Reed DEPUTY
DEPUTY

CASE NO.: DC-23-05790
cr
( } EICG County Mutual Insurance Company, IN THE

iGh tn
GG
Dallas County 134th District Court

Kimberly Kay Carson and Danny Wilson Sharpe,

1
Dallas COUNTY, TX

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

', Katina Labreace Hayes, do state that the following is true and correct:

That | am over the age of eighteen, not a party to this suit, and have no interest in the outcome of the suit.
| have met the criteria
and | am authorized to serve process in the State of Texas.

1) October 06, 2023 at 3:37 PM, | received a Citation, Plaintiff's Original Petition to be delivered
to Danny Wilson Sharpe at 1018
hland Dr, Grand Prairie, TX 75051-3005.

at on Octaber 16, 2023 at 11:47 AM, | Personally Delivered said documents to Danny Wilson
Sharpe at 1018 Highland Dr,
Grand Prairie, TX 75051-3005 in the county of DALLAS.

Description of Person Accepting Service:
sex: Male Race: White Height: 6ft Weight: 200 Hair: Gray

Military Status: N/A
nN Marriage Status: N/A

Katina Labreace Hayes
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
TO BY Katina Labreace Hayes in the County of PPS # : PSC:16922 EXP:06/30/2023
D x fay
zis 15/8 5 Name: Last, First, Middle Ee 2 | v =cj Al;m]eé 2)6| =£13 jee]
Oo! .2
Ga |68/63/d2
aj/Oz/OL
Se DIN SIMO +O) Bilwsl] o Nn eo lasl[o#!] — |wol] tu Ses 2i45
gio = -—eIlI Oo

Case Info

Judge

TILLERY, DALE Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

(Subscribe to View)

Document Filed Date

February 13, 2024

Case Filing Date

May 03, 2023

County

Parties

CARSON, KIMBERLY KAY Defendant
GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company Plaintiff
GEICO COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCECOMPANY Plaintiff
LOBES, JESSICA R Attorney for the Plaintiff
SHARPE, DANNY WILSON Defendant
TEAGUE, MARK ANTHONY Attorney for the Defendant
Johnny Breeze Attorneys for Defendants
Blaise Wilcott Attorneys for Defendants
Selene Peña Attorneys for Defendants
Mark Humphrey Attorneys for Defendants
Ashanti Baker Attorneys for Defendants
Thomas Needham Attorneys for Defendants
Kristen James Attorneys for Defendants
John Merritt Attorneys for Defendants

For full print and download access, please subscribe at https://www.trellis.law/.

Motion,Ex Parte: GEICO COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCECOMPANY vs. KIMBERLY KAY CARSON, et al

Preview

Related Topics

Case Info

Parties