Preview
ng
‘Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Appeals Court for the Commonwealth
At Boston
|
In the case no. Z0-P-899
PHILIP J. MAZZOLA, trustee,
v
| vs.
JOHN F. O'BRIEN & another.
Pending in the Superior
Court for the County of Essex
Ordered, that the following entry be made on the docket:
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court,
Doreyeh So SS ee,sCClerk
(pate October 15, 2021.
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are/superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error ox other formal Jerror, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjcjstate.ma.us
20-P-899 Appeals Court
PHILIP J. MAZZOLA, qrustee,? vs. JOHN F. O'BRIEN & another .?
No. 20~P-899.
Essex. April 7, 2021. - October 1s, 2021.
Present): Milkey, Hand, & Grant, JJ.
Easement. Real |[Property, Easement, Nuisance. Motor Vehicle,
All-terrain vehicle, Permission to o perate. Nuisance.
Statute, Canstru¢tion.
Civil_action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 17, 2016.
The case wds heard by David A. Deakin, J
William H. Sheehan, III, for the plaintiff.
Meredith A! Fine for the defendants.
GRANT, J The issue presented is whether defendants John
F and Bonita J: O'Brien (collectively, O'Briens) may drive all-
terrain vehicles (ATVs) on an easement appurtenant to their
1 Of the Seventeen Wingaersheek Realty Trust.
2 Bonita J} O'Brien.
property for the/limitled purpose of accessing a beach in
Gloucester. The} easement burdens the property of plaintiff
Philip J. Mazzola, as |trustee of the Seventeen Wingaersheek
Realty Trust, who argues that the scope of the easement is
limited to pedestrian/traffic and that G. L. c 90B, § 26 (e),
prohibits the O'’Briens from driving ATVs on the easement.
Following a jury-waived trial on Mazzola's claims that the
O'Briens were overburdening the easement and creating a
nuisance, a judge of the Superior Court found in favor of the
O'Briens. Mazzala appeals, and we affirm.
Background | We set forth the facts as found by the trial
judge, supplemented by undisputed facts from the record. In
1960, Bengt Eriksson,| as trustee of the Ellis Farm Trust, bought
two parcels of land that he then further divided. Some of the
resulting parcels fronted on the beach, while others did not.
At issue here are lot 10 (a lot with direct beach access that is
now owned by Magzola)) and lot D (a lot without direct beach
access that is now owned by the O'Briens). In 1963, lot 10 was
sold to Mazzola's prddecessor-in-interest. The deeds in
Mazzola's chain] of title stated that the premises were conveyed
subject to a filfteen;foot wide easement "for the benefit of all
persons at any [time wning or leasing any part of the remaining
land of the grantor,|or being lawfully invited to any part of
said land, to pass and repass to and from the beach area, and
for ali other purposes) for which right of ways are customarily
used." In 1965, lot D was sold to one of the O'Briens'
predecessors-—in-interest, and the deeds in the O'Briens' chain
of title conveyed the jright to use the easement on lot 10.3
The easement, as |described in the various deeds, is fifteen
feet wide and 45) fect long. It runs from Wingaersheek Road to
the beach. Fron! Wingaersheek Road to the edge of the sand dunes
on the beach, the easement is a gravel path that also serves as
Mazzola's driveway. Where the gravel path meets the sand dunes,
the easement changes to a sandy area bordered on either side by
beach grass. Alltthough the easement is described in the various
deeds as fifteen feet) wide, the sandy area is only a few feet
wide, and people passing over the easement -- whether by foot or
ATV -- usually ttempt to stay within the confines of the sandy
area, thereby ayoiding the beach grass.
As acknowledged by the trial judge, the evidence regarding
vehicular use of the jeasement prior to 1994 was "scant."
However, there as testimony from a former neighbor, who lived
in the area fron 1967 to 1999 and who had the right to use the
easement, that he used to drive an ATV on the easement to get to
3 When the] O'Briiens purchased lot D in 1978, their deed
conveyed the rifght t use the beach "for bathing, beaching and
mooring of boats and) for all other purposes for which a beach is
used with the right to use with others, legally entitled thereto”
the easement on lot 10.
the beach. The neighbor testified that he would make one round
trip on the days|that he went to the beach, that his ATV was
"quieter than the average motorcycle," and that no one ever
complained to hiy about the fact that he drove an ATV .on the
easement. The OfBriens purchased lot D in 1978,4 and their son
testified that, as a boy,> he saw several different types of
|
motor vehicles -- inc uding ATVs -- on the easement. The trial
judge credited the ne ghbor's and the son's testimony on these
points.
Meanwhile, lazzola purchased lot 10 in 1994. The beach
house on lot 10 was the year-round residence of Mazzola and his
family for three years, at which point it became a vacation
property where they lived for significant periods of time in the
summer and visited in| the spring and fall. In 2005, Mazzola and
his wife, their |children then grown, moved back to the beach
house. They continued to live there year-round until 2008, when
they moved and once again began using the beach house as a
vacation property.
Mazzola testifi d that between 2005 and 2008, he mostly saw
people traverse, the asement by foot, although he sometimes saw
ATVs on the easement During that time period, the ATV use was
4 They have lived there continuously since.
5 The O'Briens' son was three or four years old when the
family purchased lot;D in 1978.
mostly limited t the 0'Briens' son, who drove an ATV on the
easement approximately once every two weeks. From 2008 to 2014,
use of the easement began to increase in general -- including
both pedestrian and AWV traffic -- which was perhaps
attributable to an increase in neighbors renting out their
houses. Regardless,
the O'Briens' ATV use did not increase
during the 2008 fo 2014 time period.
In 2013 or 2014, jMazzola asked several neighbors, including
the O'Briens, to| stop|driving ATVs on the easement. While some
neighbors acquielsced to this request, the O'Briens did not. The
’
O'Briens' ATV use instead increased. As a result of significant
physical limitations,/Bonita O'Brien had difficulty traversing
the easement by |foot, and the O'Briens' ATV enabled her to
access the beach. Inj 2015 and 2016, the O'Briens' son drove an
ATV on the easerent alt least two or three times per week.
In or around May 2016, Mazzola responded to the O'Briens'
increased use of the jeasement by installing two concrete
bollards at the|sand /dunes where the gravel path meets the sandy
area. The bollards ere spaced so that ATVs could not pass.
John O'Brien immediately dug up the bollards and left them on.
the ground on the side of the easement. The removal of the
bollards spurred Mazzola to file this lawsuit in October 2016
During thel summer of 2017, the O'Briens' ATV use again
increased. On |Labor| Day, while Mazzola was not at his beach
house, the O'Briens' son transported Bonitaé O'Brien and various
supplies to and from the-beach for a picnic. He made
approximately te round trips in the ATV on the easement, a
level of use that had |no precedent and was not repeated.
Meanwhile, on a security camera, Mazzola was recording those
trips across the] easement. Mazzola later obtained an injunction
prohibiting the O'Briens from driving ATVs on-the easement, and
the O'Briens complied|with the injunction.
Discussion. Mazzola argued below that the O'Briens were
overburdening the easement and creating a nuisance because
(1) the O'Briensj were|not permitted to drive ATVs on the
easement, and (2) alternatively, the O'Briens' ATV use had
increased to suqh an xtent that it was interfering with
Mazzola's quiet jJenjoyment of title, damaging the sand dunes, and
causing dangerous conditions on the easement. On appeal,
however, Mazzold argues only that the O'Briens are not permitted
to drive ATVs on the jeasement, either because (1) the scope of
the easement is|limitled to pedestrian traffic, or (2) G. L.
c. 90B, § 26 (e}, and the regulations implementing that statute
prohibit the O'Briens from driving ATVs on the easement. We
address each argument in turn.
1 Scope pf the easement. "The general principle
governing the interpretation of deeds is that the intent of the
parties is ascertained from the words used in the written
instrument interpreted in the light of all the attendant facts"
(quotation and citation omitted). Assad v. Sea Lavender, LLC,
95 Mass. App. Ct 689, 693 (2019). The same principles apply
when interpreting easements created by conveyance. See, €.g.,
id.; Sheftel v. Lebel, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 (1998). We
accept the trial) judge's findings regarding the attendant facts
unless clearly erroneous. See Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC,
467 Mass. 1, 8 (2014)! But the trial judge's ultimate
interpretation off the;/easement is a question of law, see Assad,
supra, that we review de novo, see Martin, supra.
We agree wilth the trial judge that the scope of the
easement is not jlimited to pedestrian traffic. The easement
exists for the henefit of those who purchased Eriksson's land,
for them to use |"to pass and repass to and from the beach area,
and for all other purposes for which right of ways are
customarily used." This language does not expressly limit use
of the easement ;to pedestrian traffic, nor do the attendant
facts suggest ay intent to so limit use of the easement. As
noted by the trial suege, when the easement was created in 1963,
people commonly} drov: to the beach, and the easement is wide .
enough to accommodat vehicular traffic. Where nothing in the
easement language or!/the objective circumstances supports an
express limitation, the easement "may be used for such purposes
as are reasonablly necessary to the full enjoyment of the
premises to whic! the right of way is appurtenant” (citation
omitted). Cannata v. [Berkshire Natural Resources Council Inc.,
73 Mass. App. Ct 789, 795 (2009). See Kubic v..Audette, 98
Mass. App. Ct. 289, 303 (2020), quoting Cannata, supra (within
judge's authorit to ule "that using motor vehicles to ferry
people or goods L, thi water was ‘reasonably necessary to the
full enjoyment’ bf the access rights" provided by easement).
Especially where) the | cenene is 450 feet long, a distance that
is difficult or jimpossible for some to walk, using ATVs to
transport people and equipment to the beach is a reasonably
necessary use.®é See Kubic, supra.
The trial judge id not err in concluding that the scope of
the easement is jnot 1 imited to pedestrian traffic.’
2 General Laws! c. 90B, § 26 (e).- We next address
Mazzola's argument that G. L. c 90B, § 26 (e), prohibits the
O'Briens from driving ATVs on the easement. Mazzola's complaint
alleged that the O'Briens’ use of ATVs on the easement "is in
!
6 We note, as did the trial judge, that our conclusion does
not permit the P'Briens to drive ATVs on the easement for
purposes other than the limited purpose of accessing the beach,
in a manner thajt does not create a nuisance.
7 Because the right of way permitted the O'Briens to use the
easement for purposes including accessing the beach with ATVs,
we do not reach the uestion whether language in the deed
entitling them |to us the beach for "mooring of boats," see note
3, supra, contemplated their use of motor vehicles over the
easement to transport boats to the water.
violation of [S]tate and local laws and conservation
principles," but nade no mention of any specific statute or
regulation. The| judge's legal rulings refer to Mazzola's
contentions that|G. LJ c. 90B, § 26 (e), and 323 Code Mass.
Regs. § 3.03(3) (2011) independently prohibit people from
operating ATVs ower the right of way. However, the record
appendix contains no opy of any pleading in which Mazzola
raised a claim that w s based on or that construed that statute
or regulation, nlor do s it contain any transcript of the four-
day trial.® “As aA result, the precise contours of the factual and
legal claims before the trial judge are not apparent, and so our
discussion of the legal issues is necessarily constrained, as
explained below
Whether G. |L. c.; 90B, § 26 (e€), prohibits people from
operating ATVs ver the right of way is a question of statutory
interpretation that ie review de novo. See Dolan v. Dolan, 99
Mass. App. Ct. 284, 288 (2021). Under well-established
principles of statutary construction, we interpret the statute
“according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all
its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the
8 As appellant, it was Mazzola's responsibility to provide
those documents] to t is court. Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as
appearing in 48/1 Mass. 1637 (2019). See Shawmut Community Bank,
N.A. v. Zagami,| 411 lass. 807, 811 (1992). See also Roby v.
Superintendent,| Mass Correctional Inst., Concord, 94 Mass. App.
Ct. 410, 412 (2018).
10
language, considered in connection with the cause of its
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the
main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of
its framers may |be effectuated" (citation omitted). Chin v.
Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015). We begin with the statutory
language, looking not/ just at the provision at issue but at the
statute as a whole, and we also consider the legislative history
where it is informative. See Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482
Mass. 789, 793 2019); Chin, supra.
The plain language of G. L. c 90B, § 26 (e), prohibits the
operation of snow and recreation vehicles® on "privately-owned
property” unles "the; operator is the owner or lessee or an
immediate family member of the owner or lessee of the property,"
"the owner or lessee of the property has designated the area for
use by such vehicles by posting reasonable notice of such
designation, " or
"the operator hds in his possession either a document,
signed by -he owner or lessee of such property or his
agent, authorizing the operation
. such vehicle on of
the property by |the operator or valid proof of current
membership] in a]|club, association or other organization to
which express authorization for the operation of such
vehicles on the |property has been granted; provided,
however, that such operation shall be consistent with the
express authorization granted and any restriction imposed
therewith."
5. The O'Briens do not dispute that the ATV they drove on the
easement is a recreation vehicle, as that term is defined in
GL. c 90B, § 20.
11
This language permits |those who have clear legal authority
(i.e., owners, lessees, and those who are on designated paths or
who have written, authdcization) to operate snow and recreation
vehicles on the property, and it prohibits others who do not
have that clear legall/authority to be on the property from doing
50 Thus, the language of § 26 (e) is directed toward persons
who use recreation vehicles to trespass on the property of
another Of course, prior to the enactment of that statute,
trespassing on the property of another -- with or without a
recreation vehidle ~-| was already prohibited See G. L Cc 266
§ 120 It appears that the point of § 26 (e) is to address the
particular problems posed by trespassing recreation vehicles,
and to provide 44 mechanism for recreation vehicle operators to
demonstrate that they, have permission to do so on the property.
To be sure just] because someone may have permission as a
matter of property law to use a recreation vehicle on particular
property does not limit the ability of the government to
regulate or even ban |such use For example, G. L. Cc 90B, § 24,
prohibits operation of a recreation vehicle "which emits noxious
fumes or makes pnusual or excessive noise," and § 25 prohibits
operation of a recreation vehicle upon a public way See G. L
c 90B, § 21 (gequiring operators under age eighteen to
successfully complete recreation vehicle safety course); § 22
(requiring registration of recreation vehicles); § 24 (requiring
12
recreation vehiclesto have safety equipment including
headlights, rear) red tights and xreflectors, and muffler); § 26A
(prohibiting operation of recreation vehicle while under
influence of alcphol or other intoxicants); § 26B (prohibiting
negligent or reckless|/operation of recreation vehicles) 10 But
those statutes do not|/prohibit someone from operating a
recreation vehicle on|privately owned property who has
permission to do so.
We turn to jwheth cG. L. c. 90B, § 26 (2), prohibits the
holder of an express asement -- the scope of which includes ATV
traffic -- from/driving ATVs on the easement. We conclude that
it does not. Express/ easement ‘holders are not trespassers.
While the statutory llanguage does not include an explicit
exception for express easement holders, it does include
exceptions:
for owners, lessees, and those who are on designated
paths or who have written authorization. The O'Briens' deed
containing the easement constitutes a "document, signed by the
owner or lessee)
of such property or his agent, authorizing the
operation of . such vehicle on the property by the
operator." G. L. c.|90B, § 26 (e).U
10 Absent a4 trial transcript, we do not know if Mazzola
argued at trial] that| the O'Briens violated any of those
statutes. Thug we dO not pass upon that issue.
il Absent a trial transcript, we do not know if Mazzola
argued at trial that| the requirement that the operator have "in
13
Nothing in |the regulations implementing G. L. c 90B,
§ 26 (e), alters} our conclusion that the O'Briens may drive ATVs
on the easement
.|? Mazzola points to a regulation that prohibits
anyone from operjating| "a snow vehicle or recreation vehicle
within 150 feet jof an occupied residence without the permission
of the owner, hils or her agent or lessee of such residence,
except in cases jof emergency, when directly departing or
returning to such residence or when operating on the property of
another for which permission has been granted." 323 Code Mass.
Regs. § 3.03 (3) We do not construe ‘this regulation, however,
as applying to property owners or easement holders who are
operating snow x recreation vehicles on their own properties or
easements. Otherwise, the regulation would illogically permit
someone to operate a [snow or recreation vehicle within 150 feet
of an occupied residence when operating on the property of
another for which permission’has been granted, but prohibit
someone from doing the same on his or her own property or
easement. See Commonwealth v. Aldana, 477 Mass. 790, 801 n.22
his possession"| the document authorizing operation of the ATV on
f
the property, G. L. 90B, § 26 (e), meant that the O'Briens’
son was required to ave a copy of the deed with him while
operating the ATV on) the easement. Thus we do not pass upon
that issue.
t
12 The interpretation of a regulation is also a question of
law that we review d novo, applying the traditional rules of
statutory construction. See Commonwealth v. Hourican, 85 Mass.
App. Ct. 408, 410 (2014).
14
(2017) (traditional rules of statutory construction apply to
interpretation of regulation) See also Sullivan v. Brookline,
435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001) (fundamental tenet of statutory
interpretation is to avoid illogical results).
We thus con¢lude jthat G. L. c. 90B, § 26 (e}, and 323 Code
Mass. Regs. § 3.6313) do not prohibit the O'Briens from driving
ATVs on the easement.}?
Judgment affirmed.
13 The O'Byiens'
request for attorney's fees, made on the
basis that Mazzola's/appeal is frivolous, is denied. Mazzola's
appeal presents) a noyel question of statutory interpretation and
is not frivolous. Nor do any of Mazzola's other arguments rise
to the level of} frivolousness required for an award of
attorney's fees.
Preview
ng ‘Commonwealth of Massachusetts Appeals Court for the Commonwealth At Boston | In the case no. Z0-P-899 PHILIP J. MAZZOLA, trustee, v | vs. JOHN F. O'BRIEN & another. Pending in the Superior Court for the County of Essex Ordered, that the following entry be made on the docket: Judgment affirmed. By the Court, Doreyeh So SS ee,sCClerk (pate October 15, 2021. NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are/superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error ox other formal Jerror, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjcjstate.ma.us 20-P-899 Appeals Court PHILIP J. MAZZOLA, qrustee,? vs. JOHN F. O'BRIEN & another .? No. 20~P-899. Essex. April 7, 2021. - October 1s, 2021. Present): Milkey, Hand, & Grant, JJ. Easement. Real |[Property, Easement, Nuisance. Motor Vehicle, All-terrain vehicle, Permission to o perate. Nuisance. Statute, Canstru¢tion. Civil_action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 17, 2016. The case wds heard by David A. Deakin, J William H. Sheehan, III, for the plaintiff. Meredith A! Fine for the defendants. GRANT, J The issue presented is whether defendants John F and Bonita J: O'Brien (collectively, O'Briens) may drive all- terrain vehicles (ATVs) on an easement appurtenant to their 1 Of the Seventeen Wingaersheek Realty Trust. 2 Bonita J} O'Brien. property for the/limitled purpose of accessing a beach in Gloucester. The} easement burdens the property of plaintiff Philip J. Mazzola, as |trustee of the Seventeen Wingaersheek Realty Trust, who argues that the scope of the easement is limited to pedestrian/traffic and that G. L. c 90B, § 26 (e), prohibits the O'’Briens from driving ATVs on the easement. Following a jury-waived trial on Mazzola's claims that the O'Briens were overburdening the easement and creating a nuisance, a judge of the Superior Court found in favor of the O'Briens. Mazzala appeals, and we affirm. Background | We set forth the facts as found by the trial judge, supplemented by undisputed facts from the record. In 1960, Bengt Eriksson,| as trustee of the Ellis Farm Trust, bought two parcels of land that he then further divided. Some of the resulting parcels fronted on the beach, while others did not. At issue here are lot 10 (a lot with direct beach access that is now owned by Magzola)) and lot D (a lot without direct beach access that is now owned by the O'Briens). In 1963, lot 10 was sold to Mazzola's prddecessor-in-interest. The deeds in Mazzola's chain] of title stated that the premises were conveyed subject to a filfteen;foot wide easement "for the benefit of all persons at any [time wning or leasing any part of the remaining land of the grantor,|or being lawfully invited to any part of said land, to pass and repass to and from the beach area, and for ali other purposes) for which right of ways are customarily used." In 1965, lot D was sold to one of the O'Briens' predecessors-—in-interest, and the deeds in the O'Briens' chain of title conveyed the jright to use the easement on lot 10.3 The easement, as |described in the various deeds, is fifteen feet wide and 45) fect long. It runs from Wingaersheek Road to the beach. Fron! Wingaersheek Road to the edge of the sand dunes on the beach, the easement is a gravel path that also serves as Mazzola's driveway. Where the gravel path meets the sand dunes, the easement changes to a sandy area bordered on either side by beach grass. Alltthough the easement is described in the various deeds as fifteen feet) wide, the sandy area is only a few feet wide, and people passing over the easement -- whether by foot or ATV -- usually ttempt to stay within the confines of the sandy area, thereby ayoiding the beach grass. As acknowledged by the trial judge, the evidence regarding vehicular use of the jeasement prior to 1994 was "scant." However, there as testimony from a former neighbor, who lived in the area fron 1967 to 1999 and who had the right to use the easement, that he used to drive an ATV on the easement to get to 3 When the] O'Briiens purchased lot D in 1978, their deed conveyed the rifght t use the beach "for bathing, beaching and mooring of boats and) for all other purposes for which a beach is used with the right to use with others, legally entitled thereto” the easement on lot 10. the beach. The neighbor testified that he would make one round trip on the days|that he went to the beach, that his ATV was "quieter than the average motorcycle," and that no one ever complained to hiy about the fact that he drove an ATV .on the easement. The OfBriens purchased lot D in 1978,4 and their son testified that, as a boy,> he saw several different types of | motor vehicles -- inc uding ATVs -- on the easement. The trial judge credited the ne ghbor's and the son's testimony on these points. Meanwhile, lazzola purchased lot 10 in 1994. The beach house on lot 10 was the year-round residence of Mazzola and his family for three years, at which point it became a vacation property where they lived for significant periods of time in the summer and visited in| the spring and fall. In 2005, Mazzola and his wife, their |children then grown, moved back to the beach house. They continued to live there year-round until 2008, when they moved and once again began using the beach house as a vacation property. Mazzola testifi d that between 2005 and 2008, he mostly saw people traverse, the asement by foot, although he sometimes saw ATVs on the easement During that time period, the ATV use was 4 They have lived there continuously since. 5 The O'Briens' son was three or four years old when the family purchased lot;D in 1978. mostly limited t the 0'Briens' son, who drove an ATV on the easement approximately once every two weeks. From 2008 to 2014, use of the easement began to increase in general -- including both pedestrian and AWV traffic -- which was perhaps attributable to an increase in neighbors renting out their houses. Regardless, the O'Briens' ATV use did not increase during the 2008 fo 2014 time period. In 2013 or 2014, jMazzola asked several neighbors, including the O'Briens, to| stop|driving ATVs on the easement. While some neighbors acquielsced to this request, the O'Briens did not. The ’ O'Briens' ATV use instead increased. As a result of significant physical limitations,/Bonita O'Brien had difficulty traversing the easement by |foot, and the O'Briens' ATV enabled her to access the beach. Inj 2015 and 2016, the O'Briens' son drove an ATV on the easerent alt least two or three times per week. In or around May 2016, Mazzola responded to the O'Briens' increased use of the jeasement by installing two concrete bollards at the|sand /dunes where the gravel path meets the sandy area. The bollards ere spaced so that ATVs could not pass. John O'Brien immediately dug up the bollards and left them on. the ground on the side of the easement. The removal of the bollards spurred Mazzola to file this lawsuit in October 2016 During thel summer of 2017, the O'Briens' ATV use again increased. On |Labor| Day, while Mazzola was not at his beach house, the O'Briens' son transported Bonitaé O'Brien and various supplies to and from the-beach for a picnic. He made approximately te round trips in the ATV on the easement, a level of use that had |no precedent and was not repeated. Meanwhile, on a security camera, Mazzola was recording those trips across the] easement. Mazzola later obtained an injunction prohibiting the O'Briens from driving ATVs on-the easement, and the O'Briens complied|with the injunction. Discussion. Mazzola argued below that the O'Briens were overburdening the easement and creating a nuisance because (1) the O'Briensj were|not permitted to drive ATVs on the easement, and (2) alternatively, the O'Briens' ATV use had increased to suqh an xtent that it was interfering with Mazzola's quiet jJenjoyment of title, damaging the sand dunes, and causing dangerous conditions on the easement. On appeal, however, Mazzold argues only that the O'Briens are not permitted to drive ATVs on the jeasement, either because (1) the scope of the easement is|limitled to pedestrian traffic, or (2) G. L. c. 90B, § 26 (e}, and the regulations implementing that statute prohibit the O'Briens from driving ATVs on the easement. We address each argument in turn. 1 Scope pf the easement. "The general principle governing the interpretation of deeds is that the intent of the parties is ascertained from the words used in the written instrument interpreted in the light of all the attendant facts" (quotation and citation omitted). Assad v. Sea Lavender, LLC, 95 Mass. App. Ct 689, 693 (2019). The same principles apply when interpreting easements created by conveyance. See, €.g., id.; Sheftel v. Lebel, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 (1998). We accept the trial) judge's findings regarding the attendant facts unless clearly erroneous. See Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC, 467 Mass. 1, 8 (2014)! But the trial judge's ultimate interpretation off the;/easement is a question of law, see Assad, supra, that we review de novo, see Martin, supra. We agree wilth the trial judge that the scope of the easement is not jlimited to pedestrian traffic. The easement exists for the henefit of those who purchased Eriksson's land, for them to use |"to pass and repass to and from the beach area, and for all other purposes for which right of ways are customarily used." This language does not expressly limit use of the easement ;to pedestrian traffic, nor do the attendant facts suggest ay intent to so limit use of the easement. As noted by the trial suege, when the easement was created in 1963, people commonly} drov: to the beach, and the easement is wide . enough to accommodat vehicular traffic. Where nothing in the easement language or!/the objective circumstances supports an express limitation, the easement "may be used for such purposes as are reasonablly necessary to the full enjoyment of the premises to whic! the right of way is appurtenant” (citation omitted). Cannata v. [Berkshire Natural Resources Council Inc., 73 Mass. App. Ct 789, 795 (2009). See Kubic v..Audette, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 303 (2020), quoting Cannata, supra (within judge's authorit to ule "that using motor vehicles to ferry people or goods L, thi water was ‘reasonably necessary to the full enjoyment’ bf the access rights" provided by easement). Especially where) the | cenene is 450 feet long, a distance that is difficult or jimpossible for some to walk, using ATVs to transport people and equipment to the beach is a reasonably necessary use.®é See Kubic, supra. The trial judge id not err in concluding that the scope of the easement is jnot 1 imited to pedestrian traffic.’ 2 General Laws! c. 90B, § 26 (e).- We next address Mazzola's argument that G. L. c 90B, § 26 (e), prohibits the O'Briens from driving ATVs on the easement. Mazzola's complaint alleged that the O'Briens’ use of ATVs on the easement "is in ! 6 We note, as did the trial judge, that our conclusion does not permit the P'Briens to drive ATVs on the easement for purposes other than the limited purpose of accessing the beach, in a manner thajt does not create a nuisance. 7 Because the right of way permitted the O'Briens to use the easement for purposes including accessing the beach with ATVs, we do not reach the uestion whether language in the deed entitling them |to us the beach for "mooring of boats," see note 3, supra, contemplated their use of motor vehicles over the easement to transport boats to the water. violation of [S]tate and local laws and conservation principles," but nade no mention of any specific statute or regulation. The| judge's legal rulings refer to Mazzola's contentions that|G. LJ c. 90B, § 26 (e), and 323 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.03(3) (2011) independently prohibit people from operating ATVs ower the right of way. However, the record appendix contains no opy of any pleading in which Mazzola raised a claim that w s based on or that construed that statute or regulation, nlor do s it contain any transcript of the four- day trial.® “As aA result, the precise contours of the factual and legal claims before the trial judge are not apparent, and so our discussion of the legal issues is necessarily constrained, as explained below Whether G. |L. c.; 90B, § 26 (e€), prohibits people from operating ATVs ver the right of way is a question of statutory interpretation that ie review de novo. See Dolan v. Dolan, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 288 (2021). Under well-established principles of statutary construction, we interpret the statute “according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the 8 As appellant, it was Mazzola's responsibility to provide those documents] to t is court. Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 48/1 Mass. 1637 (2019). See Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami,| 411 lass. 807, 811 (1992). See also Roby v. Superintendent,| Mass Correctional Inst., Concord, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 412 (2018). 10 language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may |be effectuated" (citation omitted). Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015). We begin with the statutory language, looking not/ just at the provision at issue but at the statute as a whole, and we also consider the legislative history where it is informative. See Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 793 2019); Chin, supra. The plain language of G. L. c 90B, § 26 (e), prohibits the operation of snow and recreation vehicles® on "privately-owned property” unles "the; operator is the owner or lessee or an immediate family member of the owner or lessee of the property," "the owner or lessee of the property has designated the area for use by such vehicles by posting reasonable notice of such designation, " or "the operator hds in his possession either a document, signed by -he owner or lessee of such property or his agent, authorizing the operation . such vehicle on of the property by |the operator or valid proof of current membership] in a]|club, association or other organization to which express authorization for the operation of such vehicles on the |property has been granted; provided, however, that such operation shall be consistent with the express authorization granted and any restriction imposed therewith." 5. The O'Briens do not dispute that the ATV they drove on the easement is a recreation vehicle, as that term is defined in GL. c 90B, § 20. 11 This language permits |those who have clear legal authority (i.e., owners, lessees, and those who are on designated paths or who have written, authdcization) to operate snow and recreation vehicles on the property, and it prohibits others who do not have that clear legall/authority to be on the property from doing 50 Thus, the language of § 26 (e) is directed toward persons who use recreation vehicles to trespass on the property of another Of course, prior to the enactment of that statute, trespassing on the property of another -- with or without a recreation vehidle ~-| was already prohibited See G. L Cc 266 § 120 It appears that the point of § 26 (e) is to address the particular problems posed by trespassing recreation vehicles, and to provide 44 mechanism for recreation vehicle operators to demonstrate that they, have permission to do so on the property. To be sure just] because someone may have permission as a matter of property law to use a recreation vehicle on particular property does not limit the ability of the government to regulate or even ban |such use For example, G. L. Cc 90B, § 24, prohibits operation of a recreation vehicle "which emits noxious fumes or makes pnusual or excessive noise," and § 25 prohibits operation of a recreation vehicle upon a public way See G. L c 90B, § 21 (gequiring operators under age eighteen to successfully complete recreation vehicle safety course); § 22 (requiring registration of recreation vehicles); § 24 (requiring 12 recreation vehiclesto have safety equipment including headlights, rear) red tights and xreflectors, and muffler); § 26A (prohibiting operation of recreation vehicle while under influence of alcphol or other intoxicants); § 26B (prohibiting negligent or reckless|/operation of recreation vehicles) 10 But those statutes do not|/prohibit someone from operating a recreation vehicle on|privately owned property who has permission to do so. We turn to jwheth cG. L. c. 90B, § 26 (2), prohibits the holder of an express asement -- the scope of which includes ATV traffic -- from/driving ATVs on the easement. We conclude that it does not. Express/ easement ‘holders are not trespassers. While the statutory llanguage does not include an explicit exception for express easement holders, it does include exceptions: for owners, lessees, and those who are on designated paths or who have written authorization. The O'Briens' deed containing the easement constitutes a "document, signed by the owner or lessee) of such property or his agent, authorizing the operation of . such vehicle on the property by the operator." G. L. c.|90B, § 26 (e).U 10 Absent a4 trial transcript, we do not know if Mazzola argued at trial] that| the O'Briens violated any of those statutes. Thug we dO not pass upon that issue. il Absent a trial transcript, we do not know if Mazzola argued at trial that| the requirement that the operator have "in 13 Nothing in |the regulations implementing G. L. c 90B, § 26 (e), alters} our conclusion that the O'Briens may drive ATVs on the easement .|? Mazzola points to a regulation that prohibits anyone from operjating| "a snow vehicle or recreation vehicle within 150 feet jof an occupied residence without the permission of the owner, hils or her agent or lessee of such residence, except in cases jof emergency, when directly departing or returning to such residence or when operating on the property of another for which permission has been granted." 323 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.03 (3) We do not construe ‘this regulation, however, as applying to property owners or easement holders who are operating snow x recreation vehicles on their own properties or easements. Otherwise, the regulation would illogically permit someone to operate a [snow or recreation vehicle within 150 feet of an occupied residence when operating on the property of another for which permission’has been granted, but prohibit someone from doing the same on his or her own property or easement. See Commonwealth v. Aldana, 477 Mass. 790, 801 n.22 his possession"| the document authorizing operation of the ATV on f the property, G. L. 90B, § 26 (e), meant that the O'Briens’ son was required to ave a copy of the deed with him while operating the ATV on) the easement. Thus we do not pass upon that issue. t 12 The interpretation of a regulation is also a question of law that we review d novo, applying the traditional rules of statutory construction. See Commonwealth v. Hourican, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 410 (2014). 14 (2017) (traditional rules of statutory construction apply to interpretation of regulation) See also Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001) (fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is to avoid illogical results). We thus con¢lude jthat G. L. c. 90B, § 26 (e}, and 323 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.6313) do not prohibit the O'Briens from driving ATVs on the easement.}? Judgment affirmed. 13 The O'Byiens' request for attorney's fees, made on the basis that Mazzola's/appeal is frivolous, is denied. Mazzola's appeal presents) a noyel question of statutory interpretation and is not frivolous. Nor do any of Mazzola's other arguments rise to the level of} frivolousness required for an award of attorney's fees.