Proof of Service: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, As Trustee For The Pooling And Servicing Agreement Dated August1, 2005 Park Place Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed Passthrough Certificates Series 2005-Whq4 v. Phyllis Barravechia, Quadrille Wallpapers Inc, St Anthonys High School, At Home Senior Care Inc., Point 62 Llc, United States Of America- Internal Revenue Services, New York States Department Of Taxation And Finance, Nassau County Clerks Office, John Doe and JANE DOE said names being fictitious, it being the intention of plaintiff to designate any and all occupants of premises being foreclosed herein,

Matter on the Disocvery Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, line 5, PLAINTIFF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO BY AND THROUGH THE SAN FRANCISCO PORT COMMISSION'S Motion To Have Requests For Admission Deemed Admitted; To Compel Responses To Discovery; And Request For Monetary Sanctions Against Defendants Kathrine Higdon, Lolman Enterprises, Inc. And Cynthia Foxworth Off calendar. Motion to be set in department 501 per SF Local Rule 8.10. = (302/JPT)

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Case Number: BC722308 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 61 NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL TENTATIVE Plaintiff Nike USA, Inc.s Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Defendants to provide notice. DISCUSSION The authority of a trial court to grant a new trial is established and circumscribed by statute. Section 657 sets out seven grounds for such a motion: (1) [i]rregularity in the proceedings; (2) [m]isconduct of the jury; (3) [a]ccident or surprise; (4) [n]ewly discovered evidence; (5) [e]xcessive or inadequate damages; (6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence; and (7) [e]rror in law. [Citation.] (Montoya v. Barragan (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.) When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant, and Cross-Complainant Nike USA, Inc. (Nike) moves for a new trial on three of the above grounds: irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of the evidence, and errors of law. Nikes argument based on procedural irregularity is based on the courts purported lack of consideration of its objections to its statement of decision. (Motion at pp. 1213.) Nike argues for insufficiency of the evidence, based on purportedly contradictory findings that neither Nike nor Defendants and Cross-Complainants 5860 West Jefferson, LLC, 5860 West Jefferson I, LLC, and Samitaur Constructs (Defendants) had prevailed on their respective claims for damages based on construction delay, and on other issues. (Motion at pp. 1320.) Nike finally argues that the statement of decision contains errors of law in the application of the burden of proof under the lease agreement, and fails to adequately set forth any declaration of the parties rights under the lease. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Defendants in opposition argue that the present motion exceeds the page limit articulated in California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1113. (Opposition at p. 9.) They further contend that the present motions memorandum, declaration, and supporting evidence were filed and served tardily. (Opposition at pp. 89.) Defendant argues that Nikes objections to the statement of decision were late, and that the court in any event had notice of Nikes objections from its earlier-filed Request for Statement of Decision. (Opposition at pp. 1011.) Defendants argue that the courts statement of decision was based on substantial evidence and contains no errors of law. (Opposition at pp. 1118.) Plaintiffs memorandum exceeds the page limits prescribed by CRC Rule 3.1113. That rule states that no opening or responding memorandum except in summary judgment motions may exceed 15 pages, excluding the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (d).) Excluding these last matters, Plaintiffs memorandum here extends to 21 pages. A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (g).) The memorandum and supporting materials are also actually late. Nikes notice of intent to move for new trial was filed on May 28, 2024. Per Code of Civil Procedure § 659a, the party seeking new trial shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the motion within 10 days of filing the notice [of intention to move for a new trial]. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) Although Nike filed the memorandum and supporting declaration by the June 7, 2024 deadline, it did not serve them until June 8 (Evans Decl. ¶ 8), and did not file or serve the supporting evidence until June 10. These timelines are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 342), and the statute provides courts the power, for good cause shown by affidavit or by written stipulation of the parties to extend the period for filing and serving materials for an additional period not to exceed 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) A court may retroactively extend the deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did not seek an extension in advance. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 342.) Here, in the absence of prejudice shown by Defendants arising from the tardiness of service of the memorandum and supporting evidence, the court will exercise its discretion to assess the motion on its merits. Nike argues that the entry of judgment on the statement of decision evidenced irregularity in the proceedings, because the court entered judgment on May 14, 2024, in the erroneous belief that Nikes objections had not been timely filed, when in fact Nike had until May 16, 2024, to file such objections. Nikes argument as to the timing of the objections is persuasive. The proposed statement of decision not captioned proposed, but identified as such in its opening paragraph was filed and served on April 26, 2024. Per CRC Rule 3.1590, subd. (g), [a]ny party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment. 15 days after service of the statement of decision would have been May 11, a Saturday, rendering the deadline for filing objections Monday, May 13, 2024. Yet because the statement of decision was served by mail, the time for filing of objections was extended by five calendar days, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure § 1013, subd. (a). Thus the deadline by which to serve objections was May 16, 2024. Nikes objections were served on May 14, 2024, the same day the court entered judgment on the proposed statement of decision in the belief that no objections had been timely filed. (See 5/14/2024 Minute Order.) However, Nike has suffered no prejudice resulting from the claimed irregularity. In granting a new trial based on judicial error, [p]rejudice is required . . . and there is no discretion to grant a new trial for harmless error. (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.) Before Nike filed its objections to the statement of decision, it filed on May 8, 2024, a Request for Statement of Decision, taking issue with what Nike termed procedural ambiguities in the statement of decision and itemizing 87 issues, questions, and arguments for the court to consider. The court considered these issues in its order dated May 14, 2024, and found that its proposed statement of decision sufficiently addresses the evidence and legal and factual issues raised by Nike. (5/14/2024 Minute Order.) The issues raised in Nikes request for statement of decision parallel the objections it later offered, and were considered by the court. This is thus unlike the case in Raville v. Singh (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1130, cited by Nike, in which a different judge signed off on a statement of decision after the judge who had authored the tentative version had died. The same judge here held trial, prepared a proposed statement of decision, reviewed Nikes arguments, and entered judgment. As to insufficiency of the evidence, Nike contends that the courts decision does not support its conclusion that the premises were substantially complete on July 28, 2018. (Motion at pp. 1415.) However, the statement of decision notes that the City issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on July 28, 2018. (Statement of Decision (SOD) at p. 6.) The court noted that it was necessary to determine whether the BSC [base shell and core] or tenant improvements were completed to the extent that only punchlist items remained and whether any remaining uncompleted items adversely affected Nikes use of the property. (Ibid.) The court cited the myriad photos of the construction, and determined no items remained to be addressed which adversely affected Nikes occupancy. (Ibid.) The courts finding was supported by substantial evidence, as noted by Defendants in opposition. (Opposition at p.13.) Nike argues that this courts findings that neither Nike nor Defendants prevailed on their breach of contract claims as to who caused the delay are inherently contradictory, because one party must have caused the delay. (Motion at p. 16.) Yet this argument fails to reckon with the applicable burden of proof. The parties each bore the burden to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e. to present evidence, which when weighed with contrary evidence, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth. (City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 314 .) But if two parties make conflicting showings of culpability for the same event, and both showings are equally persuasive, then neither has shown that theirs has the greater probability of truth, and neither has met their burden. The courts statement of decision on the causes of the delay addresses all material disputes and is supported by substantial evidence. Although Nike argues that the court was required to make findings as to the cause of each period of delay, it presents no authority holding that such detail is required. (Motion at pp. 1618.) The applicable authority suggests otherwise: A trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A trial court is not required to make findings with regard to detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence. Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result. Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error. [Citation.] In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a party's request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the court's decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163.) The statement of decision meets this standard. Nike further argues that the courts finding as to the tardiness of its request to rent parking spaces under the lease was erroneous. This argument is as follows: The lease provides that Nike could exercise an option to certain parking spaces by the commencement of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date. (Motion Exh. 81, Addendum ¶ 54.1.) Nike cites evidence that it provided notice of its intent to rent 123 monthly parking passes in an email dated January 23, 2020. (Motion Exh. T.) And because Nike had 18 months to request the parking until February 1, 2020, given a commencement date of July 28, 2018 Nike argues that no substantial evidence supports the courts finding that Nikes request was untimely. (Motion at pp. 1819.) The lease, however, did not give Nike until the end of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date to seek the parking spaces. The lease instead set the deadline at the commencement of the eighteenth month i.e., until January 1, 2020. Nike thus did not have until February 1, 2020,to rent the parking spaces, and by this reckoning, Nikes January 23, 2020 request was untimely, and the courts reasoning stands. Nikes argument as to the breach of warranty claim is also unpersuasive, as the courts findings as to the condition of the roof was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the parties were aware of the susceptibility of the roof to leaks, yet requested the type of roof at issue anyway. (SOD at p. 7.) The court found no evidence of structural defects, and that the Defendants had maintained and addressed the leaks that Nike identified. (Ibid.) Nikes arguments as to errors of law, meanwhile, are similarly unavailing. Nike argues that the court misapplied the burden of proof, because under the lease, any delay was attributed to Defendants unless proven to be caused by Nike. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Yet Nike identifies no provision of the lease attributing delayed substantial completion to Defendants by default. It identifies a provision of an attached work letter stating that the date of substantial completion shall be deemed to be . . . the date on which the Tenant Improvements would have been Substantially completed if no such a . . . Delay had occurred, provided that the delay was caused by the lessee (Nike). (Motion at pp. 2021, citing Motion Exh. 81, at pp. 6465.) This provision does not purport to create a presumption of either partys default for the cause of delay, or to affect the ordinary burden of proof applicable to a breach of contract action. Nike further identifies provisions indicating that time was of the essence, and setting a date for completion of construction, but once more, these provisions do not purport to assign a presumption of fault for the delay to Defendants. (Motion at p. 22, citing Motion Exh. 81 at p. 65.) Finally, Nike argues that the statement of decision rendered judgment in favor of Defendants on their declaratory relief cause of action, without offering the actual declaration of rights requested, or a contrary declaration to what Nike requested in its Complaint. (Motion at p. 25.) Nike relies on the case Kroff v. Kroff (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 404, in which the court stated: A dispute existed as to the meaning of a document and the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration of her rights. It was the duty of the court to set forth the meaning and effect of the clause in question. Here the court merely adjudged that plaintiff take nothing by her said cause of action, and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff. (Id. at p. 405.) The present case is distinguishable, as the court here did not merely adjudge that plaintiff take nothing and defendants prevail, but offered a statement of decision explaining the facts of the case and its reasoning. Nike sought a declaration that the property was not substantially complete as of the date of the complaint, that its obligation to pay rent had not begun, that Plaintiff was entitled to immediate correction and completion of all incomplete or defective aspects of the property, and it is entitled to free rent for a number of days determined by the court. (FAC ¶ 57.) Yet these prayers for relief were addressed by the courts determination that the property was substantially complete as of July 28, 2018. (SOD at p. 6.) The motion is therefore DENIED.

Case Number: 24STCV07725 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING OYEKUNLE JEGEDE , vs. 90018 COLLECTION LLC, et al. Case No.: 24STCV07725 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Moving Defendant 90018 Collection LLC s demurrer to pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle Jegedes complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Defendant 90018 Collection LLCs motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs complaint is denied as moot. Defendant 90018 Collection LLC (90018 Collection) (Moving Defendant) demurs to the Complaint and each cause of action in pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle J egede s (Jegede) (Plaintiff) complaint (Complaint) on the grounds Plaintiffs Complaint and each cause of action fails to state facts on which relief may be granted and is uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).) Moving Defendant also filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs Complaint. (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §436(b).) Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.) The demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).) Moving Defendants counsel submitted a meet and confer declaration stating that she met and conferred with Plaintiff telephonically on May 21, 2024. ( See Decl. of Windler ¶2.) Moving Defendants counsel declares she explained to Plaintiff the defects in the complaint and the parties were not able to come to an agreement on the pleadings. ( See Decl. of Windler ¶2.) Accordingly, the Court will consider Moving Defendants demurrer. Background Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint on March 27, 2024, against Defendant and Non-moving Defendants Winston Cenac, Trustee of the Island Boy Trust (Cenac), Shelby Ring (Ring), the Law Offices of Rebecca Hufford-Cohen (Law Offices), and On Time (On Time) (collectively, Defendants) alleging four causes of action: (1) illegal eviction; (2) illegal theft; (3) discrimination; and (4) fraud. Plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2023, he was a tenant at 238 1⁄2 Market Street, Venice, CA 90291 , and was subjected to an eviction by Moving Defendant. (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges on November 28, 2021, property valued at over $150,000.00 was removed without his consent, and this occurred two weeks after the alleged eviction. (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges he fulfilled all payments by July 24, 2023, as outlined in a stipulation agreement with Cenac. (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges Cenac filed an ex parte that alleged non-payment and included a misleading hearing notice that led to an erroneous judgment. (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges he uncovered the use of Moving Defendants improper use of documentation for the eviction. (Complaint ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy involving Cenac, Law Office, and On Time. (Complaint ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges On Time participated in the enforcement of the eviction and the confiscation of Plaintiffs property. (Complaint ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges that following the eviction, Moving Defendant and Jason Pennington, Ring, and On Time initiated major reconstruction without permits from the Los Angeles Housing Authority and displaced Plaintiff and violated the health rights of tenants. (Complaint ¶4.) Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer and accompanying motion to strike on May 21, 2024. Plaintiff filed his oppositions on July 5, 2024. Moving Defendant filed its replies on July 8, 2024. A. Demurrer Summary of Demurrer Moving Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that the entire Complaint and each cause of action alleged therein fails to state facts on which relief may be granted and is uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 2-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).) Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Failure to State a Claim Illegal Eviction (1st COA) California recognizes the tort of wrongful eviction. ( See Barkett v. Brucato (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 264, 275.) An essential element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the premises. [Citations.] ( Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 900.) The elements of a cause of action in tort for wrongful eviction are (1) the tenant has property rights and privileges with regard to the use or enjoyment that has been interfered with; (2) there has been a substantial invasion of those rights or privileges; (3) the conduct of the landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenants rights or privileges ; and (4) the invasion is intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct . ( Tooke v. Allen (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 230, 237.) Plaintiff fails to allege Moving Defendant is the landlord of 238 1⁄2 Market Street, Venice, CA 90291, factual allegations that Moving Defendant substantially invaded his rights as a tenant, that Moving Defendants as the landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenants rights or privileges, and that Moving Defendants invasion was intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct. Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Illegal Theft (2nd COA) Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendants conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. ( Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 354 P.3d 334].) To prove a cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff must show the defendant acted intentionally to wrongfully dispose of the property of another. ( Duke v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 490, 508.) [C]onversion is a strict liability tort. It does not require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession. ( Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1158.) Plaintiff fails to identify the property valued at over $150,000.00 that was removed without his consent. ( See Complaint ¶1.) Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs 2nd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Discrimination (3rd COA) The elements of the cause of action for housing discrimination are: (1) Plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) applied for and was qualified for a housing accommodation; (3) was denied a housing accommodation; and (4) circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive, such as similarly situated individuals applied for and obtained housing. ( Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 896, 902 .) Plaintiff fails to allege the protected class he belongs to for which Moving Defendant based its impermissible decision to deny Plaintiffs application for a housing accommodation. Plaintiff fails to allege he applied for and was qualified for a housing accommodation. Plaintiff fails to allege circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege he filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) against Moving Defendant prior to filing the instant action. ( See Govt. Code §12980(h).) Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to the 3rd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Fraud (4th COA) A complaint for fraud must allege the following elements: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages . ( Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816 [combining misrepresentation and scienter as a single element].) Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading. ( Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.) Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations. ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made . ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645; West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.) Plaintiff fails to allege a knowingly false representation by the defendant, an intent to deceive or induce reliance, and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made. Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to the 4th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. B. Motion to Strike In light of the Courts ruling on Moving Defendants demurrer, Moving Defendants motion to strike is denied as moot. Conclusion Moving Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action. Moving Defendants motion to strike is denied as moot. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24STCV02455 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 IVAN D. RODRIGUEZ, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. EVARISTO RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ; LENEICE WHITE; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants. Case No.: 24STCV02455 Hearing Date: 7/12/24 Trial Date: None set [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants Demurrer and Motion to Strike. Facts Plaintiff Ivan Rodriguez rented the property located at 3280 Folsom Street Los Angeles, California 90063 to Defendants. On or around December 28, 2023, plaintiff listed the property for sale to which defendants disagreed. On or around January 17, 2024, real estate agent Jesse Uribe conducted a title search and discovered a grant deed recorded on December 29, 2023. The deed, identified as instrument number 20230919365 grants defendant a 50% interest in the property as joint tenants with plaintiff who claims he was unaware of the forged deed until informed by Uribe on January 17, 2024. On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for: 1. Quiet Title 2. Cancellation of Instrument 3. Declaratory Relief 4. Negligence 5. Payment on Bond. Defendant Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez (Defendant) demurs to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action on three grounds: (1) that the pleadings are vague and the complaint is based on information and belief as to matters for which Defendant does not have superior knowledge; (2) as to the first cause of action for quiet title, the complaint must be amended to reflect the date as of which the determination is sought and the pleadings are vague and unintelligible; and (3) as to the second cause of action for cancellation of instrument, the complaint fails to allege how Plaintiff knows that Defendant forged the purported grant deed when Plaintiff has possession of the driver license that was presented to the notary public, the pleadings are vague and unintelligible such that Defendant cannot respond to such allegations of ultimate facts made on information and belief that are not within his superior knowledge, and Defendant is in essence investigating the facts that Plaintiff should have discovered prior to bringing the action. The Court analyzes each ground in turn. Meet and Confer The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement for this motion has been satisfied. (See Graham Decl., ¶ 2.) Demurrer Analysis : The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer Legal Standard A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. ( Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer challenges only legal sufficiency of complaint, not truth or accuracy of its factual allegations or plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations. ( Assurance Co. of Am. v. Haven (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 78, 82.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP § 430.30(a).) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. ( Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence." ( Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc . (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.) Quiet Title A plaintiff alleges a quiet title action where they allege that [1] the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land and [2] that the defendant claims an interest therein [3] adverse to him. ( South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 740; see also Gray v Walker (1910) 157 Cal. 381, 384 [the complaint contains a statement of all the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action. It avers that plaintiff is the owner and in possession of certain land, that defendant claims an interest therein adverse to plaintiff, and that such claim is without right.].) However, generally, the holder of equitable title cannot maintain a quiet title action against the legal owner. ( Lewis v. Superior Ct. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1866; see also Staffor v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 294-95 [It has been held consistently that the owner of an equitable interest cannot maintain an action to quiet title against the owner of the legal title.]) There is a limited exception to this rule, in the case where legal title was acquired through fraud. (See Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 114.) Legal title does not have a strict legal meaning. ( Solomon v. Walton (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 381, 386.) The term legal title has been defined as one cognizable or enforceable in a court of law, or one which complete and perfect so far as regards the apparent right of ownership and possession, but which carries no beneficial interest in the property, another person being equitably entitled thereto. . . ( Parkmerced Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1094-95.) Defendant argues that the claim for quiet title action fails because Plaintiff failed to plead the date as of which the determination is sought and failed to provide the information which he relied upon to believe that Defendant committed forgery. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for quiet title as the complaint alleges that Defendant obtained title by fraud. Since Plaintiff seeks to establish title against the adverse claims of Defendant, he argues that the claim for quiet title is the appropriate remedy. Defendant provides no arguments in reply. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of real property located at 3280 Folsom Street Los Angeles, California 90063 (Compl. ¶ 6), that a forged deed purports to grant Defendant a 50% gift interest in the subject property (Compl. ¶ 10), and that Plaintiff seeks to quiet title against all adverse claims as of December 29, 2023 as they are without any right whatsoever. (Compl. ¶ 15.) The Court finds that these constitute sufficient facts to support a cause of action for quiet title. Cancellation of Instrument To prevail on a claim to cancel an instrument, a plaintiff must prove (1) the instrument is void or voidable due to, for example, fraud; and (2) there is a reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alteration of one's position. ( Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal. App. 5th 1180, 1193-94.) Defendant argues that the complaint fails to provide the information which led Plaintiff to believe that Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez committed forgery. Defendant also asserts that the complaint fails to allege tender, to the extent that Evaristo Rodriguez Gonzalez is the equitable owner, and Plaintiff holds title as constructive trustee with no authority to list the property for sale out from under Defendant. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for cancellation of instrument as he is attacking the forged deed and is seeking an order to cancel the forged deed. Defendant provides no arguments in reply. In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Grant Deed recorded on December 29, 2023 is a forged deed that is void or voidable and that said grant deed will cause Plaintiff serious injury as he is being deprived of his 100% ownership in the subject property. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-21.) The Court finds that these constitute sufficient facts to support a cause of action for cancellation of instrument. Declaratory Relief Plaintiff argues that he is seeking a judicial determination that he is the 100% owner of the subject property and that Defendant has no interest in the subject property. Plaintiff states he is seeking a judicial declaration that the forged deed is invalid. Defendant provides no arguments as to why the claim for declaratory relief fails as a matter of law. The complaint requests declaratory relief in the form of a judicial declaration that Plaintiff is 100% owner of the subject property and Defendant holds no interest in the Subject Property. The Court finds this is sufficient. Accordingly, the demurrer OVERRULED. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer is OVERRULED.

Case Number: 22SMCV01397 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Christian Carrillos Motion to Compel Cross-Defendants Compliance with the Courts Prior Discovery Order and Request for Sanctions is DENIED. Plaintiff Christian Carrillo to give notice. REASONING Plaintiff Christian Carrillo (Plaintiff) moves the Court for an order compelling Cross-Defendant Mohammed Tehrani (Cross-Defendant) to comply with the Courts order dated March 27, 2024, requiring Cross-Defendant to serve code-compliant responses to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories, Set One, without objections, within thirty (30) days of entry of the Courts order and to pay monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $1,010 within thirty (30) days of entry of the Courts order. Put simply, the Court cannot issue an order compelling a party to compel with a court order, as it has already done so in issuing the prior order in the first place. While Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 provides a basis for imposing sanctions, including terminating, evidence, and monetary sanctions, where a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, including disobeying a court order to provide discovery, Plaintiff has not moved for sanctions under this statute. Accordingly, Plaintiff Christian Carrillos Motion to Compel Cross-Defendants Compliance with the Courts Prior Discovery Order and Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

Case Number: 23STCV15693 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles BEATRIZ LAYNEZ, et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. ALVARADO EQUITIES LLC; et al., Defendant(s). Case No.: 23STCV15693 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 07/05/23 Trial Date: 06/23/25 Hearing date: July 11, 2024 Moving Parties: (1) Plaintiff Beatriz Laynez (2) Claimant Emili Gabriela Chavez Laynez, a minor by and through their guardian ad litem Beatriz Laynez (3) Claimant Jayleen Arlette Chavez Laynez, a minor by and through their guardian ad litem Beatriz Laynez (4) Claimant Jeremy Elijah Chavez Laynez, a minor by and through their guardian ad litem Beatriz Laynez Responding Party: None (1) Motion for Reconsideration; (2) Petitions to Confirm Minors Compromise The court considered the moving papers and petitions. No oppositions were received. The court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration. The court GRANTS the petitions to confirm minors compromise of claimants Emili Gabriela Chavez Laynez, Jayleen Arlette Chavez Laynez, and Elijah Chavez Laynez, minors by and through their guardian ad litem Beatriz Laynez . Background This is a habitability case. Plaintiffs Beatriz Laynez, an individual; Emili Gabriela Chavez Laynez, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem; Beatriz Laynez; Jayleen Arlette Chavez Laynez, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, Beatriz Laynez; and Jeremy Elijah Chavez-Laynez, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, Beatriz Laynez filed this action against Defendants Alvarado Equities LLC, Robert Staback, as Trustee of The Rudolph and Grace Staback Revocable Inter Vivos Trust, and JNM Realty Inc. alleging causes of action for (1) Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; (3) Negligence; and (5) Breach of Contract. Claimants Emili Gabriela Chavez Laynez, Jayleen Arlette Chavez Laynez, and Elijah Chavez Laynez, minors by and through their guardian ad litem Beatriz Laynez filed their petitions on May 6, 2024. On June 6, 2024, the court continued the petitions and reduced the attorney fees for all plaintiffs to 25%. On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff Beatriz Laynaz filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the courts June 6, 2024 order reducing her attorney fees to 25%. Discussion Plaintiff Beatriz Laynaz moves the court to reconsider its June 6, 2024 order that reduced her attorney fees to 25%. She contends that she is a competent adult and her attorney fees were not before the court, and are pursuant to her contract with her counsel. The court agrees. The court previously had concerns about the $18,250 in attorney fees from Defendants Alvarado Equities LLC and JNM Realty Inc. to Plaintiffs counsel and how that is appropriate (Petitions, § 17(f)), but it appears it is the attorney fees for Beatriz Laynaz which is appropriate and does not interfere with the minors settlements. Generally, that would be paid from Beatriz Laynaz, but it appears that Defendants are paying counsel directly as part of Beatrizs settlement. Accordingly, this explains the previous concern regarding attorney fees, and the court did not properly have Beatrizs attorneys fees pursuant to her contract before it. Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration, and GRANTS the petitions of all three minors. It is so ordered. Dated: July 11, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV09833 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 KALE FREDHOLM, an individual; MARIA FREDHOLM, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Minor PELESTENE FREDHOLM, an individual; ALICIA GILLILAND, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Minor RYAN NAEMARK, an individual; DANA GILLILAND, an individual; ANDREA CUTSHALL, individually and as Guardia Ad Litem for Minor MATTHEW ERICK CUTSHALL, an individual, and Minor JASON ALLEN CUTSHALL, an individual; ROSA MONTOYA, an individual; AMBER WASHINGTON, an individual; and ANGELA DADE, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. R.E.C. DEVELOPMENT, INC., also known as Real Estate Connection; LAN, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV09833 Hearing Date: 07/10/24 Trial Date: 07/16/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Petitioner Guardian Ad Litem Maria Fredholms Expedited Petition to Approve Compromise of Pending Action for Minor of Person with a Disability. T he named Plaintiffs bring this breach of habitability suit against their landlords or former landlordsDefendants R.E.C. Development, Inc. and LANbased on allegations that the Defendants rented to the Plaintiffs four different rental units with numerous alternate uninhabitable conditions and that the Defendants faileddespite numerous complaints by the Plaintiffsto remediate these conditions in the Plaintiffs respective rental units, all located at 22307 Kent Avenue, Torrance, CA 90505 (Subject Premises). These conditions include(d): cockroach and rodent infestations; lack of adequate control of infestations; resulting health problems to tenants; water leaks and intrusion; toxic mold causing mold spores to float in the air and be inhaled by plaintiffs; holes and cracks in the ceilings and/or interior walls; damaged and deteriorated carpeting/flooring; inoperable heating; lack of air conditioning; lack of sanitary plumbing; lack of fixtures in bathrooms; inoperable stoves or ovens; broken kitchen cabinets; an unsanitary and unsafe pool; and extensive trash strewn across the common areas. On May 21, 2024, Guardian Ad Litem Maria Fredholm filed with the Court an unopposed Expedited Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person with a Disability (the Petition) in favor of Plaintiff Pelestene Fredholm. The Petition details a gross $50,000.00 Settlement between the Parties, with a distribution of gross distribution $45,100.00 to each Maria Fredholm and $4,900.00 for Pelestene Fredholm, and a final net settlement of $3,551.41 for Pelestene Fredholm. Expedited Petition to Approve Compromise for Minor or Person with Disability: GRANTED Legal Standard : Under Code of Civil Procedure section 372, any settlement of a claim made by a minor or adult with a disability must be approved by the Court. (See also Prob. Code § 3600, subd. (b) [a compromise or covenant for a disputed claim or damages, money, or other property of a minor or person who lacks legal capacity is valid only after it has been approved by the superior court].) ¿A petition for court approval of a compromise of a minor or disabled adults compromise or settlement of a pending action or proceeding to which this person is a party must be verified by the petitioner and must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise, covenant, settlement, or disposition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 7.951-52.) The petition is generally submitted on a completed Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person with a Disability (form MC-350). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.) If the Court is satisfied that the settlement is in the best interest of the¿person, then the Court should approve the settlement.¿¿(See Pearson v. Superior Ct. ¿(2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338.)¿¿¿¿ Procedural Requirements : A review of the instant Petition shows that it meets the requirements of California Rules of Court, rules 7.950 to 7.955. The Petitions satisfy California Rules of Court, rule 7.950. Petitioner Maria Fredholm submits a verified Civil Form MC-350EX seeking a settlement between R.E.C. Development, Inc. also known as Real Estate Connection (R.E.C., Development, Inc.) and Pelestene Fredholm. (See Petition, p. 7 [Petitioner verification].) Further, the Petition contains a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise, covenant, settlement, or disposition, in satisfaction of California Rules of Court, rule 7.950. The Petition details $50,000.00 in gross settlement funds to be distributed to the Fredholm family. (Petition, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Maria Fredholm is set to receive the gross settlement of $45,100.00. (Petition, Attach. 12.) Pelestene Fredholm is set to receive a gross settlement of $4,900.00 and net compromise of $3,551.41. (Petition, ¶ 17(f), Attach. 12; Attach. 19(b)(4).) Additionally, $1,225.00 of the Pelestene Fredholms net settlement will be used to pay attorneys fees. (Petition, ¶ 17(c), 14(a).) Moreover, the remaining $123.59 will be used to pay the expenses which include mediation and filing fees. (Petition 17(e), see also Ohn Decl. ¶ 8 [limiting its cost reimbursement request as to the Minor Plaintiff in the amount of $123.59].) The Petition satisfies California Rules of Court, rule 7.951. This requirement provides that where a petitioner that has been represented or assisted by an attorney in preparing the petition to compromise the claim or in any other respect with regard to the claim, the petition must disclose specific information, which the Petition contains as follows: (1) The name, state bar number, law firm, if any, and business address of the attorney. (Ohn Decl. p.1) [Gerald S. Ohn, SBN 217382, The Law Offices of Gerald S. Ohn, APC, 800 South Figueroa Street, Suite 750 Los Angeles, CA 90017].) (2) Whether the attorney has received any attorneys fees or other compensation for services provided in connection with the claim giving rise to the petition or with the preparation of the Petition, and, if so, the amounts and the identity of the person who paid the fees or other compensation. (Petition, ¶ 18(b) [has not nor expects to receive]). (3) Whether the attorney became involved with the Petition, directly or indirectly, at the instance of any party against whom the claim is asserted or of any partys insurance carrier. (N/A). (4) Whether the attorney represents or is employed by any other party or any insurance carrier involved in the matter. (Petition ¶ 18(a), Attach. 18(a) [is representing another party, i.e., all of the plaintiffs in this action which is the subject of this Petition]). (5) If the attorney has not received any attorneys fees or other compensation for services provided in connection with the claim giving rise to the petition or with the preparation of the Petition, whether the attorney expects to receive any fees or other compensation for these services, and, if so, the amounts and the identity of the person who is expected to pay the fees or other compensation. (Petition, ¶ 17(d), Ohn Decl. ¶ 8) [is not being compensated by another party]).) (6) The terms of any agreement between the petitioner and the attorney. (Petition, Attach. 14(a) [Redacted Attorney-Client Retainer Agreement].) The Guardian Ad Litem Petitioner and Plaintiff satisfy California Rules of Court, rule 7.952. The Petition states that $3,551.41 be paid or delivered to a parent of the minor on the terms and under the conditions specified in Probate Code sections 3401-3402, without bond. The name of the parent is MARIA FREDHOLM and her current address is P.O. Box 1783 Lynwood, CA 90262. Thus, a separate check in the amount of $3,551.41 shall be issued to Petitioner and parent MARIA FREDHOLM. (Petition Attach. 19b(4).) The Petition need not satisfy California Rules of Court, rule 7.954. This rule provides the requirements for requesting the withdrawal of funds already deposited in favor of a minor or person with a disability pursuant to a prior compromise, which is not the case here. (See Petition generally.) The Petition satisfies California Rules of Court, rule 7.955. This rule requires that the Court determine whether the attorneys fees charged of a minor or a person with a disability are reasonable. Here, the Petition contains a Declaration from Gerald S. Ohn, Esq.the attorney who represents the Plaintiffsindicating that Pelestene Fredholm will be paying 25% of their $4,900.00 gross settlementi.e., $1,225.00toward Mr. Ohns legal services. (Petition, Attach. 14(a).) The Court finds that a 25% recovery for the type of action at bar is reasonable. Substantive Requirements : The Court finds that the settlement is in the best interests of Pelestene Fredholm. (See Pearson , supra , 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338.) Pelestene Fredholm will receive $4,900.00 of which $1,348.59 will be used for attorneys fees and costs. The remainding $3,551.41 will be paid or delivered to a parent of the minor on the terms and under the conditions specified in Probate Code sections 3401-3402, without bond. Thus, a separate check in the amount of $3,551.41 shall be issued to Petitioner and parent MARIA FREDHOLM. (Petition Attach. 19b(4).) The remaining $45,100.00 of the Settlement will be distributed to her parent, Maria Fredholm is in the best position to care for her children and can use the remaining proceeds of the Settlement to further the economic welfare and physical wellbeing of Pelestene Fredholm. Conclusion : Accordingly, the Expedited Petition for Approval of Compromise is GRANTED. Conclusion Guardian Ad Litem Maria Fredholms Petition for Approval of Compromise for Minor or Adult with Disability on behalf of Pelestene Fredholm is GRANTED because the Petition meets all requirements set forth in California Rules of Court rules 7.590 to 7.595 and the Court is satisfied that the Settlement is in the best interests of Plaintiff Pelestene Fredholm.