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DOCKET NO.: UWY-CV21-6060768-S SUPERIOR COURT
ELIZABETH STEWART, ET AL J.D. OF WATERBURY
vs. AT WATERBURY
SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL SEPTEMBER 18, 2023
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
Pursuant to Section 10-40 of the Conn. Practice Book, the plaintiffs hereby object to
the defendants’ Motion to Strike dated March 10, 2023.
1 The Motion to Strike is Untimely and Should Be Denied on That Basis
Alone
The plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit in June, 2021, The original 10 count Complaint
alleged various causes of action, including causes of action against all defendants based on loss
of filial consortium by the plaintiff-parents, Cynthia Brown and Edward Stewart. See,
Complaint, May 17, 2021, Counts 8 and 9. On September 30, 2021, these defendants filed a
Requestto Revise (#118.00) seeking the separation of various counts against multiple defendants
into counts against each individual defendant. The plaintiffs filed a Revised Complaint on
January 19, 2022 (#135.00) which complied with the defendants’ Request to Revise but did not
change the wording of any of the original counts. On April 8, 2022, these defendants filed a
1
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Motion to Strike (#149.00) various counts of the Complaint which alleged bystander emotional
distress, These defendants did not move to strike the loss of filial consortium counts, although
they could have. The Court granted their Motion to Strike and the plaintiffs’ filed a Substituted
Complaint on December 16, 2022 (#167.00) re-alleging the bystander emotional distress counts.
Notably, the counts alleging loss of filial consortium remained unchanged from the way in which
they were alleged over 2 years ago when the original Complaint was filed. When no pleading
was filed in response to the Substituted Complaint, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default for
failure to plead on March 6, 2023 and the defendants response was to file a second Motion to
Strike as to the loss of filial consortium counts that have remained unchanged since the case was
first commenced in June, 2021.
Section 10-6 of the Connecticut Practice Book sets forth the order of pleadings. The
defendants took advantage of the rules by filing both a Request to Revise followed by a Motion.
to Strike. A party is not permitted under our Rules of Practice to file a second Motion to Strike
when that option was available to them when they filed their first Motion to Strike.
In Red Law Firm, LLC v. Webster Bank, 57 Conn. L. Rptr. 640, the Court was faced with
a similar factual scenario and denied a second Motion to Strike.
“{A]ithough the appellate courts have not ruled on the issue, in numerous cases,
Howarn, Korn Spracue & FirzGeraco, LLP « ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O. BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 + (660) 526-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160
the judges of the Superior Court have concluded that the rules of practice
preclude a party from filing successive motions to strike when the grounds raised
in a later motion could have been raised in the initial motion ... [A] second
motion to strike may be appropriate in limited circumstances. For example, when
a plaintiff, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44, files a subsequent pleading
alleging new facts ... Additional motions to strike, however, are not allowed
when the grounds asserted therein could have been raised in an earlier motion.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) Kaithamattam v. Walnut Hill, Inc., Superior
Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV—I 1-6022262-S (September
11, 2013, Peck, J.) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 821, 822). “[Because] [t]he Practice Book
provides for pleading multiple grounds in a single motion to strike and, further,
provides that pleadings are to advance after the adjudication of each enumerated
pleading, a defendant may not impede the progress of the suit by dividing his
grounds and pleading them in consecutive motions to strike.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Grazioli v. Nichols, Superior Court, judicial district of New
Haven, Docket No. CV-06-5001604 (October 2, 2007, Lopez, J.) (44 Conn. L.
Rptr. 273, 275).
Tn this case, although a Substituted Complaint was filed, no changes were made to the
counts that are now being attacked by the defendants, There is no reason why the defendant
could not have moved to strike these counts when they filed their Motion to Strike on April 8,
2022. On that basis alone, the Court should deny the defendants’ Motion to Strike.
2. If the Court Allows a Second Motion to Strike, Which Jt Should Not, the
Motion Should Be Denied
The Counts attacked by the defendants set forth causes of action by the parents of
Elizabeth Stewart for loss of filial consortium. As stated by the defendants, there is no
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controlling appellate authority in Connecticut on whether this cause of action is or would be
recognized in Connecticut. The plaintiffs submit that such a cause of action should be
recognized.
For many years, Connecticut did not recognize a cause of action for loss of parental
consortium. In Campos v Coleman, 319 Conn. 36, 123 A.3d 854 (2015), our Connecticut
Supreme Court determined that it was long overdue to recognize loss of parental consortium as
a viable cause of action. One reason that the Court gave for determining that there was a viable
claim for loss of parental consortium
was based upon the fact that children derive certain services
from their parents that are difficult to replace. The Court cited Mendillo v. Board of Education.
supra, at 478, 717 A.2d 1177, in which our Supreme Court held that “Similarly, parental
consortium consists of both a parent's services to his or her children, such as cooking, driving
or housekeeping, as well as such intangibles as the parent's “love, care, companionship and
guidance.” Campos v. Coleman, supra, at 50, 863.
Although our appellate courts have not officially recognized a cause of action for loss of
filial consortium, many of our trial courts have recognized such an action. See, Condron v.
Pollak, No. CV92 0128731 S, 1993 WL 498900, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1993, Dean,
J.); Condon v. Guardiani, No. CV 9500522038, 1996 WL 240420, at *1 (Conn, Super. Ct. Mar.
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16, 1996, Skolnick, J.); Perez v. Stanford, No. HHDCV196117765S, 2021 WL 828560 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2021, Budzik, J.); LeBlanc v. Vitam Youth Treatment Ctr, No, CV
9501486118, 1997 WL 260910 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 9, 1997, Nadeau, J.); Delvalle v.
Goggins, No. 0128043, 1996 WL 614829 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 1996, Peck J.); and Pacelli
Nv. Dorr, No. CV 9603825478, 1998 WL 470580 (Conn, Super. Ct. July 31, 1998, Hartmere, J.).
These cases analyzed whether a loss of filial consortium should be recognized, and if so, to what
extent. The judges in these cases allowed such a claim not only because the relationship between
a parent and a child is constitutionally protected but also because there are similarities between
the recognized claims of loss of spousal and parental consortium and loss of filial consortium.
See, Perez v. Stanford, supra, at *3.
A cause of action for loss of filial consortium involves the same or similar elements as
acause of action for loss of parental consortium. ‘The relationship between parent and child goes
both ways. Children derive a similar benefit from their relationship with their parents as parents
derive from their relationship with their children. For example, when a parent begins to age, it
is oftentimes the adult child who steps in to provide care and services for the parent. Sometimes,
the children spend more of their life taking care of the parent than the other way around.
Service and care-taking alone does not encompass the whole meaning of loss of
Howarp, Koun Spracue & FrzGerao, LLP » ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
287 BUCKINGHAM STREET + P.O, BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06126-4796 » (660) 525-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160
consortium, In Pacelli y. Dorr, supra, at *3, the court stated that:
A claim for loss of consortium, however, encompasses more than just the
“service” aspects of consortium. See Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn.
485, 492, 408 A.2d 260 (1979). Arguably, a child provides his parents with more
than just “support or services,” A claim for loss of consortium also includes
“sentimental” elements such as “loss of companionship, society, affection, and
moral support ...” Id. at 494, 408 A.2d 260. In addition, a consortium claim is
designed to compensate the “mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a
healthy, loving, companionable mate turn into a shell of a person ... Id. at 493,
408 A.2d 260. Contrary to the reasoning in St. Armand, the foreseeability of
harm to the parent is not too remote where “[t]he same emotional and mental
anguish is caused to a parent by seeing what might have been a healthy joyful
child turned into a ‘shell of a person.’ * Scalise v. Bristol Hospital, Superior
Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 525217
(July 6, 1995) (Corradino, J.) (14 Conn. L. R ptr. 534, 535); see also LeBlanc v.
Vitam Youth Treatment Center, supra, 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 485.
A child, no matter the age, can be a companion to a parent. Children and parents bond.
from the time of birth and that relationship, for the most part, carries into the adulthood of the
child. A parent and their child are often life-long companions, and the loss of one or the other
can have a negative and traumatic life-long effect. The Plaintiff, Elizabeth Stewart, was only 18
years of age at the time of the accident and still shared a home with her parents. They have a
deeply bonded relationship and rely upon one another. One can imagine the severe emotional and
mental anguish these plaintiff-parents have gone through seeing their daughter in the aftermath
of the incident alleged in the Complaint.
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297 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O, BOX 261798 « HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 + (860) 525-3101 » JURIS NO. 28160
The defendants argue that Connecticut should not recognize loss of filial consortium for
the parents of an adult child, however, several other states have held otherwise. See, Howard
Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Ct. of State of Ariz., In & For Maricopa Caty., 150 Ariz. 228, 722
P.2d 955 (1986) (we believe parents should have a remedy in damages against a negligent
tortfeasor whose actions have so severely injured the parents’ adult child that they are deprived
of their child's society, companionship, love and support—in short, of the child's consortium”);
Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989) (We hold that a parent may
recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child.”); and Brady v. Miller,
2003-Ohio-4582 (“Just as the Ohio Supreme Court found in Rolf in the context of a
parental-consortium claim brought by an adult child, we find that it is irrational to deny recovery
for loss of filial consortium simply because the child has reached the age of majority. “The
parent-child relationship does not end when the child becomes eighteen. It endures throughout
life and can be characterized by love, care and affection for the duration.’ Rolf, supra, at 383, 745
N.E.2d 424, quoting Hammar, Breaking the Age Barrier in Alaska: Including Adult Children in
Loss of Filial Consortium Actions (1995), 12 Alaska L.Rev. 73, 83.”).
Whether a child is a minor or an adult should not be the controlling factor in deciding
whether to recognize a particular claim for loss of filial consortium. The nature of this
Howarp, Koun Spracue & FirzGeraco, LLP * ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
237 BUCKINGHAM STREET = P.O. BOX 261788 + HARTFORD, CT 06126-1788 + (860) 525-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160
relationship, not an artificial dividing line by age, should be the determining factor. A minor
child may have no relationship with her parents while, conversely, an adult child may have the
deepest and most profound relationship with her parents. These relationships regardless of the
age of the child should be protected by the law when hindered or destroyed by a tortious act. A
jury is well qualified to evaluate and address the nature of the relationship between parent and
adult child when considering whether such a claim is worthy of compensation or not.
Last, in Scalise vy. Bristol Hospital, supra, 14 Conn, L. Rptr. 534, Judge Corradino
observed the following with regards to motions to strike:
“when [a] motion to strike is being used to test a new cause of action, a trial court
should permit the plaintiff to develop a factual basis for the claim. That is, as
long as a suggested new cause of action has what may be called, for want of a
better term, a prima facie legal viability, it would be fairer and wiser to allow the
new theory to be tested by way of summary judgment or after trial. Sometimes
legal questions require a factual setting within which to be decided. Just because
we have a pleading device called a motion to strike [does not mean that such a
motion should] ... be regarded as a straightjacket preventing a proper testing of
new legal theories.”
Simply because our appellate courts have not had the opportunity to recognize a claim for loss
of filial consortium does not mean that this Court should dismiss Counts 11-14 and 18-21 for
failing to state a legally cognizable cause of action. Under the facts of this case, it would be
“fairer and wiser” to allow the plaintiffs to develop a factual basis for their claim than to dismiss
Howarp, Koxn Sprague & FitzGerap, LLP * ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O, BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06426-1798 + (860) 625-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160
it at the outset simply because the defendants believe that a “tidal wave” of claims will result if
the claim is permitted.
The plaintiffs submit that this Court should deny the defendants’ attempt to get a second
bite of the apple when they failed to move to strike the loss of filial consortium claims in their
original motion to strike. Alternatively, this Court should deny the motion on the ground that
the plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action that should be recognized in this State and it would
be inappropriate to strike those claims at this early stage.
PLAINTIFFS,
By. fs/_ 301934
Thomas P. Cella
Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald.
237 Buckingham Street
Hartford, CT 06106
ph: (860)525-3101
fax: (860)247-4201
tpc@hksflaw.com
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CERTIFICATION
Thereby certify that this pleading complies with the requirements of Practice Book § 4-7
and a copy of the foregoing was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or electronically delivered.
pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 to all counsel and pro se parties of record who have given
written consent for electronic delivery, on the 18" day of September, 2023, as follows:
Michael Neubert, Esq.
Gretchen G. Randali, Esq.
Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.
195 Church Street, 13" Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
Mneubert@npmlaw.com
Grandall@npmlaw.com
Frederick J. Trotta, Esq.
Halloran & Sage, LLP
265 Church Street, 8" Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
irotta@halloransage.com
‘cooney@halloransage.com
pangonyte@halloransage.com
BY. /s/ 301934
Thomas P. Cella
Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald
10
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237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O. BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 = (880) 525-3101 - JURIS NO. 28160
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DOCKET NO.: UWY-CV21-6060768-S SUPERIOR COURT ELIZABETH STEWART, ET AL J.D. OF WATERBURY vs. AT WATERBURY SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL SEPTEMBER 18, 2023 OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE Pursuant to Section 10-40 of the Conn. Practice Book, the plaintiffs hereby object to the defendants’ Motion to Strike dated March 10, 2023. 1 The Motion to Strike is Untimely and Should Be Denied on That Basis Alone The plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit in June, 2021, The original 10 count Complaint alleged various causes of action, including causes of action against all defendants based on loss of filial consortium by the plaintiff-parents, Cynthia Brown and Edward Stewart. See, Complaint, May 17, 2021, Counts 8 and 9. On September 30, 2021, these defendants filed a Requestto Revise (#118.00) seeking the separation of various counts against multiple defendants into counts against each individual defendant. The plaintiffs filed a Revised Complaint on January 19, 2022 (#135.00) which complied with the defendants’ Request to Revise but did not change the wording of any of the original counts. On April 8, 2022, these defendants filed a 1 Howarp, Kon Spracue & FirzGeraip, LLP » ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O. BOX 261798 + HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 + (860) 525-3101 +» JURIS NO. 28160 Motion to Strike (#149.00) various counts of the Complaint which alleged bystander emotional distress, These defendants did not move to strike the loss of filial consortium counts, although they could have. The Court granted their Motion to Strike and the plaintiffs’ filed a Substituted Complaint on December 16, 2022 (#167.00) re-alleging the bystander emotional distress counts. Notably, the counts alleging loss of filial consortium remained unchanged from the way in which they were alleged over 2 years ago when the original Complaint was filed. When no pleading was filed in response to the Substituted Complaint, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default for failure to plead on March 6, 2023 and the defendants response was to file a second Motion to Strike as to the loss of filial consortium counts that have remained unchanged since the case was first commenced in June, 2021. Section 10-6 of the Connecticut Practice Book sets forth the order of pleadings. The defendants took advantage of the rules by filing both a Request to Revise followed by a Motion. to Strike. A party is not permitted under our Rules of Practice to file a second Motion to Strike when that option was available to them when they filed their first Motion to Strike. In Red Law Firm, LLC v. Webster Bank, 57 Conn. L. Rptr. 640, the Court was faced with a similar factual scenario and denied a second Motion to Strike. “{A]ithough the appellate courts have not ruled on the issue, in numerous cases, Howarn, Korn Spracue & FirzGeraco, LLP « ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O. BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 + (660) 526-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160 the judges of the Superior Court have concluded that the rules of practice preclude a party from filing successive motions to strike when the grounds raised in a later motion could have been raised in the initial motion ... [A] second motion to strike may be appropriate in limited circumstances. For example, when a plaintiff, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44, files a subsequent pleading alleging new facts ... Additional motions to strike, however, are not allowed when the grounds asserted therein could have been raised in an earlier motion.” Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) Kaithamattam v. Walnut Hill, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV—I 1-6022262-S (September 11, 2013, Peck, J.) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 821, 822). “[Because] [t]he Practice Book provides for pleading multiple grounds in a single motion to strike and, further, provides that pleadings are to advance after the adjudication of each enumerated pleading, a defendant may not impede the progress of the suit by dividing his grounds and pleading them in consecutive motions to strike.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grazioli v. Nichols, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-06-5001604 (October 2, 2007, Lopez, J.) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 273, 275). Tn this case, although a Substituted Complaint was filed, no changes were made to the counts that are now being attacked by the defendants, There is no reason why the defendant could not have moved to strike these counts when they filed their Motion to Strike on April 8, 2022. On that basis alone, the Court should deny the defendants’ Motion to Strike. 2. If the Court Allows a Second Motion to Strike, Which Jt Should Not, the Motion Should Be Denied The Counts attacked by the defendants set forth causes of action by the parents of Elizabeth Stewart for loss of filial consortium. As stated by the defendants, there is no Howarn, Koxn Spracue & FirzGeratp, LLP * ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O, BOX 261788 « HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 + (860) 525-3101 » JURIS NO. 28160 controlling appellate authority in Connecticut on whether this cause of action is or would be recognized in Connecticut. The plaintiffs submit that such a cause of action should be recognized. For many years, Connecticut did not recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. In Campos v Coleman, 319 Conn. 36, 123 A.3d 854 (2015), our Connecticut Supreme Court determined that it was long overdue to recognize loss of parental consortium as a viable cause of action. One reason that the Court gave for determining that there was a viable claim for loss of parental consortium was based upon the fact that children derive certain services from their parents that are difficult to replace. The Court cited Mendillo v. Board of Education. supra, at 478, 717 A.2d 1177, in which our Supreme Court held that “Similarly, parental consortium consists of both a parent's services to his or her children, such as cooking, driving or housekeeping, as well as such intangibles as the parent's “love, care, companionship and guidance.” Campos v. Coleman, supra, at 50, 863. Although our appellate courts have not officially recognized a cause of action for loss of filial consortium, many of our trial courts have recognized such an action. See, Condron v. Pollak, No. CV92 0128731 S, 1993 WL 498900, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1993, Dean, J.); Condon v. Guardiani, No. CV 9500522038, 1996 WL 240420, at *1 (Conn, Super. Ct. Mar. Howaro, Korn Sprasue & FirzGeraio, LLP = ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET + P.O, BOX 261788 « HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 + (860) 525-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160 16, 1996, Skolnick, J.); Perez v. Stanford, No. HHDCV196117765S, 2021 WL 828560 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2021, Budzik, J.); LeBlanc v. Vitam Youth Treatment Ctr, No, CV 9501486118, 1997 WL 260910 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 9, 1997, Nadeau, J.); Delvalle v. Goggins, No. 0128043, 1996 WL 614829 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 1996, Peck J.); and Pacelli Nv. Dorr, No. CV 9603825478, 1998 WL 470580 (Conn, Super. Ct. July 31, 1998, Hartmere, J.). These cases analyzed whether a loss of filial consortium should be recognized, and if so, to what extent. The judges in these cases allowed such a claim not only because the relationship between a parent and a child is constitutionally protected but also because there are similarities between the recognized claims of loss of spousal and parental consortium and loss of filial consortium. See, Perez v. Stanford, supra, at *3. A cause of action for loss of filial consortium involves the same or similar elements as acause of action for loss of parental consortium. ‘The relationship between parent and child goes both ways. Children derive a similar benefit from their relationship with their parents as parents derive from their relationship with their children. For example, when a parent begins to age, it is oftentimes the adult child who steps in to provide care and services for the parent. Sometimes, the children spend more of their life taking care of the parent than the other way around. Service and care-taking alone does not encompass the whole meaning of loss of Howarp, Koun Spracue & FrzGerao, LLP » ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 287 BUCKINGHAM STREET + P.O, BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06126-4796 » (660) 525-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160 consortium, In Pacelli y. Dorr, supra, at *3, the court stated that: A claim for loss of consortium, however, encompasses more than just the “service” aspects of consortium. See Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 492, 408 A.2d 260 (1979). Arguably, a child provides his parents with more than just “support or services,” A claim for loss of consortium also includes “sentimental” elements such as “loss of companionship, society, affection, and moral support ...” Id. at 494, 408 A.2d 260. In addition, a consortium claim is designed to compensate the “mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a healthy, loving, companionable mate turn into a shell of a person ... Id. at 493, 408 A.2d 260. Contrary to the reasoning in St. Armand, the foreseeability of harm to the parent is not too remote where “[t]he same emotional and mental anguish is caused to a parent by seeing what might have been a healthy joyful child turned into a ‘shell of a person.’ * Scalise v. Bristol Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 525217 (July 6, 1995) (Corradino, J.) (14 Conn. L. R ptr. 534, 535); see also LeBlanc v. Vitam Youth Treatment Center, supra, 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 485. A child, no matter the age, can be a companion to a parent. Children and parents bond. from the time of birth and that relationship, for the most part, carries into the adulthood of the child. A parent and their child are often life-long companions, and the loss of one or the other can have a negative and traumatic life-long effect. The Plaintiff, Elizabeth Stewart, was only 18 years of age at the time of the accident and still shared a home with her parents. They have a deeply bonded relationship and rely upon one another. One can imagine the severe emotional and mental anguish these plaintiff-parents have gone through seeing their daughter in the aftermath of the incident alleged in the Complaint. Howarn, Koxn Spracue & FirzGeraco, LLP » ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 297 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O, BOX 261798 « HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 + (860) 525-3101 » JURIS NO. 28160 The defendants argue that Connecticut should not recognize loss of filial consortium for the parents of an adult child, however, several other states have held otherwise. See, Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Ct. of State of Ariz., In & For Maricopa Caty., 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986) (we believe parents should have a remedy in damages against a negligent tortfeasor whose actions have so severely injured the parents’ adult child that they are deprived of their child's society, companionship, love and support—in short, of the child's consortium”); Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989) (We hold that a parent may recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child.”); and Brady v. Miller, 2003-Ohio-4582 (“Just as the Ohio Supreme Court found in Rolf in the context of a parental-consortium claim brought by an adult child, we find that it is irrational to deny recovery for loss of filial consortium simply because the child has reached the age of majority. “The parent-child relationship does not end when the child becomes eighteen. It endures throughout life and can be characterized by love, care and affection for the duration.’ Rolf, supra, at 383, 745 N.E.2d 424, quoting Hammar, Breaking the Age Barrier in Alaska: Including Adult Children in Loss of Filial Consortium Actions (1995), 12 Alaska L.Rev. 73, 83.”). Whether a child is a minor or an adult should not be the controlling factor in deciding whether to recognize a particular claim for loss of filial consortium. The nature of this Howarp, Koun Spracue & FirzGeraco, LLP * ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET = P.O. BOX 261788 + HARTFORD, CT 06126-1788 + (860) 525-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160 relationship, not an artificial dividing line by age, should be the determining factor. A minor child may have no relationship with her parents while, conversely, an adult child may have the deepest and most profound relationship with her parents. These relationships regardless of the age of the child should be protected by the law when hindered or destroyed by a tortious act. A jury is well qualified to evaluate and address the nature of the relationship between parent and adult child when considering whether such a claim is worthy of compensation or not. Last, in Scalise vy. Bristol Hospital, supra, 14 Conn, L. Rptr. 534, Judge Corradino observed the following with regards to motions to strike: “when [a] motion to strike is being used to test a new cause of action, a trial court should permit the plaintiff to develop a factual basis for the claim. That is, as long as a suggested new cause of action has what may be called, for want of a better term, a prima facie legal viability, it would be fairer and wiser to allow the new theory to be tested by way of summary judgment or after trial. Sometimes legal questions require a factual setting within which to be decided. Just because we have a pleading device called a motion to strike [does not mean that such a motion should] ... be regarded as a straightjacket preventing a proper testing of new legal theories.” Simply because our appellate courts have not had the opportunity to recognize a claim for loss of filial consortium does not mean that this Court should dismiss Counts 11-14 and 18-21 for failing to state a legally cognizable cause of action. Under the facts of this case, it would be “fairer and wiser” to allow the plaintiffs to develop a factual basis for their claim than to dismiss Howarp, Koxn Sprague & FitzGerap, LLP * ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O, BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06426-1798 + (860) 625-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160 it at the outset simply because the defendants believe that a “tidal wave” of claims will result if the claim is permitted. The plaintiffs submit that this Court should deny the defendants’ attempt to get a second bite of the apple when they failed to move to strike the loss of filial consortium claims in their original motion to strike. Alternatively, this Court should deny the motion on the ground that the plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action that should be recognized in this State and it would be inappropriate to strike those claims at this early stage. PLAINTIFFS, By. fs/_ 301934 Thomas P. Cella Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald. 237 Buckingham Street Hartford, CT 06106 ph: (860)525-3101 fax: (860)247-4201 tpc@hksflaw.com Howaro, Kon Spracue & FirzGerao, LLP » ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O, BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 * (@60) 528-3101 + JURIS NO. 28160 CERTIFICATION Thereby certify that this pleading complies with the requirements of Practice Book § 4-7 and a copy of the foregoing was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or electronically delivered. pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 to all counsel and pro se parties of record who have given written consent for electronic delivery, on the 18" day of September, 2023, as follows: Michael Neubert, Esq. Gretchen G. Randali, Esq. Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13" Floor New Haven, CT 06510 Mneubert@npmlaw.com Grandall@npmlaw.com Frederick J. Trotta, Esq. Halloran & Sage, LLP 265 Church Street, 8" Floor New Haven, CT 06510 irotta@halloransage.com ‘cooney@halloransage.com pangonyte@halloransage.com BY. /s/ 301934 Thomas P. Cella Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald 10 Howaro, Konn Sprague & FirzGeraco, LLP © ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 237 BUCKINGHAM STREET « P.O. BOX 261798 » HARTFORD, CT 06126-1798 = (880) 525-3101 - JURIS NO. 28160