Motion in Limine Evidentiary in Eddie Greathouse, et al Plaintiff vs. TYPTAP INSURANCE COMPANY Defendant| Trellis.Law

On September 23, 2022 a Motion,Ex Parte was filed involving a dispute between Greathouse, Eddie, Greathouse, Eddie And Meredith, Greathouse, Meredith, and Typtap Insurance Company, for 3 in the District Court of Broward County.

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Filing# 158577279 E-Filed 10/04/2022 03:40:31 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA

EDDIE & MEREDITH CASE NO.: CACE-22-014354
GREATHOUSE

Plaintiffs,

VS.

TYPTAP INSURANCE COMPANY

Defendant.
i

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE

COME NOW EDDIE
the Plaintiff(s), & MEREDITH GREATHOUSE, by and

through the undersigned counsel, and moves this Honorable Court for an Order

any comment or testimony and precludingany
precludingdefense counsel from eliciting

person called by defense counsel from commenting or testifying
as set forth in the

following Second Motion in Limine states as follows:

The Plaintiff has filed suit against the Defendant for homeowner's insurance

benefits. The Plaintiff anticipatesthat the Defendant will attempt to elicit and make

and remarks during the
prohibitedgeneralallegations trial. The primary purpose of a

motion in limine is to prevent prejudiceat the time of trial that cannot be corrected which

would result in a party not receiving a fair trial. The Court has the authorityto issue a

of evidence. The decision
preliminaryrulingon the admissibility to do so is vested in the

sound discretion of the Court. The Court's decision will not be overturned on appeal

absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. These motions are designed to simplify

avoid side-bars,and avoid prejudicethat often occurs
the trial, when a party is forced to

*** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 10/04/2022 03:40:30 PM.****
objectin the front ofthe jury to the introduction of evidence.

The Plaintiffs hereby moves to preclude the Defendant, the Defendant's attorney

or the Defendant's witnesses from directlyor indirectlymaking any such reference

regardingany of the following:

1. Any questions or interrogationsregarding the time period or circumstances

under which the Plaintiff or the patienthired an attorney or changed attorneys.

th
Watson v. Builders Square, Inc., 563 So.2d 721 (Fla. 4' DCA 1990),

Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L.

Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla.Broward Cty Court 2002). The Plaintiff seek an Order

of the Court precluding the Defendant, Defendant's attorney, or the

Defendant's witnesses from testifying
or inquiringin any fashion as to when

the Plaintiff retained the services of an attorney. The date the Plaintiff retained

the services of an attorney is There
not relevant and extremely prejudicial. is

no probativevalue in learningwhen the Plaintiff retained the services of an

attorney, the date when
and any evidence or testimony of any kind reflecting

said attorney was retained would be unfairlyprejudicial
to the Plaintiff. The

Plaintiff has the rightto obtain competent counsel to obtain assistance during

this process.

2. Any reference to "crowded courtrooms" or identifying,either directlyor

this case as being the type of case that causes delaysor backlogs in
implicitly,

th
the court systems. Stokes v. Wet'n Wild, Inc., 523 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5- DCA

1988); Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla.Broward Cty Court 2002).

2
3. Any mention that the effect or results of a claim, suit, or judgment upon

insurance rates, premiums, or charges,either generallyor as particularly,
to

Defendant or its insured, as a result of this lawsuit or any other lawsuit.

Davido#v. Segret,551 So.2d 1274 (Fla zfh DCA 1989); Russel v. Guider, 362

So.2d 55 (Fla.4m DCA 1978).

4. Any mention or reference to an "insurance crisis". Davidojf v. Segret, 551

So.2d 1274 (Fla. 4DCA 1989), Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward Cty Court

2002).

5. Any mention regarding whether the Plaintiff or any other insured made a

claim againstany other party or has a pending claim againstanyone. Samick

Corp. v. Jackson, 645 So.2d 1095 (Fla.4?h DCA 1994).

6. Any mention of whether the insured ever made a previousinsurance claim.

7. That if Defendant's expert is he should not be permitted
permitted to testify,

to express his opinions as to the Plaintiff's expert(s)or any adjusters/loss

consultants or reference any opinions not contained in Defendant's expert

See Carver
report or answers to Expert Interrogatories. v.
Orange Counot 444

So.2d 452 (Fla 5th DCA 1983) (errorto permit expert witness to impeach

another expert witness by asking first expert witness as to second expert's

It is improper
ability). to from another
impeach an expert witness by eliciting

expert witness what he thinks of that expert. Schwab v. Tolley,345 So.2d 747

(Fla.fhDCA 1977); Ecker v. Nashville Roofing of Miami, Inc., 201 So.2d 586

rd
-
(Fla. 3' DCA 1967). See also Dungan v. Ford, 632 So.2d 159 (Fla 1St DCA

3
1994) (improper to allow expert to testifyon lack of skill or judgment and

poor results achieved by a treating Levinson
physician), v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward

Cty Court 2002).

8 The Defendant's attorney, experts and/or witnesses should be limited from

statingpersonal opinions about the Plaintiff,or any other insured, or the

consultant, or the water mitigationcompany, or any other or
adjuster/loss

about the merits of the claim. See Wasten v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co.,

474 So. 2d 825 (Fla.2nd DCA 1985) (errorto state personalopinionsabout the

rev. den., 484 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
of the Plaintiff).
merits of the case or credibility

1986). See also Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co., Inc., 553 So.2d 787

St
Cfla. 1 DCA 1989); Blue Grass Shows, Inc. v. Collins, 614 So.2d 626 (Fla.

1
St'
DCA 1993); Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 361 (Fla. C DCA
th

St
1978); Rileyv. Willis,585 So.2d 676 (Fla.1 DCA 1995). Cf.,Feller v. State,

637 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1994) (errorfor expert to state belief that victim was

Tinglev. State, 536 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1989) (errorto commit
the truth);
telling

Hitchcock v. State, 636 So. 2d 572 (Fla.
she believed victim.);
expert to testify

C DCA
th
1994); Davis v. State, 527 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 5"'
th
DCA 1988) terrorto

permit expert to testifythe victim was frank).A trial is no place for an

attorney'spersonalopinions and any opinions would violate the Rules of the

Florida Bar.

4
9- The Plaintiff hereby moves to preclude the Defendant, the Defendant's

attorney or the Defendant's witnesses from directlyor indirectly
making any

reference concerning fraud. Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (F\a. Broward Cty Court

2002). This case involves a homeowner's insurance suit over the Defendant's

failure to pay a property damage claim pursuant to Florida law and the terms

and conditions of the policy of insurance. The Defendant has not plead any

affirmative defense relatingto fraud of any kind or listed any exhibit or

witness with information concerning fraud. Any discussion about fraud of any

of fraud or the prevention of fraud will be unduly
kind, the possibility

and outside the scope ofthese pleadings.
prejudicial

10. Plaintiff hereby moves to preclude Defendant, Defendant's attorneys, or

Defendant's witnesses from directlyor indirectlymaking any reference,

comment, remark, or inference concerning fraud as this is not and has never

been an issue in this case and would severelyprejudicethe jury'simpartiality.

to fraud and will not
Defendant did not plead any affirmative defenses relating

.,
be prejudiced by the exclusion of this highly prejudicial"buzzword.'

Defendant may attempt to allegeor infer some kind of fraud which is not

plead. It is a well-established point of law that fraud must be plead with

See Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure 1.120(b).See Bankers Mutual
specificity.

Cap. Corp.v. US Fidelity& Gmmnty Co.,784 So.2d 485 Cfla.4th DCA

200I1i Peninsular Florida Dist. Council v. Pan Am. Invest & Dev. Corp., 450

So. 2d 1231 Cfla. 4th DCA 19841. The elements of fraud are: 1)

5
of a material fact;2) knowledge
misrepresentation that misrepresentationis

false; 3) intention that the other party rely on said misrepresentation;
4)

reliance and; 5) resultinginjuryor damage. See Eastern Cement
justifiable v.

Halliburton Co., 600 So. 2d 469 (Fla.4th DCA 1992); Arnold v. Weck, 388

So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th DCA in an
1980). Pleading fraud without particularity

affirmative defense does not raise the issue of fraudfbr trial. Cady v. Chevy

Case S. & L. Assoc., 528 So. 2d 136 (1988). Moreover, elements not pled

may not be infkrred*om context. Myers v. Myers, 652 So. 2d 1214 (Fla.5th

DCA 1995).Failure to allegefraud with particularity
is grounds for dismissal

of fae claim. General Dynamics Corp. v. Hewitt, 225 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3rd

DCA 1979). The Defendant must be precluded from inferringor claiming any

kind of fraud which is inadmissible as a matter of law at trial.

11. The Plaintiff seeks an Order of the Court precluding the Defendant, the

Defendant's counsel, or any of the witnesses from informing the jury that the

engineersor experts hired by Defendant were "independent".These
adjusters,

individuals are not independent.The defendant's adjusters/engineers/experts

were hired by the defense and paid by the defense. See US. Securityv.

Cimino, 754 So.2d 697 (Fla.2000); Allstate v. Boecher, 733 So.2d 993 (Fla.

1999, footnote 6); Nguyen v. State Farm, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 305 (Fla.

Palm Beach Cir. Court 2002). If the jury hears the adjustersor engineersare

"independent" the jury may be confused into believing or thinking the

adjustersor engineers were appointed by this court, the county, a governing

body, or with the approval of the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff's attorney. The

6
Defendant should refer its adjustersand/or engineersas defense witnesses. See

also Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L.

Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward Cty Court 2002); Arbogast v. Barlow, 11

Florida L. Weekly Supp. 119 (Fla. Broward Cir. Court 2003)(jn a 9
?rd
party

case the Court ruled the doctor hired by the insurance company cannot be

referred to as "independenf').See also McGarrah v. Bayfront,889 So.2d 923

(Fla.2d DC4) where the Court referred to the exam as a compulsory medical

examination.

12. The Defendant should also be precluded from making any arguments, of any

kind, that the filingof the claim was somehow manipulated or orchestrated by

an attorney since there is no evidence of same. Levinson v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward

Cty Court 2002).

13. The Plaintiff also seeks an order of the Court precluding any evidence of

whether the Plaintiff, loss consultant or mitigation
any other insured, adjuster,

company had an attorney for any purpose. These partieshave the rightto hire

an attorney to assist them in bringinga claim and any reference that the claim

was brought in bad faith should be precluded.

14. There should be no questionsas to what the Plaintiff or any other insured did

or did not do in relation to any policereport.

15. The Plaintiff seeks an Order from the Court from precludingthe Defendant's

experts from testifyingto the same evidence as any other Defense expert

witness. This type of testimony would be unnecessarily duplicative,

7
It would also violate F.S. § 90.403 and §90.612.
cumulative and prejudicial.

"
th
See also Delgardo v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 731 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4 DCA

1999)(stating that if a witness will offer testimony that unnecessarily

duplicatesthe testimony of another witness, the trial judge has the discretion

.th
to limit it);Holiday Inn v. Shelburne, 576 So.2d 322 (Fla. 4- DCA 1991),

.th
Gravin v. Promo Brands USA, 578 So.2d 518 (Fla. 4'" DCA 1991); and

Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356 (Fla.2d DCA 1356 (Fla.2d DCA 1994).

16. The Plaintiff also seeks an order precludingthe raisingof any ofthe Plaintiff's

prior property claims, subsequent property claims, or unrelated property

repairswhich are not relevant to Qiis case. Allstate v. Mazzorana, 731 So.2d

"
.th
38 (Fla.4 DCA 1999); Smith v. Courtesy Car Rental and Sales, 696 So.2d

,th
1228 (Fla.4'" DCA 1997). F.S. § 90.403 states that even relevant evidence is

not admissible at trial if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of

prejudiceto a party.

17. The Plaintiff also seeks an order precluding the raisingor asking about the

amount of property damage the insured's personal property sustained during

the loss. There is no correlation between personal property damages and the

amount of damages sustained by a dwelling.There has been no expert witness

who is qualifiedto discuss this issue and any reference to the amount of

and would be irrelevant
personalproperty damage will be unduly prejudicial

to this case.

18. The Plaintiff seeks an order precludingthe Defendant from making reference,

8
asking questions,or presentingwitnesses that would testify
as to any prioror

subsequent claims not at issue in this litigation.

19. Defendant shall be prohibitedfrom making any mention, comment, reference,

suggestion or question regarding anything suspicious about the claim.

Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L.

Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward Cty Court 2002).

20. Defendant shall be prohibitedfrom making any mention, comment, reference,

suggestion or question that the type of loss involved in this case would not

cause property damages.

21. Defendant shall be prohibitedfrom making any mention, comment, reference,

suggestionor question to the financial status of the Plaintiff as it would not be

relevant. Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 9

Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla.Broward CO? Court 2002).

22. Defendant shall be prohibitedfrom making any mention, comment, reference,

suggestionor questionto any claims that the Plaintiff has ever made including

unemployment, workers compensation,or jury claims whatsoever. Levinson v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.

721 (Fla.Broward Cty Court 2002).

23. Defendant shall be prohibitedfrom making any mention, comment, reference,

suggestion or question of the opinion of any adjusterof Defendant or the

opinion any witness appearing on behalf of Defendant as to the validityor the

lack of validity of the Plaintiffs claim. Levinson v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward

9
Cty Court 2002).

24. Defendant should be prohibited from making any mention, comment,

reference, suggestion or question that the Plaintiff obtained or may obtain a

Levinson V. State
settlement against other parties. Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward Cty Court

2002).

25. Defendant should be prohibited from making any mention, comment,

reference,suggestion or question of other insured representedby the attorney,

adjuster or loss consultant. Levinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla. Broward Cty Court

2002).

26. The Defendant should be precluded from making any argument, comment or

reference to any other technical problems with the claim forms, powers of

attorney, directions to pay or assignment of benefits. These are not issues in

the case and they are not questionsof fact. Further, Defendant has not alleged

any such defenses.

27. The Defendant should be precluded from statingwhether the policy of

insurance is exhausted. Exhaustion is not an issue for the jury and if the jury

learns the policy is exhausted, they may become confused as to what are the

true issues for them. Exhaustion is a legaldefense and there is no place for

this argument at the time of the trial. There is no evidence of same in this case.

28. The Defendant should be precluded from raisingany additional defenses or

legalissues as these issues have not been previouslyplead.The Plaintiff is

10
entitled to and any new defenses should be
rely on the pretrialstipulation

deemed waived. See Cooke v. Insurance Co. Of North America, 652 So.2d

1154 (Fla.2d DCA 1995). The Plaintiff will be prejudicedas it will be unable

to prepare for any new legal arguments at the time of trial. "Where a

defendant fails to provide an answer or responsive pleading he waives

defenses that could have been raised in those pleadings" Chillemi v. Rorabeck,

629 So.2d 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Furthermore, "all other defenses are

waived if not raised by motion or responsive pleading" JA.B. Enterprises v.

Gibons, DCA 1992), "[alverments
596 So.2d 1247 (4th in a pleading to which

a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not denied in the

responsive pleading" Id,.at 1249, See also, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure

1.110(e)."In the absence of a responsive plea(lingto a cross-claim which

states a cause of action, the court, after notice and a hearing may enter a

default judgment" Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.500Cb), See Also, National Union Fire

Insurance Pennsylvaniav. J.M.
Company of Pittsburg, Pontiac, Inc., 571 So.

2d 512 (Fla. 3'd DCA that subjectto
1990). "Appellant argues, correctly,

certain exceptionsnot applicablehere, affirmative defenses not allegedin the

answer are deemed waived. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)& (h).See Billo v. Benoit,

519 So.2d 1114 (Fla.lstDCA 1988), Moreover, nonperformanee of a

and with particularity",
condition precedent must be plead "specifically or it

will be deemed waived, Magnum v. Susser,,
as well. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(c),

764 SO. 2d 653 (Fla. 1
St
DCA 2000).

29. The Defendant should be precluded from discussing or introducing any

11
st*ulation.The
exhibits not previouslyprovided and listed in the pretrial

Plaintiff will be prejudicedby being unable to fullyevaluate any last minute

exhibits.

30. The Defendant's attorney should not be permitted to refer to the Plaintiff's

expert as a "hired gun."

.,
31. Any use of the phrases "welcome to the world of Homeowner's Insurance,'

"all you need is leak and you are off and running,"and any other terms or

phrases that improperly and negativelycharacterize the nature of this lawsuit.

32. The Defendant should not be permittedto inquireas to various fee schedules

or contract rates with health insurers. See Brass and Singer v. Progressive,9

Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 629 (Fla.Dade Cty Court 2002).

33. The Defendant should be precluded from making any reference of the

Plaintiff's failure to call where such testimony would
any witness especially

be cumulative and where said witness would be equally available to the

Defendant.

34. Defendant should be prohibited from making any mention, comment, or

remark regarding fault or the reasonableness of the conduct of any person in

relation to the auto accident. Levinson vs. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 9

Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 721 (Fla.Broward CO?. Ct. 2002).

35. The Defendant should be precluded from making any reference to whether

any of the other passengers in the vehicle were injuredor not.

36. The Defendant should be precluded from making any reference or comment

that the Defendant may have to pay attorney'sfees and costs if it loses this

12
case.

37. The Plaintiff seeks to exclude any mention of whether the Plaintiff or any

insured made any payments toward its deductible as this is not an issue in the

case and could only serve to confuse the jury.

38. The Defendant should be prohibitedfrom raising"lack of cooperation"as a

reason for the non-payment of the claim. Defendant has not pleaded failure to

cooperate as an affirmative defense and as such it cannot use this defense at

trial. As such, Defendant should not be allowed at trial to mention any alleged

failure to cooperate of the claim.
with the investigation

39. Defendant should be prohibited from discussing,arguing, mentioning or

presenting to the jury any testimony, of any sort, either by direct or cross-

examination of any witness that the insured was involved in "a priorinsurance

claim." This is inadmissible hearsay and is not relevant to the subjectclaim.

Moreover, assuming arguendo, that this evidence was relevant and admissible,

Defendant does not have any expert opinion of any sort statingthat these

allegedpriorclaims caused the damages suffered by the Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, The Plaintiffs respectfully
request this Honorable Court enter an

Order grantingPlaintiff's Motion in Limine, as set forth above.

13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoingwas served by email
via the Court's E-filingPortal per Fla. R. Jud. Administration 2.516 to the Defendant's

counsel.

DATED 10/4/22.

RespectfullySubmitted,

/s/ Neil V. Singh,Esq.

NEIL V. SINGH, ESQ.
Florida Bar No: 696501
LAW OFFICES OF NEIL V. SINGH PA
10100 W. Sample Road, Third Floor
Coral SpringsFL 33065
Office: 954-603-0568
Fax: 954-827-2261
PRIMARY DESIGNATED EMAIL-.
Claims@nvslaw.com
SECONDARY EMAIL-.
NEIL.SINGH@LAW.NYU.EDU
THIRD DESIGNATED EMAIL-.
NVSLAW1@gmail.com

Case Info

Judge

Rodriguez, Carlos Augusto Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

October 04, 2022

Case Filing Date

September 23, 2022

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Motion,Ex Parte: Eddie Greathouse, et al Plaintiff vs. TYPTAP INSURANCE COMPANY Defendant

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