Legal Document: Irma Qureshi, et al Plaintiff vs. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company Defendant

On April 09, 2021 a Motion for New Trial was filed involving a dispute between Guerrero, George, Qureshi, Irma, and Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, for 3 in the District Court of Broward County.

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Filing# 168438597 E-Filed 03/09/2023 10:08:58 PM

IN THE CIRCUITCOURT OF THE ,TH
17
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NUMBER: CACE-21-007238

IRMA QURESHI, et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.
I

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Defendant, UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

(hereinafter pursuant to
"Universal"), Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530, files
hereby respectfully this motion

for new trial. The grounds for this motion are set out below.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
This case arose from mold damage claim that Plaintiffs reportedto Universal on October 15,

2020. The case proceeded to trial on February 20,2023. On February 22,2023, the Jury returned

their verdict for Plaintiffs. However, due to the numerous errors made duringTrial,Universal was

deprived of due process and a new trial must be granted to correct the errors.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
I. STANDARD FOR GRANTING NEW TRIAL

"If an error is preserved,the legalstandard the trial court uses in deciding a motion for new

trial is whether the error is that the injuredparty
so pervasiveor prejudicial is denied the rightto a

fair trial." Harlan Bakeries, Inc. v. Snow, 884 So. 2d 336, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

A trial court has a duty to grant a new trial where either the jury 1) has been influenced by

*** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 03/09/2023 10:08:58 PM.****
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 2 of 25

considerations outside the record; 2) has been deceived by the force and credibility
ofthe evidence;

or 3) the verdict is againstthe manifest weight ofthe evidence. Jordan v. Brown, 855 So. 2d 231,

233 (Fla.1st DCA 2003).The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is within the broad

discretion of a trial court. El. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Native Hammock Nursery, Inc.,698
So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla.3d DCA 1997).

II. GROUNDS FOR SEEKING A NEW TRIAL
A. This Court Made Numerous Evidentiary Errors Prior To And During The

Course Of Trial.

i. This Court Permitted Plaintiffs To Introduce Improper Damages

Evidence.

Prior to trial,Universal submitted a Motion in Limine regarding the introduction of

damages evidence and testimony related of the property.
1
to damages not repairedpriorto the sale

CSee,Universal's MIL on Damages). Therein, Universal argued that priorto Plaintiffs' sale of the

property on June 11, 2021, Plaintiffs had conducted only minimal repairsto the property and had

not conducted the repairscontemplated by either of Plaintiffs' damages estimates. At the
certainly

time that the Motion in Limine was argued, Plaintiffs had paid five (5) vendors for repairs

ostensiblyrelated to the Claim: SERVEPRO, MoldPros, Lincoln Electrical Contractors, Inc.,and

Braulio Echevarria. (P's Exhibit 11 at 67-82; P's Exhibit 20; & P's Exhibit 23). These invoices

totaled $15,984.47, of which $10,854.47 fell under the mold limit. (Id.). this Court
Essentially,

should have restricted Plaintiffs to introducing $5,130.00 in potentiallyrecoverable damages.

Instead,this Court improperlypermitteddamage estimates to be introduced into evidence.

the Motion in Limine herein.
1
Universal hereby fullyincorporates

2
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 3 of 25

To be clear,by sellingthe Property, Plaintiffs cut off any damages outside of paid repairs

that could possiblyinure to them from Universal's allegedbreach. This is the case for two reasons:

(1)the Policy'sLoss Payment provisionties Plaintiffs' damages to repairsactuallymade; and (2)

the Policy restricts Plaintiffs from recovering for diminution in value.

1. The Loss Payment Provision Caps Plaintiffs' Damages.

In this breach of contract action,as in any other,the language of the contract controls. See,

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569 (Fla. 2011)-,Kokhan v. Auto Club

Ins. Co. ofFlorida,297 So. 3d 570,572 (Fla.4th DCA 2020); Vazquez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.,

304 So. 3d 1280, 1284 (Fla.3d DCA 2020). Here, the unambiguous language ofthe Policy'sLoss

Settlement provisiongoverns the maximum measure of damages Plaintiffs are entitled to recover.

The provisionreads:

E
D. Loss Settlement
In this Condition D., the terms cost to repair or j

replace and replacernent cost do not include the t
increased costs incurred to comply wilh the
i
enforcemenl of any ordinance or law, except to ?i
the exlent that coverage for these increased i
costs is provided in Additional Coverage i
11. Ordinance Or Law under Section I - Property
A.

B
Coverages. Additionally, Lhe valiation of any
covered property losses does not indude and we
not pay any amount for ?diminution in value--
will t
Covered property losses are settled as follows:
k.

3
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 4 of 25

2. Buildings and screened enclosures covered t
under Coverage A or B at replacement cost M
without deduction for depreciation, subjecl to t
the follo?ng $
t

a. If, at the time of loss, the amount of M
insurance In :his policy on the damaged
building is 80% or more of the full 1:
replacement cost of the building e
immediately before the tos&, we will pay b
the cost to repair or replace, withnnl f
deduction for depreciation, but not more k
than the least of the following amounts:

(1) The limit under this policy
of Ilabiltty t
that applies to the building;

(2) The replacement cost of that part of i
the building damaged with materiad of 1

like kind and qualityand for like use: %
or

(3) The necessary amount actually speni
to repair or replace me damaged ;,

building.
If the building is rebuilt at a new i-
premises, Ihe cost described in (2) above 6

is limited k) the cost whicn would have i
been incurred if the building had been f:
built at tne orlglnalpretnlses.

(P's Exhibit 1 at page 21 of UPCIC HO3 15 05 18).The plaintlanguage of the provisionprovides

that the most Universal will pay for damage to a buildingis the lesser of three amounts: (1) the

policylimit;(2)the replacement cost ofthe damaged portionofthe building;or (3)the "necessary

amount actually spent" to repairthe damaged portionof the building.Ud.j. Here, the lesser of

these three amounts is,at most, $5,130.00. Despite this,Plaintiffs were permittedto introduce

evidence of damages far greater than the "necessary amount actuallyspent" to conduct repairs.

This was error.

2. The PolicyDoes Not Cover Diminution In Value.

The insurance contract does not cover diminution in value. The Policy contains a definition

of diminution in value. It reads:

4
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 5 of 25

5. "Diminutionin value" means any reduction in )
3
value of any covered property prior to or i
following repair or replacement as compared
to the value of that property immediately i
before the loss.

(P'sExhibit 1 at page 4 of UPCIC HO3 15 05 18).Notably, diminution in value refers both to

repairedand unrepaired property followinga loss. Later,the Policyexplicitly
(Id.). states that

Universal will not cover diminution in value:

SECTION I - PERILS INSURED AGAINST
A. Coverage A - Dwelling And Coverage B -
Other Structures k

1. We insure against direct physical loss to ?
property described in Coverages A and B. f
However, loss does not include and we will f:
not pay for any "diminution in value".

(P'sExhibit 1 at page 14 of UPCIC HO3 15 05 18).Combining these two provisions,
the Policy

reads:

"We insure againstdirect physicalloss to property described in Coverages and B. A
However, loss does not include and we will not pay for any reduction in value of any
covered property priorto or followingrepairor replacement as compared to the value
..
of that property immediately before the loss.'

(P'sExhibit 1 at pages 4,14 of UPCIC HO3 15 05 18).The Policygoes on to reiterate the lack of

coverage for diminution in value in the Loss Settlement provisionofthe Policy:

k
D. Loss Settlement
In this Condition D., the terms cost to repair or ;
replace and replacernent cost do not include the
increased costs incurred to comply with the
enforcemenl of any ordinance or law. except to l
>

the exlent that coverage for these increased t

costs 1s provided in Additional Coverage t
11. Ordinance Or Law under Section I - Property
Coverages. Additionally, [he val?ation of any e:

covered property losses does not indude and we f
not pay any amount for diminution in value--
will
l
Covered property losses are settled as follows: 4

5
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 6 of25

(P's Exhibit 1 at page 21 of UPCIC HO3 15 05 18).Based on the foregoing,the Policy clearly

does not cover-and Plaintiffs agreed that Universal will not pay for-diminution in value.

Where an insurance policy does not cover diminution in value, an insured cannot recover

damages for diminution in value. To be clear,Florida's Supreme Court has addressed this very

issue :

As no coverage for diminished value exists under this contract of insurance, this Court
certainlycannot create coverage out ofwhole cloth. In contract interpretation cases, the
would preferthat the policy
issue to be addressed is not what this Court or the petitioner

cover, but what losses the mutually agreed-upon contractual language covers. Thus,
even if inclined to do so, we could not interpret
we were the policyin accordance with
the petitioner'sassertions. The contract of insurance before us clearlydoes not cover a
covered automobile's loss of value due to an accident. Should partiesin the petitioner's
situation wish to obtain coverage for diminishment in value due to accident,they may
either contract for the coverage initially,or urge the Legislatureto mandate coverage

through the enactment of a statute. Certainly,however, we cannot manufacture
coverage that does not exist.

Sieglev. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 732, 739-40 (Fla.2002) (internal
quotations

and citations omitted).

In Florida, breach of contract damages are measured in terms of the amount the non-

breaching party would have received had the breach not occurred minus those expenses not yet

incurred. See Gruskin v.
Holiday Pools ofBroward, Inc.,448 So. 2d 523, 523 (Fla.4th DCA 1984)

("[T]he measure of damages is the amount which the innocent party would have received if the

contract had been performed, less any deductions for expenses not yet (quotingAdams
incurred.")

v.
Dretts Interstate Development Corp.,352 So.2d 76 at 78 (Fla.4th DCA 1977).Essentially,

then, the loss to Plaintiffs from Universal's allegedbreach can only be calculated in terms of (1)

Plaintiffs' out-of-pocketlosses to conduct repairs;
plus (2) losses incurred by Plaintiffs in the sale

of the Property due to the diminished value of the asset. Universal does not cover the latter. AS

such, Plaintiffs' proffer of damages in excess of the expenses actuallyincurred to repair the

damaged Property was error.

6
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 7 of 25

ii. This Court Permitted Plaintiffs To Read The Discovery Deposition Of

Gyula Papp Into The Record.

Florida Statute §90.803(22)purports to allow use of depositionseven where witnesses are

not shown to be unavailable. However, the courts in civil cases have not embraced the statutory

provision.See Jones v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 830 So. 2d 854 (Fla.2d DCA 2002) (affirming
trial court's grant of a new trial based upon questionableadmission of depositionstaken by

in other cases).There, the
plaintiffs trial to be read into
court permitted depositiontranscripts

evidence based on the statute. Thereafter,the Florida Supreme Court refused to adopt the statute

2
as a rule o f evidence. The trial court then granted a motion for new trial and an appeal followed.

2
See, In re Amendments Florida Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339,341 (Fla. 2000) C'The
to the
Code and Rules of Evidence Committee and those who filed comments in oppositionto chapter
98-2, section number of significant
1 raise a concerns, many of which echo the concerns voiced
The reasons offered for not adopting the amendment include such
in the Governor's veto message.

things as: (1) the amendment violates a defendant's constitutional right to confront adverse
witnesses; (2) this expanded former-testimony hearsay exception would result in "trial by
deposition,"thereby precluding the fact-finder from evaluating witness credibility;
(3) the
amendment simply strips the section 90.804(2)(a) former-testimony exception of its
"unavailability" requirement,thereby making the section 90.804 exception obsolete; (4) the
amendment is inconsistent with several rules of procedure,thereby causing confusion as to which
4
rule should control; and (5)the expanded hearsayexceptionwill shift expense burdens relating to
the introduction of evidence from the proponent of the testimony to the party againstwhom the

testimonyis being offered who will have to call witnesses in order to challengethe testimony.The
majority of those who filed comments ask us to declare chapter 98-2, section 1 proceduralin
nature and refuse to adopt it because of the above listed concerns.

We agree that this Court should not adopt chapter 98-2, section 1 to the extent it may be
procedural. Our decision not to adoptthe amendment also is based on the inescapableconclusion
. .

that this amendment, which as drafted would appear to apply to both civil and criminal
proceedings,is an unacceptable change to a long-standingrule of evidence. Unlike the exceptions
to the hearsay rule which this Court adopted to the extent they were proceduralwhen the Evidence
Code was first enacted, chapter 98-2, section 1 is not based on well established law; nor is it
modeled after the Federal Rules o f Evidence. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 802.1
(2000 ed.) (statingthat hearsay exceptions contained in sections 90.803 and 90.804 generally
restate the law that existed priorto the adoptionof the Evidence Code). Moreover, we can find no
with a similarlybroad former-testimony exception to the hearsay rule. In fact,
other jurisdiction
the only former-testimonyexceptionrecognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence requiresthat the
declarant be "unavailable." See Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1);Ehrhardt, supra, § 803.22a."

7
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 8 of25

M at 855. In affirming the grant of the new trial,the Second District stated,"[i]fthere is any

constitutional applicationof a rule such as section 90.803(22), it may be in this context.

Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has refused to adopt the rule in its present form..."Jones

v. R.1 Reynolds Tobacco Co., 830 So. 2d 854, 856 (Fla.2d DCA 2002).
As must generallydemonstrate the unavailability
a rule of civil procedure,litigants of a

witness in order to read their depositionat trial. The rule reads, in pertinentpart:

(a)Use of Depositions.At the trial or upon the hearingof a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding,any part or all of a depositionmay be used againstany party who was
present or representedat the takingof the depositionor who had reasonable notice o f
it so far as admissible under the rules of evidence appliedas though the witness were

then present and testifying in accordance with any ofthe followingprovisions:...

(3) The depositionof a witness,whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; (B) that the witness is at a
greater distance than 100 miles from the place o f trial or hearing,or is out o f the state,
unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offeringthe
deposition;(C) that the witness is unable to attend or testifybecause of age, illness,
infirmity,or imprisonment; (D) that the party offeringthe depositionhas been unable
to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; (E) upon application
and notice,
thatsuch exceptionalcircumstances exist as to make it desirable,in the interest of
justiceand with due regardto the importance o f presentingthe testimony o f witnesses
orallyin open court, to allow the depositionto be used; or (F) the witness is an expert
or skilled witness.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.330.

Here, Plaintiffs requestedthat the reading ofthe discoverydepositionof Gyula Papp based

solelyon an allegedsinglefailed attempt to serve a subpoena on the third-party
witness. Generally,

it is incumbent on the party profferinga witness's depositionto adduce evidence showing his or

her rightto use it. Weber v. Berry, 133 So. 2d 327, 329 (Fla.2d DCA 1961). The ipsie dixit of

Plaintiffs' counsel that they made a singlefailed attempt to serve the witness, without more,

to procure the attendance ofthe witness
constituted insufficient proof ofthe Plaintiffs' inability by

8
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 9 of25

subpoena. See, e.g., Henderson v. Dade Cuty. Sch. Bd., 734 So. 2d 549, 550 (Fla.3d DCA 1999)

("[A]lthoughwe view the introduction ofwitness Kendra Moss's videotapeddepositionas proper

that Moss planned to attend collegeout-of-
because of statements during the depositionindicating

state see Colonnades, Inc.
(thusexplainingher non-availability), v. Vance Baldwin, 318 So.2d 515

(Fla.4th DCA 1975),the better course of action would be for the School Board to affirmatively

show that it was unable to procure Moss's attendance by subpoena.");Safeway Ins. Co. v. Saxon,

452 So. 2d 60 (Fla.3d DCA 1984) (No error in refusingto permit use of defendant's pretrial

depositionby defense after defendant failed to appear where whereabouts of defendant were

unknown at time request for use of the depositionwas made, and, although a representation
was

subsequentlymade that defendant's absence may have been occasioned by circumstances beyond

his control,no sworn motion to that effect was made.); Williams v. Johnson, 17% F.R.D. 1,6

(D.D.C. 2011) (statingthat partiesmust show reasonable diligencein effectingservice of trial

subpoenas and holding that party'smultipledocumented failed attempts to subpoena witness did

not satisfy In reDwek, 07-11757,2010
diligencerequirement); WL 4918974, at *1 (Bankr.D.N.J.
Nov. 24, 2010) On Wollins v. Omega Flex, Inc.,2010 WL 2470944, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

59182 (E.D.Pa. June 15, 2010)],the court found that the mere assertion that the witness was

unavailable by the party seeking to introduce a priordepositionunder Rule 32(a)(4)(D) was

inadequateto show the witnesses unavailability.
Id. This may be contrasted with [Thomas v. Cook

where the party seekingto introduce
County Sher#fs Dep't,588 F.3d 445,458 (7th Cir.2009)],

testimony from a former depositionsuccessfullydemonstrated a witnesses [SIC] was unavailable

two subpoenas, a show cause order,numerous phone calls,and a search by a
'

by showing [alfter

the moving party could not get the witness
privateinvestigator' into court to Thomas at
testify.

9
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
page 10 of 25

3
458-459."). The foregoing caselaw is consistent with this Court's "must
policy that the litigants

do all thingsreasonable and necessary" to secure their witnesses' attendance at trial:

IX. COIJRT POLICIES:
A. Parties must do thingsreasonable and necessary to assure the availability
all of witnesses ?
Period or to otherwise preserve witness testimony for trial as provided ?
for the entire Trial

by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Scc Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.300 &
1.460. Yee o/so Fla.
R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.545.

(TrialOrder).Plaintiffs did not profferany proof that the witness was unavailable to appear at the

trial in this matter or that they had made reasonably diligentefforts to secure the witness'

appearance. Despite this failure of proof,this Court permitted the depositionto be read into the

record. This was error.

Further, Plaintiffs profferedthat the purpose of the introduction of the testimony was to

demonstrate that Universal had hired an inexperiencedadjuster.
This Court acceptedthis argument

despitethe fact that the witness did not work for Universal, he was an independentadjusterwho

worked for Prodigy Assurance Adjusters:

23 Q And what company or companies did you work for t
$

24 as an adjuster?

25 A Only Prodigy.

(Papp Depo. at 14:23-25).Universal hired Prodigy,an experienceindependentadjustingfirm,not

The stated purpose for which the depositionwas being
Papp, an allegedlyinexperiencedadjuster.

offered was to impune the character ofUniversal. That purpose could not be achieved
essentially

3
Fla- Rule Civ. "[d]erivedfrom Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32." Fla. R. Civ. P.
P. 1.330 is

1.330 (Committee Notes).As such, reliance on federal case law in interpreting
the provisionsof
the rule is appropriate.

10
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
page 11 of 25

through the deposition,yet, the Jury was likelyleft with the impression that Papp was Universal's

hired agent. This was error.

Finally,on this issue,the Court in Friedman v. Friedman, 764 So. 2d 754 (Fla.2d DCA

2000) stated:

We hold that the admissibility of a discovery depositionof a nonparty witness as
substantive evidence continues to be governed by rule 1.330(a)(3). We reach this
has not been amended and continues
conclusion for two reasons. First,rule 1.330(a)(3)
torequirecertain prerequisitesbefore the depositionof a nonparty is admissible at trial.
Second, section 90.803(22)requiresthat "the party againstwhom the testimonyis now
offered ... had an opportunityand similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination." (Emphasis added.) An attorney taking a discovery
depositiondoes not approach the examination of a witness with the same motive as one
taking a depositionfor the purpose o f presentingtestimony at trial.

Friedman v. Friedman, 764 So. 2d 754,755 (Fla.2d DCA 2000).Here, Plaintiffs used a discovery

depositionin their adheringto Fla. R. Civ. P. Further,at the time
1.330(a)(3).

the depositionwas taken, Universal did not have a similar motive to develop testimony by cross-

examination so any resort to Fla. Stat. would be improper.
§90.803(22)as a basis for admissibility

iii. This Court Permitted Plaintiffs To Call Universal's Expert Despite

Not Being Listed On Their Witness List.

Over Universal's objection,this Court permitted Plaintiffs to call Universal's expert

witness to render an opinion during their case-in-chief,despitethe fact that the witness was not

listed on Plaintiffs' witness list. This rulingruns contrary to this Court's trial order,which only

permitswitnesses who have been properlyand timely disclosed:

6. Witness I.ists: Parties must furnish a written list containing the names and addresses of l
all witnesses intended to be called at trial in order. Such
alphabetical list must designate i

the type of wimess ("expert, rebuttai," "impeachment," or otherwise) and must be :

attached to tile Joint Pretrial Stipulation. All fact witness lists must include a brief p

descriptionof the substance and scope of the testimony to be elicited from such t
witness, All expert witness lists must designate the expert's specialties If any party 6
objects to any witness, such objection must be stated in the Joint Pretrial Stipulation, !
setting forth the grounds with specificity At trial. only those witnesses properly and f
timely disclosed will be permitted to testify

11
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
page 12 of 25

(TrialOrder). Plaintiffs' last-minute decision to call Universal's expert prevented Universal's

counsel from planningtheir defense strategy to counter the unexpected testimony.This was error.

iv. This Court Permitted Plaintiffs To Introduce Cumulative Evidence In

The Form Of Numerous Email Chains Containing The Same Emails.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7 contained Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9 contained

Plaintiffs Exhibits 8, 7, and 6. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 contained Plaintiffs' Exhibits 6-9. Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 13 contained Plaintiffs' Exhibits 6-9 andl2. Et Cetera. Simply put, Plaintiffs' was

to introduce the same exhibits multipletimes.
improperlypermitted,over Universal's objection,

This cumulative presentationof evidence was improper.

Pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code, "[r]elevant
evidence is inadmissible if its probative

value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
substantially confusion of issues,misleading

the jury, or needless presentationof cumulative evidence." § 90.403, Fla. Stat. Ann. Here,

Plaintiffs could have introduced each singleemail as a separate exhibit or introduced one email

chain with all of the emails as one exhibit. They did neither. They profferedmultipleemail chains

displayingthe exact same evidence numerous times. This proffergave undue weight, force,and

influenced the jury'sdetermination of the case. The
to the evidence. This necessarily
credibility

admission of this cumulative evidence constituted error.

v. This Court Declined To Permit Universal To Introduce The 4 Star

Services Invoices Into Evidence.

At trial,Plaintiff,Irma Qureshi, testified that she did not send Universal documents

regardingtheir prior2016 claim because Universal alreadyhad them:

12
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
Page 13 qf 25

Q. So those were sent back in 2017 but

not in response to this letter in 2020, correct?

A. Weli, I didn't send anything for

item 13 because you guys already had everything.
5&

(IG Test. at 103:11-14).This constitutes admission that Plaintiffs had a copy of the documents

from the 2016 claim, they merely decided not to give them to Universal in response to Universal's

request. She further testified that Universal provided her with the 2017 email she sent to Universal

with all of the claim documents attached to it:

Q. So you're saying from the 2016 claim i

where you had a leak, that any repairs you made,

you turned over those documents to Universal?

A. Yes, I sent in all the invoices to
§:

Universal. I actually know this because you (

forwarded our emails from 2017 to us just like a 6

few days ago and that had the attachments from
i

it. r

(IG Test. at 102:3-10).

As part of the 2016 claim, Plaintiffs hired 4 Star Services to conduct the plumbing repairs:

Q. And you hired Four Star Services for
ti
the 2016 claim to deal with the leak; does that

ring any bells?

A. Yes, yes.
a-9.'- t- ' ---- I --'u:%%%'-%% 9 '%:-"-%'/?'%?-x /?'B.%>%9'BI-9 I-'%%%%?"x ' - 'B.%:?9/ '%'?' ' % %%"B:-%-IA- ''.2'

(IG Test. The
at 1 17:7-10). 4 Star Services invoice demonstrates that duringthe priorclaim, there

was a slab leak in the master bedroom. The slab leak was stemming from a leak "on the cold water

loop in the slab going over to [SICI kitchen and bathroom." To repairthe leak,4 Star Services

13
Irnia Qureshi, et. at. v. Universal
Case No.: CACE-21-007238
page 14 of 25

"Eliminated both loops underground and ran new hot + cold lines through attic to kitchen and

bathroom. Repaired leaks on copper fittings
behind tub."

INVOICE #: 801626 E

ZJMTam
-SERVICES
DA I E:
[' ID j 11.-D #:l??11
CUSTOMER NAMEI.!,iwiri,Ilv
-) {
-

NAME
L>-
'

Case Info

Judge

Haimes, David A. Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

March 09, 2023

Case Filing Date

April 09, 2021

County

Parties

Francisco, Touron, III Attorney for the Plaintiff
Galka, Ryan Jamie Attorney for the Defendant
Guerrero, George Plaintiff
Qureshi, Irma Plaintiff
Ruiz, Amy E Attorney for the Plaintiff
Strudwick, Joshua, ESQ. Attorney for the Defendant
Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company Defendant
Lisset Trujillo Attorneys for Defendants
Steven Getman Attorney
Edilsa Ruiz Attorney
Patrick Walkington Attorney
David Noel Attorney
Kara Link Attorney
Vincent Sullivan Attorney
Antonio de Rey Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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