Motion-Secondary: Pnc Bank, National Association v. Cameron Arthur Assoc. Inc., State Of New York, City Of New York Environmental Control Board, City Of New York Parking Violations Bureau, City Of New York Transit Adjudication Bureau, John Doe, Said Name Being Fictitious, It Being The Intention Of Plaintiff To Designate Any And All Occupants Of Premises Being Foreclosed Herein, and any parties, corporations or entities, if any, having or claiming an interest or lien upon the mortgaged premises

Case Number: 24SMCV00625 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC to give notice. REASONING Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC (Plaintiff) requests judicial notice of the Deed of Trust recorded November 6, 2019, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20191198681; the Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded February 12, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210247143; and the Trustees Deed Upon Sale recorded March 3, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210348502. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). Analysis Plaintiff moves the Court for an order granting summary judgment or adjudication in its favor on the grounds that Defendants Eliyahu Marciano and Anthony Marciano (Defendants) have not paid any rent to Plaintiff since the time Plaintiff acquired and perfected its title to the property; the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 does not apply to this action or the tenancy because the more restrictive local ordinance applies instead, and Plaintiff has complied with all provisions of the local ordinance; and any contention that service of the complaint was defective is inapposite where Defendants appeared in the action and filed an answer. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) [T]he court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection) . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that it owns the premises at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard in Venice, and Defendants entered into a written fixed-term lease with Palms Blvd. Venice Beach, LLC for the period of November 30, 2020 to May 31, 2022 with monthly rent at $4,500, payable on the seventh day of each calendar month. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-8.) Plaintiff acquired title and ownership of the property following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and title was perfected on March 3, 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendants failed to pay any rent after Plaintiff acquired title to the property, and Defendants comply with the 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, which expired on January 26, 2024, a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, a second 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, or a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit. Plaintiff seeks past-due rent of $162,000 under four notices, holdover damages, and forfeiture of the agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-19.) The basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), are (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed. (Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16.) Plaintiff provides evidence that it acquired title to the subject real property at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard, Venice, California 90291 following a foreclosure sale that went forward on February 4, 2021, and Plaintiff perfected its title to the property by recording a Trustees Deed Upon Sale on March 21, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The property consists of a five-bedroom main residence with an additional guesthouse containing two additional bedrooms. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 3.) Shortly after acquiring the property, on April 7, 2021, Defendants presented Plaintiff with a copy of a residential lease purportedly entered into by Defendants and the prior owner, Palms Blvd Venice Beach, LLC (Palms, LLC). (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff states it was unaware, prior to April 7, 2021, that any lease existed for any tenants or occupants of the property. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 7.) The lease reflects that, on November 30, 2020, Defendants entered into a residential lease for the property with Palms, LLC, providing that Defendants were to pay $4,500.00 per month, beginning on November 30, 2020, payable on the seventh day of each month, for a term expiring on May 31, 2022. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has not received any rent from Defendants since acquiring title to the property on or about February 4, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 9.) On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff proceeded with a civil lawsuit against Defendants, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 21STCV16332 (HOF REO 1 LLC v. Marciano) to ascertain the validity of the lease, but Plaintiff ultimately dismissed the civil suit and concedes here that the lease is a bona fide lease between Defendants and the prior owner, Palms, LLC. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 10.) However, Plaintiff contends there was never any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants directly to occupy the property, whether in writing, oral, or otherwise. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff served a total of four separate notices to pay rent to quit as follows: (1) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, totaling $31,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) (2) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, totaling $76,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) (3) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning February 7, 2023, through November 7, 2023, totaling $45,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) (4) On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning January 7, 2024, through February 7, 2024, totaling $9,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D.) The time for Defendants to cure under each of the notices expired, and no payment was received, nor was there any attempt to make payment. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 12; Labarre Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also provides evidence that it has complied with Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09, which applies in place of Civil Code section 1946.2 because the local ordinance is more protective (see Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B; Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶¶ 3-8, Exs. A-E), and Defendants answered the complaint on March 8, 2024, thereby waiving any argument that service of the complaint was incomplete (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1014 [A defendant appears in an action when the defendant answers].) The lease agreement provided with the motion shows that Defendants entered into the lease with the prior owner, Palms, LLC, which Plaintiff does not dipsute. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. 5.) The lease agreement includes information on how to pay rent; specifically, lease payments must be made at the landlords address stated in the notices provision of the lease in paragraph 46. (Ibid.) Notably, Plaintiff provided no evidence with its initial motion that it informed Defendants of the name, telephone number, and address of the person or entity to whom rent payment must be made after Plaintiff became owner of the property, which is required under Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c). The statute states that an owner shall not serve a notice to pay rent or quit or otherwise evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent that accrued during a period of noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 (ibid.), and merely making contact with Defendants is insufficient to show compliance with the statute. The Court continued the hearing on the motion, despite Defendants nonappearance at the hearing, and required Plaintiff to show compliance with the statute. In its supplemental filing, Plaintiff provides evidence that on November 22, 2023, it served a Notice Regarding Residential Lease, which provided Defendants with Plaintiffs name, a copy of the Trustees Deed Upon Sale through which Plaintiff acquired title, provided contact information for Plaintiffs agents, included information for service of process, provided the name and address for payments to be made, and included a copy of the lease agreement. (Labarre Supplemental Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. F.) While compliance with Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c), makes it such that Defendants may be liable for unpaid rent during the earlier noncompliance period, it is axiomatic that there is a one-year ceiling on a rent demand, i.e., a three-day notice can only demand rent accrued within one year prior to its service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2).) Plaintiff states that the first notice was served on December 22, 2023, seeking rent owing from March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, which clearly exceeds the one-year limit, and the second notice, served on the same day, sought rent owing from October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, also exceeding the one-year limit. While Code of Civil Procedure section 1179.05 tolled the one-year limitations period if the landlord was prohibited by COVID-19 related authority from demanding payment of rent, Plaintiff has not alleged any such tolling under this statute or any other statute. Thus, Plaintiff has not clearly established its claim for unlawful detainer as to the first two notices, and Plaintiff has moved only for summary judgment, not adjudication. Thus, the burden does not shift to Defendants to create a triable issue of material fact. For these reasons, Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Evidentiary Objections Defendants object to certain statements within the declarations of Kevin Holliday and Olivier J. Labarre. Defendants objections are OVERRULED.

Case Number: 22TRCV00181 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: B 5901 Century Owner, LLC v. Festival Management Corporation, Case No. 22TRCV00181 Tentative Ruling: Motion in limine re Los Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant Protection Resolution This is an action by Plaintiff 5901 Century Owner, LLC against Defendant Festival Management Corporation for alleged breach of lease. The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid rent, alleged to total $673,956.32, plus interest. By this in limine motion Plaintiff seeks to preclude the introduction of evidence or argument related to the Los Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant Protections Resolution (Resolution). Plaintiff contends that under the express terms of the Resolution the matter asserted by the Defendant is an affirmative defense which has not been pleaded, and is thus waived. (The Court grants judicial notice of the January 24, 2023 Resolution of the Board of Supervisors and the June 10, 2022 Revised Guidelines to Aid in the Implementation of Los Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant Protections.) The Resolution provides an affirmative defense to Evictions (Section VI) and in the Remedies article (Section XI). Article VI.A.1. relates to evictions for nonpayment of rent. It provides: Nonpayment of Rent . During the time periods set forth below, a Tenant may assert an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent, late charges, interest, or any other fees accrued if the Tenant demonstrates an inability to pay rent and/or such related charges due to Financial Impacts Related to COVID-19 and the Tenant has provided notice to the Landlord within seven (7) days after the date that rent and/or such related charges were due, unless extenuating circumstances exist that the Tenant is unable to pay. The affirmative defense provided under this Paragraph is described in Section C of Paragraph XI, below . FOR COMMERCIAL TENANTS, THERE SHALL BE NO FURTHER EVICTION PROTECTIONS AFTER JANUARY 31, 2022. (Bold added.) Article XI.C. states: C. Affirmative Defense . Effective March 4, 2020, any Protections , including the Protection pertaining to Personal Guarantees for commercial rental debt, provided under this Resolution shall constitute an affirmative defense for a Tenant in any unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, as amended, and any other civil action seeking repossession and repayment of rental debt. The Tenant shall have the burden to prove the basis of their affirmative defense, including the merit of any self-certification of a Financial Impact Related to COVID-19 made pursuant to this Resolution . Said affirmative defenses shall survive the termination or expiration of these Protections. (Bold added.) Defendant failed to assert the Resolution as an affirmative defense at any time in this proceeding. Defendant makes a number of arguments claiming that it is entitled to introduce evidence of the Resolution created affirmative defense and related facts. First, Defendant claims that the Central Issue of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is the Effect of the Resolution on the Partys Rights. In essence, Defendant contends that since the Second Amended Complaint alleges the existence of the City and County COVID ordinances that therefore the affirmative defense issue was tendered by Plaintiff. The Court disagrees. The fact that the Plaintiff alleged that Defendant remained legally obligated to pay rent, but could not be evicted for a period of time (Complaint ¶ 11) did not relieve the Defendant of an obligation to plead its Resolution based affirmative defense. Nor does the fact that Plaintiff pleaded the existence of the March 2020 and September 2020 County resolutions (Complaint ¶ 12, 13) relieve the Defendant of an obligation to assert any claimed affirmative defense arising under either of those resolutions. Afterall, the affirmative defense is dependent upon proving certain facts to establish the defense. (Article VI.) Not all commercial entities were entitled to a defense. The Court notes that paragraph 14 alleges: Plaintiff does not know if Festival is entitled to the protections of the Resolution since it does not know if Festival was unable to pay rent incurred during the Moratorium due to Financial Impacts Related to Covid-19 as set forth in the Resolution . In an abundance of caution, however, Plaintiff proceeds as if Festival was entitled to such protections. This allegation reveals that Plaintiff is not asserting facts that constitute the affirmative defense. The mention of the resolutions did not relieve Defendant of its obligation to assert any defenses it might have, including an affirmative defense arising under the Resolution. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiff added surplusage to the Second Amended Complaint does not relieve Defendant of its obligation to plead its Resolution based affirmative defense. Second, Defendant alleges that its general denial was sufficient to constitute the affirmative defense provided by the Resolution. Defendant cites no case authority for such a proposition. Nor does such a general denial of the material allegations give rise to the affirmative defense claimed by Defendant. This is particularly true here, as the Plaintiff expressly alleged in paragraph 14 that it was not aware of whether or not Defendant was entitled to the protections of the Resolution. Further, establishing the affirmative defense is dependent upon alleging and ultimately proving additional facts such as the financial impact of COVID-19. Paragraph 14 made clear that it was incumbent upon the Defendant to make such claimed defense known. Defendant did not make any assertion that the affirmative defense applied. Third, Defendant asserts that it is not required to plead the Resolution provided affirmative defense, as the Resolution allows a tenant to plead an affirmative defense. (A tenant& may assert an affirmative defense&) The Court disagrees with this argument. The granting to the tenant of an affirmative defense that may be asserted does not mean that the affirmative defense need not be pleaded like every other affirmative defense expressly and affirmatively. The suggestion by Defendant that the affirmative defense was already in the case by virtue of Plaintiffs description of some of the provisions of the COVID ordinances and resolutions is wrong. (See discussion above.) Finally, Defendant suggests that the affirmative defenses it did plead were adequate to raise the issue of the Resolution affirmative defense. The Court disagrees. The Seventh Affirmative Defense states: As a separate and distinct affirmative defense to each of plaintiffs causes of action and, while denying each of the allegations contained therein, this answering defendant asserts that, by virtue of the acts or omissions of the plaintiff, it has been excused from performing under the subject matter lease. This cannot reasonably be understood to allege that the Resolution based defense was being asserted. Defendant claims that its Eleventh Affirmative Defense arises under the Resolution. As a separate and distinct affirmative defense to each of plaintiffs causes of action and, while denying each of the allegations contained therein, this answering defendant asserts that plaintiffs damages, if any, should be reduced, eliminated, and/or offset by the amount of damages suffered by defendant attributable to any wrongful acts and omissions of Plaintiff. That also fails to give anyone notice that the affirmative defense was based on the Resolution. Defendant asserts that the Twelfth Cause of Action preserved this defense. As a separate and distinct affirmative defense to each of plaintiffs causes of action and, while denying each of the allegations contained therein, this answering defendant asserts that by virtue of plaintiffs unlawful, immoral, careless, negligent and other wrongful conduct, plaintiff is barred from recovery from defendant under the equitable doctrines of unclean hands and of in pari delicto . This is not an assertion of the Resolution as an affirmative defense. The Court GRANTS the motion in limine . No evidence of the Resolution shall be introduced.

Set for Discovery on Thursday, July 11, 2024 Line 1, PLAINTIFF STEPHEN SCHNEIDER'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF STEPHEN SCHNEIDER'S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND MONETARY SANCTIONS. (see notes). Continued to July 30, 2024. No JPT available. =(302/JPT)

Case Number: 24STCV07725 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING OYEKUNLE JEGEDE , vs. 90018 COLLECTION LLC, et al. Case No.: 24STCV07725 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Moving Defendant 90018 Collection LLC s demurrer to pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle Jegedes complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Defendant 90018 Collection LLCs motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs complaint is denied as moot. Defendant 90018 Collection LLC (90018 Collection) (Moving Defendant) demurs to the Complaint and each cause of action in pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle J egede s (Jegede) (Plaintiff) complaint (Complaint) on the grounds Plaintiffs Complaint and each cause of action fails to state facts on which relief may be granted and is uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).) Moving Defendant also filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs Complaint. (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §436(b).) Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.) The demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).) Moving Defendants counsel submitted a meet and confer declaration stating that she met and conferred with Plaintiff telephonically on May 21, 2024. ( See Decl. of Windler ¶2.) Moving Defendants counsel declares she explained to Plaintiff the defects in the complaint and the parties were not able to come to an agreement on the pleadings. ( See Decl. of Windler ¶2.) Accordingly, the Court will consider Moving Defendants demurrer. Background Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint on March 27, 2024, against Defendant and Non-moving Defendants Winston Cenac, Trustee of the Island Boy Trust (Cenac), Shelby Ring (Ring), the Law Offices of Rebecca Hufford-Cohen (Law Offices), and On Time (On Time) (collectively, Defendants) alleging four causes of action: (1) illegal eviction; (2) illegal theft; (3) discrimination; and (4) fraud. Plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2023, he was a tenant at 238 1⁄2 Market Street, Venice, CA 90291 , and was subjected to an eviction by Moving Defendant. (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges on November 28, 2021, property valued at over $150,000.00 was removed without his consent, and this occurred two weeks after the alleged eviction. (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges he fulfilled all payments by July 24, 2023, as outlined in a stipulation agreement with Cenac. (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges Cenac filed an ex parte that alleged non-payment and included a misleading hearing notice that led to an erroneous judgment. (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges he uncovered the use of Moving Defendants improper use of documentation for the eviction. (Complaint ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy involving Cenac, Law Office, and On Time. (Complaint ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges On Time participated in the enforcement of the eviction and the confiscation of Plaintiffs property. (Complaint ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges that following the eviction, Moving Defendant and Jason Pennington, Ring, and On Time initiated major reconstruction without permits from the Los Angeles Housing Authority and displaced Plaintiff and violated the health rights of tenants. (Complaint ¶4.) Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer and accompanying motion to strike on May 21, 2024. Plaintiff filed his oppositions on July 5, 2024. Moving Defendant filed its replies on July 8, 2024. A. Demurrer Summary of Demurrer Moving Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that the entire Complaint and each cause of action alleged therein fails to state facts on which relief may be granted and is uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 2-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).) Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Failure to State a Claim Illegal Eviction (1st COA) California recognizes the tort of wrongful eviction. ( See Barkett v. Brucato (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 264, 275.) An essential element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the premises. [Citations.] ( Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 900.) The elements of a cause of action in tort for wrongful eviction are (1) the tenant has property rights and privileges with regard to the use or enjoyment that has been interfered with; (2) there has been a substantial invasion of those rights or privileges; (3) the conduct of the landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenants rights or privileges ; and (4) the invasion is intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct . ( Tooke v. Allen (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 230, 237.) Plaintiff fails to allege Moving Defendant is the landlord of 238 1⁄2 Market Street, Venice, CA 90291, factual allegations that Moving Defendant substantially invaded his rights as a tenant, that Moving Defendants as the landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenants rights or privileges, and that Moving Defendants invasion was intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct. Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Illegal Theft (2nd COA) Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendants conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. ( Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 354 P.3d 334].) To prove a cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff must show the defendant acted intentionally to wrongfully dispose of the property of another. ( Duke v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 490, 508.) [C]onversion is a strict liability tort. It does not require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession. ( Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1158.) Plaintiff fails to identify the property valued at over $150,000.00 that was removed without his consent. ( See Complaint ¶1.) Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs 2nd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Discrimination (3rd COA) The elements of the cause of action for housing discrimination are: (1) Plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) applied for and was qualified for a housing accommodation; (3) was denied a housing accommodation; and (4) circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive, such as similarly situated individuals applied for and obtained housing. ( Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 896, 902 .) Plaintiff fails to allege the protected class he belongs to for which Moving Defendant based its impermissible decision to deny Plaintiffs application for a housing accommodation. Plaintiff fails to allege he applied for and was qualified for a housing accommodation. Plaintiff fails to allege circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege he filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) against Moving Defendant prior to filing the instant action. ( See Govt. Code §12980(h).) Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to the 3rd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Fraud (4th COA) A complaint for fraud must allege the following elements: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages . ( Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816 [combining misrepresentation and scienter as a single element].) Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading. ( Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.) Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations. ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made . ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645; West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.) Plaintiff fails to allege a knowingly false representation by the defendant, an intent to deceive or induce reliance, and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made. Accordingly, Moving Defendants demurrer to the 4th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. B. Motion to Strike In light of the Courts ruling on Moving Defendants demurrer, Moving Defendants motion to strike is denied as moot. Conclusion Moving Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action. Moving Defendants motion to strike is denied as moot. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

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Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 12, 2024 line 4. DEFENDANT LAURENCE MANAGEMENT DEMURRER to COMPLAINT is OFF CALENDAR per June 21, 2024 order striking the filing of the Demurrer. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23STCV07444 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Nicole Management, LLC v. B-Side Group, LLC CASE NO.: 23STCV07444 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS-COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Nicole Management, LLC CASE HISTORY : · 04/03/23: Complaint filed. · 10/17/23: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an action for breach of a rental contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay rent on a commercial lease agreement. Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. DISCUSSION: Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. // Legal Standard Parties generally must file a cross-complaint against the party who filed the complaint before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50(a).) However, parties seeking to file untimely compulsory cross-complaints may file with the Court for leave to do so, even though the failure to timely file resulted from oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.) In such a case, after notice to the adverse party, the Court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint if the party acted in good faith. This section is liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. ( Id .) The purpose of the compulsory cross-complaint statute is to prevent piecemeal litigation. ( Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 959.) Compulsory cross-complaints consist of those causes of action existing at the time of service of the answer that the defendant must bring against the plaintiff, or else forfeit the right to bring them in any other action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30(a).) Specifically, compulsory cross-complaints consist of the causes of action that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10(c).) To avoid piecemeal litigation, courts liberally construe the term transactionit is not confined to a single, isolated act or occurrence . . . but may embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated. ( Align Technology , supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 960.) Thus, a motion to file a compulsory cross-complaint at any time during the action must be granted where forfeiture would otherwise result, unless the moving party engaged in bad faith conduct. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99.) The determination that the moving party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid.; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902 [We conclude that this principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section].) Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith. ( Silver Organizations Ltd, supra , 217 Cal.App.3d at 99 ) Rather, bad faith is defined as [t]he opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . . , but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. ( Id. at 100.) Whether Claims are Compulsory Defendants seek leave to file a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and new parties Masoud and Ramin Omrany alleging fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and related claims arising from the same rental agreement that is the basis of the original Complaint in this action. (Declaration of Rachel A. Baker ISO Mot. Exh. A.) Defendants counsel states that the proposed cross-complaint is substantively identical to the October 17, 2023 Cross-Complaint stricken by the Court. (Baker Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that B-Side is not entitled to pursue a cross-complaint in this action and that Defendants have not explained what discovery gave rise to their crossclaims. Neither argument is persuasive. First, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, B-Side Group is not named as a party on the proposed Cross-Complaint. (Baker Decl. Exh.1.) Second, no explanation of the facts giving rise to the crossclaim is required in the context of a compulsory cross-complaint. Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith with substantial evidence, the Court is obliged to grant a motion for leave to file an untimely cross-complaint. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902.) Plaintiff has made no such affirmative showing. Defendants motion must therefore be granted, as the proposed crossclaims are compulsory on their face. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. Moving Parties to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 10, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 24STCV10041 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Spring Towers, LLC, Plaintiff, Case No.: 24STCV10041 vs. Tentative Ruling Jacob Carlson, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Motion to Quash Service of Summons Moving Party : Defendant Jacob Carlson Responding Party : Plaintiff Spring Towers, LLC T/R : THE MOTION IS DENIED. PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. DEFENDANT TO FILE AN ANSWER WITHIN 5 DAYS. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers and opposition. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Spring Towers, LLC filed this unlawful detainer action against Defendant Jacob Carlson on April 22, 2024. On May 28, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs application to serve the summons and complaint by posting it at the subject premises and mailing it to the same address. Plaintiff later attested that it effected service by posting on June 5, 2024. On June 18, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to quash service, claiming Plaintiff failed to serve the summons and complaint in the manner required by the Code of Civil Procedure. ANALYSIS A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process. ( Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) Compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. ( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) The filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper, but only if the proof of service satisfies relevant statutory requirements. ( Id. , at 1441-1442.) A summons in an action for unlawful detainer of real property may be served by posting if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served ... other than [by] publication and that certain other requirements are satisfied. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.45(a).) The Court granted Plaintiffs application to serve by posting. The Court found that Plaintiff had shown reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Defendant by other means. If publication is ordered, [t]he court shall order the summons to be posted on the premises in a manner most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served and direct that a copy of the summons and of the complaint be forthwith mailed by certified mail to such party at his last known address. ( Id. , subd. (b).) Defendant concedes he received the summons and complaint in the mail, but he argues Plaintiff did not post it on the premises as required. Defendant declares: I never found a copy of the summons and complaint at the premises. No[ ]one has appeared at my home in an attempt to serve me with anything. (Carlson Decl., 1:11-13.) Plaintiffs proof of service, accompanied by the declaration of a registered process server, establishes a presumption that service was properly effected. (Evid. Code § 647; Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.) Defendant cannot rebut this presumption by denying knowledge of service; he must offer some affirmative evidence that service did not take place in the manner Plaintiff claims. (See Louis & Diederich, Inc. v. Cambridge European Imports, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 1574, 1591 [no finding can be predicated on the absence of evidence].) Defendant has not rebutted the sworn statement by Plaintiffs process server in the proof of service. Defendants motion is denied.