Preview
Electronically Filed
7/9/2020 7:03 PM
Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
CAUSE NO. C-2 1 90-20-B
CHRISTOPHER DE LEON D/B/A IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DE LEON AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
PROFESSIONAL,
Plaintifif
OOOWDOODOOOWDOmOOOWDOODOOO
vs. 93rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CITY 0F WESLACO and WESLACO
MID VALLEY AIRPORT,
Defendants. HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS
PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff Christopher De Leon d/b/a “De Leon Aircraft Maintenance” (“Plaintiff De
Leon”), by and through his undersigned counsel, files his brief in support of Plaintiffs’ Request
for Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction and states as follows:
Procedural Historv
On June 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff” s Original Petition, Application for Temporary
Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction and Permanent Injunction.” On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff”
De Leon’s EX-Parte Temporary Restraining Order was signed, and a hearing 0n Plaintiff” s Request
for Temporary Injunction was set for July 10, 2020 at 8:30 a.m. PlaintiffDe Leon paid the required
$100.00 TRO bond on July 1, 2020. Plaintiff De Leon now files this brief in support ofhis request
for temporary injunction.
Summarv 0f Facts
Plaintiff De Leon owns and operates “De Leon Aircraft Maintenance Professional” and has
been in business since 2013. Plaintiff De Leon is in the business of providing mechanical aviation
work consisting 0f repairs, maintenance and other restorative services. Plaintiff De Leon is the
holder 0f both a TSA badge issued in year 2015 and a TWIC card issued in 2015. Additionally, he
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Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
has been certified as an inspector through the FAA. Said licenses and permits allow Plaintiff De
Leon access to any airport, seaport or port of entry in the United States.
In connection with his business, 0n 0r about June 5, 2018, Plaintiff De Leon entered into a
lease agreement with Defendants for the lease 0f 3,600 square feet (W6) of land, measuring 60
feet X 60 feet, at the Weslaco Mid Valley Airport (“W6 Lease Agreement”). See Exhibit A.
Plaintiff De Leon is the Lessee under the W6 Lease Agreement and Defendant City of Weslaco is
the Lessor. Plaintiff De Leon entered into a separate agreement for the purchase 0f the hangar
building located 0n the property designated as W6 With Seller Harold Cain d/b/a Mid Valley
Aviation. See Exhibit B. Plaintiff De Leon purchased hangar W6 With the intention 0f operating
his business. Then, on 0r about February 15, 2019, Plaintiff De Leon leased hangar W32 from
Michael Ray Poindexter. See Exhibit C. T0 date, Plaintiff De Leon utilizes hangar W6 t0 perform
repairs, maintenance and other restorative services on small airplanes and hangar W32 for storage
purposes.
On or about April 20, 2020, Plaintiff De Leon was working in hangar W6 when he noticed
a fuselage on his property had been broken into. Plaintiff De Leon reported the theft on April 21,
2020. Detective Christopher Ramirez began his investigation 0f the theft and named both Plaintiff
De Leon and Plaintiff De Leon’s airport hangar neighbor, Russell Remy, as possible suspects. On
April 25, 2020, both Plaintiff De Leon and Russell Remy accessed their hangars. Plaintiff De
Leon never received written or verbal notice that he was prohibited from entering the airport.
Nonetheless, the airport manager, Andrew Munoz filed criminal trespass charges against Plaintiff
De Leon and was arrested 0n May 5, 2020. Airport personnel did not permit Plaintiff De Leon to
access his hangars thereafter.
Then, in early June 2020, Plaintiff received correspondence from Defendant’s city
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Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
attorney. See Exhibit D. The correspondence indicates that Plaintif “violated the exclusion order”
given by Mr. Andrew Munoz. Id. It further stated that the Defendant City 0f Weslaco would be
instituting a forcible detainer suit against Plaintiff immediately if Plaintiff failed to vacate the
premises. The letter provided that the Lease Agreement is “hereby terminated pursuant t0 the
Airport Rules and Regulations” but fails t0 reference the specific rule/regulation 0n which the City
of Weslaco was relying. Id. This notice was given to Plaintiff De Leon in person and was not
delivered pursuant to terms of Lease Agreement. See Exhibit E. Plaintiff De Leon was kept out of
the airport from that point thereafter Without getting direction 0n What t0 d0 0r Who t0 speak t0
regarding his access to hangars.
T0 date, Defendants continue t0 deny Plaintiff De Leon full access to his hangars such that
his business interests have been affected. See Exhibit G and Exhibit H. Plaintiff De Leon’s access
to his hangars is sometimes granted but Plaintiff De Leon is followed, supervised and monitored.
Id. Airport officials have advised Plaintiff De Leon that he is only able t0 access the premises
When someone from the airport is able to supervise, monitor his actions. 1d.
Plaintiff has not been given the opportunity to perform the outstanding work for each 0f
the eight (8) aircraft currently held in his hangars. Id. Some of the aircraft belong to Plaintiff by
operation 0f law as a result 0f the fact that Plaintiff was never paid and holds a mechanics’ lien t0
said aircraft. See Exhibit I. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has been effectively been deprived 0f this
personal property by Defendants’ actions/omissions and have caused Plaintiff t0 lose out 0n
thousands of dollars of expected profits from customers who had entrusted him with their aircraft.
See Exhibit J, Exhibit K and Exhibit L.
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Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
The W6 Lease Agreement provides in relevant part:
Section 4. Use ofLease Premises
A) Lessee and Lessee ’s associates shall comply at all times, at Lessee ’s sole cost, with any
and all laws and regulation that are applicable t0 Lessee ’s use, occupancy, 0r operations
at the leasepremises 0r l‘heAirport, which include, but are not limited t0, all laws, statutes,
ordinances, regulations, rules, orders, writs, judgements, decrees, injunctions, directives,
common law and otherpronouncements 0f
rulings, guidelines, standards, codes, policies,
any kind having law
efi’ect
0f including, but not limited, t0 the Airport Rules and
Regulations, City 0f Weslaco masterplans and zoning codes, and all laws and regulations
pertaining t0 the environment, any and all plans and programs developed in compliance
with such requirements and all lawful, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory airportpolicies
and other requirements.
Section 6. Termination
A) This contract agreement may be prematurely terminated by Lessor 0r Lessee if either
fails t0 abide by the terms and conditions express herein and due the complainant and so
decreed by a court Ofcompetentjurisdiction.
Section I3. Notice Requirements
A) This Agreement has specific and strict notice requirements...
All notices between the Lessor and Lessee Shall be sent t0 the following addresses for
Lessor in paragraph B andfor Lesseein paragraph C. All notices shall be sent regular
mail and certified mail return receipt...
Venuefor any action arising out ofor related t0 this Agreement 0r actions contemplated
hereby may be brought in the District Courtfor the State ofTexas sitting in Hidalgo Count,
Texas.
Request for Extension 0f Temporary Restraining Order and
Request for Temporarv Iniunction
In order t0 obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific
elements: (1) a cause 0f action against the Defendant; (2) a probable right t0 the relief sought; and
(3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor, 84 S.W.3d
198, 204 (Tex. 2002).
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Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
a. Cause ofAcz‘ion Against Defendants
In order to prevail 0n a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) the
existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach
of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result 0f the
breach." Valera Mktg. & Supply C0. v. Kalama Int’l, LLC, 51 S.W.3d 345, 351 (TeX.App.-Houston
[lst Dist] 2001, no pet); see also Bridgman v. Array Sys. Corp, 325 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir.2003).
Plaintiff De Leon has established each 0f the elements 0f its claim for breach 0f contract.
As t0 element (1), Plaintiff De Leon has attached Exhibit A herein, which includes the valid
contract by and between Plaintiff De Leon and Defendant. As to element (2), Plaintiff De Leon
has performed as required by the underlying contract. Specifically, Plaintiff De Leon has made all
payments associated With his lease, he is not a holdover tenant, he has abided by all rules and
regulations, he has not subleased and he has kept his working area clear as required by the
underlying lease contract. As t0 element (3) Defendants have breached the following provisions
of the lease agreement in question:
Section 4. Use ofLease Premises
A) Lessee and Lessee ’s associates shall comply at all times, at Lessee ’s sole cost, with any
and all laws and regulation that are applicable t0 Lessee ’s use, occupancy, 0r operations
at the leasepremises 0r theAirport, which include, but are not limited t0, all laws, statutes,
ordinances, regulations, rules, orders, writs, judgements, decrees, injunctions, directives,
rulings, guidelines, standards, codes, policies, common law and otherpronouncements 0f
any kind having effect 0f law including, but not limited, t0 the Airport Rules and
Regulations, City 0f Weslaco masterplans and zoning codes, and all laws and regulations
pertaining t0 the environment, any and all plans and programs developed in compliance
with such requirements and all lawful, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory airportpolicies
and other requirements.
Section 6. Termination
A) This contract agreement may be prematurely terminated by Lessor 0r Lessee if either
by the terms and conditions express herein and due the complainant and so
fails t0 abide
decreed by a court Ofcompetentjurisdiction.
Electronically Filed
7/9/2020 7:03 PM
Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
Section 13. Notice Requirements
A) This Agreement has specific and strict notice requirements...
All notices between the Lessor and Lessee shall be sent t0 the following addresses for
Lessor in paragraph B andfor Lessee in paragraph C. All notices Shall be sent regular
mail and certified mail return receipt...
Venuefor any action arising out ofor related t0 this Agreement 0r actions contemplated
hereby may be brought in the District Courtfor the State ofTexas sitting in Hidalgo Count,
Texas.
Finally, as to element (4), Plaintiff De Leon has sustained damages t0 his person and to his
business. The temporary injunction sought by Plaintiff De Leon should be granted for the
remainder 0f this litigation since Plaintiff De Leon has demonstrated a valid cause 0f action against
Defendants.
b. Probable Right t0 ReliefSought
In order t0 show a probable right 0f recovery, an applicant need not establish that it Will
finally prevail in the litigation, rather, it must only present some evidence that, under the applicable
rules oflaw, tends to support its cause ofaction. Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 5 15, 348 S.W.2d 5 17,
519 (TeX.1961); Butnaru v. Ford Motor C0., 84 S.W.3d 198, 21 1, (TeX. 2002); IAC, Ltd. v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Ina, 160 S.W.3d 191, 197 (Tex. App.—F0rt Worth 2005, n0 pet). T0
establish a probable right of recovery, a party need not prove conclusively that it Will prevail 0n
the merits; instead, it need only show that a bona fide issue exists as to its right to ultimate relief.
Gatlin v. GXG, Ina, N0. 05-93-01852-CV, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 4047 (TeX.App.—Da11as April
19, 1994, n0 pet), 183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF Joint Venture, 765 S.W.2d 901, 904
(TeX.App.—Austin 1989, writ dism’d), Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348 S.W.2d 517, 519
(1961).
Plaintiff De Leon’s application for temporary restraining order, 0n its face, shows that
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Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
Plaintiff De Leon has a probable right t0 relief t0 the request sought. Specifically, Plaintiff De
Leon never got notice that he was not to be 0n airport premises before his arrest, he never received
formal notice 0f Defendants’ request that he vacate the premises and no formal determination was
made regarding the termination 0f the Lease Agreement by any Court 0f competent jurisdiction.
c. Probable, Imminent, and Irreparable Injury in the Interim
The final element an applicant must show is a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury
if the temporary injunction is denied. Lightning Oil C0. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520
S.W.3d 39 (TeX. 2017); IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Ina, 160 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2005, n0 pet). Injunctive relief requires the plaintiff t0 prove the defendant has
attempted 0r intends t0 harm the plaintiff in the future. Morris v. Collins, 881 S.W.2d 138, 140
(Tex. App.—Houston [1“ Dist] 1994, writ denied.
“Imminent” means that the injury is relatively certain to occur rather than being remote
and speculative. Limon v. State, 947 S.W.2d 620, 625 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, n0 writ); City 0f
Arlington v. City ofForth Worth, 873 S.W.2d 765, 768-69 (Tex. App.—F0rt Worth 1994, writ
deism’s w.0.j.). The issue is not What harm a plaintiff would incur without the ultimate relief
requested in the suit, but rather, it is the harm plaintiff would sustain in the interim Without
temporary injunctive relief. Mejerle v. Brookhollow Ofifice Prod. Ina, 666 S.W.2d 192, 193 (TeX.
App.—Dallas 1983, no writ).
There is no adequate remedy at law if the damages cannot be calculated 0r the damages
cannot be measured by a certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru v. Ford Motor C0., 84 S.W.3d 198,
204 (Tex. 2002).
Here, Plaintiff De Leon has demonstrated that he Will suffer and is currently suffering
probable, imminent, or irreparable injury without injunctive relief. Plaintiff De Leon has provided
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Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
the following evidence showing the injury is imminent:
Exhibit I — Aircraft N8 1 705 Lien
Exhibit J — Peter Murphy Text Message Requesting Aircraft
Exhibit K — Seth Dapaah Piper Arrow Text Messages Requesting Aircraft
Exhibit L — Text Message Regarding Cessna 182 and Requesting Aircraft
The temporary injunction sought by Plaintiff De Leon should be granted because Plaintiff
De Leon has established all the elements 0f the injunctive relief sought.
Prayer
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff De Leon prays that this Court grant
Plaintiff De Leon’s Request for a Temporary Injunction and for such other and further relief to
Which Plaintiff De Leon may be entitled, either at law 0r in equity.
Respectfully submitted,
DE LA GARZA LAW FIRM
By: /S/ Rafael de la Garza
Rafael de 1a Garza
State Bar No. 24076343
4919 South Jackson Rd.
Edinburg, Texas 78539
Telephone: (956) 533-1426
Fax: (956) 284-05 1 8
E-mail: rdlglaw@gmail.com
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Hidalgo County District Clerks
Reviewed By: Alessandra Galvan
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Rafael de 1a Garza, hereby certify that on July 9, 2020, a true and correct copy 0f the
above and foregoing instrument was forwarded t0 the following attorneys 0f record:
VIA E-MAIL: rsandoval@rofllp.c0m
Rose Conrad-Sandoval
Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, LLP
10225 N. 10th St.
McAllen, Texas 78504
(956) 393-6300
(956) 386-1625
DE LA GARZA
/S/ RAFAEL
RAFAEL DE LA GARZA