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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
CIVIL
TENTATIVE RULINGS - October 15, 2020
EVENT DATE: 10/16/2020 EVENT TIME: 03:00:00 PM DEPT.: 41
JUDICIAL OFFICER:
CASE NO.: 34-2017-00210560-CU-OE-GDS
CASE TITLE: SPEARS VS. HEALTH NET OF CALIFORNIA INC
CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment
EVENT TYPE: Motion - Other - Complex
CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion to Strike, 03/06/2020
The following shall constitute the Court's tentative ruling on the above matter to be heard in Department
41, on Friday October 16, 2020, at 3:00 p.m. This tentative ruling shall become the final ruling of the
Court unless a party wishing to be heard so advises the clerk of Department 41 no later than 4:00 p.m.
on the court day preceding the hearing, and further advises the clerk that such party has notified the
other side of its intention to appear.
The Court remains closed to personal access for civil proceedings of this nature by order of the
Presiding Judge in light of the continuing pandemic health restrictions. Thus, if a hearing is requested, it
will be conducted remotely through the Zoom application and live-streamed on the court's YouTube
page. A link to the court's YouTube page is available on the Sacramento County Superior Court's public
website. Once a hearing is requested, refer to the Zoom instructions at the end of this tentative.
Defendant, HEALTH NET OF CALIFORNIA, INC. ("HNCA"), moves the Court for an order striking
Plaintiff ANDREA SPEARS' ("Spears") representative claims asserted by her in the Consolidated
Complaint filed December 21, 2017, under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA, Lab. Code §2698
et seq.). The motion is denied as set forth below.
Spears' PAGA Notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the "LWDA"), stated that she
sought PAGA penalties for the following three claims: (1) failure to include "nondiscretionary incentive"
payments such as "health benefits cash out options" in her regular rate of pay; (2) failure to provide
employees with on-time meal periods, as well as failure to provide employees with second meal periods
when required; and (3) failure to timely provide employees with ten-minute rest periods.' Based on these
claims, Spears also asserted derivative claims for (1) failure to provide employees with accurate wage
statements; and (2) failure to timely pay employees for all wages due following termination
HNCA argues that Spears' PAGA claim alleging a regular rate violation now takes the form of the
"Miscalculation Class" referenced in the trial plan. That claim contends that HNCA miscalculated the
regular rate of pay by failing to include "MedFlxWave" payments, "DenFlxWave" payments, SPOT
Awards, ACA Incentive Payments, and Wellness Incentive Payments in the regular rate. HNCA
complains that none of these payments were mentioned in Spears' LWDA Notice, and that the Notice
instead presented an entirely different theory of liability. As a consequence, HNCA argues that "the
current iteration" of this miscalculation claim has never been administratively exhausted with the LWDA.
Moreover, HNCA contends that trial of the Miscalculation Claim would present serious manageability
challenges for the Court.
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CASE TITLE: SPEARS VS. HEALTH NET OF CASE NUMBER: 34-2017-00210560-CU-OE-GDS
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As to Spears' "Meal Period PAGA Claim," she contends that HNCA failed to advise its employees to use
the "DTO" payroll code for meal periods, "result[ing] in numerous unpaid meal period claims." HNCA
argues that this theory of liability does not appear in Spears' LWDA Notice, and is actually contrary to
Spears' prior meal period theory. As a result, HCNA argues that the Court should strike Spears' meal
period claim, both under the doctrine of judicial estoppel and for failure to exhaust with the LWDA. HCNA
also argues that Spears' meal period claim is deficient because it cannot be proven uniformly as to all
allegedly aggrieved employees, and therefore poses insurmountable manageability problems for trial.
Although HNCA's notice of motion does not expressly move to strike an "Off the Clock" PAGA claim by
Spears, the motion does note in a footnote that Spears' LWDA Notice contained no allegation that she or
any other aggrieved employee performed work off the clock. In that light, HNCA's points and authorities
simply argue that since Spears did not make an "Off the Clock" claim in her LWDA Notice, she may not
pursue such a claim now. (HNCA MPA, p. 16:4-12.)
HCNA notes that parties' joint Trial Plan contains no discussion of Spears' rest period PAGA claim, and
surmises that Spears has evidently abandoned that claim. Thus, HCNA argues the Court should strike it
as well on that ground.
Finally, because Spears' remaining PAGA claims are derivative of the claims HNCA seeks to strike,
HNCA argues the Court should strike derivative claims too.
Spears opposes HCNA's motion to strike. She first argues that the Court previously ordered that
HCNA's present motion should not be filed before the Trial Plan is reviewed and settled which has not
yet occurred. Spears also argues that she exhausted administrative remedies because her LWDA
Notice set forth sufficient facts and theories so as to fairly encompass and give notice of the substance
of her present Miscalculation, Meal Period and Off-the-Clock work claims. She also argues that case
authority allows PAGA claimants some room to expand theories of liability under stated claims. Spears
argues that her PAGA claims should not be stricken based upon class-action requirements like
manageability because PAGA claims are not subject to such procedural restrictions. And, she argues
that her claims are manageable even if the class-action restrictions did apply. Spears argues that the
Court's prior decision not to certify her meal period class claim does not result in a bar of her PAGA on
the same alleged violations. Spears' closes her opposition arguing that HCNA's motion is not procedural
proper, and contravenes the Court's prior instructions.
The Trial Presentation and Management Plan ("Trial Plan") jointly filed by Arana and his co-Plaintiff
ANDREA SPEARS on January 24, 2020, now indicates that the plaintiffs' PAGA claims are pared down
to four which are described as: (1) Miscalculation Class - derivative PAGA; (2) Off-the-Clock Class -
derivative PAGA; (3) Meal Period Premium PAGA; and (4) EMPCenter Timekeeping System Off the
Clock PAGA. Based upon the parties' points and authorities, the Court understands that as a starting
point, this motion and its analysis are therefore primarily focused on these remaining PAGA claims.
"Post-Pleading" Evidentiary Motion To Strike
The Court's initial concern with the present motion is whether it is procedurally proper and supported by
law. Whether the motion is a pleading motion, an evidentiary motion, or both, dictate the mandatory
procedures to be followed and the standard(s) to be employed by the Court in resolving the issues
raised.
HNCA argues that its present motion, fashioned as a motion to "strike", is a procedurally proper and
available tool to seek the relief it requests, i.e. the dismissal of Spears' PAGA claims. As HNCA appears
to concede, the present motion is not a motion to strike "as used during the pleading stage." (HNCA
[Spears] MPA, p. 10:10-19.) As opposed to a statutory motion to strike a pleading, HNCA describes the
present motion as a "post-pleading" motion that asks the Court "to weigh evidence and determine
whether the particular claims are susceptible to litigation on a representative basis." HNCA relies upon
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authorities where the court was assessing challenges by defendants against class action claims
preemptively attacking class certification by raising deficiencies in the various requisites for that special
form of representative litigation. HNCA also contends that its motion to strike can be heard by this Court
under its broad statutory authority to adopt procedures and processes necessary to carry out justice,
even if not expressly prescribed by law citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 128(a)(8), 187, and
Government Code section 68070. HNCA also cites Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367,
1377 for the proposition that "courts have inherent equity, supervisory and administrative powers as well
as inherent power to control litigation before them," thereby allowing them to fashion "new forms of
procedures when required to deal with the rights of the parties and to manage the caseload of the court"
out of necessity where rights would be lost or the court could not function because of the absence of a
previously established procedural rule. (HNCA [Spears] MPA, p. 10:20-28.)
The only authority cited by HNCA that appears to note a "post-pleading" motion to strike is Esparza v.
Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 47 which HNCA describes as a case affirming the trial court's
granting of a motion to strike PAGA claims because the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. The opinion
is not entirely clear as to the procedural context of the defendant's motion to strike in that long
procedurally complex case. For example, the opinion is not clear whether the motion to strike was a
"pleading" motion as opposed to an evidence weighing motion as proposed here by HNCA. And, it does
not appear that the parties disputed the "motion to strike" procedure employed in that matter in the
appellate court. In that regard, the Court does not find the case to be strong authority for the proposition
that this Court can dismiss a PAGA claim on a "motion to strike" during which it weighs evidence and
determines whether or not the plaintiff's PAGA claims are susceptible to litigation on a representative
basis.
The Court is also not persuaded that it is simply free to construct such a hybrid motion under the broad
authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 128 or the rationale of Cottle v. Superior Court simply
because this is a PAGA case, a putative representative or complex civil action. The law currently
provides several readily available procedural tools, all accompanied by their own rules, requirements,
limits, and standards that could properly bring HNCA's various challenges to Spears' PAGA claims
before the Court. Where the law already provides procedures to request an order, remedy or relief, the
Court is not encouraged to construct its own.
Here, HNCA's primary arguments are premised upon theories of judicial estoppel, failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the statute of limitations, and whether the claims may be manageably tried by
the Court. Depending upon the bases of these arguments, they can/could be raised by a proper timely
pleading motion (demurrer, MJOP, motion to strike), or by a motion for summary adjudication. However,
the law does not provide for an evidentiary motion to "strike" claims that in essence results in the
dismissal of some or all of the plaintiff's claims.
In this vein, a motion to strike that is supported by facts outside the pleadings is a "speaking motion,"
which will ordinarily be treated as a motion for summary judgment or adjudication under Code Civ. Proc.
§ 437c. (City and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1914.) A
speaking motion to strike that is treated as a motion for summary adjudication must therefore comply
with the specific provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 437c. (See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.
3d 153, 167.) Thus, such a motion to strike will be granted only if the evidence filed in support of the
motion are sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the moving party and the evidence filed in
opposition are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. (See Mediterranean Exports, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 605, 616.) A "motion to strike" that attacks a complaint on the ground that
a claim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action effectively seeks a judgment on the
pleadings and may be treated accordingly by the court. (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989)
216 Cal. App. 3d 340, 342-343.)
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that it is procedurally prevented from resolving HNCA's motion to
the extent it requires the Court to weigh evidence because the motion is not properly presented as an
evidentiary motion, like a motion for summary adjudication, and Spears has asserted the deficiency in
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her opposition. The motion is also not properly structured to resolve as a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. For these reasons, the motion is denied.
Manageability
With respect to the issue of "manageability," the Court is also not persuaded that it can "strike" a PAGA
claim on this record upon the anticipatory contention that it is not "manageable" as that concept is
employed in class action litigation.
As argued by Spears in opposition, our Supreme Court has held that class action requirements "need
not be met when an employee's representative action against an employer is seeking civil penalties
under" PAGA. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 975.) And, manageability is a class action
requirement. "In considering whether a class action is a superior device for resolving a controversy, the
manageability of individual issues is just as important as the existence of common questions uniting the
proposed class." (Duran v. U.S. National Bank Association (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 29.) The Court is not
aware of any published California authority imposing an analogous manageability requirement in PAGA
actions.
HNCA represents that "a PAGA plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that claims brought in a
representative capacity do not pose manageability problems for the Court." (HNCA [Arana] MPA,
p.15:18-21.) HNCA cites Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 559 (Williams), and describes
the opinion as "stating that a plaintiff bringing a PAGA representative action must "render trial of the
action manageable." (Id., emphasis added.) The Court's review of Williams does not find that it imposes
a mandatory "manageability" requirement on PAGA claims.
In Williams, the Supreme Court considered the scope of discovery in a representative PAGA action.
(See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 537-538.) The plaintiff alleged that his employer failed to provide
meal and rest periods and sought to pursue civil penalties for the violations in a representative PAGA
action. (Id. at pp. 538-539.) During discovery, the plaintiff sought to discover the names and contact
information for all affected employees in the state. (Id. at p. 539.) The store opposed the request as
overbroad and unduly burdensome, and the trial court agreed; it ordered the store to provide the
requested information for the single store at which the plaintiff worked. (Ibid.) The plaintiff sought writ
relief, which the appellate court denied. The Supreme Court "granted review to resolve issues of first
impression concerning the appropriate scope of discovery in a PAGA action." (Id. at p. 540.)
In the course of resolving those issues, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's reasoning that
the plaintiff's broad discovery request could be granted if he demonstrated a "uniform companywide
policy." (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 559.) The Court explained: "A uniform policy may be a
convenient or desirable way to show commonality of interest in a case where class certification is
sought, but it is not a condition for discovery, or even success, in a PAGA action, where recovery on
behalf of the state and aggrieved employees may be had for each violation, whether pursuant to a
uniform policy or not. [Citation.] This is not to say uniform policies play no role in PAGA cases; proof of a
uniform policy is one way a plaintiff might seek to render trial of the action manageable. But nothing in
PAGA or our privacy precedents suggests courts can or should condition disclosure of contact
information, which might lead to proof of a uniform or companywide policy, on prior proof of a uniform or
companywide policy." (Ibid.)
Williams does not support an assertion that a representative plaintiff in an action under PAGA must seek
to render trial of the action manageable. Williams neither considered nor held that plaintiffs in a PAGA
action must demonstrate that trial of their claims is manageable on a class-wide basis.
The Court notes that the limited federal cases addressing this issue are not in agreement, and do not
compel a different conclusion here.
While the Court does not hold that it may not exercise its authority to reasonably manage the litigation
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and the presentation of evidence at trial, it does not find that it would be appropriate to dismiss Spears'
PAGA claims on the contention that the claims cannot be manageably tried based upon the first Trial
Plan and HNCA's "motion to strike."
****
NOTICE: Given the circumstances presented by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, this hearing
will be conducted remotely via Zoom [which includes telephonic and teleconferencing options].
The Department 41 Zoom link is: https://saccourt.zoom.us/my/dept41a.
The Zoom ID is: 349 373 7884. The Zoom number is (888) 475-4499.
Any party desiring an official record shall make arrangements for reporting services not later than 4:30
p.m. on the day before the hearing with the clerk of the department where the matter will be heard and
deposit fees with the clerk prior to the hearing, but not later than the conclusion of the court session.
The fee is $30.00 for civil proceedings lasting under one hour and is $239.00 per half day. Local Rule
9.06(B) and Government Code 68086.
Event ID: 2500241 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.:
Page: 5
Preview
1 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO CIVIL TENTATIVE RULINGS - October 15, 2020 EVENT DATE: 10/16/2020 EVENT TIME: 03:00:00 PM DEPT.: 41 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 34-2017-00210560-CU-OE-GDS CASE TITLE: SPEARS VS. HEALTH NET OF CALIFORNIA INC CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Motion - Other - Complex CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion to Strike, 03/06/2020 The following shall constitute the Court's tentative ruling on the above matter to be heard in Department 41, on Friday October 16, 2020, at 3:00 p.m. This tentative ruling shall become the final ruling of the Court unless a party wishing to be heard so advises the clerk of Department 41 no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, and further advises the clerk that such party has notified the other side of its intention to appear. The Court remains closed to personal access for civil proceedings of this nature by order of the Presiding Judge in light of the continuing pandemic health restrictions. Thus, if a hearing is requested, it will be conducted remotely through the Zoom application and live-streamed on the court's YouTube page. A link to the court's YouTube page is available on the Sacramento County Superior Court's public website. Once a hearing is requested, refer to the Zoom instructions at the end of this tentative. Defendant, HEALTH NET OF CALIFORNIA, INC. ("HNCA"), moves the Court for an order striking Plaintiff ANDREA SPEARS' ("Spears") representative claims asserted by her in the Consolidated Complaint filed December 21, 2017, under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA, Lab. Code §2698 et seq.). The motion is denied as set forth below. Spears' PAGA Notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the "LWDA"), stated that she sought PAGA penalties for the following three claims: (1) failure to include "nondiscretionary incentive" payments such as "health benefits cash out options" in her regular rate of pay; (2) failure to provide employees with on-time meal periods, as well as failure to provide employees with second meal periods when required; and (3) failure to timely provide employees with ten-minute rest periods.' Based on these claims, Spears also asserted derivative claims for (1) failure to provide employees with accurate wage statements; and (2) failure to timely pay employees for all wages due following termination HNCA argues that Spears' PAGA claim alleging a regular rate violation now takes the form of the "Miscalculation Class" referenced in the trial plan. That claim contends that HNCA miscalculated the regular rate of pay by failing to include "MedFlxWave" payments, "DenFlxWave" payments, SPOT Awards, ACA Incentive Payments, and Wellness Incentive Payments in the regular rate. HNCA complains that none of these payments were mentioned in Spears' LWDA Notice, and that the Notice instead presented an entirely different theory of liability. As a consequence, HNCA argues that "the current iteration" of this miscalculation claim has never been administratively exhausted with the LWDA. Moreover, HNCA contends that trial of the Miscalculation Claim would present serious manageability challenges for the Court. Event ID: 2500241 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: Page: 1 CASE TITLE: SPEARS VS. HEALTH NET OF CASE NUMBER: 34-2017-00210560-CU-OE-GDS CALIFORNIA INC As to Spears' "Meal Period PAGA Claim," she contends that HNCA failed to advise its employees to use the "DTO" payroll code for meal periods, "result[ing] in numerous unpaid meal period claims." HNCA argues that this theory of liability does not appear in Spears' LWDA Notice, and is actually contrary to Spears' prior meal period theory. As a result, HCNA argues that the Court should strike Spears' meal period claim, both under the doctrine of judicial estoppel and for failure to exhaust with the LWDA. HCNA also argues that Spears' meal period claim is deficient because it cannot be proven uniformly as to all allegedly aggrieved employees, and therefore poses insurmountable manageability problems for trial. Although HNCA's notice of motion does not expressly move to strike an "Off the Clock" PAGA claim by Spears, the motion does note in a footnote that Spears' LWDA Notice contained no allegation that she or any other aggrieved employee performed work off the clock. In that light, HNCA's points and authorities simply argue that since Spears did not make an "Off the Clock" claim in her LWDA Notice, she may not pursue such a claim now. (HNCA MPA, p. 16:4-12.) HCNA notes that parties' joint Trial Plan contains no discussion of Spears' rest period PAGA claim, and surmises that Spears has evidently abandoned that claim. Thus, HCNA argues the Court should strike it as well on that ground. Finally, because Spears' remaining PAGA claims are derivative of the claims HNCA seeks to strike, HNCA argues the Court should strike derivative claims too. Spears opposes HCNA's motion to strike. She first argues that the Court previously ordered that HCNA's present motion should not be filed before the Trial Plan is reviewed and settled which has not yet occurred. Spears also argues that she exhausted administrative remedies because her LWDA Notice set forth sufficient facts and theories so as to fairly encompass and give notice of the substance of her present Miscalculation, Meal Period and Off-the-Clock work claims. She also argues that case authority allows PAGA claimants some room to expand theories of liability under stated claims. Spears argues that her PAGA claims should not be stricken based upon class-action requirements like manageability because PAGA claims are not subject to such procedural restrictions. And, she argues that her claims are manageable even if the class-action restrictions did apply. Spears argues that the Court's prior decision not to certify her meal period class claim does not result in a bar of her PAGA on the same alleged violations. Spears' closes her opposition arguing that HCNA's motion is not procedural proper, and contravenes the Court's prior instructions. The Trial Presentation and Management Plan ("Trial Plan") jointly filed by Arana and his co-Plaintiff ANDREA SPEARS on January 24, 2020, now indicates that the plaintiffs' PAGA claims are pared down to four which are described as: (1) Miscalculation Class - derivative PAGA; (2) Off-the-Clock Class - derivative PAGA; (3) Meal Period Premium PAGA; and (4) EMPCenter Timekeeping System Off the Clock PAGA. Based upon the parties' points and authorities, the Court understands that as a starting point, this motion and its analysis are therefore primarily focused on these remaining PAGA claims. "Post-Pleading" Evidentiary Motion To Strike The Court's initial concern with the present motion is whether it is procedurally proper and supported by law. Whether the motion is a pleading motion, an evidentiary motion, or both, dictate the mandatory procedures to be followed and the standard(s) to be employed by the Court in resolving the issues raised. HNCA argues that its present motion, fashioned as a motion to "strike", is a procedurally proper and available tool to seek the relief it requests, i.e. the dismissal of Spears' PAGA claims. As HNCA appears to concede, the present motion is not a motion to strike "as used during the pleading stage." (HNCA [Spears] MPA, p. 10:10-19.) As opposed to a statutory motion to strike a pleading, HNCA describes the present motion as a "post-pleading" motion that asks the Court "to weigh evidence and determine whether the particular claims are susceptible to litigation on a representative basis." HNCA relies upon Event ID: 2500241 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: Page: 2 CASE TITLE: SPEARS VS. HEALTH NET OF CASE NUMBER: 34-2017-00210560-CU-OE-GDS CALIFORNIA INC authorities where the court was assessing challenges by defendants against class action claims preemptively attacking class certification by raising deficiencies in the various requisites for that special form of representative litigation. HNCA also contends that its motion to strike can be heard by this Court under its broad statutory authority to adopt procedures and processes necessary to carry out justice, even if not expressly prescribed by law citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 128(a)(8), 187, and Government Code section 68070. HNCA also cites Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377 for the proposition that "courts have inherent equity, supervisory and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control litigation before them," thereby allowing them to fashion "new forms of procedures when required to deal with the rights of the parties and to manage the caseload of the court" out of necessity where rights would be lost or the court could not function because of the absence of a previously established procedural rule. (HNCA [Spears] MPA, p. 10:20-28.) The only authority cited by HNCA that appears to note a "post-pleading" motion to strike is Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 47 which HNCA describes as a case affirming the trial court's granting of a motion to strike PAGA claims because the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. The opinion is not entirely clear as to the procedural context of the defendant's motion to strike in that long procedurally complex case. For example, the opinion is not clear whether the motion to strike was a "pleading" motion as opposed to an evidence weighing motion as proposed here by HNCA. And, it does not appear that the parties disputed the "motion to strike" procedure employed in that matter in the appellate court. In that regard, the Court does not find the case to be strong authority for the proposition that this Court can dismiss a PAGA claim on a "motion to strike" during which it weighs evidence and determines whether or not the plaintiff's PAGA claims are susceptible to litigation on a representative basis. The Court is also not persuaded that it is simply free to construct such a hybrid motion under the broad authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 128 or the rationale of Cottle v. Superior Court simply because this is a PAGA case, a putative representative or complex civil action. The law currently provides several readily available procedural tools, all accompanied by their own rules, requirements, limits, and standards that could properly bring HNCA's various challenges to Spears' PAGA claims before the Court. Where the law already provides procedures to request an order, remedy or relief, the Court is not encouraged to construct its own. Here, HNCA's primary arguments are premised upon theories of judicial estoppel, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the statute of limitations, and whether the claims may be manageably tried by the Court. Depending upon the bases of these arguments, they can/could be raised by a proper timely pleading motion (demurrer, MJOP, motion to strike), or by a motion for summary adjudication. However, the law does not provide for an evidentiary motion to "strike" claims that in essence results in the dismissal of some or all of the plaintiff's claims. In this vein, a motion to strike that is supported by facts outside the pleadings is a "speaking motion," which will ordinarily be treated as a motion for summary judgment or adjudication under Code Civ. Proc. § 437c. (City and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1914.) A speaking motion to strike that is treated as a motion for summary adjudication must therefore comply with the specific provisions of Code Civ. Proc. § 437c. (See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 153, 167.) Thus, such a motion to strike will be granted only if the evidence filed in support of the motion are sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the moving party and the evidence filed in opposition are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. (See Mediterranean Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 605, 616.) A "motion to strike" that attacks a complaint on the ground that a claim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action effectively seeks a judgment on the pleadings and may be treated accordingly by the court. (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 340, 342-343.) In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that it is procedurally prevented from resolving HNCA's motion to the extent it requires the Court to weigh evidence because the motion is not properly presented as an evidentiary motion, like a motion for summary adjudication, and Spears has asserted the deficiency in Event ID: 2500241 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: Page: 3 CASE TITLE: SPEARS VS. HEALTH NET OF CASE NUMBER: 34-2017-00210560-CU-OE-GDS CALIFORNIA INC her opposition. The motion is also not properly structured to resolve as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. For these reasons, the motion is denied. Manageability With respect to the issue of "manageability," the Court is also not persuaded that it can "strike" a PAGA claim on this record upon the anticipatory contention that it is not "manageable" as that concept is employed in class action litigation. As argued by Spears in opposition, our Supreme Court has held that class action requirements "need not be met when an employee's representative action against an employer is seeking civil penalties under" PAGA. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 975.) And, manageability is a class action requirement. "In considering whether a class action is a superior device for resolving a controversy, the manageability of individual issues is just as important as the existence of common questions uniting the proposed class." (Duran v. U.S. National Bank Association (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 29.) The Court is not aware of any published California authority imposing an analogous manageability requirement in PAGA actions. HNCA represents that "a PAGA plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that claims brought in a representative capacity do not pose manageability problems for the Court." (HNCA [Arana] MPA, p.15:18-21.) HNCA cites Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 559 (Williams), and describes the opinion as "stating that a plaintiff bringing a PAGA representative action must "render trial of the action manageable." (Id., emphasis added.) The Court's review of Williams does not find that it imposes a mandatory "manageability" requirement on PAGA claims. In Williams, the Supreme Court considered the scope of discovery in a representative PAGA action. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 537-538.) The plaintiff alleged that his employer failed to provide meal and rest periods and sought to pursue civil penalties for the violations in a representative PAGA action. (Id. at pp. 538-539.) During discovery, the plaintiff sought to discover the names and contact information for all affected employees in the state. (Id. at p. 539.) The store opposed the request as overbroad and unduly burdensome, and the trial court agreed; it ordered the store to provide the requested information for the single store at which the plaintiff worked. (Ibid.) The plaintiff sought writ relief, which the appellate court denied. The Supreme Court "granted review to resolve issues of first impression concerning the appropriate scope of discovery in a PAGA action." (Id. at p. 540.) In the course of resolving those issues, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's reasoning that the plaintiff's broad discovery request could be granted if he demonstrated a "uniform companywide policy." (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 559.) The Court explained: "A uniform policy may be a convenient or desirable way to show commonality of interest in a case where class certification is sought, but it is not a condition for discovery, or even success, in a PAGA action, where recovery on behalf of the state and aggrieved employees may be had for each violation, whether pursuant to a uniform policy or not. [Citation.] This is not to say uniform policies play no role in PAGA cases; proof of a uniform policy is one way a plaintiff might seek to render trial of the action manageable. But nothing in PAGA or our privacy precedents suggests courts can or should condition disclosure of contact information, which might lead to proof of a uniform or companywide policy, on prior proof of a uniform or companywide policy." (Ibid.) Williams does not support an assertion that a representative plaintiff in an action under PAGA must seek to render trial of the action manageable. Williams neither considered nor held that plaintiffs in a PAGA action must demonstrate that trial of their claims is manageable on a class-wide basis. The Court notes that the limited federal cases addressing this issue are not in agreement, and do not compel a different conclusion here. While the Court does not hold that it may not exercise its authority to reasonably manage the litigation Event ID: 2500241 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: Page: 4 CASE TITLE: SPEARS VS. HEALTH NET OF CASE NUMBER: 34-2017-00210560-CU-OE-GDS CALIFORNIA INC and the presentation of evidence at trial, it does not find that it would be appropriate to dismiss Spears' PAGA claims on the contention that the claims cannot be manageably tried based upon the first Trial Plan and HNCA's "motion to strike." **** NOTICE: Given the circumstances presented by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, this hearing will be conducted remotely via Zoom [which includes telephonic and teleconferencing options]. The Department 41 Zoom link is: https://saccourt.zoom.us/my/dept41a. The Zoom ID is: 349 373 7884. The Zoom number is (888) 475-4499. Any party desiring an official record shall make arrangements for reporting services not later than 4:30 p.m. on the day before the hearing with the clerk of the department where the matter will be heard and deposit fees with the clerk prior to the hearing, but not later than the conclusion of the court session. The fee is $30.00 for civil proceedings lasting under one hour and is $239.00 per half day. Local Rule 9.06(B) and Government Code 68086. Event ID: 2500241 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: Page: 5