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1 Todd A. Jones (Bar No. 198024)
tjones(^archemorris.com ^LEDi^NDORSED
2 Gregory K. Federico (Baf No. 242184)
gfederico(@archemorris.com
3 ARCHERNORRIS MAR 2 2 2011
A Professional Law Corporation
4 301 University Avenue, Suite 110
Sacramento, Califomia 95825-5537 Bv E IVIUNIZ
Deputy Clerk
5 Telephone: 916.646.2480
Facsimile: 916.646.5696
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Attomeys for Defendants and Cross-Defendants
7 RICHARD KIRK RUYBALID, individually, and
dba CA CONSTRUCTION
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9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
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12 RODNEY ABBOTT and FLORENTINE CaseNo. 07AS04450
ABBOTT,
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Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
14 DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL
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RONALD PAUL BRITSCHGI, et al., Hearing Date: March 18, 2011
16 Time: 10:30 a.m.
Defendants. Dept.: 43
17 Judge: Brian Van Camp
18 Action Filed: September 24,2007
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20 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS.
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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Court entered the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
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for New Trial on March 18, 2011. A copy ofthe Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
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N i a 4 l/l 109894-1 1
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
1 Dated: March 22,2011 ARCHERNORRIS y ^
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Gregory K. Federico
4 Attomeys for Defendants and Cross-
Defendants RICHARD KIRK RUYBALID,
5 individually, and dba CA CONSTRUCTION
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NIC341/1109894-1
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 Name of Action: Rodney Abbott, et al. v. Ronald Paul Britschgi, et al.
Court and Action No: Sacramento County Superior No. 07AS04450
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I, Cindy A. Ingland, declare that I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this
4 action or proceeding. My business address is 301 University Avenue, Suite 110, Sacramento,
Califomia 95825. On March 22,2011,1 caused the following document(s) to be served:
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NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW
6 TRIAL
7 ra By placing a tme copy ofthe documents listed above, enclosed in a sealed envelope,
addressed as set forth below, for collection and mailing on the date and at the business
8 address shown above following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar
with this business' practice for collection and processing of correspondence for
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mailing with the United States Postal Service. On the same day that a sealed envelope
10 is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course ofbusiness
with the United States Postal Service with postage fully prepaid.
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J I By having a tme copy of the document(s) listed above transmitted by facsimile to the
12 person(s) at the facsimile number(s) set forth below before 5:00 p.m. The transmission
was reported as complete without error by a report issued by the transmitting facsimile
13 machine.
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I j By placing a tme copy ofthe document(s) listed above, in a box or other facility
15 regularly maintained by UPS, an express service carrier, or delivered to a courier or
driver authorized by the express service carrier to receive documents, in an envelope
16 designated by the express service carrier, with delivery fees paid or provided for,
addressed as set forth below.
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rn by having personal delivery by FIRST LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES a tme copy of
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the document(s) listed above, enclosed in a sealed envelope, to the person(s) and at the
19 address(es) set forth below.
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[SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST]
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I declare under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is tme and correct. Executed on
22 March 22, 2011, at Sacramento, Califomia.
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INDY A. INGLAND
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NIC341/608293-1
PROOF OF SERVICE
1 Service List
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Stephanie Finelli PLAINTIFFS
3 Law Offices of Stephanie J Finelli
1007 Seventh Street, Suite 500 Tel: (916) 443-2144
4 Sacramento, CA 95814 Fax:(916)443-1511
E-mail- sfinelli700@yahoo.com
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Richard D. Sopp Counsel for CADRE DESIGN GROUP, INC.
6 Wheatley Sopp LLP
1004 River Rock Drive, Suite 245 Tel: (916) 988-3857
7 Folsom, CA 95630 Fax:(916)988-5296
Email, rds@mwsblaw.com
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l\/lark Smith In Pro Per
9 8549 Willow Valley Place
Granite Bay, CA 95746 -
10 markdarlenesmith@gmail.com
11 Richard W. Freeman Counsel for R4CORP
Scott S. Brooks
12 WOOD SMITH HENNING & BERI\/IAN LLP Tel: (925) 356-8200
1401 Willow Pass Road, Suite 700 Fax: (925) 356-8250
13 Concord, CA 94520-7982
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NIC34I/608293-1
SERVICE LIST
EXHIBIT "A"
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAUFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 03/18/2011 TIIVIE: 10:30:00 AM DEPT: 43
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Brian Van Camp
CLERK: A. Brown
REPORTER/ERM: None
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT:
CASE NO: 07AS04450 CASE INIT.DATE: 09/24/2007
CASE TITLE: Rodney Abbott, et al vs. Ronald Paul Britschgi, et al
CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited
EVENT TYPE: Motion for New Trial - Post Trial Motions
APPEARANCES
PROCEEDINGS: PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The above-indicated hearing came before this Court on this day.
The Court, having received, read and considered all papers submitted in this matter, published its
tentative ruling the previous day via facsimile and through the court's website, a copy of the tentative
ruling is fully incorporated within this Minute Order.
There being no request for oral argument, the Court AFFIRMS its tentative ruling which is now the order
of the Court.
TENTATIVE RULING:
The motion of plaintiffs, Florentine and Rodney Abbott, for new trial, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
sections 656, 657, and 659, are found to be without merit, so must be denied.
Plaintlffs raise four grounds in support of their motion:
1) Plaintiffs contend that a prejudicial in'egularity in the proceedings of the court justify a new trial,
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657(1). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that they had
insufficient time to try their case, as a result of which they were precluded from offering all of the relevant
evidence they otherwise would have offered. In this respect, plaintiffs claim that the Court denied them
the right to present rebuttal evidence. Plaintiffs also argue that the lack of trial time prohibited them from
fully cross-examining defendants' witnesses.
As a primary foundation for this challenge, plaintiffs assert that the Court created this prejudicial
truncation of trial time by repeatedly threatening plaintiffs with a mistrial if the case was not completed
and submitted to the jury within the 9 court days scheduled by the Court. The Court finds that, for a
number of reasons, including ones shown in the record, that the plaintiffs were provided more than
sufficient trial time in which to have presented their entire case.
First, the scheduled amount of trial time exceeded plaintiffs' own estimate required for the trial by at least
2 full days. Given the Martin Luther King Holiday, the Court had available, and the parties agreed to,
DATE: 03/18/2011 MINUTE ORDER Pagel
DEPT: 43 Calendar No.
CASE TITLE: Rodney Abbott, et al vs. Ronald Paul CASE NO: 07AS04450
Britschgi, et al
nine days for the trial of this case, the first day of which consisted of jury selection and opening
statements. The next five and a half days were spent by the Plaintiffs presenting their case, consuming
thereby fully 5.5/7ths of the trial time given over to taking evidence.
Plaintiffs' examination of witnesses and presentation of evidence was never halted or shortened by the
Court, and plaintiffs never raised any objection or complaint that they did not have enough time to fully
and fairiy present their case. The Court's memory is not perfect on whether it asked plaintiffs to present
rebuttal evidence upon the conclusion of defendants' case, but such is the standard practice of the
Court. In any event, piaintiffs declined to present any rebuttal evidence. Last, rather than "threatening
mistrial," the Court frequently reminded counsel of the difficulties that would be presented by failing to
deliver the case to the jury by Jan. 28, in light of the Court's long-established vacation schedule and trial
schedule following such.
In the Court's opinion. Plaintiffs' manner of conducting their case in chief was the primary factor that
Plaintiffs ran short of time, if they in fact did. The Court can recall any number of times that, after getting
an answer to her question, counsel would pause and continue to gaze either at the witness, or off into a
far corner of the room, without saying anything. Further, repeatedly unable to locate her desired exhibit
for an extended time, counsel would ultimately resort to asking the Court Clerk for the court's copy,
again wasting valuable court time. Still again, counsel repeatedly asked near duplicate questions of the
same witnesses, often prompting objections from opposing counsel, and many other times leaving the
Court to wonder why they had not.
In order to maximize the parties' time in front of the jury, the Court often extended its day, by meeting
counsel eariy in the morning, commencing trial one day at 8:30 a.m., rather than the regulariy scheduled
time of 9 a.m., and staying after court to wori< on Jury instructions and verdict forms, several times
working with counsel or alone until well after 7 pm, all in order to give counsel maximum time during the
trial day within which to present their cases to the jury.
Aside from the foregoing, plaintiffs also fail to present any evidence upon which it could be concluded
that their case was prejudiced by the trial schedule, even if its assertions about time limitations were
true. Plaintlffs present no evidence as to what testimony they would have presented either with more
time or on rebuttal, or expected to glean in further cross-examination, that would likely have changed the
jury's verdict. As to the defendants' witness, Mr. Dynan Keller, who had at the time stated that he could
not retum for cross-examination the following day, the parties stipulated that he could be excused from
further testimony. That notwithstanding, Mr. Keller did in fact retum the next day in order to afford
plaintiffs the opportunity to cross examine him further, whereupon piaintiffs again stipulated that he was
no longer needed for cross examination.
In the end, no party can have an expectation of an unlimited hold on the scarce resources of the court,
including time available for trying a case, especially a party who takes more time than originally asked
for, and then proceeds to abuse in a number of ways the time afforded to it.
2) & 3) Plaintiffs next contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, or that the verdict
is contrary to law, justifying a new trial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657(6) Specifically,
plaintiffs argue that the jury had insufficient evidence upon which to have found that plaintiffs did not do
all or substantially all of the significant things the contract required them to do, or that defendant CA
Construction's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' harm. The Court's
consideration and view of the evidentiary record as a whole is to the contrary. Rather, the verdict may
be harmonized and interpreted in the manner asserted by defendant in its opposition.
4) Last, plaintift's contend that the judgment is inconsistent with the special verdict, entitling then to a
new trial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663(2). Specifically, plaintiffs point out that the jury
found that defendant CA Construction was negligent and had departed from accepted trade standards
for good and workmanlike construction, but then found that such did not cause plaintiffs' harm. As
defendant persuasively argues, within the context of the evidentiary record, the jury's findings as to
defendant's breach of a standard of care or practice did not necessitate a finding that such conduct had
a causal nexus as a substantial ^ctor in any harm evidenced by plaintiffs. In short, the findings of
DATE: 03/18/2011 MINUTE ORDER Page 2
DEPT: 43 Calendar No.
CASE TITLE: Rodney Abbott, et al vs. Ronald Paul CASE NO: 07AS04450
Britschgi, et al
breach of the standard of care are not inconsistent with findings of no causation. If every finding of
negligence or breach of a standard of care is to be considered ipso facto a finding of liability, there would
never be a reason to inquire as to whether such breach was a substantial factor causing in a claimant's
harm.
Further, a motion to vacate pursuant to Section 663(2) is not an appropriate procedural method with
which to attack a special verdict claimed to be internally inconsistent, as plaintiffs assert here, nor does it
provide for a new trial. Instead, the procedure afforded under Section 663(2) allows the Court, upon
finding a judgment that is inconsistent with a special verdict, to vacate same and enter a new judgment
that is consistent with such verdict. Piaintiffs do not here contend that the judgment entered by the Court
is inconsistent with the special verdict as rendered by the jury. {Acosta v. Los Angeles Unified Sctiool
Dist. (1995) 31 Cal. App 4th 471, 479, fri. 7.)
For the above reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial based on CCP 657(1) & (6) and
CCP 663(2).
DATE: 03/18/2011 MINUTE ORDER Page 3
DEPT: 43 Calendar No.