Preview
I Geoffrey K. Willis (State Bar No. 126504)
Law Offices of Geoffrey Willis
Geoff Willis, A Professional Corporation
9891 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 200
Irvine, CA 92618
Phone: (949) 374-3815
gwillis@geoffwillislaw.corn
5
Gregory F.. Woodard (SBN 203019)
Woodard Legal PC
7700 1rvine Center Dr.,Suite80011156
7
Irvinc, CA 92618
Phone: (949) 878-6615
gwaawoodardlegal.corn
9
Aitomeys for Plaintiffs
10
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TIRE STA I'E OF CALIFORNIA
12
COUNTY OF NAPA
13
RAIA DFVELOPPMFNT CO., INC., a California Case No. 19CV000682
corporation; CASHEL, INC., an Alaska
corporation doing business in California as NAPA REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
15 CASI IEL; and CARTER RANDALL LEAVE TO FILF. FOURTH AMENDEI)
CALLAI-IAN, and individual; COMPLAINT
16
17 Pl ainti ffs,
Date: September 20, 2023
18 vs. Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: A
NAPA SANITARY DISTRICT; COUNTY OF
NAPA; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Action tiled: May 6, 2019
20 Trial date; None Set
21 Defendants.
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23
24
25
27
REPLY RE: MOTION FOIX LEAVF. TO FILE FOURTH AMFNDED COMPLAINT
1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2 Plaintiffs Raja Development Corporation, Inc., CASHEL, Inc., and Carter Randall Callahan
3 (collectively "Plaintiffs" ) collectively own 82 condominium units within the boundaries of the District.
4 For subdivision purposes, the 82 units are mapped as condominiums but all have been owned
by
5 Plaintiffs since the inception of thc project. While characterized as "condominiums" these units have
6 functionally operated as apartments for more than 30 years. There is no separate ownership of any
7 individual units and all of the common areas are owned by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have 82 separate ground
8 leases governing the use of the units.
9 'I'he District is a California special government local
entity which provides wastewater collection
10 and treatment services to its citizens. (Third Amended Complaint "Complaint", p. 2:14-15.) The District
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12
13
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16
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ol'4
imposes illegal taxes which it improperly characterizes as "fees" and/or "charges." (Complaint, p. 2:16.)
The wastewater collection and treatment services it provides are property-related services and the illegal
taxes are charged as "fees" imposed by the District upon parcels of land and persons as an incident
property ownership. (Complaint, p. 2:17-19.) Owners of apartment buildings only pay 60% of the fees
charged by the District to owners of condominiums and townhomes without any justification or study.
Government Code Section 53723 provides:
No local government... may impose any general tax unless and until such
general tax is submitted to the electorate of the local government... and
approved by a majority vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue.
Since at least 1975, the District has consistently charged single family homes as 1.0 Equivalent
Dwelling Unit ("EDU") while apartments have been charged an annual service charge of 0.6 EDU.
(Complaint, pp. 20-21.) The District has conducted legally required "nexus studies" on both single-
family residences and apartment buildings and have used those studies to justify the rates set for those
two categories of uses. (Complaint, p. 2:22-23.)
The District charges townhomcs and condominiums a 1.0 EDU, but unlike single-family
25
residences and apartments, the District has not conducted ANY study demonstrating the actual cost ol
27 providing ihe services io the owners of condominiums and townhomes. (Complaint, p. 2:24-26.) The
District has never conducted thc legally required "nexus study" on iownhomcs and condominiums and
1
REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMLNDED COMPLAINT
I instead randomly assigned a value ol 1.0 FDU without justification or explanation.
2 Thc District's failure to conduct the legally required "nexus study" results in a fee that is not
3 directly tied to the District's costs of providing the services. Anytime a public agency collects monies
4 fi'om property owners that are not directly tied to ihe costs of providing those services, those monies
5 constitute a tax which cannot bc legally imposed until it is approved by a required voter election.
6 (Proposition 62 — Government Code Sections 53720-53730.)
7 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND THE COURT OF APPEAL REVERSAL
8 This action was filed on May 6, 2019, containing a single cause of action alleging that thc District
9 is violating Propositions 13, 62 and 218 by collecting an illegal tax that Defendants improperly describe
10 as a "fee," On July 26, 2019, the District filed a Moiion to Strike and a Demurrer challenging thc
11 complaint on multiple grounds including allegations thai. Ihe Complaint was barred by thc statute of
12 limitations. The Court granted the Demurrer without prejudice in part finding that thc action was barred
13 by the statute of limitations.
14 On September 5, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Firsi Amended Complaint against Dcfcndants Napa
15 Sanitary District and Napa County (the "County" ). The I'irst Amended Complaint consisted of three
16 causes of action: I) against the District for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief'regarding the District's
17 violation of Propositions 13, 62, and 218, California Constitution Articles 13A, 1313, and 13C, and
18 Govcrnmcnt Code Section 53721; 2) against the District and the County for Declaratory Relief regarding
19 violations of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 and Government Code Sections 53723 and
20 53728; and 3) a claim for rel'und of improperly collecied taxes. Thc second cause of action under
21 Governmctu Code section 53728 rcquircs Defendants to disgorge all fees collected without a supporting
22 nexus study. The District once again filed a Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint again arguilig,
23 allaolig other things, a violation of the statute of limitations. On February 21, 2020, the Court once again
24 granted the Demurrer, based upoiu aliloi'ig oillcf things, a dctcrmination that the aciion was barred by the
25 statute of limitations. The Court sustained the Demurrer to the first cause of action without prejudice, but
26 dismissed the second cause of action WITH prejudice.
27 On March 2, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended
28 Complaint contained two causes of action. The first cause of action was against the County and the
2
REPLY RF: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOUI%TH AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 District alleging a violation of numerous laws including Propositions 13, 62 and 218. 'I he second cause
2 of action once again sought repayment of fees paid directly by Plaintiffs. Defendants once again
3 Demurred to the Second Amended Complaint and the Court once again dismissed Plaintif'fs'laims
4 without prejudice.
5 On September 30, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint which contained a single
6 cause of action for Declaratory Relief alleging that Defendants were in violation of numerous laws
7 including Propositions 13, 62 and 218. Defendants once again filed a Demurrer which was granted by
8 the Court, this time with prejudice effectively sending the case to the Court of Appeal.
Plaintiffs appealed all of the Trial Court's rulings including the dismissal of the Second Cause of
10 Action in thc First Amended Complaint with prejudice. After full briefing and without argument, the
11 Court of Appeal reversed the trial court finding that all of the Trial Court's rationale for granting the
12 Demurrer was poorly taken, that no portion of the case was barred by any statute of limitation and that
13 Defendants'rguments regarding severance of fees was opposite of the Defendants'osition and that the
14 Defendants bore the burden of risk to its bonds because of the way the District drafted its fce ordinance.
15 All of'the causes of action previously pled in thc first four versions of the Complaint were all
16 dismissed based solely on the'improper application of the statute of limitations. The appeal challenged
17 all of those dismissals of all causes of action. The Court of Appeal determined that the statute of
18 limitations was not applicable and not a bar to any of those claims.
19 This Fourth Amended Complaint attempts to rcinstitule the arguments form the First Cause of
20 Action in the Third Amended Complaint and the Second Cause of Action from the First Ameiided
21 Complaint, The Court of Appeal specilically found that none of the causes of action were barred by any
22 statute of limitations which was the sole ground for the Trial Court's grant of Demurrer to the Second
23 Cause of Action to the First Amended Complaint.
24 III. THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS PROPERLY ADDED BECAUSE THE COURT klAS
25 SOLELY FOCUSFD ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
26 In the four demurrcis brought by the District and the County, the sole issue addressed
by the
27 Couri was the statute of limitations. In each of the demurrers brought to the first four complaints, the
28 demurrers and the Court's rulings on those demurrers all found that all causes of action were barred
by
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REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMFNDI'.D COMPLAINT
I applicable statutes of limitations.
2 The added cause of action had previously been a part of the First Cause of Action. Thc demurrer
3 to that Complaint focused on the statute of limitations. The Opposition to the Demurrer did not rise
and
4 fall on the merits and the Court made no decision on the merits of thc claim or the adequacy ol'thc facts
5 pled, solely on the statute of limiiations. Plaintiffs appropriately focused solely on the statute of
6 limitations in their Opposition. The Court then dismissed that claim with prejudice.
7 All of the causes of action previously pled in the lirst four versions of the Complaint were all
8 dismissed based solely on the improper application of the statute of limitations. The appeal challenged
9 all of those dismissals of all causes of action. The Court of Appeal determined that ihe statute of
10 limitations was not applicable and not a bar to any of those claims
ll On appeal, the sole issue was the statute of limitations, not just for the single claim brought in thc
12 Third Amended Complaint but for all previous causes of action that had also been dismissed in the earlier
13 versions of the Complaint. Included in that list of challenged claims was thc Second Cause of Action
14 sought to be added here. The Appellate Court I'ound the statute of limitations inapplicable to all related
15 causes of action including thc cause of action at issue on this Motion.
16 This Fourth Amended Complaint attempts to reinstitute the arguments from the First Cause of
17 Action in the Third Amended Complaint and the Second Cause of Action fiom the First Amended
18 Complaint. The Court of Appeal specifically found that none of the causes of action were barred by any
19 statute of limitations which was the sole ground for the Trial Court" s grant of Demurrer to the Second
20 Cause of Action to the First Amended Complaint.
21 'I'herc has never been a "waiver" of any claims, just the relentless, and incorrect,
assertion thai all
22 of Plaintiffs'laims are barred by the statute of limitations. The Trial Court dismissed this claim based
23 upon the statute of limitations, which dismissal was found to be inappropriate based upon the Court of
24 Appeal's ruling. The Court of Appeal has clearly held that the Trial Court erred in finding the statute of
25 limitations applicable to the present claims. For these reasons, the Motion to Amend should be granted.
26 1o deny this Motion to Amend would be to fly in the I'ace of a long-established policy ol liberal
27 allowance of amendments.
The Court has discretion to allow the amendment of pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure ss
4
REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE. FOURTkl AMENDED COMPLAINT
I 473(a)(1) "in furtherance ofjustice," and "upon any terms as may be just." The decision whether to
2 grant leave to amend is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Sullivan v. City of
3 S'acrantento (1987) 190 Cal, App. 3d 1070, 1081.)
4 "California courts have 'a policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the
5 proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits where the authorization does not
6 prejudice the substantial rights of others.'Citation omitted.] Indeed, 'it is a rare case in which 'a court
7 will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleading so that hc may properly present his case.'
[Citation and internal quotations omitted.]" (Douglas v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 155, 158
9 [noting the lact that the party had ahcady amended his pleading twice before was not by itself grounds to
10 deny leave to amend again]; scc also Ilong Sang Adarket, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 488
11 ["'[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party, thc rule of great liberality in allowing
12 amendment of pleadings will prevail.'Citation omitted]," quoting Board of 71 utstees v. Superior Court
13 (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163]; Atkinson v. Elk Cr&rp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760-761.)
14 Without a showing of prejudice, the failure to grant leave to amend may be an abuse of discretion. (Fair
15 v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147; 'Ihompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of
16 Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 544-545.)
17 Courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendmcnts to the complaint
18 "at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial," absent prejudice to thc adverse
party.
19 (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 (internal quotes omitted); Ventura v ABM
20 Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 267-268 [linding no abuse ol discretion in trial court
21 granting leave to plaintiff to I&le second amended complaint based on an cx parte application made the
22 day before trial].) Delay alone is not a basis to deny a motion for leave to amend. (Hig~~ins v. Del Faro
23 (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565 [reversing judgment on the pleadings for defendant after plaintifgs
24 motion to amend made on the day of trial was denied; defendant was not surprised or misled by the
25 proposed amendment, and the short delay in the trial which would result from the amendmcnt did not
26 prejudice defendant]; Kittredge Sports Ck&. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.) If
27 delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced thc other side, the liberal policy of allowing
28 amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case, even if sought as
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REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
I late as the time of trial. (Higgins v. De] Faro, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 558, at pp. 564-565.)
2 Ordinarily, an unqualified reversal (i.e., reversal without directions to the trial court) vacates the
3 appealed judgment or order and remands the case for a new trial or evidentiary hearing as though it had
4 never been tried or heard. On remand, the parties are placed in the same positions and have the same
5 rights as before rendition of the reversed judgment or order. (8'eisenburgv. CI"ugholnt (1971) 5 Cal.3d
6 892, 896; Grpusan v Jay(1998) 66 Cal App4th 734, 743; see 73uenesv. Litton Systems, Inc (1994) 28
7 Cal.App.4th 681, 683-684.) All issues involved in the case arc placed "at large" for retrial upon remand.
8 (IFeighnnun v. Hadley (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 831, 836, 292.) The parties have the same right to request
9 leave to amend the pleadings as if the appealed judgment had never occurred ... including an amendment
10 to state an entirely new delense, such as the statute of limitations. (Fsvure ofHcuvnun (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62,
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of'472-73; In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1500; see Clark
83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1055-1056.)
v. Baxter Heulrhcare Corp. (2000)
In the prcscnt case, the only reason thc Demurrer was sustained to the Second Cause of Action
the First. Amended Complaint was the erroneous application of an improperly applied statute of
limitations. The Court of Appeal specifically rejected all of Defendants'tatute of limitations arguments
removing rory basis preventing Plaintiffs fiom reasserting that cause of action. In fact, based on the
Court of Appeal's ruling and the Esture qf'Horman case discussed immediately above, Plaintilfs could
bring the Second Cause of Action to the I ourth Amended Complaint even if it had never been brought
before. Plaintiffs cannot lose their right to bring a cause of action because of the Trial Court's erroneous
ruling.
21 Phtally, Defendants will sulfer no prcjudicp if the Court grants leave to amend since they Itave
22 been aware of Plaintiffs'laims for at least four years, have had a significant amount of time to correct
23 the detailed deficiencies, and have refused to even acknowledge, let alone change the defective statute.
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REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOUItTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
I iV. C:ONCLUSION
l'or lh ' casual si'll '&f af)& vc. I'lainiif7.'cspccil'ully rcqucsi ihc C'ouri 'rani ih 'ir rcqucai an&I allow
3 ihc lifin&~& of ihc auachcd I:ourlh Amcn&fc&f Con)plaini.
4 I)ale&0 Scj)lcn)f)cr 12, 2023 I,aw Ol'licca of'Ocof'f'rcy Willi»
I2
ff'0 Willin
I'Ininii
1G
l7
lq
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ICFPI,Y I(I'.: MO'I'ION FOI( I,FAVF. TO FII,F. I'OUI&'I'll AMFNI)I.D C OMI'I.AINT
PROOF OF SERVICE
2
I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the
age of 18 and not a
3 party to the within action; my business address is Woodard Legal PC, 770 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 800
¹156, Irvine, California 92618. My email address is: gw@woodardlegal.corn.
4
On September 13, 2023, I served thc following described as:
5
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED
6 COMPLAINT
011 the interested parties in this by having a copy sent by electronic mail to the email addresses
listed
below:
8
Catherine Carlisle, Esq. John David Bakkcr, Esq.
Meyers Nave Meyers Nave
10 707 Wilshire Boulevard, 24th Floor 1999 Harrison St, 9" I'loor
Los Angeles, CA 90017 Oakland, CA 94612
Tel: (213) 626-2906 Tel: (510) 808-2000
Email: ccarlisle@meyersnave.corn Email: jbakker meyersnave.corn
12
13
[ ] (BY U.S. MAIL); I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. postal service on
14
that same day with postage thereon fully in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of
15 thc party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more
than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
16
[
v'] (BY EMAIL): The foregoing document(s) were served via electronic mail to the email address(es)
listed above. The transmissions were made without any errors being noted in our oflice's email program.
18
[ ](BY OVERNITE EXPRESS AND/OR FEDEX): I caused such envelope to be delivered by
19 OverNite Express and/or FedEx to the offices of the addressees.
[v'] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that thc
foregoing is true and correct.
22 Fxecuted on September 13, 2023, at Boise, Idaho.
23
24
Gregory Woodard
25
26
27
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REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE POtJRTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
Preview
I Geoffrey K. Willis (State Bar No. 126504) Law Offices of Geoffrey Willis Geoff Willis, A Professional Corporation 9891 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 200 Irvine, CA 92618 Phone: (949) 374-3815 gwillis@geoffwillislaw.corn 5 Gregory F.. Woodard (SBN 203019) Woodard Legal PC 7700 1rvine Center Dr.,Suite80011156 7 Irvinc, CA 92618 Phone: (949) 878-6615 gwaawoodardlegal.corn 9 Aitomeys for Plaintiffs 10 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TIRE STA I'E OF CALIFORNIA 12 COUNTY OF NAPA 13 RAIA DFVELOPPMFNT CO., INC., a California Case No. 19CV000682 corporation; CASHEL, INC., an Alaska corporation doing business in California as NAPA REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 15 CASI IEL; and CARTER RANDALL LEAVE TO FILF. FOURTH AMENDEI) CALLAI-IAN, and individual; COMPLAINT 16 17 Pl ainti ffs, Date: September 20, 2023 18 vs. Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: A NAPA SANITARY DISTRICT; COUNTY OF NAPA; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Action tiled: May 6, 2019 20 Trial date; None Set 21 Defendants. 22 23 24 25 27 REPLY RE: MOTION FOIX LEAVF. TO FILE FOURTH AMFNDED COMPLAINT 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs Raja Development Corporation, Inc., CASHEL, Inc., and Carter Randall Callahan 3 (collectively "Plaintiffs" ) collectively own 82 condominium units within the boundaries of the District. 4 For subdivision purposes, the 82 units are mapped as condominiums but all have been owned by 5 Plaintiffs since the inception of thc project. While characterized as "condominiums" these units have 6 functionally operated as apartments for more than 30 years. There is no separate ownership of any 7 individual units and all of the common areas are owned by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have 82 separate ground 8 leases governing the use of the units. 9 'I'he District is a California special government local entity which provides wastewater collection 10 and treatment services to its citizens. (Third Amended Complaint "Complaint", p. 2:14-15.) The District 11 12 13 15 16 17 19 20 ol'4 imposes illegal taxes which it improperly characterizes as "fees" and/or "charges." (Complaint, p. 2:16.) The wastewater collection and treatment services it provides are property-related services and the illegal taxes are charged as "fees" imposed by the District upon parcels of land and persons as an incident property ownership. (Complaint, p. 2:17-19.) Owners of apartment buildings only pay 60% of the fees charged by the District to owners of condominiums and townhomes without any justification or study. Government Code Section 53723 provides: No local government... may impose any general tax unless and until such general tax is submitted to the electorate of the local government... and approved by a majority vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue. Since at least 1975, the District has consistently charged single family homes as 1.0 Equivalent Dwelling Unit ("EDU") while apartments have been charged an annual service charge of 0.6 EDU. (Complaint, pp. 20-21.) The District has conducted legally required "nexus studies" on both single- family residences and apartment buildings and have used those studies to justify the rates set for those two categories of uses. (Complaint, p. 2:22-23.) The District charges townhomcs and condominiums a 1.0 EDU, but unlike single-family 25 residences and apartments, the District has not conducted ANY study demonstrating the actual cost ol 27 providing ihe services io the owners of condominiums and townhomes. (Complaint, p. 2:24-26.) The District has never conducted thc legally required "nexus study" on iownhomcs and condominiums and 1 REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMLNDED COMPLAINT I instead randomly assigned a value ol 1.0 FDU without justification or explanation. 2 Thc District's failure to conduct the legally required "nexus study" results in a fee that is not 3 directly tied to the District's costs of providing the services. Anytime a public agency collects monies 4 fi'om property owners that are not directly tied to ihe costs of providing those services, those monies 5 constitute a tax which cannot bc legally imposed until it is approved by a required voter election. 6 (Proposition 62 — Government Code Sections 53720-53730.) 7 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND THE COURT OF APPEAL REVERSAL 8 This action was filed on May 6, 2019, containing a single cause of action alleging that thc District 9 is violating Propositions 13, 62 and 218 by collecting an illegal tax that Defendants improperly describe 10 as a "fee," On July 26, 2019, the District filed a Moiion to Strike and a Demurrer challenging thc 11 complaint on multiple grounds including allegations thai. Ihe Complaint was barred by thc statute of 12 limitations. The Court granted the Demurrer without prejudice in part finding that thc action was barred 13 by the statute of limitations. 14 On September 5, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Firsi Amended Complaint against Dcfcndants Napa 15 Sanitary District and Napa County (the "County" ). The I'irst Amended Complaint consisted of three 16 causes of action: I) against the District for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief'regarding the District's 17 violation of Propositions 13, 62, and 218, California Constitution Articles 13A, 1313, and 13C, and 18 Govcrnmcnt Code Section 53721; 2) against the District and the County for Declaratory Relief regarding 19 violations of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 and Government Code Sections 53723 and 20 53728; and 3) a claim for rel'und of improperly collecied taxes. Thc second cause of action under 21 Governmctu Code section 53728 rcquircs Defendants to disgorge all fees collected without a supporting 22 nexus study. The District once again filed a Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint again arguilig, 23 allaolig other things, a violation of the statute of limitations. On February 21, 2020, the Court once again 24 granted the Demurrer, based upoiu aliloi'ig oillcf things, a dctcrmination that the aciion was barred by the 25 statute of limitations. The Court sustained the Demurrer to the first cause of action without prejudice, but 26 dismissed the second cause of action WITH prejudice. 27 On March 2, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended 28 Complaint contained two causes of action. The first cause of action was against the County and the 2 REPLY RF: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOUI%TH AMENDED COMPLAINT 1 District alleging a violation of numerous laws including Propositions 13, 62 and 218. 'I he second cause 2 of action once again sought repayment of fees paid directly by Plaintiffs. Defendants once again 3 Demurred to the Second Amended Complaint and the Court once again dismissed Plaintif'fs'laims 4 without prejudice. 5 On September 30, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint which contained a single 6 cause of action for Declaratory Relief alleging that Defendants were in violation of numerous laws 7 including Propositions 13, 62 and 218. Defendants once again filed a Demurrer which was granted by 8 the Court, this time with prejudice effectively sending the case to the Court of Appeal. Plaintiffs appealed all of the Trial Court's rulings including the dismissal of the Second Cause of 10 Action in thc First Amended Complaint with prejudice. After full briefing and without argument, the 11 Court of Appeal reversed the trial court finding that all of the Trial Court's rationale for granting the 12 Demurrer was poorly taken, that no portion of the case was barred by any statute of limitation and that 13 Defendants'rguments regarding severance of fees was opposite of the Defendants'osition and that the 14 Defendants bore the burden of risk to its bonds because of the way the District drafted its fce ordinance. 15 All of'the causes of action previously pled in thc first four versions of the Complaint were all 16 dismissed based solely on the'improper application of the statute of limitations. The appeal challenged 17 all of those dismissals of all causes of action. The Court of Appeal determined that the statute of 18 limitations was not applicable and not a bar to any of those claims. 19 This Fourth Amended Complaint attempts to rcinstitule the arguments form the First Cause of 20 Action in the Third Amended Complaint and the Second Cause of Action from the First Ameiided 21 Complaint, The Court of Appeal specilically found that none of the causes of action were barred by any 22 statute of limitations which was the sole ground for the Trial Court's grant of Demurrer to the Second 23 Cause of Action to the First Amended Complaint. 24 III. THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS PROPERLY ADDED BECAUSE THE COURT klAS 25 SOLELY FOCUSFD ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 26 In the four demurrcis brought by the District and the County, the sole issue addressed by the 27 Couri was the statute of limitations. In each of the demurrers brought to the first four complaints, the 28 demurrers and the Court's rulings on those demurrers all found that all causes of action were barred by 3 REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMFNDI'.D COMPLAINT I applicable statutes of limitations. 2 The added cause of action had previously been a part of the First Cause of Action. Thc demurrer 3 to that Complaint focused on the statute of limitations. The Opposition to the Demurrer did not rise and 4 fall on the merits and the Court made no decision on the merits of thc claim or the adequacy ol'thc facts 5 pled, solely on the statute of limiiations. Plaintiffs appropriately focused solely on the statute of 6 limitations in their Opposition. The Court then dismissed that claim with prejudice. 7 All of the causes of action previously pled in the lirst four versions of the Complaint were all 8 dismissed based solely on the improper application of the statute of limitations. The appeal challenged 9 all of those dismissals of all causes of action. The Court of Appeal determined that ihe statute of 10 limitations was not applicable and not a bar to any of those claims ll On appeal, the sole issue was the statute of limitations, not just for the single claim brought in thc 12 Third Amended Complaint but for all previous causes of action that had also been dismissed in the earlier 13 versions of the Complaint. Included in that list of challenged claims was thc Second Cause of Action 14 sought to be added here. The Appellate Court I'ound the statute of limitations inapplicable to all related 15 causes of action including thc cause of action at issue on this Motion. 16 This Fourth Amended Complaint attempts to reinstitute the arguments from the First Cause of 17 Action in the Third Amended Complaint and the Second Cause of Action fiom the First Amended 18 Complaint. The Court of Appeal specifically found that none of the causes of action were barred by any 19 statute of limitations which was the sole ground for the Trial Court" s grant of Demurrer to the Second 20 Cause of Action to the First Amended Complaint. 21 'I'herc has never been a "waiver" of any claims, just the relentless, and incorrect, assertion thai all 22 of Plaintiffs'laims are barred by the statute of limitations. The Trial Court dismissed this claim based 23 upon the statute of limitations, which dismissal was found to be inappropriate based upon the Court of 24 Appeal's ruling. The Court of Appeal has clearly held that the Trial Court erred in finding the statute of 25 limitations applicable to the present claims. For these reasons, the Motion to Amend should be granted. 26 1o deny this Motion to Amend would be to fly in the I'ace of a long-established policy ol liberal 27 allowance of amendments. The Court has discretion to allow the amendment of pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure ss 4 REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE. FOURTkl AMENDED COMPLAINT I 473(a)(1) "in furtherance ofjustice," and "upon any terms as may be just." The decision whether to 2 grant leave to amend is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Sullivan v. City of 3 S'acrantento (1987) 190 Cal, App. 3d 1070, 1081.) 4 "California courts have 'a policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the 5 proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits where the authorization does not 6 prejudice the substantial rights of others.'Citation omitted.] Indeed, 'it is a rare case in which 'a court 7 will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleading so that hc may properly present his case.' [Citation and internal quotations omitted.]" (Douglas v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 155, 158 9 [noting the lact that the party had ahcady amended his pleading twice before was not by itself grounds to 10 deny leave to amend again]; scc also Ilong Sang Adarket, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 488 11 ["'[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the adverse party, thc rule of great liberality in allowing 12 amendment of pleadings will prevail.'Citation omitted]," quoting Board of 71 utstees v. Superior Court 13 (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163]; Atkinson v. Elk Cr&rp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760-761.) 14 Without a showing of prejudice, the failure to grant leave to amend may be an abuse of discretion. (Fair 15 v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147; 'Ihompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of 16 Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 544-545.) 17 Courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendmcnts to the complaint 18 "at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial," absent prejudice to thc adverse party. 19 (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 (internal quotes omitted); Ventura v ABM 20 Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 267-268 [linding no abuse ol discretion in trial court 21 granting leave to plaintiff to I&le second amended complaint based on an cx parte application made the 22 day before trial].) Delay alone is not a basis to deny a motion for leave to amend. (Hig~~ins v. Del Faro 23 (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565 [reversing judgment on the pleadings for defendant after plaintifgs 24 motion to amend made on the day of trial was denied; defendant was not surprised or misled by the 25 proposed amendment, and the short delay in the trial which would result from the amendmcnt did not 26 prejudice defendant]; Kittredge Sports Ck&. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.) If 27 delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced thc other side, the liberal policy of allowing 28 amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case, even if sought as .5 REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT I late as the time of trial. (Higgins v. De] Faro, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 558, at pp. 564-565.) 2 Ordinarily, an unqualified reversal (i.e., reversal without directions to the trial court) vacates the 3 appealed judgment or order and remands the case for a new trial or evidentiary hearing as though it had 4 never been tried or heard. On remand, the parties are placed in the same positions and have the same 5 rights as before rendition of the reversed judgment or order. (8'eisenburgv. CI"ugholnt (1971) 5 Cal.3d 6 892, 896; Grpusan v Jay(1998) 66 Cal App4th 734, 743; see 73uenesv. Litton Systems, Inc (1994) 28 7 Cal.App.4th 681, 683-684.) All issues involved in the case arc placed "at large" for retrial upon remand. 8 (IFeighnnun v. Hadley (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 831, 836, 292.) The parties have the same right to request 9 leave to amend the pleadings as if the appealed judgment had never occurred ... including an amendment 10 to state an entirely new delense, such as the statute of limitations. (Fsvure ofHcuvnun (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 of'472-73; In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1500; see Clark 83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1055-1056.) v. Baxter Heulrhcare Corp. (2000) In the prcscnt case, the only reason thc Demurrer was sustained to the Second Cause of Action the First. Amended Complaint was the erroneous application of an improperly applied statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal specifically rejected all of Defendants'tatute of limitations arguments removing rory basis preventing Plaintiffs fiom reasserting that cause of action. In fact, based on the Court of Appeal's ruling and the Esture qf'Horman case discussed immediately above, Plaintilfs could bring the Second Cause of Action to the I ourth Amended Complaint even if it had never been brought before. Plaintiffs cannot lose their right to bring a cause of action because of the Trial Court's erroneous ruling. 21 Phtally, Defendants will sulfer no prcjudicp if the Court grants leave to amend since they Itave 22 been aware of Plaintiffs'laims for at least four years, have had a significant amount of time to correct 23 the detailed deficiencies, and have refused to even acknowledge, let alone change the defective statute. 24 25 26 27 6 REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOUItTH AMENDED COMPLAINT I iV. C:ONCLUSION l'or lh ' casual si'll '&f af)& vc. I'lainiif7.'cspccil'ully rcqucsi ihc C'ouri 'rani ih 'ir rcqucai an&I allow 3 ihc lifin&~& of ihc auachcd I:ourlh Amcn&fc&f Con)plaini. 4 I)ale&0 Scj)lcn)f)cr 12, 2023 I,aw Ol'licca of'Ocof'f'rcy Willi» I2 ff'0 Willin I'Ininii 1G l7 lq 20 21 2.u 2G 27 ICFPI,Y I(I'.: MO'I'ION FOI( I,FAVF. TO FII,F. I'OUI&'I'll AMFNI)I.D C OMI'I.AINT PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a 3 party to the within action; my business address is Woodard Legal PC, 770 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 800 ¹156, Irvine, California 92618. My email address is: gw@woodardlegal.corn. 4 On September 13, 2023, I served thc following described as: 5 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED 6 COMPLAINT 011 the interested parties in this by having a copy sent by electronic mail to the email addresses listed below: 8 Catherine Carlisle, Esq. John David Bakkcr, Esq. Meyers Nave Meyers Nave 10 707 Wilshire Boulevard, 24th Floor 1999 Harrison St, 9" I'loor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Oakland, CA 94612 Tel: (213) 626-2906 Tel: (510) 808-2000 Email: ccarlisle@meyersnave.corn Email: jbakker meyersnave.corn 12 13 [ ] (BY U.S. MAIL); I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. postal service on 14 that same day with postage thereon fully in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of 15 thc party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. 16 [ v'] (BY EMAIL): The foregoing document(s) were served via electronic mail to the email address(es) listed above. The transmissions were made without any errors being noted in our oflice's email program. 18 [ ](BY OVERNITE EXPRESS AND/OR FEDEX): I caused such envelope to be delivered by 19 OverNite Express and/or FedEx to the offices of the addressees. [v'] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that thc foregoing is true and correct. 22 Fxecuted on September 13, 2023, at Boise, Idaho. 23 24 Gregory Woodard 25 26 27 8 REPLY RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE POtJRTH AMENDED COMPLAINT