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  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
  • Jane Doe vs Mission Rowing et alUnlimited Civil Rights (08) document preview
						
                                

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1 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET, SUITE 300 2 SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 TELEPHONE: 805-965-5131 TELECOPIER: 805-965-6751 3 4 John C. Eck, SBN 194975 5 Attorneys for Defendant, Mission Rowing 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA - COOK DIVISION 10 11 KATHERINE LORD-KRAUSE, CASE NO.: 23CV01793 12 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT MISSION ROWING'S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND 13 v. DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF 14 MISSION ROWING, a California nonprofit POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN public benefit corporation; CONAL GROOM, SUPPORT THEREOF; DECLARATION 15 an individual; CAROL NAGY, an individual; OF JOHN C. ECK RE MEET AND and DOES 1-50, inclusive, CONFER 16 Defendants. Date: October 11, 2023 17 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept: SM3 18 Trial Date: None Set 19 [Assigned for All Purposes to the Honorable 20 Timothy J. Staffel] 21 22 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 23 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on October 11, 2023, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon 24 thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department SM3 of the above-entitled Court, located at 25 312 E. Cook Street, Building E, Santa Maria, California, Defendant Mission Rowing (hereinafter 26 "Defendant" or "Mission Rowing") will, and hereby does, demur to the First Amended 27 Complaint filed by Plaintiff Katherine Lord-Krause (hereinafter "Plaintiff') in the above- 28 referenced action. GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATIORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - - - - - -- -- - - - -- - - - - " ~- - - - - - - -- ------- 6 EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 This demurrer is brought on the grounds that the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, 2 Seventh, and Tenth Causes of Action all fail to state facts sufficient to state those causes of 3 action against this demurring Defendant. 4 This demurrer will be based on this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and 5 Authorities in support thereof, the Declaration of John C. Eck, the pleadings on file of which the 6 Court is requested to take judicial notice, and upon such other and further oral and/or 7 documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this demurrer. 8 ated: September 11 , 2023 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP 9 10 By: ~c~ John C. Eck 11 Attorneys for Defendant, Mission Rowing 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - - -- - -- - -- - - -- - - -"""'-- -- - - - -- - - -- -- -- - 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 83101 · 2762 1 DEMURRER 2 Defendant Mission Rowing demurrers, generally and specially, to the First Amended 3 Complaint ("F AC") filed by Plaintiff on the following grounds: 4 1. The First Cause of Action for Assault and Battery fails to allege sufficient facts to 5 state a cause of action against Defendant. (Civ. Proc. §430.lO(e).) 6 2. The Second Cause of Action for Sexual Battery fails to allege sufficient facts to 7 state a cause of action against Defendant. (Civ. Proc. §430.10(e). ) 8 3. The Third Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment fails to allege sufficient facts to 9 state a cause of action against Defendant. (Civ. Proc. §430.lO(e).) 10 4. The Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Ralphs Civil Rights Act fails to allege 11 sufficient facts to state a cause of action against Defendant. (Civ. Proc. §430. lO(e).) 12 5. The Sixth Cause of Action for False Imprisonment fails to allege sufficient facts 13 to state a cause of action against Defendant. (Civ. Proc. §430.lO(e).) 14 6. The Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fails 15 to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action against Defendant. (Civ. Proc. §430.lO(e).) 16 ated: September 11, 2023 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP 17 18 By: John C. Eck 19 Attorneys for Defendant, Mission Rowing 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - -- - -- - -- - -- - - -- -- - ' - -- - -- - -- - -- - - - - -- 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 I. INTRODUCTION 3 The FAC alleges that Plaintiff was a female rower who trained with Defendants Mission 4 Rowing and Conal Groom ("Groom"), an alleged employee of Mission Rowing, in Santa Ynez, 5 California. Plaintiff alleges that Groom forcibly detained and restrained, falsely imprisoned, 6 assaulted, battered, and sexually battered her during the late-night hours of August 13, 2021, 7 when Plaintiff was 17 years old. 8 Plaintiff asserts various intentional causes of action against Groom arising from an 9 alleged sexual battery on August 13, 2021. She also alleges that Mission Rowing is liable for 10 these intentional causes of action by claiming that Mission Rowing "ratified" the conduct of 11 Groom, and that Groom' s alleged sexual battery was done within the course and scope of his 12 employment. However, as set forth below, the FAC falls short of alleging sufficient facts that 13 would support liability against Mission Rowing, the employer of Groom, for these intentional 14 causes of action. 15 The FAC sets forth various alleged actions of Groom from 2002 to 2021. It also 16 generally alleges that Mission Rowing ratified Groom's actions during this period. However, as 17 the FAC concedes, Mission Rowing was not even in existence and operating until at the earliest 18 May 2019 (FAC, ,isl) or the "summer of2019." (i!68.) Thus, any of Groom's actions prior to 19 Mission Rowing's existence in 2019 cannot serve as the basis for liability based upon the theory 20 of respondeat superior (course and scope of employment) or ratification. 21 Recognizing that many of the intentional actions alleged against Groom cannot be 22 imputed to Mission Rowing because they fall outside the course and scope of employment, the 23 FAC repeatedly inserts the phrase that Groom "engaged in these abusive actions toward Plaintiff 24 in his position and capacity as a rowing coach for, and during the course and scope of his 25 employment with, Mission Rowing, and in furtherance of Mission Rowing's enterprise." Yet, 26 alleging the actions were within the course and scope of employment, and in furtherance of 27 Mission Rowing's enterprise, are legal conclusions. The facts as alleged in the FAC do not 28 support these conclusory allegations. GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - -- - - -- - -- - -- - - -- - -- - -- - - -- -- - - - -- - B EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101 -2762 1 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 2 The FAC contains many allegations of past conduct by Groom, even dating back to more 3 than 16 ~ years ago (F AC, if21 ). The FAC concedes that Mission Rowing was not even in 4 existence and operating until at the earliest May 2019 (F AC, if5 l) or the "summer of 2019." 5 (if68.) The facts that give rise to the causes of action to which Mission Rowing demurs to took 6 place on August 13, 2021. 7 The FAC alleges that on the evening of August 13, 2021, after 9:00 p.m., Groom invited 8 Plaintiff to his living quarters to have a private good bye before Plaintiff returned to her home 9 town on Seattle. (FAC, ififl44, 147.) Plaintiffs friends expressed concern at the invitation. 10 (FAC, ifl46.) Plaintiff went to Groom's place of residence, Groom blocked her from getting up 11 from her stool, brushed his hand against Plaintiffs breast, touched her waist, buttocks, thighs, 12 and inner thigh area. (FAC, ififl54, 155.) 13 That evening at 11:04 p.m., Plaintifftexted a Mission Rowing coach to alert him what 14 happened. (FAC, ifl66.) Early the next morning, the Mission Rowing coach texted back and sai 15 that is in no way appropriate or normal, and he told Plaintiff he had to report the incident. (F AC, 16 ifl67.) The Mission Rowing coach explained that he was a mandated reporter, and on August 17 15, 2021, he reported the incident to Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services, which was 18 subsequently reported to the Santa Barbara County Sheriffs office. (FAC, ,r,r172, 174.) Mission 19 Rowing's board was informed of the incident on August 16, 2021, and the board met and 20 "purportedly" removed Groom from coaching Mission Rowing thereafter. (FAC, ,r,r176, 180.) 21 There are no allegations in the FAC that Groom was criminally charged. 22 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 23 A. General Law on Demurrers 24 The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint. 25 (Code Civ. Proc.§ 589; Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) A 26 court is to "treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not 27 contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law," and may also consider "matters which 28 may be judicially noticed." (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A general demurrer is GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - -- - -- -- -- - -- -- - ~- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- - ! EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 appropriate where the complaint "does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." 2 (Code Civ. Proc.§ 430.lO(e).) Additionally, a complaint is subject to special demurrer when the 3 allegations are uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.lO(f).) 4 Though a court may adopt a liberal construction of complaint (Robertson v. Saadat 5 (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 630), it should disregard contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or 6 law. (Nealy v. County of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594.) A court need not accept 7 allegations containing legal conclusions, adjectival descriptions, or unsupported speculation. 8 (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.41h 953.) These 9 concepts are important here, as the FAC repeatedly alleges the legal conclusion that Groom 10 engaged in actions toward Plaintiff in his position and capacity as a rowing coach for, and during 11 the course and scope of his employment with, Mission Rowing, and in furtherance of Mission 12 Rowing's enterprise. Thus, the Court is not bound by Plaintiffs allegations that Groom' s 13 conduct was done within the course and scope of employment or that Mission Rowing ratified 14 his conduct. 15 B. The F AC Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts of Mission Rowing's Ratification 16 The FAC alleges that Groom' s actions were ratified by Mission Rowing and its founder, 17 Directors, and then-Executive Director Carol Nagy, who were aware of Groom's wrongful 18 conduct toward Plaintiff and other athletes but did nothing to protect Plaintiff from further harm. 19 (F AC, ,I13.) However, the claim ofratification is refuted by other facts contained in the original 20 Complaint and the F AC. 21 "The failure to discharge an agent or employee may be evidence of ratification. As 22 noted in McChristian v. Popkin (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 249, 'If the employer, after knowledge of 23 or opportunity to learn of the agent's misconduct, continues the wrongdoer in service, the 24 employer may become an abettor and may make himself liable in punitive damages."' (Murillo 25 v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 852.) For the purposes of this demurrer, it is 26 important to note that the original Complaint does not allege Mission Rowing ratified the alleged 27 sexual battery of August 13, 2021. It only alleges that Mission Rowing ratified past conduct of 28 Groom. Without ratification of Groom's alleged sexual battery, Mission Rowing cannot be GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - ---'L-- -- - - - - - - -- -- - -- - 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 liable for the intentional torts that are alleged to have been committed by Groom on August 13, 2 2021. 3 As the original Complaint and the FAC acknowledge, Mission Rowing took appropriate 4 steps when it was informed of the incident that took place late at night on August 13, 2021. The 5 F AC contains a conclusory allegation of ratification not contained in the original Complaint. 6 However, a plaintiff is bound by an allegation in an earlier version of the complaint even though 7 the allegations is omitted from later version. (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Kern County 8 (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697.) 9 The steps taken by Mission Rowing, as alleged in the original Complaint but omitted in 10 the FAC, include the following: 11 • At 11 :04 p.m., Plaintiff texted a Mission assistant rowing coach. (Complaint, if 156; FAC, ifl66). Early the next morning, August 14, 2021, the assistant coach texted "That is 12 bad ... That is in no way appropriate or normal." (FAC, if167.) 13 • The Mission Rowing assistant coach reported the incident to SafeSport. (Complaint, 14 ifl57; FAC, if167.) 15 • The assistant coach explained he was a mandated reporter and had to report the incident. (Complaint if162; FAC, ,r172.) 16 17 • On Sunday, August 15, 2021, the Mission assistant coach reported the incident to Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services. CWS subsequently reported the incident to the 18 Sheriff's office, which contacted Plaintiffs parents and commenced an investigation. (Complaint, ifl64; FAC, ifl74.) 19 20 • On August 16, 2021, Plaintiff reported the incident to a member of Mission's Board of Directors. That director contacted Plaintiffs mother and Carol Nagy and reported what 21 was told to him. (Complaint, ,r,r166, 167; FAC, ,r,r176, 177.). 22 • A Mission coach, Nagy, and another member of Mission's executive board had an 23 emergency meeting on August 16, 2021, and Mr. Groom was reportedly removed from his coaching duties with Mission thereafter. (Complaint, ,r170.) 24 25 Still, the FAC attempts to disregard all of Mission Rowing's swift actions and, instead, 26 argues ratification by alleging Ms. Nagy's "recommendation for and endorsement of Groom's 27 continued employment by Mission. (Complaint, ifl 72; FAC, ,r182.) In her initial Complaint, 28 Plaintiff makes no allegations that Groom was allowed to continue with Mission Rowing. And GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LlP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - -- - -- -- - -- -- -- - -~ - -- -- - - - -- -- - - - - - 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 both the Complaint and F AC contain numerous factual allegations. Yet, the F AC, for the first 2 time and without any factual basis, alleges that Mission Rowing allowed Groom to continue to 3 engage in various coaching activities, including activities involving minors, and to remain 4 employed with Mission Rowing. (FAC, 1186.) These allegations contradict the allegations in the 5 original Complaint, and they contain no facts, only "information and belief." 6 C. First Cause of Action (Assault & Battery) 7 The First Cause of Action for Assault and Battery against Mission Rowing fails to state 8 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Civ. Proc. §430.lO(e).) This cause of action is 9 alleged not only against Groom, but it is also alleged against Mission Rowing. The FAC alleges 10 that Mission Rowing and Conal Groom "committed acts which resulted in the imminent 11 apprehension of harmful and offensive contact" with Plaintiff. (FAC, 1191.) However, the FAC 12 fails to allege any facts that support Mission Rowing participated in the alleged assault and 13 battery of plaintiff. It merely contains the legal conclusion that Groom committed the assault 14 and battery within the course and scope of employment with Mission Rowing and to further 15 Mission's Rowing's enterprise of training athletes. 16 For Mission Rowing to be liable for Groom's alleged assault and battery, Groom's 17 actions must be determined to be within the course and scope of his employment with Mission 18 Rowing. Where the operable, overt, observable facts are indisputable (such as considered in a 19 demurrer), the question is one oflaw. (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 20 962,968, see Bingener v. City ofLos Angeles (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 134, 140. Thus, the issue 21 of "course and scope of employment" may be properly decided at the demurrer stage. 22 Groom' s alleged assault and battery of Plaintiff, as alleged in the FAC, was not done 23 within the course and scope of his employment with Mission Rowing. "Historically, the scope o 24 employment doctrine has been limited to acts which are directly or indirectly in furtherance of 25 the employer's purpose, precluding vicarious liability for criminal acts not related to the 26 employer's enterprise." (Thorn v. City of Glendale (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1382.) An act 27 is within the course and scope of employment only if: 28 "(a) it is of the kind the employee is employed to perform; (b) it occurs GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - -- - - - -- -- - - -- - -- . . . . . _ - - -- - - - - - -- -- - - - - 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2782 1 substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least 2 in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by 3 the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master." 4 (Thorn v. City of Glendale (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1382.) 5 Groom's actions, as alleged in the FAC, are not actions that he was employed to perform. 6 They include allegations of battery that took place late at night at his residence, which is not 7 where his training of Plaintiff took place. They were not actions that were done to serve his 8 employer, Mission Rowing. They were unexpected by Mission Rowing and were, in fact, 9 actions that Mission Rowing strictly prohibits. 10 D. Second Cause of Action (Sexual Battery, Civil Code §1708.5) 11 The Second Cause of Action for Sexual Battery against Mission Rowing fails to state 12 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Civ. Proc. §430. lO(e)) and it is barred by statutory 13 and case law. This cause of action alleges that Mission Rowing "caused an offensive contact 14 with one or more intimate parts of Plaintiff's body, including Plaintiffs breast and buttocks." 15 (Complaint, ,185.) There are no allegations in the FAC that claim anyone at Mission Rowing, 16 other than Groom, sexually battered Plaintiff. Thus, liability must be based upon vicarious 17 liability of Mission Rowing. As set forth below, an employer is not liable for the sexual battery 18 of its employee because such action is outside the course and scope of employment. 19 Several decisions from California Courts have addressed whether an employee's sexual 20 misconduct directed toward a third party is within the scope of employment for respondeat 21 superior purposes. Those cases hold that, except where sexual misconduct by on-duty police 22 officers against members of the public is involved (e.g., Mary M, supra, 54 Cal.3d 202, 285 23 Cal.Rptr. 99, 814 P.2d 1341; White v. County of Orange (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 566,212 24 Cal.Rptr. 493), the employer is not vicariously liable to the third party for such misconduct 25 (e.g., Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 718, [church not liable for 26 repeated acts of sexual assault on minor by Sunday school teacher]; Rita M v. Roman Catholic 27 Archbishop (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1453, [Roman Catholic archbishop not liable for seduction o 28 parishioner by priests]; Alma W Oakland Unified School District (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATIORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - -- -- - - -- -- -- - -- - - ' - - -- -- - -- -- - -- - - - - - B EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 [school district not liable for janitor's rape of student]). 2 "In those decisions, vicarious liability was rejected as a matter of law because it could not 3 be demonstrated that the various acts of sexual misconduct arose from the conduct of the 4 respective enterprises. In particular, the acts had been undertaken solely for the employees' 5 personal gratification and had no purpose connected to the employment. Moreover, the acts had 6 not been engendered by events or conditions relating to any employment duties or tasks; nor had 7 they been necessary to the employees' comfort, convenience, health, or welfare while at work." 8 (Farmers Ins. Group v. County ofSanta Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1006-1007.) 9 Moreover, an employer will not be held vicariously liable where it clearly appears that 10 neither directly nor indirectly could the employee have been serving his employer. (Farmers Ins. 11 Group v. County ofSanta Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1008.) A sexual tort will not be 12 considered engendered by the employment, for purposes of respondeat superior liability, unless 13 its motivating emotions were fairly attributable to work-related events or conditions. (Brown v. 14 USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal. App. 5th 1077.) 15 Additional cases have held that an employer is not responsible for the sexual torts of an 16 employee. In one case, a school district was not liable for a janitor's rape of a student. (Alma W 17 v. Oakland Unified School District (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d.) A school district could not be held 18 liable for claims brought by a student who alleged a guidance counselor sexually assaulted her in 19 his office because, if the assault occurred, the counselor was acting outside the scope of his 20 employment. (Daza v. Los Angeles Community College District (2016) 247 Cal.App.41h 260, 21 269.) In another case, the court ruled that, as a matter oflaw, an employer could not be held 22 liable for its employee ' s alleged assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of 23 emotional distress. (KG. v. County ofRiverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1378.) 24 E. Third Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment (Civ. Code §51.9) 25 The Third Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment against Mission Rowing fails to state 26 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Civ. Proc. §430.IO(e)). This cause of action 27 alleges that Groom, acting on behalf of an as an agent and servant of Mission Rowing, made 28 sexual advances, solicitations, and engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATIORNEYSANOCOUNSELORS - -- - -- -- - -- -- - - - - -~ -- -- -- - -- -- - - -- - - 6 EAST FIGUEROA STREET- STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 sexual nature or of a hostile nature towards Plaintiff based on her gender that were unwelcome 2 and pervasive or severe. 3 "As a matter of law, however, sexual harassment is not within the scope of employment 4 even where the harassing employee is the plaintiffs supervisor. A plaintiff therefore may not 5 hold an employer liable for sexual harassment under the doctrine ofrespondeat superior." 6 (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833,852 (citing Farmers Ins. Group v. 7 County ofSanta Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1011-1015.) 8 F. Fifth Cause of Action (Ralphs Civil Rights Act, Civ. Code §51.7) 9 The Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Ralphs Civil Rights Act against Mission 10 Rowing fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Civ. Proc. §430.IO(e)). This 11 cause of action alleges that Groom, acting on behalf of and as an agent and servant of Mission 12 Rowing, subjected Plaintiff to violence and/or intimidation by threats of violence, against her 13 person on account of her sex. 14 There are no factual allegations in the FAC that Mission Rowing's alleged actions against 15 Plaintiff were committed against her on the account of her sex. The analysis set forth regarding 16 the first and second causes of action, in particular whether the employee's act was found to be 17 within the course and scope of employment, are equally applicable to this cause of action. That 18 is, for an employer to be liable for violation of Civil Code section 51. 7 based upon an 19 employee's conduct, the court must find that the employee's conduct was within the course and 20 scope of his employer. As set forth above, Groom's actions as alleged in the FAC were not 21 within the course and scope of his employment. (See Beliveau v. Caras (C.D. Cal. 1995) 873 22 F.Supp. 1393, 1401.) Thus, we request that this cause of action be dismissed. 23 G. Sixth Cause of Action (False Imprisonment) 24 The Sixth Cause of Action for False Imprisonment against Mission Rowing fails to state 25 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Civ. Proc. §430.10(e)). This cause of action 26 alleges that Mission Rowing, through Groom, falsely imprisoned Plaintiff. However, just like 27 the other causes of action referenced above, allegations of Groom's false imprisonment will not 28 be imputed to his employer unless his actions were done within the course and scope of his GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - -- - -- -- - -- - - - - -~ . _ , _- -- - -- - -- -- -- - - - - 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 03101-2762 1 employment. As set forth above, there is nothing about Groom's employment that comes close 2 to furthering Mission Rowing's purposes in running its nonprofit club. 3 H. Seventh Cause of Action (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 4 The Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fails to state 5 facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Civ. Proc. §430.IO(e)) and it is barred by statutory 6 and case law. One court has held that an employer was not vicariously liable for plaintiffs 7 emotional distress resulting from threatening emails and Internet postings sent from its 8 employee's workplace computer. The emails and postings had nothing to do with the employee's 9 job duties and were plainly outside the scope of employment. (Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, 10 Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 813-814.) 11 ated: September 11, 2023 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP 12 13 By: Attorneys for Defendant, Mission Rowing 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - - - -- - - -- - -- - -- - - -......__-- - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - 8 EAST AGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 83101-2762 1 DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK 2 I, John C. Eck, declare as follows: 3 1. I am an attorney, licensed to practice before the courts of the State of California, 4 and am a partner in the law firm of Griffith & Thornburgh, LLP, counsel of record for Defendant 5 Mission Rowing. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could and would 6 competently testify thereto if called upon to do so. 7 2. On July 12, 2023, I sent a letter to Plaintiffs attorney, Janean Acevedo Daniels 8 that set forth an explanation and legal authority relating to the issues I had with Plaintiff's 9 original Complaint. The letter included requests that Plaintiff dismiss several causes of action 10 against Mission Rowing. 11 3. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on or about August 3, 2023, and served 12 it that day via email. After August 3, 2023, Ms. Daniels and I spoke on the phone regarding 13 Mission Rowing file a demurrer to the First Amended Complaint. We were unable to reach an 14 agreement on further revisions to the First Amended Complaint; therefore, Mission Rowing is 15 filing this demurrer. 16 I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the 17 foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 11, 2023, at Santa Barbara, California. 18 19 John C. Eck, Declarant 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANOCOUNSELORS - - - - -- -- -- - -- -- -- -....,_- - - - - - -- - -- -- -- - - 8 EAST FIGUEROA STREET- STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I am employed in the County of Santa Barbara, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and am not a party to the within action; my business address is 8 East Figueroa Street, Suite 3 300, Santa Barbara, California 93101-2762; my business email address is cordero@g-tlaw.com. 4 On September 11, 2023, I served the foregoing document described as DEFENDANT MISSION ROWING'S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO FIRST 5 AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK RE MEET AND CONFER 6 on interested parties in this action as follows: PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST. 7 8 BY MAIL: by placing D the original ~ a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as shown above or on the attached service list. I am "readily familiar" with the 9 firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. postal service on that same day with postage 10 thereon fully prepaid at Santa Barbara, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal 11 cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. 12 D BY OVERNIGHT COURIER: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package 13 provided by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons at the addresses listed above or on the attached service list. I placed the envelope or package for 14 collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier. 15 D BY FACSIMILE: I caused to be transmitted the document described herein via the fax 16 number listed above or on the attached service list. Upon completion of said facsimile transmission, the transmitting machine issued a transmission report showing the 17 transmission was complete and without error. 18 D BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I delivered said document by hand to the addressee listed above or on the attached service list. 19 BY E-MAIL (Pursuant to CCR 2.251 and CCP 1010.6): I caused the document to be sent 20 electronically to the person at the e-mail address listed above or on the attached service list. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission any electronic 21 message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 22 D BY ELECTRONIC FILING SERVICE PROVIDER (EFSP) (Pursuant to CCR 2.251 and CCP 1010.6): I am readily familiar with the firm's practice for filing electronically. I 23 caused e-service notification to be electronically sent through the certified, court approved EFSP, to the address which was listed as the designated service contact on the 24 EFSP. 25 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 26 Executed on September I I, 2023, at S~ 27 28 Kimberlie Cordero GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATTORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS - -- -- - - -- -- -- -- - -~ - -- -- - -- - -- -- - -- - l EAST FIGUEROA STREET - STE 300 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF JOHN C. ECK SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-2762 1 SERVICE LIST 2 3 Counsel for Plaintiff Janean Acevedo Daniels 4 Law Office of Janean Acevedo Daniels 5 1160 Via de Rey Goleta, CA 93117 6 E-mail: janean@jadanielslaw.com 7 Counsel for Defendant Conal Groom 8 Steven H. Schwartz 9 SCHWARTZ & JANZEN, LLP 12100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite #1125 10 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Email: sschwartz@sj-law.com 11 Luis Esparza 12 Esparza Law Group, P.C. 13 Post Office Box 343 Santa Barbara, CA 93102 14 E-mail: info@esparzalaw.com 15 16 Counsel for Defendant Carol Nagy Rinat Klier-Erlich 17 Brian T. Smith ZELMS ERLICH & MACK 18 20920 Warner Center Lane, Suite B Woodland Hills, CA 91367 19 E-mail: rerlich@zelmerlich.com 20 bsmith@zelmserlicb.com 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP ATIORNEYSANDCOUNSELORS -