Proof of Service: QUAIL HOLLOW CONDOMINIUMASSOCIATION Vs JOSEPH M DELAUGHDER VS.JOSEPH M DELAUGHDER ET AL

Case Number: BC722308 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 61 NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL TENTATIVE Plaintiff Nike USA, Inc.s Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Defendants to provide notice. DISCUSSION The authority of a trial court to grant a new trial is established and circumscribed by statute. Section 657 sets out seven grounds for such a motion: (1) [i]rregularity in the proceedings; (2) [m]isconduct of the jury; (3) [a]ccident or surprise; (4) [n]ewly discovered evidence; (5) [e]xcessive or inadequate damages; (6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence; and (7) [e]rror in law. [Citation.] (Montoya v. Barragan (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.) When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant, and Cross-Complainant Nike USA, Inc. (Nike) moves for a new trial on three of the above grounds: irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of the evidence, and errors of law. Nikes argument based on procedural irregularity is based on the courts purported lack of consideration of its objections to its statement of decision. (Motion at pp. 1213.) Nike argues for insufficiency of the evidence, based on purportedly contradictory findings that neither Nike nor Defendants and Cross-Complainants 5860 West Jefferson, LLC, 5860 West Jefferson I, LLC, and Samitaur Constructs (Defendants) had prevailed on their respective claims for damages based on construction delay, and on other issues. (Motion at pp. 1320.) Nike finally argues that the statement of decision contains errors of law in the application of the burden of proof under the lease agreement, and fails to adequately set forth any declaration of the parties rights under the lease. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Defendants in opposition argue that the present motion exceeds the page limit articulated in California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1113. (Opposition at p. 9.) They further contend that the present motions memorandum, declaration, and supporting evidence were filed and served tardily. (Opposition at pp. 89.) Defendant argues that Nikes objections to the statement of decision were late, and that the court in any event had notice of Nikes objections from its earlier-filed Request for Statement of Decision. (Opposition at pp. 1011.) Defendants argue that the courts statement of decision was based on substantial evidence and contains no errors of law. (Opposition at pp. 1118.) Plaintiffs memorandum exceeds the page limits prescribed by CRC Rule 3.1113. That rule states that no opening or responding memorandum except in summary judgment motions may exceed 15 pages, excluding the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (d).) Excluding these last matters, Plaintiffs memorandum here extends to 21 pages. A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (g).) The memorandum and supporting materials are also actually late. Nikes notice of intent to move for new trial was filed on May 28, 2024. Per Code of Civil Procedure § 659a, the party seeking new trial shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the motion within 10 days of filing the notice [of intention to move for a new trial]. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) Although Nike filed the memorandum and supporting declaration by the June 7, 2024 deadline, it did not serve them until June 8 (Evans Decl. ¶ 8), and did not file or serve the supporting evidence until June 10. These timelines are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 342), and the statute provides courts the power, for good cause shown by affidavit or by written stipulation of the parties to extend the period for filing and serving materials for an additional period not to exceed 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) A court may retroactively extend the deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did not seek an extension in advance. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 342.) Here, in the absence of prejudice shown by Defendants arising from the tardiness of service of the memorandum and supporting evidence, the court will exercise its discretion to assess the motion on its merits. Nike argues that the entry of judgment on the statement of decision evidenced irregularity in the proceedings, because the court entered judgment on May 14, 2024, in the erroneous belief that Nikes objections had not been timely filed, when in fact Nike had until May 16, 2024, to file such objections. Nikes argument as to the timing of the objections is persuasive. The proposed statement of decision not captioned proposed, but identified as such in its opening paragraph was filed and served on April 26, 2024. Per CRC Rule 3.1590, subd. (g), [a]ny party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment. 15 days after service of the statement of decision would have been May 11, a Saturday, rendering the deadline for filing objections Monday, May 13, 2024. Yet because the statement of decision was served by mail, the time for filing of objections was extended by five calendar days, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure § 1013, subd. (a). Thus the deadline by which to serve objections was May 16, 2024. Nikes objections were served on May 14, 2024, the same day the court entered judgment on the proposed statement of decision in the belief that no objections had been timely filed. (See 5/14/2024 Minute Order.) However, Nike has suffered no prejudice resulting from the claimed irregularity. In granting a new trial based on judicial error, [p]rejudice is required . . . and there is no discretion to grant a new trial for harmless error. (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.) Before Nike filed its objections to the statement of decision, it filed on May 8, 2024, a Request for Statement of Decision, taking issue with what Nike termed procedural ambiguities in the statement of decision and itemizing 87 issues, questions, and arguments for the court to consider. The court considered these issues in its order dated May 14, 2024, and found that its proposed statement of decision sufficiently addresses the evidence and legal and factual issues raised by Nike. (5/14/2024 Minute Order.) The issues raised in Nikes request for statement of decision parallel the objections it later offered, and were considered by the court. This is thus unlike the case in Raville v. Singh (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1130, cited by Nike, in which a different judge signed off on a statement of decision after the judge who had authored the tentative version had died. The same judge here held trial, prepared a proposed statement of decision, reviewed Nikes arguments, and entered judgment. As to insufficiency of the evidence, Nike contends that the courts decision does not support its conclusion that the premises were substantially complete on July 28, 2018. (Motion at pp. 1415.) However, the statement of decision notes that the City issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on July 28, 2018. (Statement of Decision (SOD) at p. 6.) The court noted that it was necessary to determine whether the BSC [base shell and core] or tenant improvements were completed to the extent that only punchlist items remained and whether any remaining uncompleted items adversely affected Nikes use of the property. (Ibid.) The court cited the myriad photos of the construction, and determined no items remained to be addressed which adversely affected Nikes occupancy. (Ibid.) The courts finding was supported by substantial evidence, as noted by Defendants in opposition. (Opposition at p.13.) Nike argues that this courts findings that neither Nike nor Defendants prevailed on their breach of contract claims as to who caused the delay are inherently contradictory, because one party must have caused the delay. (Motion at p. 16.) Yet this argument fails to reckon with the applicable burden of proof. The parties each bore the burden to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e. to present evidence, which when weighed with contrary evidence, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth. (City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 314 .) But if two parties make conflicting showings of culpability for the same event, and both showings are equally persuasive, then neither has shown that theirs has the greater probability of truth, and neither has met their burden. The courts statement of decision on the causes of the delay addresses all material disputes and is supported by substantial evidence. Although Nike argues that the court was required to make findings as to the cause of each period of delay, it presents no authority holding that such detail is required. (Motion at pp. 1618.) The applicable authority suggests otherwise: A trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A trial court is not required to make findings with regard to detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence. Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result. Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error. [Citation.] In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a party's request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the court's decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163.) The statement of decision meets this standard. Nike further argues that the courts finding as to the tardiness of its request to rent parking spaces under the lease was erroneous. This argument is as follows: The lease provides that Nike could exercise an option to certain parking spaces by the commencement of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date. (Motion Exh. 81, Addendum ¶ 54.1.) Nike cites evidence that it provided notice of its intent to rent 123 monthly parking passes in an email dated January 23, 2020. (Motion Exh. T.) And because Nike had 18 months to request the parking until February 1, 2020, given a commencement date of July 28, 2018 Nike argues that no substantial evidence supports the courts finding that Nikes request was untimely. (Motion at pp. 1819.) The lease, however, did not give Nike until the end of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date to seek the parking spaces. The lease instead set the deadline at the commencement of the eighteenth month i.e., until January 1, 2020. Nike thus did not have until February 1, 2020,to rent the parking spaces, and by this reckoning, Nikes January 23, 2020 request was untimely, and the courts reasoning stands. Nikes argument as to the breach of warranty claim is also unpersuasive, as the courts findings as to the condition of the roof was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the parties were aware of the susceptibility of the roof to leaks, yet requested the type of roof at issue anyway. (SOD at p. 7.) The court found no evidence of structural defects, and that the Defendants had maintained and addressed the leaks that Nike identified. (Ibid.) Nikes arguments as to errors of law, meanwhile, are similarly unavailing. Nike argues that the court misapplied the burden of proof, because under the lease, any delay was attributed to Defendants unless proven to be caused by Nike. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Yet Nike identifies no provision of the lease attributing delayed substantial completion to Defendants by default. It identifies a provision of an attached work letter stating that the date of substantial completion shall be deemed to be . . . the date on which the Tenant Improvements would have been Substantially completed if no such a . . . Delay had occurred, provided that the delay was caused by the lessee (Nike). (Motion at pp. 2021, citing Motion Exh. 81, at pp. 6465.) This provision does not purport to create a presumption of either partys default for the cause of delay, or to affect the ordinary burden of proof applicable to a breach of contract action. Nike further identifies provisions indicating that time was of the essence, and setting a date for completion of construction, but once more, these provisions do not purport to assign a presumption of fault for the delay to Defendants. (Motion at p. 22, citing Motion Exh. 81 at p. 65.) Finally, Nike argues that the statement of decision rendered judgment in favor of Defendants on their declaratory relief cause of action, without offering the actual declaration of rights requested, or a contrary declaration to what Nike requested in its Complaint. (Motion at p. 25.) Nike relies on the case Kroff v. Kroff (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 404, in which the court stated: A dispute existed as to the meaning of a document and the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration of her rights. It was the duty of the court to set forth the meaning and effect of the clause in question. Here the court merely adjudged that plaintiff take nothing by her said cause of action, and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff. (Id. at p. 405.) The present case is distinguishable, as the court here did not merely adjudge that plaintiff take nothing and defendants prevail, but offered a statement of decision explaining the facts of the case and its reasoning. Nike sought a declaration that the property was not substantially complete as of the date of the complaint, that its obligation to pay rent had not begun, that Plaintiff was entitled to immediate correction and completion of all incomplete or defective aspects of the property, and it is entitled to free rent for a number of days determined by the court. (FAC ¶ 57.) Yet these prayers for relief were addressed by the courts determination that the property was substantially complete as of July 28, 2018. (SOD at p. 6.) The motion is therefore DENIED.

MOTION TO VACATE NOTICE OF COTTONWOOD CANYON SETTLEMENT OF ENTIRE CASE HILLS COMMUNITY TEC1204451 FILED ON JUNE 2, 2020, BY ASSOCIATION VS COTTONWOOD CANYON HILLS ARMENTA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION Tentative Ruling: No tentative will be given, appearances are required. Counsel should be prepared to address why this matter should not be dismissed pursuant to the CCP 664.6 provision in the settlement agreement.

Case Number: 21CHCV00247 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/12/24 Case #21CHCV00247 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES Motion filed on 3/13/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Jeffrey Harris and Austin Harris, Co-Trustees of the Harris Family Trust RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Helene Stahl and Extensions Plus, Inc. NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order awarding Plaintiff attorneys fees and costs in the total amount of $73,118.75 comprised of $63,643.75 in attorney fees, $7,575.00 in expert fees and $1,900 in fees for the instant motion. RULING : The motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part, as set forth below. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arose out of the alleged breach of a commercial lease and guaranty of the lease. Plaintiff Jeffrey Harris and Austin Harris, Co-Trustees of the Harris Family Trust (Plaintiff) were the landlord and Defendant Extensions Plus (Extensions Plus) was the tenant and Defendant Helene Stahl (Stahl) was the guarantor (collectively, Defendants). Possession of the premises was not at issue as the tenant no longer occupied the premises. Plaintiffs contended that the commercial tenant made unpermitted alterations causing substantial damages to the property and then abandoned the premises with past due rent owing to set up their business in a new location. On 3/30/21, Plaintiffs filed this action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and (3) Common Count. On 10/22/21, Defendants filed answers to the complaint. After a court trial, on 1/30/24, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on Plaintiffs complaint. ( See 1/30/24 Judgment). Plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of $203,387.50, prejudgment interest in the amount of $50,036.50 for a total award of $253,424.00. Id . On 3/13/24, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion seeking an order awarding Plaintiff attorneys fees and costs in the total amount of $73,118.75 comprised of $63,643.75 in attorney fees, $7,575.00 in expert fees and $1,900 in fees for the instant motion. Defendants have opposed the motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply to the opposition. ANALYSIS Attorneys fees are recoverable as an item of costs when authorized by contract, statute or law. See CCP 1033.5(a)(10). Civil Code 1717 provides, in relevant part: (a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract , whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. Where a contract provides for attorney's fees, as set forth above, that provision shall be construed as applying to the entire contract, unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the contract. Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit. Attorney's fees provided for by this section shall not be subject to waiver by the parties to any contract which is entered into after the effective date of this section. Any provision in any such contract which provides for a waiver of attorney's fees is void. (b)(1) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section , whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section . The lease agreement/contract which provided the basis for this action contained the following attorney fee provision: Attorney's Fees . If any Party or Broker brings an action or proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in tort, contract or equity, or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. Such fees may be awarded in the same suit or recovered in a separate suit, whether or not such action or proceeding is pursued to decision or judgment. The term, "Prevailing Party" shall include, without limitation, a Party or Broker who substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought, as the case may be, whether by compromise, settlement, judgment, or the abandonment by the other Party or Broker of its claim or defense. The attorneys' fees award shall not be computed in accordance with any court fee schedule but shall be such as to fully reimburse all attorneys' fees reasonably incurred. In addition, Lessor shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and service of notices of Default and consultations in connection therewith, whether or not a legal action is subsequently commenced in connection with such Default or resulting Breach ($200 is a reasonable minimum per occurrence for such services and consultation). ( See Complaint, Ex.A; Cordero-Sacks Decl., Ex.1). Similarly, the Guaranty provides: In the event any action be brought by said Lessor against Guarantors hereunder to enforce the obligation of Guarantors hereunder, the unsuccessful party in such action shall pay to the prevailing party therein a reasonable attorneys fee. The attorneys fee award shall not be computed in accordance with any court fee schedule, but shall be such as to full reimburse all attorneys fees reasonably incurred. Id . Based on the 1/30/24 Judgment, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys fees, not unlimited legal fees as claimed in the motion. ( See Motion, p.2:4). The amount of attorneys fees to be awarded is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. PLCM Group (2000) 22 C4th 1084, 1095-1096, internal citations omitted. Further, it has been held that experienced trial judges are the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in their courts and their judgment will only be disturbed on appeal if it is clearly wrong and an abuse of discretion. Id . A trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services without expert testimony. Id . In calculating a reasonably attorney fee award, the trial court begins with the lodestar (the number of hours reasonably spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate). Id . The reasonable hourly rate is the rate prevailing in the community for similar work. Id . Here, the Court finds that the hourly rates ranging from $375/hour for associate work and $375-$475/hour for principal work to be reasonable. However, the Court finds that the amount of time claimed to have been spent is excessive. The billing entries are extremely vague. ( See Cordero-Sacks Decl., Ex.2). For example, many of the entries are merely titled Draft without any indication of what was being drafted. Id . Other examples of vague billing entries are those titled Reduced Hourly without any indication of what task was performed at the reduced rate. Id . As such, the Court finds that a 25% reduction of the attorneys fees requested is warranted. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to support its request for an award of expert fees. In the motion, Plaintiff merely argues that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs as provided for in the Commercial Lease and Guaranty, which includes expert witness fees. (emphasis in original) ( See Motion, p.5:28-p.6:3). An award of contractual attorneys fees may not include expenses expressly denominated by statute as nonrecoverable cost items, such as expert fees not ordered by the court, postage, telephone and copying charges. See Carwash of America-PO LLC (2002) 97 CA4th 540, 544; Hsu (2005) 126 CA4th 1330, 1340-1342 (disapproving Bussey (1990) 225 CA3d 1162, 1166); Jones (2005) 127 CA4th 542, 550-551. It has been held by some courts that a contract provision which allows the prevailing party to recover all necessary expenses, or similar broad language, may permit an award of expert fees not ordered by the court. Here, it cannot be argued that the attorneys fee provisions in the lease and/or guaranty are so broad as to cover expert fees. ( See Complaint, Ex.A; Cordero-Sacks Decl., Ex.1). The only reference to recovering costs and expenses in the attorneys fee provision contained in the lease relates to costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and service of notices of Default and consultations in connection therewith, whether or not a legal action is subsequently commenced in connection with such Default or resulting Breach ($200 is a reasonable minimum per occurrence for such services and consultation). CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded $49,157.81 in attorneys fees (($63,643.75 + $1,900.00) = $65,543.75 25% ($16,385.94) = $49,157.81). Plaintiffs request for expert fees is denied.

Case Number: 24STCV09612 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 73 07/11/24 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding ROOSEVELT WHITE v. VANMAR CAPITAL LLC ( 24STCV11319 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Roosevelt White (Pro Per) Counsel for Defendants/moving party: Edward McCutchan (Sunderland McCutchan, LLP) demurrer to complaint ( filed on 5/10/24) TENTATIVE RULING The Court sustains Defendants demurrer to the Complaints third cause of action with 20 days leave to amend. The Court overrules Defendants demurrer to the rest of the Complaint. I. BACKGROUND On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff Roosevelt White (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Vanmar Capital LLC. The Complaint alleges the following causes of action: C/A 1: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2966 C/A 2: Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2924i C/A 3: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing C/A 4: Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage C/A 5: Violation of Business & Professional Code § 17200 The Complaint alleges the following. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff is the owner and occupant of the property located at 1226 W 66th Steet, Los Angeles, CA 90044 (the Property). Plaintiff resided with his mother on the Property for over 20 years. On May 22, 2020, Plaintiffs mother passed away. On or about April 22, 2021, Plaintiff recorded the Grant Deed to the Property. On or about March 23, 2022, Plaintiff took out a loan in the amount of $435,000.00 with Defendant. Plaintiff concurrently executed a Deed of Trust as security for the note. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants predatory " loan to own" practices and interference with contractual relations has resulted in Plaintiff potentially losing the Property. On May 10, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer to the Complaint . · Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs entire complaint arguing Plaintiff is not the real party in interest to pursue Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 24STCV09612 in light of his current and active Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Court action in the United States Bankruptcy Court of Californias Central Division in bankruptcy court Case No. 223-bk-17860-VZ. o The Court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading since Plaintiff is in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. o Defendant also argues in this Los Angeles County action, there is a misjoinder of the United States Bankruptcy Trustee given Plaintiffs current Chapter 13 bankruptcy where the assigned United States Trustee the real party in interest and has the authority and duty to pursue the causes of action as an asset of the bankruptcy estate in this state court action as a matter of law. · Defendant also demurs to Plaintiffs third cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Defendant argues it cannot be ascertained whether the alleged contract supporting the Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Allegation is written, oral or implied by conduct as mandated by CCP section 430.10 (g). Plaintiff did not attach any contract to his Complaint. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants demurrer arguing: · Defendant's Demurrer is premised entirely on the basis that due to Plaintiffs prior Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, this Court has no jurisdiction for this matter. · However, Defendants argument is now moot as the bankruptcy has been dismissed. o Plaintiff does not dispute that at the time the Complaint in the instant matter was filed, a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 had been initiated in the Central District of California. However, no plan was ever confirmed, and Plaintiff's bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Trustee on May 21, 2024. (See Exhibits 1 and 2 to the accompanying Request for Judicial Notice.) o Defendant's claim that there is a defect or misjoinder of parties is likewise moot as the United States Bankruptcy Trustee, is no longer a real party in interest and has no authority to pursue the 18 present causes of action. · Plaintiffs third cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is sufficiently pled o Plaintiff's implied covenant claim stems from allegations that Defendant frustrated and prevented Plaintiff's ability to complete renovations of his own property by demanding that he work on Defendant's two other properties first. Defendant further interfered with Plaintiffs ability to list and sell the subject Property by unreasonably refusing to agree to Plaintiff's prospective buyer in September 2023. There was no express contractual term that Defendant would not frustrate or prevent Plaintiff from renovating his Property or to unreasonably withhold consent to a sale, but doing so denied Plaintiff the benefit of his contract with Defendant, namely, to borrow money to renovate his Property in order to be able to sell it. On July 7, 2024, Defendant filed a reply: · Defendants reply does not address Plaintiffs assertion that the bankruptcy case was dismissed. Defendant incorporates its objections to Plaintiffs June 27, 2024 filed declaration and request for judicial notice in that the documents he has submitted are inadmissible hearsay and are not certified as being true and correct copies of the originals in the United States Bankruptcy Court. II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for Demurrer A demurrer tests the sufficiency of whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in contextany defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged. ( E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaints properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. ( Id .) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. ( Hahn , supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) B. Request for Judicial Notice Defendant requests judicial notice of the April 24, 2024 certified copy of plaintiff, Roosevelt Whites Chapter 13 plan in the United States Bankruptcy Court of California, Central Division, Case No. 223-bk-17860-VZ. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of: (1) The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California's Order of Dismissal filed in the matter entitled In re: White, Roosevelt, Case No. 2:23-bk-17860-VZ; and (2) Chapter 13 Standing Trustee's Final Report and Accounting, with financials redacted. The court may take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States, [r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States, and [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).) The Court grants Defendant and Plaintiffs requests for judicial notice. The Court notes, however, taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. ( Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) When judicial notice is taken of a document, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. (Ibid.) Judicial notice of a Court record is limited to the existence of the documents and is not the same as taking notice of the truth of any matters or facts stated therein. ( Ibid .) C. Objections to Plaintiffs Declaration Defendant objects to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Plaintiffs Declaration arguing that the documents submitted for judicial notice are not certified. The Court overrules Defendants objections. As discussed above, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiffs submitted documents. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents, but does not take notice of the truth of any matters or facts stated therein. D. Meet and Confer Requirement Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) Here, counsel for Defendant submitted a declaration stating he sent correspondence to Plaintiffs counsel outlining the deficiencies of the Complaint on April 22, 2024 and April 24, 2024. (McCutchan Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) The Court finds the moving party satisfied its obligations to meet and confer and the Court proceeds on the merits. E. Demurrer to the Complaint Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs entire Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff has a current Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Court action in the United States Bankruptcy Court of Californias Central Division in bankruptcy court Case No. 223-bk-17860-VZ. Defendant argues that due to Plaintiffs Chapter 13 bankruptcy action, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this state court action and the United States trustee is the real party in interest and has the authority and duty to pursue the causes of action as an asset of the bankruptcy estate in this action. In support, Defendant cites to two federal cases, which are non-binding authority on this Court. (See Reed v. City of Arlington (2011) 5th Cir. 650 F. 3d 571 and Copelan v. Techtronics Industries Co., Ltd . (2015) 95 F. Supp. 3d 1230.) In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants argument is moot as Plaintiff's bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Trustee on May 21, 2024. (Plaintiffs RJN, Exhs. 1 and 2.) In support, Plaintiff attached the United States Bankruptcy Courts Order of Dismissal filed in the bankruptcy case. (Plaintiffs RJN, Ex. 1.) Defendant does not address this contention in its reply. Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that the demurrer to the entire Complaint should be sustained on these grounds. Accordingly, Defendants demurrer to the entire Complaint is overruled on this basis. F. Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action: Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Defendant demurs to the Complaints third cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. A cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the following elements: (1) plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract; (2) plaintiff did all, or substantially all of the significant things that the contract required him to do or plaintiff was excused from having do to those things; (3) all conditions required for defendants performance had occurred or were excused; (4) defendant unfairly interfered with plaintiffs right to receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) plaintiff was harmed by defendants conduct. (CACI 325.) The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied by law in every contract, and it acts as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other partys rights to the benefits of the contract. ( Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031-1032.) The Complaint alleges that on March 23, 2022, Plaintiff took out a loan in the amount of $435,000.00 with Defendant. (Compl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff concurrently executed a Deed of Trust as security for the note. ( Ibid .) Plaintiff understood that under the agreement on the loan, he would owe the full amount to Defendant after one year. (Compl., ¶ 34) Plaintiff intended to renovate the home and resell it in order to pay off the loan. ( Ibid .) In Plaintiffs opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant prevented Plaintiff from renovating the Property which prevented Plaintiff from reselling the Property. (Compl., ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant further interfered with Plaintiffs ability to list and sell the subject Property by unreasonably refusing to agree to Plaintiff's prospective buyer in September 2023. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff has not pled the terms of the contract or attached the contract to the Complaint. Plaintiff does not specify whether the contract is written, oral or implied by conduct. Accordingly, the Court sustains Defendants demurrer to the third cause of action with leave to amend. III. DISPOSITION The Court sustains Defendants demurrer to the Complaints third cause of action with 20 days leave to amend. The Court overrules Defendants demurrer to the rest of the Complaint.

Case Number: 22STCV33658 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-11-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER DOCUMENTS MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed/Plaintiff, Iyana Jackson RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family welling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to request for production of documents, numbers 4, 9, and 12 from Plaintiff Iyana Jackson. The responses consist of references to other items. Such responses constitute an improper, factually incomplete answer. Responding Party may not refer to prior discovery. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The unopposed motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.210-2031.240 within 30 days of this order. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows three (3) remaining scheduled motions to compel further responses scheduled through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next motion to compel further responses as to Iyana Jackson set for July 16, 2024. Defendant to give notice. Dept. 68 Date: 7-11-24 c/f 7-10-24 Case #: 22STCV33658 Trial Date: 1-9-25 c/f 6-24-24 FURTHER INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Samuel Welch RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Jada Gradney RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (set one) SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiffs were tenants of a single family dwelling at 32270 Saticoy Street, West Hills, and allege unsanitary and/or unsafe conditions on the premises as a result of improper maintenance and upkeep. On October 17, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for Failure to Provide Habitable Dwellings, Breach of Covenant of Right to Quiet Enjoyment and Possession of the Property, Nuisance, and Negligence. Defendants answered the complaint on February 23, 2023. RULING : Granted. Defendant, Samuel Welch moves to compel further responses to form interrogatories (set one), numbers 2.6, 6.4, 6.7, 7.1, 9.1, 9.2, 10.3, and 12.4 from Plaintiff Jada Gradney. The responses consist of incomplete replies, with minimal answers, refusal to answer except under condition of a protective order, or references to other parties and non-parties responsible for the provision of phone number and address information. The responses are incomplete in that they fail to respond to all subcategories of the requests. The references to other persons constitutes an improper, factually incomplete answer. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783784 [Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, See my deposition, See my pleading, or See the financial statement].) The motion is therefore granted. Responding is ordered to serve responses in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.210-20310240. No sanctions requested. The court calendar shows three (3) remaining, scheduled motions to compel further responses through July 22, 2024. The motions appear as a continuation of discovery issues addressed by the court in the 23 motions to compel responses granted on November 22, 2023. The court does not conduct any informal discovery conferences. While the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system, the court finds the number of items on the court calendar through the next three months presents a potentially inordinate burden. The court reserves the right to set an OSC re: Discovery Referee in lieu of a hearing on any given motion, and may take off any and all motions in lieu of the OSC hearing. The court invites the parties to continue meeting and conferring, including the provision of supplemental responses, when possible. Next motion to compel further responses as to Iyana Jackson set for July 16, 2024. Defendant to give notice.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 9, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT JUSTIN LUU, XIAO WU DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend to allege facts in support of each element of each cause of action as to the moving defendants. Plaintiff must also allege tender or facts supporting an exception from the tender rule. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

PSC2004313 SANCHEZ vs LUTHER Motion to be Relieved as Counsel Tentative Ruling: Grant. The Court will sign the proposed order lodged with the Court on June 17, 2024. Counsel are reminded that they are not relieved until proof of service of the Court’s signed order upon Defendant is filed with the Court.

Case Number: 23STCV07444 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Nicole Management, LLC v. B-Side Group, LLC CASE NO.: 23STCV07444 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS-COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Nicole Management, LLC CASE HISTORY : · 04/03/23: Complaint filed. · 10/17/23: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an action for breach of a rental contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay rent on a commercial lease agreement. Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. DISCUSSION: Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. // Legal Standard Parties generally must file a cross-complaint against the party who filed the complaint before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50(a).) However, parties seeking to file untimely compulsory cross-complaints may file with the Court for leave to do so, even though the failure to timely file resulted from oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.) In such a case, after notice to the adverse party, the Court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint if the party acted in good faith. This section is liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. ( Id .) The purpose of the compulsory cross-complaint statute is to prevent piecemeal litigation. ( Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 959.) Compulsory cross-complaints consist of those causes of action existing at the time of service of the answer that the defendant must bring against the plaintiff, or else forfeit the right to bring them in any other action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30(a).) Specifically, compulsory cross-complaints consist of the causes of action that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10(c).) To avoid piecemeal litigation, courts liberally construe the term transactionit is not confined to a single, isolated act or occurrence . . . but may embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated. ( Align Technology , supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 960.) Thus, a motion to file a compulsory cross-complaint at any time during the action must be granted where forfeiture would otherwise result, unless the moving party engaged in bad faith conduct. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99.) The determination that the moving party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid.; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902 [We conclude that this principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section].) Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith. ( Silver Organizations Ltd, supra , 217 Cal.App.3d at 99 ) Rather, bad faith is defined as [t]he opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . . , but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. ( Id. at 100.) Whether Claims are Compulsory Defendants seek leave to file a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and new parties Masoud and Ramin Omrany alleging fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and related claims arising from the same rental agreement that is the basis of the original Complaint in this action. (Declaration of Rachel A. Baker ISO Mot. Exh. A.) Defendants counsel states that the proposed cross-complaint is substantively identical to the October 17, 2023 Cross-Complaint stricken by the Court. (Baker Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that B-Side is not entitled to pursue a cross-complaint in this action and that Defendants have not explained what discovery gave rise to their crossclaims. Neither argument is persuasive. First, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, B-Side Group is not named as a party on the proposed Cross-Complaint. (Baker Decl. Exh.1.) Second, no explanation of the facts giving rise to the crossclaim is required in the context of a compulsory cross-complaint. Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith with substantial evidence, the Court is obliged to grant a motion for leave to file an untimely cross-complaint. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902.) Plaintiff has made no such affirmative showing. Defendants motion must therefore be granted, as the proposed crossclaims are compulsory on their face. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. Moving Parties to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 10, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.