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Filing # 167901408 E-Filed 03/02/2023 01:24:03 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA
ANGELA JORDAN & KETERYNA
SHEREMET CASE NO. 16-2022-CA-006036
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE-GENERAL ISSUES
COMES NOW Defendant, SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY, by and
through its undersigned counsel, moves that Plaintiffs, their counsel, and/or any witnesses,
including witnesses designated as “expert” witnesses, be precluded from presenting or
attempting to present, insinuating, inferring, or commenting on the following matters:
1. Any evidence, testimony or argument that Defendant should pay this claim simply
because Plaintiff has paid insurance premiums in the past and is a “good insured”, or like
testimony. The length of time a party has been paying premiums has no relevance to an insurer’s
liability and the amount of premiums paid by an insured over the years has no bearing on
whether the subject loss was a covered loss. Such evidence is irrelevant and immaterial as it is
only intended to inflame the jury in this case. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Revuelta, 901 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), See also Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Clonts, 248 So. 2d 511 (2d DCA 1971); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383 So. 2d 1109 (1st
DCA 1980). Further, any such reference has been found to be reversible error. Craft v. Kramer,
571 So. 2d 1337 (4th DCA 1990).
2. Any information regarding any payment by a collateral source. Fla. Stat. § 768.76
requires the Court to reduce the amount of the jury verdict by any collateral sources, therefore
any testimony concerning the same is irrelevant, immaterial and confusing to the jury. Permitting
ACCEPTED: DUVAL COUNTY, JODY PHILLIPS, CLERK, 03/02/2023 02:41:04 PM
such evidence to be injected into the trial invades the province of the jury to make their own
determination of causation, reasonableness and necessity.
3. The relative wealth or poverty of the parties. See Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms,
Inc., 160 So. 2d 543 (2d DCA 1964); Battlemento v. Dove Foundation, Inc., 593 So. 2d 234 (5th
DCA 1991), review denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1992).
4. Any mention, reference, question, or evidence as to the financial status of the
Defendant, including but not limited to the financial position to pay any verdict, number of
employees, size of company, number of locations, revenue and the like. Sossa v. Newman, 647
So. 2d 1081 (4th DCA 1994).
5. Any mention of the defense firm/company, its size, available resources, and the like.
6. Any efforts made by collection agencies attempting to collect from the Plaintiff.
7. Any reference or statements relating to an offer to compromise or a completed
compromise including, but not limited to documents evidencing, settlement negotiations or
demands between the parties including Proposals for Settlement/Offers of Judgment or matters
involved at Mediation. Fla. Stat. § 90.408; see also Dade County v. Clarson, 240 So. 2d 828 (3d
DCA 1982).
8. Any argument presenting the “Golden Rule” argument in closing arguments or
otherwise, specifically requesting the jurors to imagine themselves as the injured party, and to
award damages as if they were the injured party. See SDG Dadeland Assocs., Inc. v. Anthony,
979 So.2d 997, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) and City of Orlando v. Piniero, 66 So.3d 1064, 1071
(Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Implicit golden rule arguments can also be improper encouraging the
jurors to place themselves in the shoes of the Plaintiffs, which is an impermissible "Golden Rule"
argument. National Car Rental System v. Bostic, 423 So. 2d 915 (3d DCA 1982).
9. Any statement which attempts to curry favor with the jury. Kelley v. Mutnich, 481
So. 2d 999 (4th DCA 1986).
10. Any statement reflecting counsel's personal belief in the justness of the cause, the
credibility of witnesses, or counsel's personal knowledge of the facts in issue. Hillson v. Deeson,
383 So. 2d 732 (3d DCA 1980).
11. Any statement asking the jury to send a message to the community with its verdict.
Maercks v. Birchansky, 549 So. 2d 199 (3d DCA 1989).
12. Any evidence not produced in discovery. Defendant asks the Court to direct that any
attempt to introduce documents or evidence not previously produced be first proffered to the
Court, outside the presence of the jury.
13. Any evidence of punitive or bad faith damages. Plaintiffs have not pled punitive
damages or a cause of action for bad faith, nor has the court determined entitlement to such
damages.
14. Any evidence or statements regarding Plaintiffs' lack of ability to compete monetarily
with the Defendant, thereby improperly appealing to the sympathy of the jury. Pierce v. Smith,
301 So. 2d 805 (2d DCA 1974).
15. Any highly emotional argument by Plaintiffs' counsel, such as crying, which would
deprive the Defendant of a fair trial. Metropolitan Dade County v. Cifuentes, 473 So. 2d 297 (3d
DCA 1985).
16. Any argument which appeals to the jury's self-interest and is intended to inject into
the jurors' minds that "the Plaintiff and ... family would become public charges, unless a verdict
favorable to the Plaintiff was returned." Rogers v. Myers, 240 So. 2d 516, 518 (5th DCA 1970).
17. Any statement constituting a direct attack on opposing counsel. Sun Supermarkets,
Inc. v. Fields, 568 So. 2d 480 (3d DCA 1990).
18. Any impermissible comment or challenge by Plaintiffs' counsel to the jury as to why
certain witnesses were not called at trial, or why deposed witnesses were not live at trial, or
making other references to matters outside the record. Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works, Inc., 545
So. 2d 430 (2d DCA 1989); Sacred Heart Hospital Inc. v. Stone, 650 So. 2d 676 (1st DCA 1995).
19. Any calling of witnesses, either in their case in chief or for purposes of impeachment
or rebuttal, which have not previously been disclosed in answers to interrogatories, in Plaintiffs'
pretrial witness list, or otherwise. "The rule is clear that a trial court may, in the proper exercise
of its discretion, exclude testimony at trial of witnesses whose names are not disclosed in
accordance with orders at pretrial conferences." Atlas v. Siso, 188 So. 2d 344 (3d DCA 1966).
Furthermore, the Court should exclude the testimony of the witness whose name has not been
disclosed in accordance with a pretrial order where use of the undisclosed witness will prejudice
the opposing party. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1313 (Fla. 1981 ). ("Pretrial
order directing the parties to exchange names of witnesses requiring a listing or notification of all
witnesses that the parties reasonably foresee will be called to testify, whether for substantive,
corroborative, impeachment or rebuttal purposes. Obviously, a general reference to ' any and all
necessary' impeachment or rebuttal witnesses, as was the case here, constitutes inadequate
disclosure."); see also Florida Marine Enterprises v. Baile, 632 So. 2d 649 (4th DCA 1994);
SNW Corp. v. Abraham, 491 So. 2d 1223 (4th DCA 1986). "The court may determine the
following factors in determining whether to preclude a late-disclosed witness from testifying: 1)
the objecting party's ability to cure the prejudice, or, similarly, his independent knowledge of the
existence of the witness; 2) the calling patty's possible intentional, or bad faith, non-compliance
with the pretrial order; and 3) the possible disruption of the orderly and efficient trial of the case
(or other cases)." Binger at 1314.
20. Any matter that is not relevant to the case or would not be supported by the evidence,
asserting personal knowledge of the facts, or stating personal opinions regarding the case or the
credibility of the witnesses or defense counsel, all of which is contrary to Rule 4-3.4(e) of the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. See also See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Rosania, 546 So.2d
736 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So.2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev.
denied, 488 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1986). The Third District has specifically held that arguments in
which an attorney asserts his personal knowledge of nefarious activities supposedly engaged by
his opponent, will not be condoned by the District Court, nor should they be condoned by the
trial court. See Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850, citing Schreier v. Parker, 415 So. 2d 794,
795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (Emphasis added).
21. Any argument denigrating the Defendant for defending the instant action, rather than
paying Plaintiff’s claim. See Carnival Corp. v. Pajares, 972 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007);
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Rosania, 546 So. 2d 736, 737-38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (both
holding that an implication of bad faith on the part of a defendant, rather than settling a
plaintiff’s claim is improper).
22. Any mention, inference, comments, or reference as to how any judgment proceeds will be
used.
23. Any comments or references to any other lawsuits involving the Defendant. This
information is irrelevant, inflammatory, overly prejudicial and not probative of any issue. Any
such testimony is relevant only to prove bad character or propensity, and per Fla. Stat. §
90.404(2)(a), is inadmissible. Fla. Stat § 90.401 states that relevant, it must have a logical
tendency to prove or disprove a material fact. For evidence to be relevant, it must have a logical
tendency to prove or disprove a fact which is of consequence to the outcome of the action. See
Shaw v. Jain, 914 So, 2d 458, (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) citing to Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida
Evidence § 401.1, at 120 (2005 ed.) (footnote omitted). Because other lawsuits and complaints
have no probative value of proving those allegations made in Plaintiff’s Complaint, reference or
comment on such additional actions should be excluded. The relative wealth or poverty of the
parties. See Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc. 160 So. 2d 543 (2d DCA 1964); Battlemento
v. Dove Foundation, Inc., 593 So. 2d 234 (5th DCA 1991), review denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla.
1992). This includes any mention, reference, question, or evidence as to the financial status of
the Defendant, including but not limited to the financial position to pay any verdict, number of
employees, size of company, number of locations, revenue and the like. See Sossa v. Newman,
647 So. 2d 1081 (4th DCA 1994).
24. Any use of inflammatory words and/or inadmissible character evidence, such as the
terms, “heartless,” “greedy.” “callous.” “uncaring.” or any other similar inflammatory words
suggesting that the Defendant, as a corporate entity, does not possess the characteristics of a
natural person. This would inflame the jury and lead them to a highly emotional response, rather
than the logical analysis which is required to apply the evidence in light of the applicable law.
Bettolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985); Fla. Stat. § 90.403 and § 90.404.
25. Any evidence or testimony of Plaintiff’s failure to make repairs to the property due to
alleged absence of financial resources. Any such testimony or argument introduces issues which
are irrelevant to any issue presented in this case and in alternative, the probative value of any
such testimony or evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusing of issues and misleading the jury prejudicial such testimony or evidence warranting
exclusion pursuant to Section 90.403, Florida Statutes.
26. Any testimony concerning Department of Insurance complaints made against the
Defendant. This information is irrelevant, inflammatory, overly prejudicial and not probative of
any issue. Any such testimony is relevant only to prove bad character or propensity, and per Fla.
Stat. § 90.404(2)(a), is inadmissible. To prevent Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel from asking the
jury to have Defendant account for or “send a message to” Defendant for failing to pay benefits.
Reveuelta, at 379; Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. Grubbs, 762 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (closing
argument asking the jury to send a message was improper).
27. Any mention of discovery disputes that have arisen throughout the course of litigation or
any Motions for Protective Orders filed by Defendant. Discovery is pretrial matter and enforced
by the Court, not the jury. Evidence about pretrial discovery issues should be excluded from the
jury’s consideration. Amlan, Inc. v Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701 (4th DCA 1995);
Emerson Elec. Co. v Garcia, 623 So. 2d 532 (3d DCA 1993). Also, evidence of discovery
disputes or conduct would be irrelevant, confusing, misleading and would be prejudicial.
Presentation of such evidence could distract the jury from its main focus of the case. Amlan, 651
So. 2d at 703.
28. Any mention by Plaintiffs and their counsel that Defendant has brought this motion in
limine prior to the beginning of trial.
29. Defendant also moves in limine to invoke “The Rule” thereby precluding witnesses from
discussing the case or their testimony with each other. Fla. Stat. § 90.616.
[certificate of service and signature block on the following page\
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The document contains no confidential or sensitive information or that any such
confidential or sensitive language has been properly protected by complying with the provisions
of Rules 2.420 and 2.425.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's Motion
in Limine has been furnished by Electronic Filing to Attorney for Plaintiff, using the Florida
Courts e-Filing Portal, which will send an automatic email message to the listed parties
registered with the e-Filing Portal system, on the 2nd March 2023.
Attorney for Plaintiff
David R. Heil, Esq. FBN: 435422
DAVID R. HEIL, P.A.
2324 Lee Road
Winter Park, FL 32789
(407) 599-2100
Email: pleadings@heil-law.com david@heil-law.com
By/s/ David. G. Marcus.
David G. Marcus, Esquire
1001 Broadway Avenue
Ormond Beach, Florida 32174
Florida Bar No. 1017428
Primary E-Mail: David.Marcus@securityfirstflorida.com
Secondary E-Mail: Cathy.Myers@securityfirstflorida.com
Alternate E-Mail: Burt.Stanley@securityfirstflorida.com
Attorney for Defendant
SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY
Preview
Filing # 167901408 E-Filed 03/02/2023 01:24:03 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA ANGELA JORDAN & KETERYNA SHEREMET CASE NO. 16-2022-CA-006036 Plaintiffs, vs. SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. ____________________________________/ DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE-GENERAL ISSUES COMES NOW Defendant, SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY, by and through its undersigned counsel, moves that Plaintiffs, their counsel, and/or any witnesses, including witnesses designated as “expert” witnesses, be precluded from presenting or attempting to present, insinuating, inferring, or commenting on the following matters: 1. Any evidence, testimony or argument that Defendant should pay this claim simply because Plaintiff has paid insurance premiums in the past and is a “good insured”, or like testimony. The length of time a party has been paying premiums has no relevance to an insurer’s liability and the amount of premiums paid by an insured over the years has no bearing on whether the subject loss was a covered loss. Such evidence is irrelevant and immaterial as it is only intended to inflame the jury in this case. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Revuelta, 901 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), See also Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Clonts, 248 So. 2d 511 (2d DCA 1971); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383 So. 2d 1109 (1st DCA 1980). Further, any such reference has been found to be reversible error. Craft v. Kramer, 571 So. 2d 1337 (4th DCA 1990). 2. Any information regarding any payment by a collateral source. Fla. Stat. § 768.76 requires the Court to reduce the amount of the jury verdict by any collateral sources, therefore any testimony concerning the same is irrelevant, immaterial and confusing to the jury. Permitting ACCEPTED: DUVAL COUNTY, JODY PHILLIPS, CLERK, 03/02/2023 02:41:04 PM such evidence to be injected into the trial invades the province of the jury to make their own determination of causation, reasonableness and necessity. 3. The relative wealth or poverty of the parties. See Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc., 160 So. 2d 543 (2d DCA 1964); Battlemento v. Dove Foundation, Inc., 593 So. 2d 234 (5th DCA 1991), review denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1992). 4. Any mention, reference, question, or evidence as to the financial status of the Defendant, including but not limited to the financial position to pay any verdict, number of employees, size of company, number of locations, revenue and the like. Sossa v. Newman, 647 So. 2d 1081 (4th DCA 1994). 5. Any mention of the defense firm/company, its size, available resources, and the like. 6. Any efforts made by collection agencies attempting to collect from the Plaintiff. 7. Any reference or statements relating to an offer to compromise or a completed compromise including, but not limited to documents evidencing, settlement negotiations or demands between the parties including Proposals for Settlement/Offers of Judgment or matters involved at Mediation. Fla. Stat. § 90.408; see also Dade County v. Clarson, 240 So. 2d 828 (3d DCA 1982). 8. Any argument presenting the “Golden Rule” argument in closing arguments or otherwise, specifically requesting the jurors to imagine themselves as the injured party, and to award damages as if they were the injured party. See SDG Dadeland Assocs., Inc. v. Anthony, 979 So.2d 997, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) and City of Orlando v. Piniero, 66 So.3d 1064, 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Implicit golden rule arguments can also be improper encouraging the jurors to place themselves in the shoes of the Plaintiffs, which is an impermissible "Golden Rule" argument. National Car Rental System v. Bostic, 423 So. 2d 915 (3d DCA 1982). 9. Any statement which attempts to curry favor with the jury. Kelley v. Mutnich, 481 So. 2d 999 (4th DCA 1986). 10. Any statement reflecting counsel's personal belief in the justness of the cause, the credibility of witnesses, or counsel's personal knowledge of the facts in issue. Hillson v. Deeson, 383 So. 2d 732 (3d DCA 1980). 11. Any statement asking the jury to send a message to the community with its verdict. Maercks v. Birchansky, 549 So. 2d 199 (3d DCA 1989). 12. Any evidence not produced in discovery. Defendant asks the Court to direct that any attempt to introduce documents or evidence not previously produced be first proffered to the Court, outside the presence of the jury. 13. Any evidence of punitive or bad faith damages. Plaintiffs have not pled punitive damages or a cause of action for bad faith, nor has the court determined entitlement to such damages. 14. Any evidence or statements regarding Plaintiffs' lack of ability to compete monetarily with the Defendant, thereby improperly appealing to the sympathy of the jury. Pierce v. Smith, 301 So. 2d 805 (2d DCA 1974). 15. Any highly emotional argument by Plaintiffs' counsel, such as crying, which would deprive the Defendant of a fair trial. Metropolitan Dade County v. Cifuentes, 473 So. 2d 297 (3d DCA 1985). 16. Any argument which appeals to the jury's self-interest and is intended to inject into the jurors' minds that "the Plaintiff and ... family would become public charges, unless a verdict favorable to the Plaintiff was returned." Rogers v. Myers, 240 So. 2d 516, 518 (5th DCA 1970). 17. Any statement constituting a direct attack on opposing counsel. Sun Supermarkets, Inc. v. Fields, 568 So. 2d 480 (3d DCA 1990). 18. Any impermissible comment or challenge by Plaintiffs' counsel to the jury as to why certain witnesses were not called at trial, or why deposed witnesses were not live at trial, or making other references to matters outside the record. Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works, Inc., 545 So. 2d 430 (2d DCA 1989); Sacred Heart Hospital Inc. v. Stone, 650 So. 2d 676 (1st DCA 1995). 19. Any calling of witnesses, either in their case in chief or for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal, which have not previously been disclosed in answers to interrogatories, in Plaintiffs' pretrial witness list, or otherwise. "The rule is clear that a trial court may, in the proper exercise of its discretion, exclude testimony at trial of witnesses whose names are not disclosed in accordance with orders at pretrial conferences." Atlas v. Siso, 188 So. 2d 344 (3d DCA 1966). Furthermore, the Court should exclude the testimony of the witness whose name has not been disclosed in accordance with a pretrial order where use of the undisclosed witness will prejudice the opposing party. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1313 (Fla. 1981 ). ("Pretrial order directing the parties to exchange names of witnesses requiring a listing or notification of all witnesses that the parties reasonably foresee will be called to testify, whether for substantive, corroborative, impeachment or rebuttal purposes. Obviously, a general reference to ' any and all necessary' impeachment or rebuttal witnesses, as was the case here, constitutes inadequate disclosure."); see also Florida Marine Enterprises v. Baile, 632 So. 2d 649 (4th DCA 1994); SNW Corp. v. Abraham, 491 So. 2d 1223 (4th DCA 1986). "The court may determine the following factors in determining whether to preclude a late-disclosed witness from testifying: 1) the objecting party's ability to cure the prejudice, or, similarly, his independent knowledge of the existence of the witness; 2) the calling patty's possible intentional, or bad faith, non-compliance with the pretrial order; and 3) the possible disruption of the orderly and efficient trial of the case (or other cases)." Binger at 1314. 20. Any matter that is not relevant to the case or would not be supported by the evidence, asserting personal knowledge of the facts, or stating personal opinions regarding the case or the credibility of the witnesses or defense counsel, all of which is contrary to Rule 4-3.4(e) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. See also See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Rosania, 546 So.2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So.2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 488 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1986). The Third District has specifically held that arguments in which an attorney asserts his personal knowledge of nefarious activities supposedly engaged by his opponent, will not be condoned by the District Court, nor should they be condoned by the trial court. See Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850, citing Schreier v. Parker, 415 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (Emphasis added). 21. Any argument denigrating the Defendant for defending the instant action, rather than paying Plaintiff’s claim. See Carnival Corp. v. Pajares, 972 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Rosania, 546 So. 2d 736, 737-38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (both holding that an implication of bad faith on the part of a defendant, rather than settling a plaintiff’s claim is improper). 22. Any mention, inference, comments, or reference as to how any judgment proceeds will be used. 23. Any comments or references to any other lawsuits involving the Defendant. This information is irrelevant, inflammatory, overly prejudicial and not probative of any issue. Any such testimony is relevant only to prove bad character or propensity, and per Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(a), is inadmissible. Fla. Stat § 90.401 states that relevant, it must have a logical tendency to prove or disprove a material fact. For evidence to be relevant, it must have a logical tendency to prove or disprove a fact which is of consequence to the outcome of the action. See Shaw v. Jain, 914 So, 2d 458, (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) citing to Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 401.1, at 120 (2005 ed.) (footnote omitted). Because other lawsuits and complaints have no probative value of proving those allegations made in Plaintiff’s Complaint, reference or comment on such additional actions should be excluded. The relative wealth or poverty of the parties. See Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc. 160 So. 2d 543 (2d DCA 1964); Battlemento v. Dove Foundation, Inc., 593 So. 2d 234 (5th DCA 1991), review denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1992). This includes any mention, reference, question, or evidence as to the financial status of the Defendant, including but not limited to the financial position to pay any verdict, number of employees, size of company, number of locations, revenue and the like. See Sossa v. Newman, 647 So. 2d 1081 (4th DCA 1994). 24. Any use of inflammatory words and/or inadmissible character evidence, such as the terms, “heartless,” “greedy.” “callous.” “uncaring.” or any other similar inflammatory words suggesting that the Defendant, as a corporate entity, does not possess the characteristics of a natural person. This would inflame the jury and lead them to a highly emotional response, rather than the logical analysis which is required to apply the evidence in light of the applicable law. Bettolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985); Fla. Stat. § 90.403 and § 90.404. 25. Any evidence or testimony of Plaintiff’s failure to make repairs to the property due to alleged absence of financial resources. Any such testimony or argument introduces issues which are irrelevant to any issue presented in this case and in alternative, the probative value of any such testimony or evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing of issues and misleading the jury prejudicial such testimony or evidence warranting exclusion pursuant to Section 90.403, Florida Statutes. 26. Any testimony concerning Department of Insurance complaints made against the Defendant. This information is irrelevant, inflammatory, overly prejudicial and not probative of any issue. Any such testimony is relevant only to prove bad character or propensity, and per Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(a), is inadmissible. To prevent Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel from asking the jury to have Defendant account for or “send a message to” Defendant for failing to pay benefits. Reveuelta, at 379; Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. Grubbs, 762 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (closing argument asking the jury to send a message was improper). 27. Any mention of discovery disputes that have arisen throughout the course of litigation or any Motions for Protective Orders filed by Defendant. Discovery is pretrial matter and enforced by the Court, not the jury. Evidence about pretrial discovery issues should be excluded from the jury’s consideration. Amlan, Inc. v Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701 (4th DCA 1995); Emerson Elec. Co. v Garcia, 623 So. 2d 532 (3d DCA 1993). Also, evidence of discovery disputes or conduct would be irrelevant, confusing, misleading and would be prejudicial. Presentation of such evidence could distract the jury from its main focus of the case. Amlan, 651 So. 2d at 703. 28. Any mention by Plaintiffs and their counsel that Defendant has brought this motion in limine prior to the beginning of trial. 29. Defendant also moves in limine to invoke “The Rule” thereby precluding witnesses from discussing the case or their testimony with each other. Fla. Stat. § 90.616. [certificate of service and signature block on the following page\ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The document contains no confidential or sensitive information or that any such confidential or sensitive language has been properly protected by complying with the provisions of Rules 2.420 and 2.425. I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's Motion in Limine has been furnished by Electronic Filing to Attorney for Plaintiff, using the Florida Courts e-Filing Portal, which will send an automatic email message to the listed parties registered with the e-Filing Portal system, on the 2nd March 2023. Attorney for Plaintiff David R. Heil, Esq. FBN: 435422 DAVID R. HEIL, P.A. 2324 Lee Road Winter Park, FL 32789 (407) 599-2100 Email: pleadings@heil-law.com david@heil-law.com By/s/ David. G. Marcus. David G. Marcus, Esquire 1001 Broadway Avenue Ormond Beach, Florida 32174 Florida Bar No. 1017428 Primary E-Mail: David.Marcus@securityfirstflorida.com Secondary E-Mail: Cathy.Myers@securityfirstflorida.com Alternate E-Mail: Burt.Stanley@securityfirstflorida.com Attorney for Defendant SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY