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Filing # 129228235 E-Filed 06/22/2021 11:09:01 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL ACTION
VENISSA DRIGGERS, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of DAVID B. FLICK, Deceased, CASENO. 21-410 CA
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK BARCIA, HOOTERS OF PORT CHARLOTTE,
INC., BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a BUFFALO
WINGS AND RINGS, ATLANTA RESTAURANT
PARTNERS, LLC d/b/a TGI FRIDAYS, and JACKMONT
HOSPITALITY, INC. d/b/a TGI FRIDAYS,
Defendants.
/
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT, BWR NORTH PORT,
LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS’, MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, VENISSA DRIGGERS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of DAVID B. FLICK,
Dec., hereby submits her Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant, BWR NORTH PORT,
LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS (“BWR’”)’s Motion to Dismiss (filed May 19, 2021), and
states as follows:
I INTRODUCTION
This dram shop wrongful death negligence action arises out of a motor vehicle crash after
the Defendant negligently and knowingly served alcohol to a known alcoholic, Mark Barcia. The
crash killed David B. Flick. Plaintiffs complaint clearly alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of
action against BWR under Florida law and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
i. STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court is limited to the four corners of the complaint and must disregard all allegations
by the Defendant. See Carmona v. McKinley, 952 So, 2d 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), which reversed
a dismissal of a claim because the trial court considered the defendant’s factual allegations, and
the Second District stressed that on a motion to dismiss the trial court must presume that all of
plaintiff's allegations are true and confine itself “to a consideration of the allegations found
within the four corners of the complaint.” See also Miller v. Nelms, 966 So, 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007) (likewise reversing the dismissal of a claim because the trial court failed to limit its
consideration to the four corners of the complaint); Thompson v. Martin, 530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1988) (complaint is proper if it alleges facts “sufficient to indicate that a cause of action
exists” and is not required to anticipate a defendant’s affirmative defenses).
It is perfectly obvious and undeniable that Plaintiff could easily recover damages in this
case, under some set of facts and evidence which could be proved in this case, whether or not
those facts and evidence are presently known to the parties.
Defendants’ motion overlooks the most fundamental pleading rule under the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, as established by Rules 1.040 and 1.110: “There shall be one form of
action to be known as ‘civil action,’ m and “forms of action and technical forms for seeking relief
and of pleas, pleadings or motions are abolished,” and a cause of action is now only to provide a
short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Drake v. Sun Bank,
400 So, 2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1973) (reversing the
dismissal of a complaint and holding that a complaint alleging that the Plaintiff's damages
resulted from Defendant’s negligence was sufficient to state a cause of action); Jean Aime v. State
Farm, 739 So. 2d, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(reversing the dismissal of a complaint and commenting
that the existence of a legal duty depends on whether a defendant’s action or inaction
foreseeably created a zone of risk, and that the Plaintiff's factual allegations were sufficient to
give rise to a legal duty).
Pleadings are merely formal statements of the issues, as distinguished from the evidence
upon which a claim is based, and “it is not necessary, nor indeed desirable, that a plaintiff allege
evidence.” See Mather v. Wyatt Northcutt, 598 So. 2d 101, 102-03 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Clark, 299 So, 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Metcalfv. Langston, 298 So, 2d 81, 85
(Fla, Ist DCA 1974) (the pleading of a claim is “merely a tentative outline of the position which
the pleader takes before his case is fully developed on the facts through discovery and
evidence”), See also Williams v. Guyton, 167 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), cert den. 168 So, 2d
751 (Fla. 1984) (“It is not necessary to allege all of the factual matters in a complaint... It is
sufficient that the complaint allege the ultimate facts on which the pleader relies sufficient to
inform the defendant of the nature of the cause against him”).
I PLAINTIFF STATES A CAUSE OF CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, BWR,
BASED UPON ITS NEGLIGENT AND KNOWING SERVICE OF ALCOHOL TO A
PERSON HABITUALLY ADDICTED TO ALCOHOL
Section 768.125 says, in relevant part:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking
age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting
from the intoxication of such person, except that _a person ... who knowingly
erves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverage:
may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the
intoxication of such ... person.
Fla. Stat. § 768.125 (emphasis added). Florida law recognizes a cause of action against a seller
of alcohol who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to alcohol. The instant case involves
the “habitual drunkard” dram shop cause of action.
“Section 768.125 now delineates the elements that a party must establish in bringing a
civil action against sellers of alcoho! 1" Luque v. Ale House Mgmt., Inc., 962 So. 2d 1062, 1065
(Fla. 5 DCA 2007) (“It was error to conclude that because the section does not create a cause of
action, it does not define one either. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on
the ground that an action brought under section 768.125 cannot state a cause of action.”).
In this case, consistent with Florida law, Plaintiff has alleged facts that cover each of the
elements for bringing a negligence claim against a seller of alcohol for personal injury. To the
extent Defendant disputes those facts, that is not to be considered on a motion to dismiss. First,
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant BWR served alcoholic beverages for profit. (Complaint at 4] 12,
52). Next, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant BWR “served alcohol to Mark Barcia, leading to his
intoxication on the day of the crash.” (Complaint at 41 19, 55).
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant BWR “knew MARK BARCIA was habitually addicted to
alcohol, and/or a habitual drunkard.” (Complaint at 4] 25). Plaintiff further alleged that “prior
to the date of the crash, MARK BARCIA was a regular patron of BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a
BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS and frequently was served alcohol to the point he was noticably
intoxicated.” (Complaint at 4] 29).
Plaintiff goes on to allege that “Defendant and/or its agents or employees negligently and
knowingly served MARK BARCIA alcohol, leading to his intoxication,” (Complaint at 4] 54), and
that “after Defendant knowingly served MARCK BARCIA alcohol leading to his intoxication, a
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person Defendant knew was habitually addicted to alcohol, MARK BARCIA collided with the
vehicle Decedent, DAVID B. FLICK, was riding in resulting in the death of Decedent, DAVID B.
FLICK” (Complaint at 4 55), and that as a result of Defendant’s negligence in knowingly serving a
known alcohol to the point of intoxication, the Decedent suffered bodily injury resulting in death.
(Complaint at 4] 56, 57). Plaintiff has clearly stated a cause of action under Florida law and
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
The Case Law Cited by Defendant is Inapplicable and Distinguishable
The case law cited by the Defendant is inapposite and distinguishable. First, Aguila v.
Hilton, Inc. is totally factually and legal distinguishable. Most notably, and unlike the case here,
the Defendant in Aguila did not even serve the Defendant. Specifically, the Court explained that:
We acknowledge that, in certain well-defined circumstances, the owner of a
business may have a duty to members of the general public for acts committed off
the premises of the business. For example, a bar or tavern has a legal duty to
refrain from serving alcoholic beverages to minors, and a breach of that duty may
subject the bar or tavern to liability for injuries caused by an intoxicated minor. In
this case, however, the motel owned and operated by the defendants did not
serve alcoholic beverages. [the drunk driver] was served elsewhere, and that
presents an entirely different issue.
Aguila v. Hilton, Inc., 878 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. lst DCA 2004)(emphasis added). Here, unlike the
defendant in Aguila, it is alleged that the Defendant, BWR, itself, negligently served Barcia, a
person it knew was a person habitually addicted to alcohol. Accordingly, Aguila is inapplicable
on its face.
Similarly, Hall v. West, relied upon by Defendant is also totally distinguishable. First, Hall
was a summary judgment case (not a motion to dismiss) and critically, unlike our case, it did not
involve allegations that the drunk driver was habitually addicted to alcohol. See id. at 331. As
explained by the Court there:
Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2008), is at play in this case:
Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of
lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or
damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such
person, except that a person who willfully and unlawfully sells or
furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful
drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted
to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for
injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of
such minor or person,
Mr. West was of legal drinking age and the record does not suggest that
Shephard's knew whether he was habitually addicted to alcohol. Thus, the
statutory exceptions establishing liability do not apply.
Hall v. West, 157 So. 3d 329, 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)(emphasis added).
Unlike Hall, Plaintiff has alleged that Barcia was habitually addicted to alcohol and that
Defendant negligently and knowingly served to the point of intoxication, a person habitually
addicted to alcohol that was a regular patron who had previously been served to the point of
noticeable intoxication. (Complaint at 4 19, 25, 28, 2954, 55), Accordingly, our case is totally
distinguishable from the facts of Hall which did not involve the statutory exception and
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
Furthermore, Defendant’s argument in its Motion that Plaintiff's complaint lacks any facts
to suggest that “subsequent to the accident,” BWR was placed on notice that Defendant Barcia
was intoxicated. First, whether BWR had knowledge “subsequent” to the accident that
Defendant was intoxicated is irrelevant. The law provides liability for service of alcohol to a
habitual drunkard priorto an accident. To the extent that was a typo in Defendant’s Motion and
6
it meant “prior” to the accident, the argument is without merit as Plaintiff has alleged that
Defendant “negligently and knowingly served Mark Barcia alcohol, leading to his intoxication, ”
(Complaint at 4 54), also alleged that “after Defendant knowingly served MARCK BARCIA alcohol
leading to his intoxication, a person Defendant knew was habitually addicted to alcohol, MARK
BARCIA collided with the vehicle Decedent, DAVID B. FLICK, was riding in resulting in the death
of Decedent, DAVID B. FLICK.” (Complaint at 1 55), and further alleged that prior to the crash
“MARK BARCIA was a regular patron of BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND
RINGS and frequently was served alcohol to the point he was noticably intoxicated.” (Complaint
at 4 28).
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above and based on the legal authorities cited above,
Plaintiff respectfully request the Court enter an order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
and for such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
| HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was furnished to the addressees herein this
22nd day of June, 2021, by Electronic Mail: Howard Holden, Esquire / Jorge W. Rodriguez-Sierra,
Esquire, Luks, Santaniello, Petrilllo & Cohen, 1422 Hendry Street, 3rd Floor, Fort Myers, FL 33901
and James F. Sposato, Esquire/Mitchel Chusid, Esquire/Jeffrey Glotzer, Esquire, Ritter Chusid,
LLP, 5850 Coral Ridge Drive, Suite 201, Coral Springs, FL 33076.
SPIVEY LAW FIRM
PERSONAL INJURY ATTORNEYS, P.A.
13400 Parker Commons Blvd.
Fort Myers, FL 33912
Phone: (239) 337-7483
Fax: (239) 337-7484
By
RANDALL L. SPIVEY
Florida Bar No. 64742
andall@spiveylaw.com
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Filing # 129228235 E-Filed 06/22/2021 11:09:01 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL ACTION VENISSA DRIGGERS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of DAVID B. FLICK, Deceased, CASENO. 21-410 CA Plaintiff, vs. MARK BARCIA, HOOTERS OF PORT CHARLOTTE, INC., BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS, ATLANTA RESTAURANT PARTNERS, LLC d/b/a TGI FRIDAYS, and JACKMONT HOSPITALITY, INC. d/b/a TGI FRIDAYS, Defendants. / PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT, BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS’, MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff, VENISSA DRIGGERS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of DAVID B. FLICK, Dec., hereby submits her Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant, BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS (“BWR’”)’s Motion to Dismiss (filed May 19, 2021), and states as follows: I INTRODUCTION This dram shop wrongful death negligence action arises out of a motor vehicle crash after the Defendant negligently and knowingly served alcohol to a known alcoholic, Mark Barcia. The crash killed David B. Flick. Plaintiffs complaint clearly alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action against BWR under Florida law and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied. i. STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS The Court is limited to the four corners of the complaint and must disregard all allegations by the Defendant. See Carmona v. McKinley, 952 So, 2d 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), which reversed a dismissal of a claim because the trial court considered the defendant’s factual allegations, and the Second District stressed that on a motion to dismiss the trial court must presume that all of plaintiff's allegations are true and confine itself “to a consideration of the allegations found within the four corners of the complaint.” See also Miller v. Nelms, 966 So, 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (likewise reversing the dismissal of a claim because the trial court failed to limit its consideration to the four corners of the complaint); Thompson v. Martin, 530 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (complaint is proper if it alleges facts “sufficient to indicate that a cause of action exists” and is not required to anticipate a defendant’s affirmative defenses). It is perfectly obvious and undeniable that Plaintiff could easily recover damages in this case, under some set of facts and evidence which could be proved in this case, whether or not those facts and evidence are presently known to the parties. Defendants’ motion overlooks the most fundamental pleading rule under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, as established by Rules 1.040 and 1.110: “There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action,’ m and “forms of action and technical forms for seeking relief and of pleas, pleadings or motions are abolished,” and a cause of action is now only to provide a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Drake v. Sun Bank, 400 So, 2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1973) (reversing the dismissal of a complaint and holding that a complaint alleging that the Plaintiff's damages resulted from Defendant’s negligence was sufficient to state a cause of action); Jean Aime v. State Farm, 739 So. 2d, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(reversing the dismissal of a complaint and commenting that the existence of a legal duty depends on whether a defendant’s action or inaction foreseeably created a zone of risk, and that the Plaintiff's factual allegations were sufficient to give rise to a legal duty). Pleadings are merely formal statements of the issues, as distinguished from the evidence upon which a claim is based, and “it is not necessary, nor indeed desirable, that a plaintiff allege evidence.” See Mather v. Wyatt Northcutt, 598 So. 2d 101, 102-03 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 299 So, 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Metcalfv. Langston, 298 So, 2d 81, 85 (Fla, Ist DCA 1974) (the pleading of a claim is “merely a tentative outline of the position which the pleader takes before his case is fully developed on the facts through discovery and evidence”), See also Williams v. Guyton, 167 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), cert den. 168 So, 2d 751 (Fla. 1984) (“It is not necessary to allege all of the factual matters in a complaint... It is sufficient that the complaint allege the ultimate facts on which the pleader relies sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the cause against him”). I PLAINTIFF STATES A CAUSE OF CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, BWR, BASED UPON ITS NEGLIGENT AND KNOWING SERVICE OF ALCOHOL TO A PERSON HABITUALLY ADDICTED TO ALCOHOL Section 768.125 says, in relevant part: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that _a person ... who knowingly erves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverage: may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such ... person. Fla. Stat. § 768.125 (emphasis added). Florida law recognizes a cause of action against a seller of alcohol who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to alcohol. The instant case involves the “habitual drunkard” dram shop cause of action. “Section 768.125 now delineates the elements that a party must establish in bringing a civil action against sellers of alcoho! 1" Luque v. Ale House Mgmt., Inc., 962 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 5 DCA 2007) (“It was error to conclude that because the section does not create a cause of action, it does not define one either. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the ground that an action brought under section 768.125 cannot state a cause of action.”). In this case, consistent with Florida law, Plaintiff has alleged facts that cover each of the elements for bringing a negligence claim against a seller of alcohol for personal injury. To the extent Defendant disputes those facts, that is not to be considered on a motion to dismiss. First, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant BWR served alcoholic beverages for profit. (Complaint at 4] 12, 52). Next, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant BWR “served alcohol to Mark Barcia, leading to his intoxication on the day of the crash.” (Complaint at 41 19, 55). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant BWR “knew MARK BARCIA was habitually addicted to alcohol, and/or a habitual drunkard.” (Complaint at 4] 25). Plaintiff further alleged that “prior to the date of the crash, MARK BARCIA was a regular patron of BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS and frequently was served alcohol to the point he was noticably intoxicated.” (Complaint at 4] 29). Plaintiff goes on to allege that “Defendant and/or its agents or employees negligently and knowingly served MARK BARCIA alcohol, leading to his intoxication,” (Complaint at 4] 54), and that “after Defendant knowingly served MARCK BARCIA alcohol leading to his intoxication, a 4 person Defendant knew was habitually addicted to alcohol, MARK BARCIA collided with the vehicle Decedent, DAVID B. FLICK, was riding in resulting in the death of Decedent, DAVID B. FLICK” (Complaint at 4 55), and that as a result of Defendant’s negligence in knowingly serving a known alcohol to the point of intoxication, the Decedent suffered bodily injury resulting in death. (Complaint at 4] 56, 57). Plaintiff has clearly stated a cause of action under Florida law and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied. The Case Law Cited by Defendant is Inapplicable and Distinguishable The case law cited by the Defendant is inapposite and distinguishable. First, Aguila v. Hilton, Inc. is totally factually and legal distinguishable. Most notably, and unlike the case here, the Defendant in Aguila did not even serve the Defendant. Specifically, the Court explained that: We acknowledge that, in certain well-defined circumstances, the owner of a business may have a duty to members of the general public for acts committed off the premises of the business. For example, a bar or tavern has a legal duty to refrain from serving alcoholic beverages to minors, and a breach of that duty may subject the bar or tavern to liability for injuries caused by an intoxicated minor. In this case, however, the motel owned and operated by the defendants did not serve alcoholic beverages. [the drunk driver] was served elsewhere, and that presents an entirely different issue. Aguila v. Hilton, Inc., 878 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. lst DCA 2004)(emphasis added). Here, unlike the defendant in Aguila, it is alleged that the Defendant, BWR, itself, negligently served Barcia, a person it knew was a person habitually addicted to alcohol. Accordingly, Aguila is inapplicable on its face. Similarly, Hall v. West, relied upon by Defendant is also totally distinguishable. First, Hall was a summary judgment case (not a motion to dismiss) and critically, unlike our case, it did not involve allegations that the drunk driver was habitually addicted to alcohol. See id. at 331. As explained by the Court there: Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2008), is at play in this case: Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a person who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person, Mr. West was of legal drinking age and the record does not suggest that Shephard's knew whether he was habitually addicted to alcohol. Thus, the statutory exceptions establishing liability do not apply. Hall v. West, 157 So. 3d 329, 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)(emphasis added). Unlike Hall, Plaintiff has alleged that Barcia was habitually addicted to alcohol and that Defendant negligently and knowingly served to the point of intoxication, a person habitually addicted to alcohol that was a regular patron who had previously been served to the point of noticeable intoxication. (Complaint at 4 19, 25, 28, 2954, 55), Accordingly, our case is totally distinguishable from the facts of Hall which did not involve the statutory exception and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied. Furthermore, Defendant’s argument in its Motion that Plaintiff's complaint lacks any facts to suggest that “subsequent to the accident,” BWR was placed on notice that Defendant Barcia was intoxicated. First, whether BWR had knowledge “subsequent” to the accident that Defendant was intoxicated is irrelevant. The law provides liability for service of alcohol to a habitual drunkard priorto an accident. To the extent that was a typo in Defendant’s Motion and 6 it meant “prior” to the accident, the argument is without merit as Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant “negligently and knowingly served Mark Barcia alcohol, leading to his intoxication, ” (Complaint at 4 54), also alleged that “after Defendant knowingly served MARCK BARCIA alcohol leading to his intoxication, a person Defendant knew was habitually addicted to alcohol, MARK BARCIA collided with the vehicle Decedent, DAVID B. FLICK, was riding in resulting in the death of Decedent, DAVID B. FLICK.” (Complaint at 1 55), and further alleged that prior to the crash “MARK BARCIA was a regular patron of BWR NORTH PORT, LLC d/b/a BUFFALO WINGS AND RINGS and frequently was served alcohol to the point he was noticably intoxicated.” (Complaint at 4 28). WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above and based on the legal authorities cited above, Plaintiff respectfully request the Court enter an order denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and for such further relief as the Court deems just and proper. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was furnished to the addressees herein this 22nd day of June, 2021, by Electronic Mail: Howard Holden, Esquire / Jorge W. Rodriguez-Sierra, Esquire, Luks, Santaniello, Petrilllo & Cohen, 1422 Hendry Street, 3rd Floor, Fort Myers, FL 33901 and James F. Sposato, Esquire/Mitchel Chusid, Esquire/Jeffrey Glotzer, Esquire, Ritter Chusid, LLP, 5850 Coral Ridge Drive, Suite 201, Coral Springs, FL 33076. SPIVEY LAW FIRM PERSONAL INJURY ATTORNEYS, P.A. 13400 Parker Commons Blvd. Fort Myers, FL 33912 Phone: (239) 337-7483 Fax: (239) 337-7484 By RANDALL L. SPIVEY Florida Bar No. 64742 andall@spiveylaw.com