Preview
MAYALL H U R L E Y P.C. D/ENDQR
JOHN P. BRISCOE (SBN: 273690)
2 ibriscoe(a),mavallaw.com
2453 Grand Canal Boulevard APR 1 8 2022
3 Stockton, California 95207-8253
Ry H. PEMELTQJl
4 Telephone: (209) 477-3833 Deputy Clerk
Facsimile: (209) 473-4818
5
Attorneys for Plaintiff David Ridge
6
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
7
8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
9 DAVID RIDGE, an individual, Case No.: 34-2019-00265393
10 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
II AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
vs. MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
12 RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; INTERROGATORIES, SET T H R E E ;
13 and DOES 1-100, inclusive. REQUEST FOR MONETARY
SANCTIONS
14 Defendants.
15 Date: May 10, 2022
Time: 1:30 p.m.
16 Dept.: 53
Res.: 2636452
17
18
19
20
21 Plaintiff David Ridge ("Ridge") submits the following Memorandum of Points and
22 Authorities in Support of his Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three;
23 Request for Monetary Sanctions.
24 I FACTUAL HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
25 Defendant California Highway Patrol ("Defendant" or "CHP") continues to hide the
26 identities of percipient witnesses for no better reason than to frustrate Ridge's discovery efforts.
27 In this employment, disability discrimination case. Ridge, a Highway Patrolman of the CHP,
28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Page I
alleges that he was denied a reasonable accommodation for his lower body injuries—permission
2 to wear his law enforcement equipment on an external load-bearing vest. CHP denied this
3 accommodation, and has since taken the position in this litigation that this was not a reasonable
4 accommodation because of amorphous "safety, operational, and appearance factors", and
5 because it did not conform to CHP's uniform policy. This comports with what Ridge was told at
6 the time—that CHP's leadership (going all the way to the Commissioner) simply prefers the
7 appearance of the traditional "Sam Browne" belt (the heavy leather belt on which law
8 enforcement officers have traditionally carried their considerable load of personal equipment).
9 Incidentally, the Legislature itself has recognized that these duty belts contribute to lower back
10 impairments. (See Lab. Code, § 3213.2.)
11 To put CHP's defense as simply as possible: CHP contends that an external load-
12 bearing vest was not a reasonable accommodation for Officer Ridge, because such a vest does
13 not conform to CHP's Uniform Policy, and that policy reflects the fact that it is not reasonable
14 for a CHP patrolman to wear such a vest as a general matter. Therefore, the reasonableness of
15 this ironclad uniform policy is at issue.
16 Through discovery, counsel for Ridge identified one Officer Erik Mallory, who has, for
17 some time, bravely and vociferously protested CHP's "no-vest" rule and advocated for change.
18 Officer Mallory was deposed, and he testified that CHP doesn't want officers to wear load-
19 bearing vests ''just because of the way they look" and "fbjecause it's not traditional. CHP
20 prides itself on our tan uniform. And anything that compromises that, does not align."
21 (Declaration of John P. Briscoe ["Briscoe Decl."], Exhibit 1,31:13-33:22, emphasis added.) This
22 corroborates with what Ridge himself was told: That the vest just doesn't look right and the
23 leadership will not compromise the appearance of the standard uniform. Officer Mallory further
24 testified as follows (emphasis added):
25 Officer Mallory, in 2015, proposed to CHP that load-bearing vests should be
26 approved as a uniform item in lieu of the traditional, leather, "Sam Browne" belt.
27 This 26-page submission included statements from himself, physicians, and others.
28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Page 2
1 such as:
2 o "Lower back injuries are the leading cause of both short-term and long-term
3 disability in law enforcement"
4 o "The introduction of the daily use of load-bearing vests would serve to
5 dramatically decrease taxpayer costs associated with back injuries"
6 o "The use of a load bearing vest transfers some of the items off the service belt to
7 the vest carrier while distributing some of the weight to the officer's shoulders
8 and not solely concentrating weight on the lower levels of the spine. This will
9 reduce forces on the lower spine and prevent cumulative and repetitive trauma
10 in the lumbar spine."
11 o The use of load-bearing vests means that CHP officers would be "less likely to
12 have lower back surgery or routine chiropractic visits for lower back issues in
13 regards to duty belt weight trauma"
14 o The weight of CHP officer's standard equipment (worn on their belt) has
15 increased from 8 to 20 pounds. (Briscoe Deck, Exhibit 1, 25:22-26:3, internal
16 exhibit GO.)
17 Though he submitted a proposal to CHP that load-bearing vests be permitted as a
18 uniform item, he never received an official response. (Id., 8:4-7.)
19 CHP's refusal to allow this vest for patrol officers, regardless of the circumstances,
20 was apparently attributable to the dictates of CHP's Commissioner himself. {Id.,
21 8:8-22.)
22 Officer Mallory has suffered substantial back pain that he attributes to wearing the
23 standard, leather, "Sam Browne" belt with his personal equipment (sidearm, radio,
24 etc.). (M, 7:15-11:19.)
25 Officer Mallory, pursuant to his own research (e.g., consulting with other law
)
26
enforcement agencies) believes that load-bearing vests should be an approved
27
uniform item for CHP patrolmen because it would alleviate lower back stress and
28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Page 3
increase officer safety and save the State money on medical payouts. {Id., 12:10-
2 14:8.)
3 As to why CHP doesn't want its officers wearing load-bearing vests. Officer Mallory
4 heard from CHP that "// appears too tactical and doesn't look like our traditional
5 uniform." {Id, 17:3-23.)
6 So as to advocate for load-bearing vests as an approved uniform item. Officer
7 Mallory and others went surveys around the state which asked (a) "in the event [load-
8 bearing vests] are approved, would you purchase your own?"; (b) "Do you currently
9 have back stress while wearing a duty belt?"; and (c) "Do you believe [load-bearing
10 vests] would benefit employees & the department?" Of437 responses, 385 CHP
II officers said they would pay f o r their own load-bearing vests i f the opportunity was
12 available. This was not an official survey; this was Officer Mallory's "baby." {Id.,
13 19:1-20:24.)
14 Officer Mallory believes that CHP doesn 7 want officers to wear load-bearing vests
15 "just because of the way they look" and "fbjecause it's not traditional. CHP prides
16 itself on our tan uniform. And anything that compromises that, does not align."
17 (31:13-33:22.)
18 The overwhelming lot of these officers also responded that they believed that external
19 load-bearing vests would benefit CHP and. its officers, and also that they are experiencing back
20 stress while wearing the standard duty belt. (Briscoe Deck, Exhibit 2.) By any stretch, this would
21 tend to undercut CHP's official line that a load-bearing vest was not a reasonable
22 accommodation because of "safety, operational, and appearance factors". After all, these are the
23 very officers who are bound by the ironclad uniform policy and are asked to wear heavy
24 equipment on their waist, every workday, for years or, even decades. Their opinion on the
25 reasonableness of this policy—which CHP has placed at issue—matters. CHP cannot
26 conceivably believe or contend otherwise.
27
28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Page 4
Though responsive to a document request in the Amended Notice of Deposition, Mallory
2 did not bring the aforementioned survey responses with him. CHP then appointed itself the
3 gatekeeper of what it called "Mallory's documents" and refused to produce them. Ridge was thus
4 forced to file a motion to compel. CHP relented and produced the sought documents and that
5 motion was withdrawn.
6 However, the survey responses do not provide contact information for any of these
7 percipient witnesses. Ridge then served Special Interrogatories, Set Three, seeking such
8 informatipn (and also for those officers that have advocated to CHP's Uniform Committee to
9 allow the wearing of external weight-bearing vests). CHP, predictably, balked at this discovery
10 also and has offered to provide only work contact information for only 20 out of as many as 519
II officers.
12 The simple matter is that these officers are percipient witnesses of an issue that CHP has
13 itself placed at issue—the reasonable of its general prohibition on the wearing of external
14 weight-bearing vests. The Civil Discovery Act provides that the names and location of witnesses
15 is discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010.) Nonetheless, CHP stands on bogus objections in
16 a transparent and shameful effort to hide witnesses and frustrate Ridge's discovery efforts. This
17 cannot be permitted. Further responses should be ordered, and sanctions against CHP and
18 counsel should be assessed so that, hopefully, these bad faith tactics end.
19 H. LAW AND ARGUMENT
20 A. A Motion to Compel Lies Where Interrogatory Responses are Incomplete and
21 Unmeritorious Objections Asserted.
22 The Civil Discovery Act provides that interrogatory responses shall be as full and
23 complete as the information reasonably available permits. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.220, subd.
24 (a).) A motion to compel lies where responses are incomplete or evasive, where reference to
25 documents is unwarranted or the required, specification of documents is inadequate, and where
26 objections tendered are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.300, subds. (a)(I)-(3).) As set
27 forth in detail in the Separate Statement, all of this happened here: CHP gave incomplete and
28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Page 5
evasive interrogatory responses, referenced documents that do not supply all of the information
2 sought, and tendered objections which are utterly devoid of merit.
3 B. The Civil Discovery Act Establishes a Litigant's Broad Right to Discovery, and the
4 Names of Witnesses Are Discoverable.
5 The right to discovery in California is a broad one. Courts have liberally construed the
6 discovery statutes, so as to uphold the right to discovei-y wherever possible. {Greyhound Corp. v.
7 Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 377-378.) The primary limitation on discovery is that the
8 information sought must be (1) not privileged, (2) relevant to the subject matter of the action, and
9 (3) either itself admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
10 evidence. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010.) Importantly, admissibility is not the test f o r discovery;
II the test is whether the information sought might at least reasonably lead to other evidence that
12 would be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Cowr/ (1984) 36 Ca.3d
13 291,401; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court {2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1490-
14 1491.) The "relevance to the subject matter" and "reasonably calculated to lead to the
15 discovery of admissible evidence" standards are applied liberally, and any doubt is generally
16 resolved in favor of permitting discovery. {Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
17 (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)
18 Clearly, one of the core functions of discovery is to identify and locate witnesses.
19 "Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
20 discoverable matter[.]" (See Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; see also Puerto v. Superior Court
21 (2008) 158 Cal.App.4"' 1242, 1249-1250.) CHP has taken the position that the requested
22 accommodation (an external load bearing vest) was not a reasonable accommodation because it
23 contravenes the uniform policy and would pose some kind of hazard. Again, it must be
24 emphasized that CHP contends that the external weight-bearing vest was not a reasonable
25 accommodation for Ridge because it's not reasonable to let patrolmen wear such a vest, as a
26 general policy. That general policy is thus at issue.
27 Hundreds of CHP officers took it upon themselves to voluntarily respond to an unofficial
28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Page 6
survey, andfreely express their willingness to pay for their own vests, if approved, and that they
2 believe wearing vests would benefit CHP and its officers. (Briscoe Deck, Exhibits 1 (19:1-
3 20:24), 2.) Most of these officers also attested that they are presently experiencing back stress
4 while wearing a duty belt. {Id., Exhibit 2.) If CHP is going to contend that its Uniform Policy
5 foreclosed Ridge's sought accommodation, and that said policy is a reasonable one, then it must
6 concede that the opinions of its own officers is of relevance. Simply put, these officers are
7 witnesses on a relevant matter, and thus their identities, per statute, are discoverable.
8 m. SANCTIONS AGAINST CHP AND COUNSEL ARE WARRANTED
9 Monetary sanctions are authorized for abuses of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc,
10 § 2023.030.) Failing to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery is grounds for
11 sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010, subd. (d).) "Making, without substantial justification, an
12 unmeritorious objection to discovery", "failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method
13 of discovery", and making an evasive response to discovery also constitute independent and
14 sufficient grounds for sanctions. (Code Civil. Proc. § 2023.010, subds. (d)-(f).) Opposing,
15 unsuccessfully, and without substantial justification, a motion to compel discovery, is further
16 grounds for sanctions. {Id., subd. (h).) Monetary sanctions shall be imposed against any party or
17 attorney who makes such an unsuccessful opposition. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.300, subd. (d).)
18 CHP is simply hiding the ball, without justification. CHP and its attorneys understand full
19 well that they have placed their Uniform Policy at issue. They further understand that the rank
20 and file have protested this policy, in free and voluntary response to an unofficial survey. They
21 understand that these persons are indeed percipient witnesses on a relevant matter, and that is
22 demonstrated by their "offer" to disclose a tiny fraction of the names and contact information.
23 Last, they definitely understand that the Information Practices Act is no bar to civil discovery,
24 since the undersigned already pointed that out to CHP's government attorneys. (See Civ. Code,
25 1798.76 [Information Practices Act does not alter right to civil discovery); see also Briscoe
26 Deck, Exhibit 4 [April 6, 2022 email].) Monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,200 against CHP
27
28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Page 7
1 and James Curran, jointly and severally, are appropriate in this instance. (See Briscoe Deck,
2 12-14.)
3 IV. CONCLUSION
4 Concealing witness information without a sliver of justification, just for the purpose of
5 bogging down a litigant's discovery efforts, is an abuse of the discovery process by any stretch.
6 The motion should be granted, and sanctions must be assessed against CHP and counsel;
7 otherwise, further abuses are certain to occur.
8 ///
9 DATED: May 7, 2022 MAYALL HURLEY P.C.
10
11 By.
JOHN P. BRISCOE
12
Attorneys for Plaintiff
13 DAVID RIDGE
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28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special
Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions
Pages •
Ridge V. California Highway Patrol, et al.
Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2019-00265393
1
PROOF OF SERVICE
2
I, the undersigned, certify and declare as follows:
3 I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 2453
Grand Canal Boulevard, Stockton, Califomia 95207 that is located in the county where the mailing
4 and/or delivery below took place. . '
5 On April 7, 2022,1 served the following document:
6 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET THREE;
7 REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
8 addressed to:
9 James F. Curran
Deputy Attomey General
10 P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
11 James.Curran@doi.ca.gov
12 • BUSINESS PRACTICE TO ENTRUST DEPOSIT TO OTHERS: I am readily familiar with
the business practice at my place of business for collection and processing of correspondence for
13 mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence so collected and processed is
deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.
14 On the date specified below, at my place of business at Stockton, Califomia a copy of the document
described above was placed for deposit in the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope,
15 with postage fully prepaid addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above; and that
envelope was placed for collection and mailing on that date following ordinary business practice.
16
• BY EXPRESS SERVICE CARRIER: On the date specified below, 1 directed to be deposited in a
17 box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express or delivered to a courier or driver
authorized by said express service carrier to receive documents, a copy of the document mentioned
18 above, in an envelope designed by the said express service carrier, with delivery fees paid or
provided for, addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above.
19
0 BY EMAIL: In accordance with Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1010.6, on the date specified
20 below, I caused a copy of the docuinent(s) described above to be sent to the person(s) at the e-mail
address(es) listed above. My business e-mail address is lrilev@mavallaw.com. I did not receive,
21 within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the
transmission was unsuccessful.
22
I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
23 foregoing is true and correct.
24 Executed on April 7, 2022, at Stockton, California.
25
26
27
PROOF OF SERVICE
28
Preview
MAYALL H U R L E Y P.C. D/ENDQR JOHN P. BRISCOE (SBN: 273690) 2 ibriscoe(a),mavallaw.com 2453 Grand Canal Boulevard APR 1 8 2022 3 Stockton, California 95207-8253 Ry H. PEMELTQJl 4 Telephone: (209) 477-3833 Deputy Clerk Facsimile: (209) 473-4818 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff David Ridge 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 9 DAVID RIDGE, an individual, Case No.: 34-2019-00265393 10 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND II AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF vs. MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER 12 RESPONSES TO SPECIAL THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; INTERROGATORIES, SET T H R E E ; 13 and DOES 1-100, inclusive. REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS 14 Defendants. 15 Date: May 10, 2022 Time: 1:30 p.m. 16 Dept.: 53 Res.: 2636452 17 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff David Ridge ("Ridge") submits the following Memorandum of Points and 22 Authorities in Support of his Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; 23 Request for Monetary Sanctions. 24 I FACTUAL HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 25 Defendant California Highway Patrol ("Defendant" or "CHP") continues to hide the 26 identities of percipient witnesses for no better reason than to frustrate Ridge's discovery efforts. 27 In this employment, disability discrimination case. Ridge, a Highway Patrolman of the CHP, 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Page I alleges that he was denied a reasonable accommodation for his lower body injuries—permission 2 to wear his law enforcement equipment on an external load-bearing vest. CHP denied this 3 accommodation, and has since taken the position in this litigation that this was not a reasonable 4 accommodation because of amorphous "safety, operational, and appearance factors", and 5 because it did not conform to CHP's uniform policy. This comports with what Ridge was told at 6 the time—that CHP's leadership (going all the way to the Commissioner) simply prefers the 7 appearance of the traditional "Sam Browne" belt (the heavy leather belt on which law 8 enforcement officers have traditionally carried their considerable load of personal equipment). 9 Incidentally, the Legislature itself has recognized that these duty belts contribute to lower back 10 impairments. (See Lab. Code, § 3213.2.) 11 To put CHP's defense as simply as possible: CHP contends that an external load- 12 bearing vest was not a reasonable accommodation for Officer Ridge, because such a vest does 13 not conform to CHP's Uniform Policy, and that policy reflects the fact that it is not reasonable 14 for a CHP patrolman to wear such a vest as a general matter. Therefore, the reasonableness of 15 this ironclad uniform policy is at issue. 16 Through discovery, counsel for Ridge identified one Officer Erik Mallory, who has, for 17 some time, bravely and vociferously protested CHP's "no-vest" rule and advocated for change. 18 Officer Mallory was deposed, and he testified that CHP doesn't want officers to wear load- 19 bearing vests ''just because of the way they look" and "fbjecause it's not traditional. CHP 20 prides itself on our tan uniform. And anything that compromises that, does not align." 21 (Declaration of John P. Briscoe ["Briscoe Decl."], Exhibit 1,31:13-33:22, emphasis added.) This 22 corroborates with what Ridge himself was told: That the vest just doesn't look right and the 23 leadership will not compromise the appearance of the standard uniform. Officer Mallory further 24 testified as follows (emphasis added): 25 Officer Mallory, in 2015, proposed to CHP that load-bearing vests should be 26 approved as a uniform item in lieu of the traditional, leather, "Sam Browne" belt. 27 This 26-page submission included statements from himself, physicians, and others. 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 2 1 such as: 2 o "Lower back injuries are the leading cause of both short-term and long-term 3 disability in law enforcement" 4 o "The introduction of the daily use of load-bearing vests would serve to 5 dramatically decrease taxpayer costs associated with back injuries" 6 o "The use of a load bearing vest transfers some of the items off the service belt to 7 the vest carrier while distributing some of the weight to the officer's shoulders 8 and not solely concentrating weight on the lower levels of the spine. This will 9 reduce forces on the lower spine and prevent cumulative and repetitive trauma 10 in the lumbar spine." 11 o The use of load-bearing vests means that CHP officers would be "less likely to 12 have lower back surgery or routine chiropractic visits for lower back issues in 13 regards to duty belt weight trauma" 14 o The weight of CHP officer's standard equipment (worn on their belt) has 15 increased from 8 to 20 pounds. (Briscoe Deck, Exhibit 1, 25:22-26:3, internal 16 exhibit GO.) 17 Though he submitted a proposal to CHP that load-bearing vests be permitted as a 18 uniform item, he never received an official response. (Id., 8:4-7.) 19 CHP's refusal to allow this vest for patrol officers, regardless of the circumstances, 20 was apparently attributable to the dictates of CHP's Commissioner himself. {Id., 21 8:8-22.) 22 Officer Mallory has suffered substantial back pain that he attributes to wearing the 23 standard, leather, "Sam Browne" belt with his personal equipment (sidearm, radio, 24 etc.). (M, 7:15-11:19.) 25 Officer Mallory, pursuant to his own research (e.g., consulting with other law ) 26 enforcement agencies) believes that load-bearing vests should be an approved 27 uniform item for CHP patrolmen because it would alleviate lower back stress and 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 3 increase officer safety and save the State money on medical payouts. {Id., 12:10- 2 14:8.) 3 As to why CHP doesn't want its officers wearing load-bearing vests. Officer Mallory 4 heard from CHP that "// appears too tactical and doesn't look like our traditional 5 uniform." {Id, 17:3-23.) 6 So as to advocate for load-bearing vests as an approved uniform item. Officer 7 Mallory and others went surveys around the state which asked (a) "in the event [load- 8 bearing vests] are approved, would you purchase your own?"; (b) "Do you currently 9 have back stress while wearing a duty belt?"; and (c) "Do you believe [load-bearing 10 vests] would benefit employees & the department?" Of437 responses, 385 CHP II officers said they would pay f o r their own load-bearing vests i f the opportunity was 12 available. This was not an official survey; this was Officer Mallory's "baby." {Id., 13 19:1-20:24.) 14 Officer Mallory believes that CHP doesn 7 want officers to wear load-bearing vests 15 "just because of the way they look" and "fbjecause it's not traditional. CHP prides 16 itself on our tan uniform. And anything that compromises that, does not align." 17 (31:13-33:22.) 18 The overwhelming lot of these officers also responded that they believed that external 19 load-bearing vests would benefit CHP and. its officers, and also that they are experiencing back 20 stress while wearing the standard duty belt. (Briscoe Deck, Exhibit 2.) By any stretch, this would 21 tend to undercut CHP's official line that a load-bearing vest was not a reasonable 22 accommodation because of "safety, operational, and appearance factors". After all, these are the 23 very officers who are bound by the ironclad uniform policy and are asked to wear heavy 24 equipment on their waist, every workday, for years or, even decades. Their opinion on the 25 reasonableness of this policy—which CHP has placed at issue—matters. CHP cannot 26 conceivably believe or contend otherwise. 27 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 4 Though responsive to a document request in the Amended Notice of Deposition, Mallory 2 did not bring the aforementioned survey responses with him. CHP then appointed itself the 3 gatekeeper of what it called "Mallory's documents" and refused to produce them. Ridge was thus 4 forced to file a motion to compel. CHP relented and produced the sought documents and that 5 motion was withdrawn. 6 However, the survey responses do not provide contact information for any of these 7 percipient witnesses. Ridge then served Special Interrogatories, Set Three, seeking such 8 informatipn (and also for those officers that have advocated to CHP's Uniform Committee to 9 allow the wearing of external weight-bearing vests). CHP, predictably, balked at this discovery 10 also and has offered to provide only work contact information for only 20 out of as many as 519 II officers. 12 The simple matter is that these officers are percipient witnesses of an issue that CHP has 13 itself placed at issue—the reasonable of its general prohibition on the wearing of external 14 weight-bearing vests. The Civil Discovery Act provides that the names and location of witnesses 15 is discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010.) Nonetheless, CHP stands on bogus objections in 16 a transparent and shameful effort to hide witnesses and frustrate Ridge's discovery efforts. This 17 cannot be permitted. Further responses should be ordered, and sanctions against CHP and 18 counsel should be assessed so that, hopefully, these bad faith tactics end. 19 H. LAW AND ARGUMENT 20 A. A Motion to Compel Lies Where Interrogatory Responses are Incomplete and 21 Unmeritorious Objections Asserted. 22 The Civil Discovery Act provides that interrogatory responses shall be as full and 23 complete as the information reasonably available permits. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.220, subd. 24 (a).) A motion to compel lies where responses are incomplete or evasive, where reference to 25 documents is unwarranted or the required, specification of documents is inadequate, and where 26 objections tendered are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.300, subds. (a)(I)-(3).) As set 27 forth in detail in the Separate Statement, all of this happened here: CHP gave incomplete and 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 5 evasive interrogatory responses, referenced documents that do not supply all of the information 2 sought, and tendered objections which are utterly devoid of merit. 3 B. The Civil Discovery Act Establishes a Litigant's Broad Right to Discovery, and the 4 Names of Witnesses Are Discoverable. 5 The right to discovery in California is a broad one. Courts have liberally construed the 6 discovery statutes, so as to uphold the right to discovei-y wherever possible. {Greyhound Corp. v. 7 Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 377-378.) The primary limitation on discovery is that the 8 information sought must be (1) not privileged, (2) relevant to the subject matter of the action, and 9 (3) either itself admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 10 evidence. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010.) Importantly, admissibility is not the test f o r discovery; II the test is whether the information sought might at least reasonably lead to other evidence that 12 would be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Cowr/ (1984) 36 Ca.3d 13 291,401; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court {2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1490- 14 1491.) The "relevance to the subject matter" and "reasonably calculated to lead to the 15 discovery of admissible evidence" standards are applied liberally, and any doubt is generally 16 resolved in favor of permitting discovery. {Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court 17 (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.) 18 Clearly, one of the core functions of discovery is to identify and locate witnesses. 19 "Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 20 discoverable matter[.]" (See Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; see also Puerto v. Superior Court 21 (2008) 158 Cal.App.4"' 1242, 1249-1250.) CHP has taken the position that the requested 22 accommodation (an external load bearing vest) was not a reasonable accommodation because it 23 contravenes the uniform policy and would pose some kind of hazard. Again, it must be 24 emphasized that CHP contends that the external weight-bearing vest was not a reasonable 25 accommodation for Ridge because it's not reasonable to let patrolmen wear such a vest, as a 26 general policy. That general policy is thus at issue. 27 Hundreds of CHP officers took it upon themselves to voluntarily respond to an unofficial 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 6 survey, andfreely express their willingness to pay for their own vests, if approved, and that they 2 believe wearing vests would benefit CHP and its officers. (Briscoe Deck, Exhibits 1 (19:1- 3 20:24), 2.) Most of these officers also attested that they are presently experiencing back stress 4 while wearing a duty belt. {Id., Exhibit 2.) If CHP is going to contend that its Uniform Policy 5 foreclosed Ridge's sought accommodation, and that said policy is a reasonable one, then it must 6 concede that the opinions of its own officers is of relevance. Simply put, these officers are 7 witnesses on a relevant matter, and thus their identities, per statute, are discoverable. 8 m. SANCTIONS AGAINST CHP AND COUNSEL ARE WARRANTED 9 Monetary sanctions are authorized for abuses of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc, 10 § 2023.030.) Failing to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery is grounds for 11 sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010, subd. (d).) "Making, without substantial justification, an 12 unmeritorious objection to discovery", "failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method 13 of discovery", and making an evasive response to discovery also constitute independent and 14 sufficient grounds for sanctions. (Code Civil. Proc. § 2023.010, subds. (d)-(f).) Opposing, 15 unsuccessfully, and without substantial justification, a motion to compel discovery, is further 16 grounds for sanctions. {Id., subd. (h).) Monetary sanctions shall be imposed against any party or 17 attorney who makes such an unsuccessful opposition. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.300, subd. (d).) 18 CHP is simply hiding the ball, without justification. CHP and its attorneys understand full 19 well that they have placed their Uniform Policy at issue. They further understand that the rank 20 and file have protested this policy, in free and voluntary response to an unofficial survey. They 21 understand that these persons are indeed percipient witnesses on a relevant matter, and that is 22 demonstrated by their "offer" to disclose a tiny fraction of the names and contact information. 23 Last, they definitely understand that the Information Practices Act is no bar to civil discovery, 24 since the undersigned already pointed that out to CHP's government attorneys. (See Civ. Code, 25 1798.76 [Information Practices Act does not alter right to civil discovery); see also Briscoe 26 Deck, Exhibit 4 [April 6, 2022 email].) Monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,200 against CHP 27 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 7 1 and James Curran, jointly and severally, are appropriate in this instance. (See Briscoe Deck, 2 12-14.) 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Concealing witness information without a sliver of justification, just for the purpose of 5 bogging down a litigant's discovery efforts, is an abuse of the discovery process by any stretch. 6 The motion should be granted, and sanctions must be assessed against CHP and counsel; 7 otherwise, further abuses are certain to occur. 8 /// 9 DATED: May 7, 2022 MAYALL HURLEY P.C. 10 11 By. JOHN P. BRISCOE 12 Attorneys for Plaintiff 13 DAVID RIDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions Pages • Ridge V. California Highway Patrol, et al. Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2019-00265393 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I, the undersigned, certify and declare as follows: 3 I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 2453 Grand Canal Boulevard, Stockton, Califomia 95207 that is located in the county where the mailing 4 and/or delivery below took place. . ' 5 On April 7, 2022,1 served the following document: 6 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET THREE; 7 REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS 8 addressed to: 9 James F. Curran Deputy Attomey General 10 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 11 James.Curran@doi.ca.gov 12 • BUSINESS PRACTICE TO ENTRUST DEPOSIT TO OTHERS: I am readily familiar with the business practice at my place of business for collection and processing of correspondence for 13 mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence so collected and processed is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. 14 On the date specified below, at my place of business at Stockton, Califomia a copy of the document described above was placed for deposit in the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope, 15 with postage fully prepaid addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above; and that envelope was placed for collection and mailing on that date following ordinary business practice. 16 • BY EXPRESS SERVICE CARRIER: On the date specified below, 1 directed to be deposited in a 17 box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express or delivered to a courier or driver authorized by said express service carrier to receive documents, a copy of the document mentioned 18 above, in an envelope designed by the said express service carrier, with delivery fees paid or provided for, addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above. 19 0 BY EMAIL: In accordance with Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1010.6, on the date specified 20 below, I caused a copy of the docuinent(s) described above to be sent to the person(s) at the e-mail address(es) listed above. My business e-mail address is lrilev@mavallaw.com. I did not receive, 21 within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 22 I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 23 foregoing is true and correct. 24 Executed on April 7, 2022, at Stockton, California. 25 26 27 PROOF OF SERVICE 28