Preview
1 MAYALL HURLEY P.C.
2
JOHN P. BRISCOE (SBN: 273690) FlLED/ENDORSED
ibriscoe(fl),inayaUaw.com
2453 Grand Canal Boulevard MAY 2 7 2021
3
Stockton, CaUfornia 95207-8253
4 Telephone: (209) 477-3833 By:. A, Macias
FacsimUe: (209) 473-4818 Deputy Clerk
5
Attorneys for Plaintiff David Ridge
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
9 DAVID RIDGE, an individual. Case No.: 34-2019-00265393
10
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION
11 TO MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS
vs. AT DEPOSITION OF MATTHEW
12 STOVER, AND REQUEST FOR
THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; MONETARY SANCTIONS
13 and DOES 1-100, inclusive,
14 Date: June 3, 2021
Defendants. Time: 1:30 p.m.
15 Dept.: 53
Res.: 2563573
16
17
18
19
20 In its continued efforts to hide the ball andfrustratePlaintiff David Ridge's discovery
21 efforts, Defendant Califomia Highway Patrol ("CHP") misstates the law and the facts to an
22 impressive degree. CHP's opposition is fatallyflawedfor these principal reasons: (1) this is not a
23 motion in limine, (2) the witness, Matthew Stover ("Stover") never answered the question at
24 issue; (3) the question that Stover ducked may lead to admissible evidence of his knowledge anc.
25 observations regarding the reasonableness of accommodations (which is primarily a factual
26 issue, not a legal one), and (4) his opinions on reasonable accommodations may be admissible,
27
28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary
Sanctions
Page 1 of6
1 I. THIS IS NOT A MOTION IN LIMINE. AND ADMISSIBIILTY IS NOT THE
2 TEST FOR DISCOVERY
3 CHP's principal argument in opposition to this motion is that Matthew Stover was called
4 upon to give an inadmissible lay opinion on an "ultimate" legal issue. It was already mentioned
5 in the moving papers, but it must be said again: Admissibility is not the test for discovery. The
6 standard is whether the information sought might, at least, reasonably lead to other evidence that
7 would be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d
8 291, 401; Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1481,1490- |
9 \49l; Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566;
10 Seahaus La Jolla Owners Assn. v. Superior Court (2015) 224 Cal.App.4th 754.) Evidence is j
11 relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or
12 facilitating a settlement. {Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Again
13 the "relevance to the subject matter" and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
14 admissible evidence" standards set forth in section 2017.010 are applied liberally, and any doubt
15 is generally resolved in favor of permitting discovery. {Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
16 Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)
17 The foregoing principles are well-established. CHP does not contradict them (actually, it
18 ducks them), but essentially argues that the only thing to be conceivably derived from the
19 question at issue ("can you think of any reason the weight-bearing vest would not have been a
20 reasonable accommodation") would be Stover's opinion, and such could never, ever be
21 admissible.^ In light of the foregoing authorities and countless others, this argument can be
22 discarded from the outset. CHP will have every opportunity to file motions in limine to exclude
23 Stover's deposition answers from trial, but that is a matter for another day.
24 ///
25
26
' No doubt the Legislature imposed the "lead to admissible evidence" standard, in part, because of attomeys'self-
27 serving predictions about what the trial court would ultimately deem admissible. Such predictions have been made
here.
28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary
Sanctions
Page 2 of6
1 II. STOVER NEVER ANSWERED THE OUESTION AT ISSUE
2 CHP dedicates an inordinate amount of time propping up thefictionthat Stover answered
3 the question. Stover clearly, and with no small amovmt of skill, danced around the question
4 without addressing it directly. Again, either Stover can think of a reason that the vest would not
5 have been a reasonable accommodation, or he cannot. Saying "I don't have an opinion" and "I
6 don't make that decision" is not responsive. That a person speaks in response to a question does
7 not mean that the question is answered.
8 III. MATTHEW STOVER'S UNDISCLOSED KNOWLEDGE AND OBSERVATIONS,
9 MADE OVER HIS 22-YEAR CAREER AS A HIGHWAY PATROLMAN. MAY
10 CONSTITUTE OR LEAD TO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
11 CHP erroneously argues that the only thing that Stover could offer, if he actually
12 answered the question at issue, would be an inadmissible lay opinion. As was made clear during
13 the meet and confer process, this is untrue. CHP repeatedly states that a lay opinion is only
14 admissible if it is (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear
15 understanding of his or her testimony. Whatever Stover has perceived with regard to the weight;
16 bearing vest, he has purposefully concealed. The question "can you think of any reason", if
17 Stover actually answered it, may lead to admissible observations on Stover's part which could be
18 relevant to whether the weight-bearing vest was a reasonable accommodation. Again, CHP
19 asserts that the vest was not a reasonable accommodation because of "operational factors, safety
20 factors, appearance factors, and concems unique to the day-to-day duties of pafrol officers". By
21 way of mere example. Stover might testify about how he has observed that a weight-bearing vest
22 can be an unsafe item of equipment (e.g., he might assert that it poses a danger of being grabbed
23 by a suspect during a violent stmggle), or he might testify that the vest does not properly
24 conform to the pafrolman's uniform or otherwise negatively impacts appearance or operational
25 factors. He might testify, of course, to any number of things which the undersigned cannot
26 predict, and such things could at least lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It's worth
27 noting, again, that Stover has been with the CHP since the 1990s, he knows the job and what
28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary
Sanctions
Page 3 of 6
1 it entails, and he has doubtless observed much in that time.^ Ridge is entitled to hear those
2 observations, so that he might be assisted in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating
3 a settlement.
4 IV. STOVER'S OPINION ITSELF MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE ADMISSIBLE
5 Again, CHP points out that a lay opinion, in order to be admissible, must be rationally
6 based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his or her
7 testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.) Fair enough, but what precisely has Stover perceived? More
8 specifically, has Stover ever perceived anything that would lead him to conclude that the weight-
9 bearing vest would not be a reasonable accommodation for Ridge? To put an even finer point on
10 it, can he think of a single reason why the requested weight-bearing vest would not be a
11 reasonable accommodation?^
12 We don't know the answer to this question because Stover didn't feel like answering it
13 (and his attomeys have only aided him in this evasion). But if Stover were to answer the
14 question, he might tick off some number of occurrences he has observed that are relevant to the
15 question of whether the vest would be a reasonable accommodation. He might, then, give his
16 opinion as to whether the vest would be reasonable. If that opinion is rationally based on his
17 perception and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony, then his opinion on the matter
18 would be admissible. Of course, that determination will not be made until a motion in limine is
19 heard, much later.
20 Ostensibly propping up the opposition are a couple citations to unreported federal district
21 court cases. Putting aside the fact that such cases are in no way binding law, they are wildly
22 inapposite to the facts of this case, and neither case, to any extent, would suggest that Stover's
23
^ Again, the reasonableness of an accommodation, as every job is different, is primarily a factual issue. {Hanson v.
24 Lucliy Stores. Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 228,fii.\ \ ; Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 345, 370.) CHP tenders no authority to the contrary, thus its protests that the question calls for a "legal
25 conclusion" are hollow and should be disregarded.
' Stover did partly answer the question, when he answered "Well, one, I don't make that decision and, two, I think
26 there is a[nother] device that was approved for him to wear." But when asked if he could think of any otiier reason
(and it was during this time that defense counsel interrupted the deposition to speak with his client for ten minutes),
27 he refused to answer the question. So Stover is clearly capable of hazarding what CHP would self-servingly call his
"inadmissible lay opinion". It would appear that he merely, and ultimately, thought it better not to do so. |
28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary
Sanctions
Page 4 of 6
1 opinion on the reasonableness of the weight-bearing vest (or those things he perceived and which
2 support his opinion) is not discoverable. Sanchez v. Jiles (CD. Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 13005996
3 was a criminal case, and the relevance of the word "reasonable" was in the context of whether a!
4 police officer used "reasonable" or excessive force in discharging his pistol a number of times.
5 For reasons that should be obvious, the district court determined that to be a subject for expert
6 testimony. The district court examined these issues in the context of—wait for it—a motion in
7 limine. The instant case, pf course, is a civil case (in a Califomia court), the immediate factual
8 question is whether a requested accotnmodation for a disabled employee was a reasonable one
9 under the circumstances, and this is not a motion in limine. Sanchez is not authority, nor is it
10 helpful guidance.
11 CHP then cites to another unreported federal trial court opinion—^more specifically, it
12 cites a footnote in that opinion, hi Bey v. U.S. Bank (CD. Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 11596165, the
13 district court mled upon a motion for summary judgment. It sustained an evidentiary objection to
14 a statement from the plaintiff that a "special fraining trip" was not an accommodation for her
15 disability. The court sustained the objection on the grounds that a layperson was improperly
16 giving a legal conclusion. This, of course, in no way affects the pronouncements of the courts of
17 this State, supra, that the reasonableness of an accommodation is primarily a factual issue. Bey \
18 can be disregarded also.
19 V. CHP'S REOUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IS FRIVOLOUS
20 Not only does CHP tender an essentially empty opposition, but it gallingly asks for
21 sanctions to be assessed against Mayall Hurley and the undersigned personally. There is
22 absolutely no factual or legal support for such a request. First, and as counsel for CHP knows full
23 well (given the lack of cited legal authority) no attomey is under any duty to pause his or her
24 deposition and have a back-and-forth legal debate with the defending attomey, anytime that
25 defending attorney feels like it. The defending attomey may only make objections or adjoum the
26 deposition and move for a protective order. Second, the undersigned made a pained effort to
27 meet and confer and avoid this motion. He wrote two meet-and-confer letters and had a phone
28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary
Sanctions
Page 5 of6
1 call with defense counsel, wherein he reiterated his position and offered to pay for costs of
2 further deposition (a responsibility Ridge certainly does not now assume). CHP's gripe that the
3 undersigned "never provided legal authority for the proposition that a non-expert legal witness
4 may be compelled to offer an opinion" is yet another red herring, since the undersigned
5 explained ad nauseum how Stover's deposition could lead to the discovery of admissible
6 evidence. (See, e.g., Declarafion of John P. Briscoe, Exhibit E.) That defense counsel would
7 throw out some arbifrary and irrelevant demand, and then demand sanctions because he was not
8 satisfied with the response, is particularly oufrageous, not least because he already told the
9 undersigned to "knock himself out" and file this motion.
10 VI. CONCLUSION
11 CHP would seek to conflate discovery standards with inadmissibility standards, so that it
12 can continue to obfuscate the facts and grind Ridge down in his discovery efforts. Ultimately,
13 this is a very simple matter: A witness danced around a simple question and his attomeys have
14 sought to ratify his evasion. The motion must be granted and sanctions assessed so that this kind
15 of gamesmanship might be deterred in the fiiture
16 ///
17 DATED: May 25, 2021 MAYALL HURLEY P.C.
18 By
JOHN P. BRISCOE
19
Attomeys for Plaintiff
20 DAVID RIDGE
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary
Sanctions
Page 6 of 6
Ridge V. Califomia Highway Patrol, et al.
Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2019-00265393
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 I, the undersigned, certify and declare as follows:
3 I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 2453
Grand Canal Boulevard, Stockton, Califomia 95207 that is located in the county where the mailing
4 and/or delivery below took place.
5 On May 25, 2021,1 served the following document:
6 PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS AT
DEPOSITON OF MATTHEW STOVER, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
7
addressed to:
8
James F. Curran
9 Deputy Attomey General
P.O. Box 944255
10 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
James.Curran(fl),doi.ca.gov
11
BUSINESS PRACTICE TO ENTRUST DEPOSIT TO OTHERS: I am readily familiar with
12 the business practice at my place of business for collection and processing of correspondence [for
mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence so collected and processed is
13 deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.
On the date specified below, at my place of business at Stockton, Califomia a copy of the document
14 described above was placed for deposit in the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope,
with postage fully prepaid addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above; and that
15 envelope was placed for collection and mailing on that date following ordinary business practice!
16 BY EXPRESS SERVICE CARRIER: On the date specified below, I directed to be deposited in a
box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express or delivered to a courier or driver
17 authorized by said express service carrier to receive documents, a copy of the document mentioned
above, in an envelope designed by the said express service carrier, with delivery fees paid or
18 provided for, addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above.
19 0 BY EMAIL: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic
transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the person[s] at the e-mail address[es] listed
20 above. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or
other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
21
I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Califomia that| the
22 foregoing is true and correct.
23 Executed on May 25, 2021, at Stockton, Califomia.
24
25
26
27
PROOF OF SERVICE - 1
28
Preview
1 MAYALL HURLEY P.C. 2 JOHN P. BRISCOE (SBN: 273690) FlLED/ENDORSED ibriscoe(fl),inayaUaw.com 2453 Grand Canal Boulevard MAY 2 7 2021 3 Stockton, CaUfornia 95207-8253 4 Telephone: (209) 477-3833 By:. A, Macias FacsimUe: (209) 473-4818 Deputy Clerk 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff David Ridge 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 9 DAVID RIDGE, an individual. Case No.: 34-2019-00265393 10 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION 11 TO MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS vs. AT DEPOSITION OF MATTHEW 12 STOVER, AND REQUEST FOR THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; MONETARY SANCTIONS 13 and DOES 1-100, inclusive, 14 Date: June 3, 2021 Defendants. Time: 1:30 p.m. 15 Dept.: 53 Res.: 2563573 16 17 18 19 20 In its continued efforts to hide the ball andfrustratePlaintiff David Ridge's discovery 21 efforts, Defendant Califomia Highway Patrol ("CHP") misstates the law and the facts to an 22 impressive degree. CHP's opposition is fatallyflawedfor these principal reasons: (1) this is not a 23 motion in limine, (2) the witness, Matthew Stover ("Stover") never answered the question at 24 issue; (3) the question that Stover ducked may lead to admissible evidence of his knowledge anc. 25 observations regarding the reasonableness of accommodations (which is primarily a factual 26 issue, not a legal one), and (4) his opinions on reasonable accommodations may be admissible, 27 28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 1 of6 1 I. THIS IS NOT A MOTION IN LIMINE. AND ADMISSIBIILTY IS NOT THE 2 TEST FOR DISCOVERY 3 CHP's principal argument in opposition to this motion is that Matthew Stover was called 4 upon to give an inadmissible lay opinion on an "ultimate" legal issue. It was already mentioned 5 in the moving papers, but it must be said again: Admissibility is not the test for discovery. The 6 standard is whether the information sought might, at least, reasonably lead to other evidence that 7 would be admissible. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 8 291, 401; Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1481,1490- | 9 \49l; Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566; 10 Seahaus La Jolla Owners Assn. v. Superior Court (2015) 224 Cal.App.4th 754.) Evidence is j 11 relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or 12 facilitating a settlement. {Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Again 13 the "relevance to the subject matter" and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 14 admissible evidence" standards set forth in section 2017.010 are applied liberally, and any doubt 15 is generally resolved in favor of permitting discovery. {Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. 16 Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.) 17 The foregoing principles are well-established. CHP does not contradict them (actually, it 18 ducks them), but essentially argues that the only thing to be conceivably derived from the 19 question at issue ("can you think of any reason the weight-bearing vest would not have been a 20 reasonable accommodation") would be Stover's opinion, and such could never, ever be 21 admissible.^ In light of the foregoing authorities and countless others, this argument can be 22 discarded from the outset. CHP will have every opportunity to file motions in limine to exclude 23 Stover's deposition answers from trial, but that is a matter for another day. 24 /// 25 26 ' No doubt the Legislature imposed the "lead to admissible evidence" standard, in part, because of attomeys'self- 27 serving predictions about what the trial court would ultimately deem admissible. Such predictions have been made here. 28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 2 of6 1 II. STOVER NEVER ANSWERED THE OUESTION AT ISSUE 2 CHP dedicates an inordinate amount of time propping up thefictionthat Stover answered 3 the question. Stover clearly, and with no small amovmt of skill, danced around the question 4 without addressing it directly. Again, either Stover can think of a reason that the vest would not 5 have been a reasonable accommodation, or he cannot. Saying "I don't have an opinion" and "I 6 don't make that decision" is not responsive. That a person speaks in response to a question does 7 not mean that the question is answered. 8 III. MATTHEW STOVER'S UNDISCLOSED KNOWLEDGE AND OBSERVATIONS, 9 MADE OVER HIS 22-YEAR CAREER AS A HIGHWAY PATROLMAN. MAY 10 CONSTITUTE OR LEAD TO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 11 CHP erroneously argues that the only thing that Stover could offer, if he actually 12 answered the question at issue, would be an inadmissible lay opinion. As was made clear during 13 the meet and confer process, this is untrue. CHP repeatedly states that a lay opinion is only 14 admissible if it is (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear 15 understanding of his or her testimony. Whatever Stover has perceived with regard to the weight; 16 bearing vest, he has purposefully concealed. The question "can you think of any reason", if 17 Stover actually answered it, may lead to admissible observations on Stover's part which could be 18 relevant to whether the weight-bearing vest was a reasonable accommodation. Again, CHP 19 asserts that the vest was not a reasonable accommodation because of "operational factors, safety 20 factors, appearance factors, and concems unique to the day-to-day duties of pafrol officers". By 21 way of mere example. Stover might testify about how he has observed that a weight-bearing vest 22 can be an unsafe item of equipment (e.g., he might assert that it poses a danger of being grabbed 23 by a suspect during a violent stmggle), or he might testify that the vest does not properly 24 conform to the pafrolman's uniform or otherwise negatively impacts appearance or operational 25 factors. He might testify, of course, to any number of things which the undersigned cannot 26 predict, and such things could at least lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It's worth 27 noting, again, that Stover has been with the CHP since the 1990s, he knows the job and what 28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 3 of 6 1 it entails, and he has doubtless observed much in that time.^ Ridge is entitled to hear those 2 observations, so that he might be assisted in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating 3 a settlement. 4 IV. STOVER'S OPINION ITSELF MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE ADMISSIBLE 5 Again, CHP points out that a lay opinion, in order to be admissible, must be rationally 6 based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his or her 7 testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.) Fair enough, but what precisely has Stover perceived? More 8 specifically, has Stover ever perceived anything that would lead him to conclude that the weight- 9 bearing vest would not be a reasonable accommodation for Ridge? To put an even finer point on 10 it, can he think of a single reason why the requested weight-bearing vest would not be a 11 reasonable accommodation?^ 12 We don't know the answer to this question because Stover didn't feel like answering it 13 (and his attomeys have only aided him in this evasion). But if Stover were to answer the 14 question, he might tick off some number of occurrences he has observed that are relevant to the 15 question of whether the vest would be a reasonable accommodation. He might, then, give his 16 opinion as to whether the vest would be reasonable. If that opinion is rationally based on his 17 perception and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony, then his opinion on the matter 18 would be admissible. Of course, that determination will not be made until a motion in limine is 19 heard, much later. 20 Ostensibly propping up the opposition are a couple citations to unreported federal district 21 court cases. Putting aside the fact that such cases are in no way binding law, they are wildly 22 inapposite to the facts of this case, and neither case, to any extent, would suggest that Stover's 23 ^ Again, the reasonableness of an accommodation, as every job is different, is primarily a factual issue. {Hanson v. 24 Lucliy Stores. Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 228,fii.\ \ ; Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345, 370.) CHP tenders no authority to the contrary, thus its protests that the question calls for a "legal 25 conclusion" are hollow and should be disregarded. ' Stover did partly answer the question, when he answered "Well, one, I don't make that decision and, two, I think 26 there is a[nother] device that was approved for him to wear." But when asked if he could think of any otiier reason (and it was during this time that defense counsel interrupted the deposition to speak with his client for ten minutes), 27 he refused to answer the question. So Stover is clearly capable of hazarding what CHP would self-servingly call his "inadmissible lay opinion". It would appear that he merely, and ultimately, thought it better not to do so. | 28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 4 of 6 1 opinion on the reasonableness of the weight-bearing vest (or those things he perceived and which 2 support his opinion) is not discoverable. Sanchez v. Jiles (CD. Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 13005996 3 was a criminal case, and the relevance of the word "reasonable" was in the context of whether a! 4 police officer used "reasonable" or excessive force in discharging his pistol a number of times. 5 For reasons that should be obvious, the district court determined that to be a subject for expert 6 testimony. The district court examined these issues in the context of—wait for it—a motion in 7 limine. The instant case, pf course, is a civil case (in a Califomia court), the immediate factual 8 question is whether a requested accotnmodation for a disabled employee was a reasonable one 9 under the circumstances, and this is not a motion in limine. Sanchez is not authority, nor is it 10 helpful guidance. 11 CHP then cites to another unreported federal trial court opinion—^more specifically, it 12 cites a footnote in that opinion, hi Bey v. U.S. Bank (CD. Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 11596165, the 13 district court mled upon a motion for summary judgment. It sustained an evidentiary objection to 14 a statement from the plaintiff that a "special fraining trip" was not an accommodation for her 15 disability. The court sustained the objection on the grounds that a layperson was improperly 16 giving a legal conclusion. This, of course, in no way affects the pronouncements of the courts of 17 this State, supra, that the reasonableness of an accommodation is primarily a factual issue. Bey \ 18 can be disregarded also. 19 V. CHP'S REOUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IS FRIVOLOUS 20 Not only does CHP tender an essentially empty opposition, but it gallingly asks for 21 sanctions to be assessed against Mayall Hurley and the undersigned personally. There is 22 absolutely no factual or legal support for such a request. First, and as counsel for CHP knows full 23 well (given the lack of cited legal authority) no attomey is under any duty to pause his or her 24 deposition and have a back-and-forth legal debate with the defending attomey, anytime that 25 defending attorney feels like it. The defending attomey may only make objections or adjoum the 26 deposition and move for a protective order. Second, the undersigned made a pained effort to 27 meet and confer and avoid this motion. He wrote two meet-and-confer letters and had a phone 28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 5 of6 1 call with defense counsel, wherein he reiterated his position and offered to pay for costs of 2 further deposition (a responsibility Ridge certainly does not now assume). CHP's gripe that the 3 undersigned "never provided legal authority for the proposition that a non-expert legal witness 4 may be compelled to offer an opinion" is yet another red herring, since the undersigned 5 explained ad nauseum how Stover's deposition could lead to the discovery of admissible 6 evidence. (See, e.g., Declarafion of John P. Briscoe, Exhibit E.) That defense counsel would 7 throw out some arbifrary and irrelevant demand, and then demand sanctions because he was not 8 satisfied with the response, is particularly oufrageous, not least because he already told the 9 undersigned to "knock himself out" and file this motion. 10 VI. CONCLUSION 11 CHP would seek to conflate discovery standards with inadmissibility standards, so that it 12 can continue to obfuscate the facts and grind Ridge down in his discovery efforts. Ultimately, 13 this is a very simple matter: A witness danced around a simple question and his attomeys have 14 sought to ratify his evasion. The motion must be granted and sanctions assessed so that this kind 15 of gamesmanship might be deterred in the fiiture 16 /// 17 DATED: May 25, 2021 MAYALL HURLEY P.C. 18 By JOHN P. BRISCOE 19 Attomeys for Plaintiff 20 DAVID RIDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Answers at Deposition of Matthew Stover, and Request for Monetary Sanctions Page 6 of 6 Ridge V. Califomia Highway Patrol, et al. Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2019-00265393 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I, the undersigned, certify and declare as follows: 3 I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 2453 Grand Canal Boulevard, Stockton, Califomia 95207 that is located in the county where the mailing 4 and/or delivery below took place. 5 On May 25, 2021,1 served the following document: 6 PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS AT DEPOSITON OF MATTHEW STOVER, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS 7 addressed to: 8 James F. Curran 9 Deputy Attomey General P.O. Box 944255 10 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 James.Curran(fl),doi.ca.gov 11 BUSINESS PRACTICE TO ENTRUST DEPOSIT TO OTHERS: I am readily familiar with 12 the business practice at my place of business for collection and processing of correspondence [for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence so collected and processed is 13 deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. On the date specified below, at my place of business at Stockton, Califomia a copy of the document 14 described above was placed for deposit in the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above; and that 15 envelope was placed for collection and mailing on that date following ordinary business practice! 16 BY EXPRESS SERVICE CARRIER: On the date specified below, I directed to be deposited in a box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express or delivered to a courier or driver 17 authorized by said express service carrier to receive documents, a copy of the document mentioned above, in an envelope designed by the said express service carrier, with delivery fees paid or 18 provided for, addressed to the individuals and/or entities mentioned above. 19 0 BY EMAIL: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the person[s] at the e-mail address[es] listed 20 above. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 21 I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Califomia that| the 22 foregoing is true and correct. 23 Executed on May 25, 2021, at Stockton, Califomia. 24 25 26 27 PROOF OF SERVICE - 1 28