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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 08/18/2022 TIME: 01:30:00 PM DEPT: 53
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Richard K. Sueyoshi
CLERK: P. Lopez
REPORTER/ERM: Teresa Kenworthy CSR# 6673
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: S. Cesario, S. Khorn
CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS CASE INIT.DATE: 09/23/2019
CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol
CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited
EVENT TYPE: Motion - Other - Civil Law and Motion
APPEARANCES
John P Briscoe, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s) remotely via video.
James F Curran, counsel, present for Defendant(s).
Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Discovery
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff David Ridge's ("Plaintiff") motion for discovery ("Pitchess motion") is ruled on as follows. The
hearing on this motion was continued by the Court on August 3, 2022, so that Defendant California
Highway Patrol ("CHP") could notify the CHP officers whose contact information is sought of the motion's
hearing date in compliance with Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (c). The Declarations of
Jennifer Vue and Jackie Castle filed on August 11, 2022, indicate notice was provided to the subject
officers as required. (ROA 89, 90.)
Background
This is a disability discrimination case in which Plaintiff alleges CHP denied him a reasonable
accommodation for his physical disability, a back injury. Plaintiff alleges his disability could have been
accommodated by allowing him to wear his law enforcement equipment on an external load-bearing vest
("vest" or "ELBV") instead of the traditional belt carrier ("belt").
CHP takes the position in this litigation that the vest was not a reasonable accommodation because it did
not conform to CHP's uniform policy ("Uniform Policy"). (Decl. of John P. Briscoe ISO Mot. ("Briscoe
Decl.") ¶¶ 3, 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff contends the reasonableness of the Uniform Policy is at issue. (Id.
at ¶ 4.)
Through discovery, Plaintiff's counsel identified Officer Erik Mallory ("Mallory") as someone who
supported the use of a vest by CHP officers. (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 5.) Mallory was deposed and testified that
as part of his efforts to advocate for the use of a vest, he and others distributed an unofficial survey
which asked: (1) "in the event [vests] are approved, would you purchase your own?"; (2) "Do you
currently have back stress while wearing a duty belt?"; and (3) "Do you believe [vests] would benefit
employees & the department?" (Ibid.) Of 437 responses, 385 CHP officers said they would pay for their
own vests if the opportunity was available. (Ibid.)
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CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
CHP subsequently produced copies of the survey responses. (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 5.) The responses do not
include contact information for the officers who participated in the survey. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff then
served CHP with a third set of special interrogatories ("SIs"), which included the following question: "No.
10: IDENTIFY each person that responded to Officer Erik Mallory's survey of [CHP's] officers regarding
external load-bearing vests." The SIs define "IDENTIFY" as calling for "that person's full name, job title,
any known aliases, last known residential address, all known telephone numbers, and all known e-mail
addresses." (Briscoe Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 3.) CHP provided the following objections in response to SI No. 10:
Objection. This interrogatory, given the definition of "IDENTIFY" . . . in these interrogatories, is overly
broad, burdensome, oppressive, and harassing given that there appear to be over 300 survey
respondents, not all respondents provided their full names when filling out the survey response forms,
and some of the respondents' names or CHP identification numbers are partially or wholly illegible on
the forms. This interrogatory is objectionable on the additional ground that it seeks information that is
neither relevant, admissible, nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,
and therefore seeks information that is outside the scope of discovery. This interrogatory is objectionable
on the additional ground that it seeks information the production of which would violate the Information
Practices Act, the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights, and/or the privacy rights of non-litigants, and
could compromise the safety of law enforcement personnel, particularly providing personal information
of peace officers.
Without waiving these objections, CHP states pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, the
answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract,
audit, or summary of or from the documents produced by CHP. The burden or expense of preparing or
making such a summary would be substantially the same for Plaintiff. These documents have been
produced in this litigation and are Bates-numbered Mallory000004-000057. CHP is amenable to meeting
and conferring with Plaintiff to provide full names, present job titles, work telephone numbers and work
email addresses for a limited number of signatories.
(Briscoe Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 4.)
Plaintiff filed a motion to compel a further response to SI No. 10 (and another SI, which is not the subject
of this motion) after unsuccessfully attempting to meet and confer with CHP. (Briscoe Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) The
Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, the motion on May 12, 2022. (ROA 68.) To the extent the SI
requested the officers' "personnel records," the Court denied the motion without prejudice to Plaintiff
bringing a Pitchess motion. (Id., at p. 3.) The Court granted the motion to the extent it sought the officers'
work contact information. (Ibid.) In issuing its tentative ruling, the Court stated:
To the extent [CHP] attempts to argue that the work contact information of the survey respondents is not
likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information because it seeks lay opinion, the Court finds that
argument not well or clearly made in its opposition papers and undercut by its provision of the [survey]
responses themselves. Thus, the Court rejects this argument for purposes of this motion. Any concern
regarding the ultimately admissibility of the views of these peace officers may be considered in the
future. Thus, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED with respect to the work contact information for the survey
respondents.
(Id. at pp. 3-4.) After oral argument, the Court affirmed its tentative ruling with additional comments.
Plaintiff received CHP's supplemental response to SI No. 10 on June 20, 2022. (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 9.) The
supplemental response included a spreadsheet, which provided the work contact information for the
officers who are current CHP employees. (Briscoe Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 5.) No contact information was
provided for former CHP employees. (Ibid.)
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CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
Discussion
Plaintiff now moves under Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code section 1043 for an order
directing CHP to serve a "full and complete response (absent objections)" to SI No. 10. (See Proposed
Order Granting Mot. 1:20-22; Mem. of P.&A. ISO Mot. 5:20-23.) Plaintiff argues:
This motion complies with [the Pitchess procedures] in full. The notice of motion provides (1) the
identification of the proceeding in which discovery is sought (this case); (2) the name of the party
seeking discovery (Plaintiff David Ridge); (3) the peace officers whose records (or, rather, information)
are sought; (4) the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records and information
(CHP); (5) the time and place at which the motion will be heard; and (6) a description of the information
sought. Further, the Declaration of John P. Briscoe shows good cause for the discovery sought.
Clearly, one of the core functions of discovery is to identify and locate witnesses. "Discovery may
be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter[.]" (See
Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; see also Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4"' 1242,
1249-1250.) CHP has taken the position that the requested accommodation (a[ vest]) was not a
reasonable accommodation because it contravenes the uniform policy and would pose some kind of
hazard. Again, it must be emphasized that CHP contends that the external weight-bearing vest was not a
reasonable accommodation for Ridge because it's not reasonable to let patrolmen wear such a vest, as a
general policy. That general policy is thus at issue.
Hundreds of CHP officers took it upon themselves to voluntarily respond to an unofficial survey, and
freely express their willingness to pay for their own vests, if approved, and that they believe wearing vests
would benefit CHP and its officers. [Citation.] Most of these officers also attested that they are presently
experiencing back stress while wearing a duty belt. [Citation.] If CHP is going to contend that its Uniform
Policy foreclosed Ridge's sought accommodation, and that said policy is a reasonable one, then it must
concede that the opinions of its own officers is of relevance. Simply put, these officers are witnesses on
a relevant matter, and thus their identities, per statute, are discoverable.
(Mem. of P.&A. ISO Mot. 6:23-8:7 [emphasis in original].) Plaintiff filed the declaration of his counsel,
John Briscoe, in support of his motion. Mr. Briscoe avers concerning "good cause" in pertinent part:
. . . The[ officers'] opinion[s] on the reasonableness of th[e Uniform P]olicy, and also their own
experience adhering to that policy, is relevant. It is self-evident that CHP's own officers-the very persons
who are required to conform to the Uniform Policy, every single workday-can testily from their own
perception and experience whether the rigid no-vest policy makes any bit of sense, not on paper but in
the real world. They might, as did [Mallory], testify that wearing the [belt] with approximately 20 pounds
of equipment, over a period of years or even decades is extremely uncomfortable and has contributed to
back stress. They might also testify, as did [Mallory], that based on their time in service, wearing [a vest]
would not likely form a physical disadvantage were an officer engaged in a violent struggle with a
criminal suspect. They may further testify to the general effect-as did [Mallory]-that the no-vest policy
makes no practical sense outside of a purely cosmetic standpoint. [Citation.] . . .
. . . If CHP is going to contend that its Uniform Policy foreclosed Ridge's sought
accommodation, and that said policy is a reasonable one, then it must concede that the opinions of its
own officers is of relevance. Simply put, these officers are witnesses on a relevant matter, and thus their
identities, per statute, are discoverable.
(Briscoe Decl. ¶¶ 5, 13 [emphasis in original].)
CHP opposes the motion, rejoining that the Notice of Motion is defective, and Plaintiff has not
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CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
established "good cause" for further responses to SI No. 10. CHP further argues that if the Court finds
good cause has been shown, an in-camera hearing is required. Finally, CHP contends that if the Court is
inclined to grant the motion, the further discovery responses should be subject to CHP's proposed
protective order, and the Court should stay its order to allow CHP time to appeal the Court's ruling.
The Court finds the good cause issue to be dispositive. Therefore, it does not address CHP's other
arguments.
CHP states that Plaintiffs counsel's declaration does not establish good cause for disclosure of the
survey respondents' personal information, arguing, among other points:
Applying common sense, and based on a "reasonable and realistic assessment of the facts and
allegations," disclosing CHP officers' home addresses and phone numbers might subject them and their
families to violent aggression, death, and other acts of vengeance from people the respondents
arrested, helped to convict, or even simply pulled over for violating traffic laws. This is undoubtedly why
Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b) (5) provides for redaction of home addresses and phone
numbers, and identities of family members. Disclosing CHP officers' personal email addresses could
subject them to online harassment, violent threats, or other digital or actual aggression. Disclosing
aliases that the officers might have used in the past could compromise under-cover operations and
could lead to violence against the officers who used the aliases. Plaintiffs alleged desire to gather
opinions from the respondents does not justify forcing CHP to reveal the information sought here.
CHP highly doubts Plaintiff intends to depose all 437 officers who responded to the survey. Furthermore,
CHP would move for a protective order preventing an undue number of depositions of such lay
witnesses who lack any personal knowledge of the facts of this case. Plaintiff Ridge does not need to
interview or depose every officer who responded to this unofficial survey, especially when none of these
officers consented to disclosure of their home addresses, etc., and where these officers would be asked
only to render inadmissible opinions. Even if Ridge did need to interview/depose every survey
respondent, he has now been apprised of the work contact information of every respondent still working
for CHP.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has identified neither a manufacturer nor a model number of any hypothetical
external, load-bearing vest (ELBV) on which he would have these officers opine. . . . Plaintiff thus wants
these lay witnesses to opine on the advantages and disadvantages of a hypothetical external,
load-bearing vest. No one knows how this hypothetical vest would be designed, what it would look like,
which pieces of equipment might be removed from the duty belt and affixed to the vest, how much the
vest weighs, whether it could be grabbed by a suspect during a fight with an officer, whether it would
provide pain relief, or any other detail relevant to such a vest. . . . Plaintiff therefore seeks to gather
opinions on a hypothetical vest or on whatever any given officer imagines about a hypothetical vest that
the officers have never seen, tried on, tested, or read about.
. . . Plaintiff's counsel has known since before he filed this Pitchess motion, i.e., since June 7, 2022, that
between July 2, 2018 and June 7, 2022, only three officers, including Plaintiff Ridge, requested an ELBV
as a reasonable accommodation. [Citation.] Even if every survey respondent opined the policy was
"unreasonable" and opined that the duty belt, in their experience, causes back pain, none of that
testimony would be admissible at trial because it would constitute improper opinion testimony.
Therefore, counsel's declaration fails to demonstrate specific and sufficient facts demonstrating the
materiality of the requested information to the subject matter of this case. . . .
Finally, requiring CHP to disclose the home and personal contact information of its officers is not the
least intrusive means by which Plaintiff's counsel might gather these, opinions. CHP has already
produced the work contact information for each survey respondent who is still employed by CHP, and
could coordinate depositions with a sample, of such officers., Indeed, CHP has already offered to do
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CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
that.
(Opp'n 12:12-22, 13:19-15:10.)
Plaintiff replies, inter alia, that "CHP continues to willfully ignore the precept that admissibility is not the
test for discovery." (Reply 3:18-20 [emphasis in original].) Plaintiff asserts:
[J]ust because an officer doesn't, for instance, have in mind a particular make and model of vest
does not mean they could not conceivably provide admissible testimony relating to this policy. An officer
could, for example, testify that the incidences of being grabbed by a suspect are few and far between.
They might testify that their shirt collars, lapels, belt, equipment, etc. could be grabbed quite easily, such
that wearing a vest wouldn't create much of an additional hazard. They could testify that wearing the
[belt] and all the required equipment, all the time, both in and out of their vehicle, hurts. They could
testify that the "operational and safety factors" which CHP ominously (and nebulously) raises as
precluding the wearing of vests really don't exist, and that the only good reason to wear the [belt] is that
it looks better in some way. These are but mere examples-the undersigned cannot predict what these
officers, with their years of unique, personal experience, might each have to say. But it is absolutely
absurd for CHP to suggest that nothing these officers might say could possibly be admissible, to any
degree, in any universe. This is not a motion in limine-this is a motion to obtain the identity and location
of witnesses so that evidence might be obtained. CHP has no grounds to exclude testimony that hasn't
happened yet.
(Id. at 3:27-4:15 [emphasis in original].)
Penal Code section 832.7 provides that the "personnel records" of peace officers, or information
obtained from those records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil
proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code. As used in
this statute, the term "personnel records" means any file maintained under that individual's name by his
or her employing agency and containing records related to personal data, among other things, including
home addresses or similar information. (Pen. Code, § 832.8.)
"The Pitchess statutory scheme recognizes that evidence contained in a law enforcement officer's
personnel file may be relevant in a lawsuit, but that the officer 'has a strong privacy interest in his or her
personnel records and that such records should not be disclosed unnecessarily.' [Citation.]" (City of
Tulare v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 373, 381-382 [emphasis added].) Thus, personnel
records of peace officer, or information obtained from those records, can be disclosed in a civil
proceeding only under specified discovery procedures. These procedures provide the exclusive means
of discovery of such records in both criminal and civil proceedings. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1605, 1609-1610.)
As pertinent here, [Evidence Code] section 1043, subdivision (a) requires a written motion and notice to
the governmental agency which has custody of the records sought, and subdivision (b) provides that
such motion shall include, inter alia, " . . . A description of the type of records or information sought[, and
a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof
to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that such
governmental agency identified has such records or information from such records."
(Brown v. Valverde (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1531, 1539 [emphasis added].)
Courts have determined the requirement for showing good cause is a "relatively low threshold." (City of
Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83; accord City & Cnty. of San Francisco (1993) 21
Cal.App.4th 1031, 1035 ["The showing of good cause required by section 1043 . . . has been 'relatively
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CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
relaxed . . . .'[Citation.]") To demonstrate good cause, the party need only show the information
requested is material to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a reasonable belief that the
government agency has the type of information requested. (City of Santa Cruz, supra, at p. 83; City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, supra, at p. 1035.) However, "the requisite allegations must 'establish some
cause for discovery other than "a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained .
. .."' [Citation.]" (City of Santa Cruz, supra, at p. 1035.) Additionally, counsel's declaration "must articulate
how the discovery sought may lead to relevant evidence or may itself be admissible direct or
impeachment evidence." (Warrick v. Super. Ct. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1024.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff's motion, including the sole declaration supporting it, does not establish the
requisite "good cause" for discovery into the personnel files of each of the officers subject to the motion.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff's "good cause" argument is only generalized and
concerns all of the officers who responded to Mallory's survey ("responding officers"). As pointed out by
CHP, 437 officers responded to the survey. Plaintiff makes no particularized showing as to any
responding officer and how "good cause" is demonstrated so as to warrant discovery into each particular
responding officer's personnel file. To the contrary, Plaintiff merely argues that all of the responding
officers are potential witnesses concerning the reasonableness of CHP's Uniform Policy, and on such
assertion alone, discovery may be obtained of the personal contact information of every individual
officer. Plaintiff has not demonstrated how such a generalized assertion, untethered and unspecified to
any individual responding officer, can be utilized as a basis for "good cause" to obtain discovery of all
responding officers' personnel files. The Court disagrees that Plaintiff's mere argument is sufficient to
establish "good cause" for discovery of hundreds of officer's personnel files. Considering the strong
privacy interest that the responding officers have in their personnel files, and the fact that information in
such files should not be unnecessarily disclosed, the Court finds that Plaintiff's request, as presented, is
impermissibly overbroad.
Further, while Plaintiff's counsel's declaration makes various arguments regarding why Plaintiff believes
the opinions of officers who responded to the survey are relevant, Plaintiff provides no persuasive
reason for why Plaintiff has "good cause" to obtain, specifically, the personal contact information (such
as home addresses, home telephone numbers, etc.) for the hundreds of responding officers given the
present state of discovery. Indeed, Plaintiff's only apparent argument to obtain the personal contact
information for hundreds of officers appears to be its mere statement that "one of the core functions of
discovery is to identify and locate witnesses." (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 12.) However, Plaintiff makes no showing
that such personal contact information is even required to accomplish such purpose. Plaintiff's argument
ignores the fact that pursuant to this Court's May 12, 2022 order, CHP has provided the last name and
badge number of every responding officer it could identify from the survey responses along with the
work contact information for the hundreds of responding officers still employed by CHP. Again, under
these facts, Plaintiff makes no good cause showing as to any individual responding officer or provides
any basis for why the personal contact information for any individual officer is even necessary to "identify
and locate witnesses" as Plaintiff asserts.
Moreover, Plaintiff's arguments concerning why all responding officers may be witnesses as to the
reasonableness of the Uniform Policy, i.e., that "CHP's own officers - the very persons who are required
to conform to the Uniform Policy, every single workday - can testify from their own perception and
experience whether the rigid no vest policy makes any bit of sense . . . in the real world," if accepted,
would potentially apply to every single officer employed by the CHP while the Uniform Policy has been in
existence, regardless of the survey. This again demonstrates that Plaintiff's motion, as presented, is
overbroad. The Court finds that Plaintiff's attempted good cause showing equates to "a mere desire for
the benefit of all information" CHP has, which is insufficient under the Pitchess procedures. (City of
Santa Cruz, supra, at p. 1035 [emphasis added].)
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CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
For the stated reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied without prejudice.
This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)
COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted. Having considered the filings and oral arguments of the parties
in this matter, the Court affirmed the tentative ruling.
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DEPT: 53 Calendar No.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE MINUTE ORDER DATE: 08/18/2022 TIME: 01:30:00 PM DEPT: 53 JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Richard K. Sueyoshi CLERK: P. Lopez REPORTER/ERM: Teresa Kenworthy CSR# 6673 BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: S. Cesario, S. Khorn CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS CASE INIT.DATE: 09/23/2019 CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited EVENT TYPE: Motion - Other - Civil Law and Motion APPEARANCES John P Briscoe, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s) remotely via video. James F Curran, counsel, present for Defendant(s). Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Discovery TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff David Ridge's ("Plaintiff") motion for discovery ("Pitchess motion") is ruled on as follows. The hearing on this motion was continued by the Court on August 3, 2022, so that Defendant California Highway Patrol ("CHP") could notify the CHP officers whose contact information is sought of the motion's hearing date in compliance with Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (c). The Declarations of Jennifer Vue and Jackie Castle filed on August 11, 2022, indicate notice was provided to the subject officers as required. (ROA 89, 90.) Background This is a disability discrimination case in which Plaintiff alleges CHP denied him a reasonable accommodation for his physical disability, a back injury. Plaintiff alleges his disability could have been accommodated by allowing him to wear his law enforcement equipment on an external load-bearing vest ("vest" or "ELBV") instead of the traditional belt carrier ("belt"). CHP takes the position in this litigation that the vest was not a reasonable accommodation because it did not conform to CHP's uniform policy ("Uniform Policy"). (Decl. of John P. Briscoe ISO Mot. ("Briscoe Decl.") ¶¶ 3, 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff contends the reasonableness of the Uniform Policy is at issue. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Through discovery, Plaintiff's counsel identified Officer Erik Mallory ("Mallory") as someone who supported the use of a vest by CHP officers. (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 5.) Mallory was deposed and testified that as part of his efforts to advocate for the use of a vest, he and others distributed an unofficial survey which asked: (1) "in the event [vests] are approved, would you purchase your own?"; (2) "Do you currently have back stress while wearing a duty belt?"; and (3) "Do you believe [vests] would benefit employees & the department?" (Ibid.) Of 437 responses, 385 CHP officers said they would pay for their own vests if the opportunity was available. (Ibid.) DATE: 08/18/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 1 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS CHP subsequently produced copies of the survey responses. (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 5.) The responses do not include contact information for the officers who participated in the survey. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff then served CHP with a third set of special interrogatories ("SIs"), which included the following question: "No. 10: IDENTIFY each person that responded to Officer Erik Mallory's survey of [CHP's] officers regarding external load-bearing vests." The SIs define "IDENTIFY" as calling for "that person's full name, job title, any known aliases, last known residential address, all known telephone numbers, and all known e-mail addresses." (Briscoe Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 3.) CHP provided the following objections in response to SI No. 10: Objection. This interrogatory, given the definition of "IDENTIFY" . . . in these interrogatories, is overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, and harassing given that there appear to be over 300 survey respondents, not all respondents provided their full names when filling out the survey response forms, and some of the respondents' names or CHP identification numbers are partially or wholly illegible on the forms. This interrogatory is objectionable on the additional ground that it seeks information that is neither relevant, admissible, nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and therefore seeks information that is outside the scope of discovery. This interrogatory is objectionable on the additional ground that it seeks information the production of which would violate the Information Practices Act, the Peace Officer Procedural Bill of Rights, and/or the privacy rights of non-litigants, and could compromise the safety of law enforcement personnel, particularly providing personal information of peace officers. Without waiving these objections, CHP states pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents produced by CHP. The burden or expense of preparing or making such a summary would be substantially the same for Plaintiff. These documents have been produced in this litigation and are Bates-numbered Mallory000004-000057. CHP is amenable to meeting and conferring with Plaintiff to provide full names, present job titles, work telephone numbers and work email addresses for a limited number of signatories. (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff filed a motion to compel a further response to SI No. 10 (and another SI, which is not the subject of this motion) after unsuccessfully attempting to meet and confer with CHP. (Briscoe Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) The Court granted, in part, and denied, in part, the motion on May 12, 2022. (ROA 68.) To the extent the SI requested the officers' "personnel records," the Court denied the motion without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing a Pitchess motion. (Id., at p. 3.) The Court granted the motion to the extent it sought the officers' work contact information. (Ibid.) In issuing its tentative ruling, the Court stated: To the extent [CHP] attempts to argue that the work contact information of the survey respondents is not likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information because it seeks lay opinion, the Court finds that argument not well or clearly made in its opposition papers and undercut by its provision of the [survey] responses themselves. Thus, the Court rejects this argument for purposes of this motion. Any concern regarding the ultimately admissibility of the views of these peace officers may be considered in the future. Thus, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED with respect to the work contact information for the survey respondents. (Id. at pp. 3-4.) After oral argument, the Court affirmed its tentative ruling with additional comments. Plaintiff received CHP's supplemental response to SI No. 10 on June 20, 2022. (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 9.) The supplemental response included a spreadsheet, which provided the work contact information for the officers who are current CHP employees. (Briscoe Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 5.) No contact information was provided for former CHP employees. (Ibid.) DATE: 08/18/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 2 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS Discussion Plaintiff now moves under Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code section 1043 for an order directing CHP to serve a "full and complete response (absent objections)" to SI No. 10. (See Proposed Order Granting Mot. 1:20-22; Mem. of P.&A. ISO Mot. 5:20-23.) Plaintiff argues: This motion complies with [the Pitchess procedures] in full. The notice of motion provides (1) the identification of the proceeding in which discovery is sought (this case); (2) the name of the party seeking discovery (Plaintiff David Ridge); (3) the peace officers whose records (or, rather, information) are sought; (4) the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records and information (CHP); (5) the time and place at which the motion will be heard; and (6) a description of the information sought. Further, the Declaration of John P. Briscoe shows good cause for the discovery sought. Clearly, one of the core functions of discovery is to identify and locate witnesses. "Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter[.]" (See Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010; see also Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4"' 1242, 1249-1250.) CHP has taken the position that the requested accommodation (a[ vest]) was not a reasonable accommodation because it contravenes the uniform policy and would pose some kind of hazard. Again, it must be emphasized that CHP contends that the external weight-bearing vest was not a reasonable accommodation for Ridge because it's not reasonable to let patrolmen wear such a vest, as a general policy. That general policy is thus at issue. Hundreds of CHP officers took it upon themselves to voluntarily respond to an unofficial survey, and freely express their willingness to pay for their own vests, if approved, and that they believe wearing vests would benefit CHP and its officers. [Citation.] Most of these officers also attested that they are presently experiencing back stress while wearing a duty belt. [Citation.] If CHP is going to contend that its Uniform Policy foreclosed Ridge's sought accommodation, and that said policy is a reasonable one, then it must concede that the opinions of its own officers is of relevance. Simply put, these officers are witnesses on a relevant matter, and thus their identities, per statute, are discoverable. (Mem. of P.&A. ISO Mot. 6:23-8:7 [emphasis in original].) Plaintiff filed the declaration of his counsel, John Briscoe, in support of his motion. Mr. Briscoe avers concerning "good cause" in pertinent part: . . . The[ officers'] opinion[s] on the reasonableness of th[e Uniform P]olicy, and also their own experience adhering to that policy, is relevant. It is self-evident that CHP's own officers-the very persons who are required to conform to the Uniform Policy, every single workday-can testily from their own perception and experience whether the rigid no-vest policy makes any bit of sense, not on paper but in the real world. They might, as did [Mallory], testify that wearing the [belt] with approximately 20 pounds of equipment, over a period of years or even decades is extremely uncomfortable and has contributed to back stress. They might also testify, as did [Mallory], that based on their time in service, wearing [a vest] would not likely form a physical disadvantage were an officer engaged in a violent struggle with a criminal suspect. They may further testify to the general effect-as did [Mallory]-that the no-vest policy makes no practical sense outside of a purely cosmetic standpoint. [Citation.] . . . . . . If CHP is going to contend that its Uniform Policy foreclosed Ridge's sought accommodation, and that said policy is a reasonable one, then it must concede that the opinions of its own officers is of relevance. Simply put, these officers are witnesses on a relevant matter, and thus their identities, per statute, are discoverable. (Briscoe Decl. ¶¶ 5, 13 [emphasis in original].) CHP opposes the motion, rejoining that the Notice of Motion is defective, and Plaintiff has not DATE: 08/18/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 3 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS established "good cause" for further responses to SI No. 10. CHP further argues that if the Court finds good cause has been shown, an in-camera hearing is required. Finally, CHP contends that if the Court is inclined to grant the motion, the further discovery responses should be subject to CHP's proposed protective order, and the Court should stay its order to allow CHP time to appeal the Court's ruling. The Court finds the good cause issue to be dispositive. Therefore, it does not address CHP's other arguments. CHP states that Plaintiffs counsel's declaration does not establish good cause for disclosure of the survey respondents' personal information, arguing, among other points: Applying common sense, and based on a "reasonable and realistic assessment of the facts and allegations," disclosing CHP officers' home addresses and phone numbers might subject them and their families to violent aggression, death, and other acts of vengeance from people the respondents arrested, helped to convict, or even simply pulled over for violating traffic laws. This is undoubtedly why Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b) (5) provides for redaction of home addresses and phone numbers, and identities of family members. Disclosing CHP officers' personal email addresses could subject them to online harassment, violent threats, or other digital or actual aggression. Disclosing aliases that the officers might have used in the past could compromise under-cover operations and could lead to violence against the officers who used the aliases. Plaintiffs alleged desire to gather opinions from the respondents does not justify forcing CHP to reveal the information sought here. CHP highly doubts Plaintiff intends to depose all 437 officers who responded to the survey. Furthermore, CHP would move for a protective order preventing an undue number of depositions of such lay witnesses who lack any personal knowledge of the facts of this case. Plaintiff Ridge does not need to interview or depose every officer who responded to this unofficial survey, especially when none of these officers consented to disclosure of their home addresses, etc., and where these officers would be asked only to render inadmissible opinions. Even if Ridge did need to interview/depose every survey respondent, he has now been apprised of the work contact information of every respondent still working for CHP. Furthermore, Plaintiff has identified neither a manufacturer nor a model number of any hypothetical external, load-bearing vest (ELBV) on which he would have these officers opine. . . . Plaintiff thus wants these lay witnesses to opine on the advantages and disadvantages of a hypothetical external, load-bearing vest. No one knows how this hypothetical vest would be designed, what it would look like, which pieces of equipment might be removed from the duty belt and affixed to the vest, how much the vest weighs, whether it could be grabbed by a suspect during a fight with an officer, whether it would provide pain relief, or any other detail relevant to such a vest. . . . Plaintiff therefore seeks to gather opinions on a hypothetical vest or on whatever any given officer imagines about a hypothetical vest that the officers have never seen, tried on, tested, or read about. . . . Plaintiff's counsel has known since before he filed this Pitchess motion, i.e., since June 7, 2022, that between July 2, 2018 and June 7, 2022, only three officers, including Plaintiff Ridge, requested an ELBV as a reasonable accommodation. [Citation.] Even if every survey respondent opined the policy was "unreasonable" and opined that the duty belt, in their experience, causes back pain, none of that testimony would be admissible at trial because it would constitute improper opinion testimony. Therefore, counsel's declaration fails to demonstrate specific and sufficient facts demonstrating the materiality of the requested information to the subject matter of this case. . . . Finally, requiring CHP to disclose the home and personal contact information of its officers is not the least intrusive means by which Plaintiff's counsel might gather these, opinions. CHP has already produced the work contact information for each survey respondent who is still employed by CHP, and could coordinate depositions with a sample, of such officers., Indeed, CHP has already offered to do DATE: 08/18/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 4 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS that. (Opp'n 12:12-22, 13:19-15:10.) Plaintiff replies, inter alia, that "CHP continues to willfully ignore the precept that admissibility is not the test for discovery." (Reply 3:18-20 [emphasis in original].) Plaintiff asserts: [J]ust because an officer doesn't, for instance, have in mind a particular make and model of vest does not mean they could not conceivably provide admissible testimony relating to this policy. An officer could, for example, testify that the incidences of being grabbed by a suspect are few and far between. They might testify that their shirt collars, lapels, belt, equipment, etc. could be grabbed quite easily, such that wearing a vest wouldn't create much of an additional hazard. They could testify that wearing the [belt] and all the required equipment, all the time, both in and out of their vehicle, hurts. They could testify that the "operational and safety factors" which CHP ominously (and nebulously) raises as precluding the wearing of vests really don't exist, and that the only good reason to wear the [belt] is that it looks better in some way. These are but mere examples-the undersigned cannot predict what these officers, with their years of unique, personal experience, might each have to say. But it is absolutely absurd for CHP to suggest that nothing these officers might say could possibly be admissible, to any degree, in any universe. This is not a motion in limine-this is a motion to obtain the identity and location of witnesses so that evidence might be obtained. CHP has no grounds to exclude testimony that hasn't happened yet. (Id. at 3:27-4:15 [emphasis in original].) Penal Code section 832.7 provides that the "personnel records" of peace officers, or information obtained from those records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code. As used in this statute, the term "personnel records" means any file maintained under that individual's name by his or her employing agency and containing records related to personal data, among other things, including home addresses or similar information. (Pen. Code, § 832.8.) "The Pitchess statutory scheme recognizes that evidence contained in a law enforcement officer's personnel file may be relevant in a lawsuit, but that the officer 'has a strong privacy interest in his or her personnel records and that such records should not be disclosed unnecessarily.' [Citation.]" (City of Tulare v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 373, 381-382 [emphasis added].) Thus, personnel records of peace officer, or information obtained from those records, can be disclosed in a civil proceeding only under specified discovery procedures. These procedures provide the exclusive means of discovery of such records in both criminal and civil proceedings. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1605, 1609-1610.) As pertinent here, [Evidence Code] section 1043, subdivision (a) requires a written motion and notice to the governmental agency which has custody of the records sought, and subdivision (b) provides that such motion shall include, inter alia, " . . . A description of the type of records or information sought[, and a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that such governmental agency identified has such records or information from such records." (Brown v. Valverde (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1531, 1539 [emphasis added].) Courts have determined the requirement for showing good cause is a "relatively low threshold." (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83; accord City & Cnty. of San Francisco (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1035 ["The showing of good cause required by section 1043 . . . has been 'relatively DATE: 08/18/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 5 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS relaxed . . . .'[Citation.]") To demonstrate good cause, the party need only show the information requested is material to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a reasonable belief that the government agency has the type of information requested. (City of Santa Cruz, supra, at p. 83; City & Cnty. of San Francisco, supra, at p. 1035.) However, "the requisite allegations must 'establish some cause for discovery other than "a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained . . .."' [Citation.]" (City of Santa Cruz, supra, at p. 1035.) Additionally, counsel's declaration "must articulate how the discovery sought may lead to relevant evidence or may itself be admissible direct or impeachment evidence." (Warrick v. Super. Ct. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1024.) The Court finds that Plaintiff's motion, including the sole declaration supporting it, does not establish the requisite "good cause" for discovery into the personnel files of each of the officers subject to the motion. As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff's "good cause" argument is only generalized and concerns all of the officers who responded to Mallory's survey ("responding officers"). As pointed out by CHP, 437 officers responded to the survey. Plaintiff makes no particularized showing as to any responding officer and how "good cause" is demonstrated so as to warrant discovery into each particular responding officer's personnel file. To the contrary, Plaintiff merely argues that all of the responding officers are potential witnesses concerning the reasonableness of CHP's Uniform Policy, and on such assertion alone, discovery may be obtained of the personal contact information of every individual officer. Plaintiff has not demonstrated how such a generalized assertion, untethered and unspecified to any individual responding officer, can be utilized as a basis for "good cause" to obtain discovery of all responding officers' personnel files. The Court disagrees that Plaintiff's mere argument is sufficient to establish "good cause" for discovery of hundreds of officer's personnel files. Considering the strong privacy interest that the responding officers have in their personnel files, and the fact that information in such files should not be unnecessarily disclosed, the Court finds that Plaintiff's request, as presented, is impermissibly overbroad. Further, while Plaintiff's counsel's declaration makes various arguments regarding why Plaintiff believes the opinions of officers who responded to the survey are relevant, Plaintiff provides no persuasive reason for why Plaintiff has "good cause" to obtain, specifically, the personal contact information (such as home addresses, home telephone numbers, etc.) for the hundreds of responding officers given the present state of discovery. Indeed, Plaintiff's only apparent argument to obtain the personal contact information for hundreds of officers appears to be its mere statement that "one of the core functions of discovery is to identify and locate witnesses." (Briscoe Decl. ¶ 12.) However, Plaintiff makes no showing that such personal contact information is even required to accomplish such purpose. Plaintiff's argument ignores the fact that pursuant to this Court's May 12, 2022 order, CHP has provided the last name and badge number of every responding officer it could identify from the survey responses along with the work contact information for the hundreds of responding officers still employed by CHP. Again, under these facts, Plaintiff makes no good cause showing as to any individual responding officer or provides any basis for why the personal contact information for any individual officer is even necessary to "identify and locate witnesses" as Plaintiff asserts. Moreover, Plaintiff's arguments concerning why all responding officers may be witnesses as to the reasonableness of the Uniform Policy, i.e., that "CHP's own officers - the very persons who are required to conform to the Uniform Policy, every single workday - can testify from their own perception and experience whether the rigid no vest policy makes any bit of sense . . . in the real world," if accepted, would potentially apply to every single officer employed by the CHP while the Uniform Policy has been in existence, regardless of the survey. This again demonstrates that Plaintiff's motion, as presented, is overbroad. The Court finds that Plaintiff's attempted good cause showing equates to "a mere desire for the benefit of all information" CHP has, which is insufficient under the Pitchess procedures. (City of Santa Cruz, supra, at p. 1035 [emphasis added].) DATE: 08/18/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 6 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS For the stated reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied without prejudice. This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.) COURT RULING The matter was argued and submitted. Having considered the filings and oral arguments of the parties in this matter, the Court affirmed the tentative ruling. DATE: 08/18/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 7 DEPT: 53 Calendar No.