Preview
ROB BONTA
Attomey General of California
2 KRISTIN M . DAILY
Supervising Deputy Attorney General FlLED/EfyOORSED
3 JAMES F. CURRAN
Deputy Attomey General
4 State'Bar No. 142041 APR 2 7 2022
v,l-300 I. Street, Suite 125
•,5 P.O. Box 944255 By:. E. Macdonald
Deputy Clerk
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
)6 Telephone: (916)210-6113
Fax: (916) 324-5567
7 E-mail: James.Curran@doj.ca.gov
Allorneys for Defendant
.8 California Highway Patrol
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
11
12
1.3
DAVID RIDGE, Case No. 34-2019-00265393
14
Plaintiff DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY
1.5 PATROL'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
16 FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES, SET THREE
.17 THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL;
and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Date: May 10,2022
18 Time: 1:30 p.m.
Defendants. Dept: 53
19 Judge: Hon. Richard K. Sueyoshi
Trial Date: April 4, 2023
20 Action Filed: September 23, 2019
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
Page
3 Introduction 5
^ Statement of Facts , 6
I. Facts Pertinent to Plaintiff Ridge's Tenure With CHP arid His Request for
5 An External, Load-Bearing Vest as a Reasonable Accommodation..: 6
II. Facts Pertinent to Why CHP's Uniform Policy Does Not Authorize Patrol
6
Officers to Wear External, Load-Bearing Vests 7
7 III. Facts Pertinent to Officer Erik Mallory's Survey '. 9
g Argument 9
I. This Motion Should Be Denied Because Plaintiffs Counsel Has Failed to
9 Meet and Confer in Good Faith on the Issues. Presented 9
A. Plaintiff s Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith
10 Concerning Special Interrogatory No. 9 ; 9
11 B. Plaintiffs Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith
Concerning Special Interrogatory No. 10 10
12 II. This Motion Should Be Denied Because the Information Sought by
,^ Interrogatory No. 10 is "Privileged" From Discovery Under the Statutes
and Case Law That Protect Information in Peace Officer Personnel
. . Records From Disclosure (The "Pitchess" Procedure) and Under the
Information Practices Act ; 11
15 A. Protections From Disclosure Provided by the Pitchess Procedure 11
B. Protections Offered by the Information Practices Act 12
16
III. This Motion Should Be Denied Because the Personal Contact Information
17 of the Patrol Officers at Issue is Outside the Scope of Discovery 14
IV. Sanctions Against CHP or Its Counsel Are Not Warranted. Rather, the
18 Court Should Issue Sanctions Against Plaintiffs Counsel 16
19 Conclusion 17
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page
3
CASES
.4
Bd. of Registered Nursing V. Superior Court of Orange County v
5 (202I)59Cal.App.5th 1011 14
^ California Teachers Assn. v. California Com. on Teacher Credentialing
7 (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1001' 13
8 City of San Jose v. Superior Court (Eli)
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135 11
9
Obregon v. Superior Courl (Cimm's, Inc.)
'0 (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424 , : 12
Osborn v.. Mission Ready Mix
12 (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104 15
13 Pitchess v. Superior Court (Echeveria)
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 897 passim
14
Prilliman V. United Air Lines, Inc.
15 (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 935 '. 15
STATUTES
Civil Code
3 § 1798, et.seq 12
§ 1798.1 12
19 §1798.3 12
§ 1798.20 12
20 § 1798.42 13
§ 1798.45 :........:..;...;... 12
21 § 1798.63 13
22 §1798.73 : 13
§ 1798.73 ; : 14
23 § 1798.76 '. : 13, 14
§ 1798.76 13
24
Code of Civil Procedure
25 §2017.010...: 16
25 §2017.010, subd. (a) 14
§ 2023.010, subd. (h) 16
27 § 2023.030 16
§ 2030.220, subd. (c) 10
28
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page
3 Evidence Code
§ 210 : 15
§ 800 : 15
§ 1043 11
§ 1043, subd. (b)(3) 11
6 § 1046 11
7 Penal Code
§ 832.5.
8 § 832.7 5
^ § 832.7, subd. (a) : 1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
10
]I California Practice Guide: Civil Trial and Evidence [Rutter Group 2020] 15
12 Edmon and Karnow, California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The
Rutter Group 2020) p : 1162.1 11
13
14
1,5
16
17
18
19
20
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1.
INTRODUCTION
2 , .
3 Plaintiff asks this court to force the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to reveal the home
4 addresses and personal phone numbers, among other personal information, of approximately 530
5 CHP patrol officers who filled out a non-CHP authorized, third-party survey regarding the CHP
6 uniform. Plaintiffs counsel apparently wants to ask each of them for their lay opinions on a
7 reasonable accommodation issue. Plaintiff asks this court to force CHP to divulge each officer's
8 last known residential address; all known telephone numbers; all known e-mail addresses, and all
9 aliases.' CHP is prohibited from disclosing this information by Penal Code section 832.7 (part of
10 the Pitchess motion procedure).'^ Furthermore, the lay opinions of officers regarding the uniform
11 policy are not relevant to whether Plaintiff was reasonably accomrriodated, or to whether CHP
12 engaged in the interactive process.
13 The third-party survey to which these officers responded asked them if they believed an
14 external, load-bearing vest (ELBV), worn outside a patrol officer's uniform shirt, "would benefit
15 employees and the department."^ This survey was distributed by an Officer Erik Mallqry,
16 unconnected to his official duties with CHP. Plaintiff noticed Mallory's deposition, during which
17 Mallory testified he still had the response forms in a paper file. {See Mallory depo. tscrpt.,
18 Briscoe Dec, Exh. 1. at 19:1-20:21:15.). After the deposition. Officer Mallory scanned and
19 emailed pdf copies of the survey forms to CHP's counsel of record. Prior to this time, neither
20 CHP nor the undersigned counsel was in possession of the survey response forms.
21 CHP has produced to Plaintiff all ofthe survey response forms given to it by Mallory.
22 Mallory conceived of the survey himself without CHP's authority or approval. Furthermore, the
23 response forms do not list the responding officers' home addresses,or personal phone numbers or
24 email addresses. Plaintiff asks this court to order CHP to look up that information for each of the
25 1 See definition of "IDENTIFY" in Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set Three, attached
as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of John Briscoe [hereinafter "Briscoe Dec."] at 1:26-28, and
26 Special Interrogatory No. 10, at 2:5-6 of Exh. 3 to the Briscoe Dec.
2 See Pitchess v. Superior Court (Echeveria) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 897.
27 3 cpjp's Uniform Committee has never been presented with a prototype of an ELBV that
it found to be acceptable for patrol officer use, so ELBVs are not approved uniform items for
28 CHP's patrol officers. Plaintiff requested an ELBV as an accommodation of his disability.
5
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 530 officers and to turn it over to Plaintiff Plaintiff claims he should be allowed to interview (or,
2 one imagines, depose) every single one of the survey respondents about whether "CHP's
3 inflexible 'no-vest' policy is a reasonable one." (Pltf Memorandum of Points and Authorities
4 ["MPA"] at 2:25-26.) Plaintiff fails to notify the court, however, of the undisputed fact CHP
5 offered Plaintiff an alternative accommodation: a Uniform Committee-approved, load-bearing
6 suspenders system worn under the uniform shirt known as The Back Defender. CHP's "policy"
7 thus is far from "inflexible." Plaintiff also failed to inform the court of CHP's meet-and-confer
8 efforts, wherein CHP offered to disclose the work addresses and phone numbers of a sample of
9 the survey respondents. Regardless, Plaintiff seeks to interview or depose over 500 officers about
10 their inadmissible lay opinions on a CHP policy. That information is neither relevant nor
11 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding whether Plaintiff
12 was reasonably accommodated. Moreover, peace officers' personal information is protected by
13 statute and decisional law, including the Pitchess motion process, the Information Practices Act,
14 and reported cases interpreting and applying those statutes. The court therefore should deny, and
15 should award attorney's fees to CHP for having to defend, this motion.
16 STATEMENT OF FACTS
17 I, FACTS PERTINENT TO PLAINTIFF RIDGE'S TENURE W I T H CHP AND HIS REQUEST
FOR AN EXTERNAL, LOAD-BEARING VEST AS A REASONABLE ACCOMIVIODATION
18
19 This is a disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation case. (See Complaint, ,
20 Exh. 2, Curran Dec.) Plaintiff began working as a patrol officer for CHP in 1995. (Plaintiffs
21 Complaint, Exh. 2, Curran Dec, at 3:1-3.) He claims he suffered a back injury while on the job.
22 (/c/., at 3:4-6.) In April 2018, Plaintiff underwent major back surgery. After a leave of absence,
23 Plaintiff returned to light duty in January 2019. Between February and April 2019, Plaintiff was
24 cleared to return to full duty but was placed in the office. Plaintiff, however, told his then-
25 commander, Cpt. Stover, that he was physically incapable of "working the road," i.e., working as
26 a patrol officer because of his chronic back problems. (Transcript of Deposition of Matthew
27 Stover, Exh. 11 to Curran Dec, at 70:5-12.) Pending resolution of Plaintiff s physical status by
28 the agreed medical examiners in his workers' compensation case. Plaintiff remained on light duty.
6
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 (Plaintiffs Complaint, Exh. 2, Curran Dec, at 3:1-8.) Plaintiff alleges he, on April 5, 2019,
2 submitted to his direct supervisor, Sgt. Mueller, a request that be allowed to return to full duty
3 and a request that he be allowed to wear an ELBV, i.e., a weight-bearing vest that is worn over
4 the patrol officer's uniform shirt, (/c/., at 3:9-13.) No prototype of an ELBV has been tested or
5 approved by CHP's Uniform Committee, and CHP offered Plaintiff an alternative
6 accommodation: the Back Defender,'' a load-bearing suspenders system worn under the uniform
7 shirt. (Stover Depo., Exh. I I , Curran Dec, at 88:7-89:25.) The Back Defender had been .
8 approved by CHP's Uniform Committee and conformed to its uniform policy. (Ibid.) Plaintiff,
9 in response, told Cpt. Stover and Sgt. Mueller the Back Defender would not work for him. (Ibid.)
10 Plaintiff told them he knew someone who tried to use the Back Defender and did not like it, so
11 Plaintiff declined to even try the Back Defender. (Ibid.)
12 In August 2019, the Agreed Medical Examiner in Plaintiffs workers' compensation case
13 issued a report opining Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the patrol officer
14 position. Plaintiff disability retired effective January 3, 2020. (.See Disability Retirement
15 Approval Letter, Exh. 12, Curran Dec pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff requested, in late October 2021, to be
16 reinstated. (See Reinstatement Application, Exh. 13, Curran Dec), and was ordered to report for
17 requalification training at CHP's training academy in February 2022. (See Requalification
18 Training Course Memorandum, Exh. 14, Curran Dec.) CHP is informed and believes Plaintiff (a)
19 has completed the requalification course, (b) is presently working full duty (not limited or "light
20 duty") as a patrol officer out of CHP's area office in Santa Ana, (c) Plaintiff is performing patrol
21 officer duties while wearing the regular "duty belt," or Sam Browne belt, and (d) has made no
22 request for reasonable accommodation of his disability since returning to work with CHP.
23 (Curran Dec, Tl 18.)
24 II. FACTS PERTINENT TO W H Y CHP's UNIFORM POLICY DOES NOT AUTHORIZE
PATROL OFFICERS TO WEAR EXTERNAL, LOAD-BEARING VESTS.
25
26 CHP's Uniform Committee ("Committee") has evaluated two ELBV prototypes. The first
27 prototype was presented to the Committee in June 2014, and the second in March 2017. The
28 ^ See https://www.backdefensesystems.com.
7
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 Committee was "impressed" with the first prototype but concluded it posed an officer safety issue
2 to areas around the shoulder and base of that could be easily grabbled." (See Second Quarter
3 2014 Minutes, Exhibit 15, Curran Dec, pp. 2-3.) The minutes further reflect that the Committee
4 felt the overall look of the first prototype was "a bit sloppy since the base of the vest carrier .did
5 not tuck into the uniform pants, yet hovered around the top of the duty belt." (Ibid.) The relevant
6 entry in the minutes concludes: "The item died for lack of a motion." (Ibid.)
7 With respect to the second prototype, presented by Officer Erik Mallory, the Committee
8 members "agreed the vest's appearance must be refined and the color matched to the current tan
9 uniform before, moving forward," and the relevant meeting minutes state that Officer Mallory was
10 to "work with the vendor on the vest's appearance, and in the meantime he will present the vest to
11 the Departmental Occupational Safety Board." (See First Quarter 2017 Meeting Minutes, Exh.
12 16, Curran Dec, p. 2.) Officer Mallory never presented a prototype to the Occupational Safety
13 Board.^ The minutes of the next Committee meeting, in July 2017, reflect that Officer Mallory
14 "was contacted by multiple members of the Committee in order to gain perspective of his
15 progress." (5ee Second Quarter 2017 Minutes, Exh. 17, Curran Dec, p. 2.) These minutes,
16 : reflect the Committee was "eager to see his next sample vest." (Ibid.) Officei- Mallory never
17 returned to the Committee to present a new prototype. (Mallory Depo. Trscrpt., Exh. 1, Briscoe
18 Dec, 38:1-12.) The Committee therefore never entertained a motion to approve Officer
19 Mallory's prototype. Review of the Committee's meeting minutes reveals it apparently has not
20 evaluated any other ELBV prototype since Officer Mallory presented his in March 2017. (Curran
21 Dec, ^ 17.) Because the Committee has never approved an ELBV prototype, CHP's Uniform
22 Policy does not authorize patrol officers to wear ELBVs.^
23
^ Mallory testified he brought a prototype to a meeting at which one Occupational Safety
24 Board member was present, but it was not an official meeting of that board. (Trscrpt. of Mallory
Depo., Exh. 1 to Briscoe Dec, at 38:1-40:7.) Mallory also brought a prototype to an official
25 meeting of the Occupational Safety Board but never actually presented the prototype at the
meeting. Rather, Mallory, discouraged by some comments he heard during the lunch break, left
26 during that break without showing his prototype to the Board, (Id. at 45:21-50:4.)
^ Certain non-patrol officers, e.g., CHP's aviation personnel, are allowed to wear external
27 vests because a traditional "duty beh" is impractical due to the confined spaces of aircraft
cockpits, but those vests "carry" fewer equipment items and are not designed for patrol officers
28 working the road.
8
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 111. FACTS PERTINENT TO OFFICER E R I K MALLORY'S SURVEY
2 Officer Mallory is not in risk management. He is not part of CHP's Equal Employment
3 Opportunity Office. He is not part of CHP's Human Resources Department. He is not qualified
4 as any expert on any subject. He is a lay witness. Plaintiff concedes Mallory did not seek or
5 receive CHP approval for the survey. (Pltf Memo, of Points and Authorities, 6:27-7:3; Mallory
6 Depo., Exh. 1 to Briscoe Dec, at 19:6-20:21.) Still, Mallory created the forms with the CHP
7 . emblem at the top of each page. (See survey response forms, Exh. 2, Briscoe Dec.)
8 Approximately 530 officers responded to the survey.^ Mallory enlisted the help of a CHP union
9 representative to distribute the survey. (Mallory Depo., Exh. 1 to Briscoe Dec, at 19:6-20:21.) It
10 is unknown what, if anything, those who filled out and returned the survey forms were told with
11 regard to who would have access to the surveys, or whether they could or would be filed in open
12 court and used in a private lawsuit. Nowhere on the response forms did the responding officers
13 consent to disclosure of their personal information or anything else. (See response, forms, Exh. 2,
14 Briscoe Dec)
15 ARGUMENT
16 I. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL HAS FAILED
TO M E E T AND CONFER IN GOOD FAITH ON THE ISSUES PRESENTED.
17
A. Plaintifrs Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith Concerning
18 Special Interrogatory No. 9.
19 This motion concerns two interrogatories: Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories Nos. 9 and 10.
20 No. 9 asks if any CHP officer has "told" CHP's Uniform Committee that ELBVs should be
21 approved for patrol officers. No. 10 asks CHP to "IDENTIFY" every officer who responded to
22 the Mallory survey by providing each officer's residential address, all known telephone numbers,
23 all known email addresses, and all known aliases, among other information. (See Exh. 3 to
24 Briscoe Dec, at pp. 1-2.) On April 5, 2022, CHP's counsel sent Plaintiffs counsel an email
25 informing him that, with respect to Special Interrogatory No. 9, CHP was in the process of
26 determining if there was any record of any CHP officer "telling" the Uniform Committee that
27
^ There might be duplication among the survey response forms, but this number is our best
28 estimate after counting the names of all of the respondents that appear in the forms.
9
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 external vests should be approved for patrol officers. CHP's counsel informed Mr. Briscoe that if
2 there was any such record, CHP would serve a further response to Interrogatory No. 9 with the
3 work contact information of any officers who made such a statement to the Uniform Committee.
4 CHP's counsel has since contacted the appropriate CHP personnel about whether such a record
5 exists. (Curran Dec, ^ 10.) CHP's counsel just received, in April 25, 2022, the final response for
6 which he was waiting. (Ibid.) CHP's counsel is now informed and believes there is no such
7 record of any CHP officer making the specified statement to the Uniform Committee. (Ibid.)
8 CHP therefore will serve, as soon as possible, a further response to Interrogatory No. 9 stating
9 CHP has made a "reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to" the
10 appropriate persons (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.220, subd. (c)). (Curran Dec, 10.) Plaintiff filed
11 the present motion on April 7, 2022. Plaintiffs counsel thus did not confer in good faith with
12 CHP's counsel about Interrogatory No. 9 prior to filing this motion, and the motion should be
13 denied as to that interrogatory.
14 B. Plaintiff s Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith Concerning
Special Interrogatory No. 10.
16 Counsel for Plaintiff and CHP have been conferring about the information in the survey
17 forms since late December 2021. (See Curran Dec, ^TI 4-10.) CHP has repeatedly pointed out
18 that it is not permitted to disclose residential addresses, personal phone numbers and personal
19 email addresses, or aliases, of its officers. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has never backed off from his quest
20 for this Pitchess-protected information, however. (Ibid.) CHP agreed, as part of the meet-and-
21 confer process, to Plaintiffs suggestion that the parties split the costs of a third-party
22 administrator (TPA) to contact the survey respondents to obtain their permission to disclose their
23 personal information, subject to Mr. Briscoe obtaining two cost estimates from prospective TPAs,
24 and as long as the information was confined to "attorneys' eyes only." (Curran Dec, Yl\ 5-7.)
25 CHP also has offered to produce the work addresses, work telephone numbers and work email
26 addresses of up to 20 survey respondents. (Id., ^ 10.) Mr. Briscoe flatly turned down both ideas.
27 (CurranDec.,Tl«117, 10.)
28
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 Plaintiffs counsel thus has failed to meet and confer in good faith about Interrogatory No.
2 10. This motion therefore should be denied as to Interrogatory No. 10, as well, and Plaintiff s
3 counsel and his law firm should be sanctioned.
4
5 II. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY
INTERROGATORY NO. 10 is "PRIVILEGED" FROM DISCOVERY UNDER THE
6 STATUTES AND CASE LAW THAT PROTECT INFORMATION IN PEACE O F F I C E R
PERSONNEL RECORDS FROM DISCLOSURE ( T H E "PITCHESS" PROCEDURE) AND
7 UNDERTHE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT.
8 A. Protections From Disclosure Provided by the Pitchess Procedure.
9 Plaintiff seeks information that is protected by the Pitchess procedure. Penal Code section
10 832.7, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: "Except as provided in subdivision (b) [listing
11 exceptions not applicable here], the personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and
12 records maintained by a state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained
13 from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding
14 except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code." (Pen. Code,
15 § 832.7, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) The personal telephone numbers, residential addresses,
16 personal email addresses, and aliases of the CHP officers who responded to the Mallory survey
17 would have to be obtained from these officers' personnel records. Therefore, Plaintiff would
18 have to file a Pitchess motion pursuant to sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code to obtain
19 those phone numbers, addresses and aliases. Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(3)
20 requires that a motion to discover information in confidential police personnel records must be
21 supported by an affidavit which demonstrates good cause and sets forth specific and sufficient
22 facts demonstrating the materiality of the requested information to the subject matter involved in
23 the pending litigation. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (Eli) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135,
24 1145.) Plaintiff has not filed such a motion. This motion therefore should be denied as to
25 Interrogatory NO. 10.
26 When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear
27 reasonably related to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an
28 intent to harass and improperly burden. (Edmon and Karnow, California Practice Guide, Civil
11
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) [hereinafter "Civil Procedure"] 18:1162.1;
2 Obregon v. Superior Court (Cimm's. Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4"^ 424, 430-431.) Here,
3 Interrogatory No. 10 is grossly overbroad on its face because it seeks Pitchess-protected
4 information about patrol officers. Plaintiff propounded Interrogatory No. 10 without having filed
5 a Pitchess motion. That interrogatory thus is not reasonably related to a legitimate discovery
6 need. (See Obregon, j-w/?ra, at pp. 430-431.)
7 Additionally, it is not reasonable for CHP to spend time tracking down the work contact
8 information for the 500-plus officers who responded to the survey. Plaintiff argues "CHP must
9 concede that the of its own officers is of relevance." (Pltf Memo, of Points and
10 Authorities, 7:4-7 [emphasis added].). Plaintiff thus wants to gather inadmissible opinion
11 evidence from lay witnesses unfamiliar with the facts of this case. Plaintiff has already filed one
12 unsuccessful motion to compel a lay witness to give an opinion on the reasonable accommodation
13 " issue.. (See Curran Dec, ^ 1, and Exh. 1 to the Curran Dec.) An abuse of discovery procedures in
14 • one instance can imply a continuing intent to abuse in other instances. (Obregon, supra, at 431.)
15 Accordingly, not only should this motion be denied as to Interrogatory No. 10, but Plaintiffs
16 counsel should be sanctioned to prevent future abuse.
17 B. Protections Offered by the Information Practices Act.
18 The State of California places a high priority on preserving the privacy of peace officers
19 and other public employees by limiting access to their personnel records. (See Civ. Code, § 1798,
20 et. seq. [the Information Practices Act of 1977, hereinafter "IPA"].) The right to privacy "is a
21 personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of California and by the United
22 States Constitution." (Civ. Code, § 1798.1.) The IPA defines "personal information" as
23 including, but not limited to, an individual's home address and home telephone number. (Civ.
24 Code, § 1798.3.) The IPA requires California State agencies to "ensure the security and
25 confidentiality" of personal information and personnel records, and to "protect against anticipated
26 threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could result in any injury." (Civ. Code, §
27 1798.20.) The IPA provides that an individual may bring a civil lawsuit against an agency that
28 fails to comply with any of the IPA's provisions. (Civ. Code, § 1798.45.) The provisions of the
12
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 IPA "shall be liberally construed so as to protect the rights of privacy arising under this chapter or
2 under the Federal or state Constitution." (Civ. Code, § 1798.63.) The IPA specifically provides
3 for redaction of information to avoid a prohibited disclosure. (Civ. Code, § 1798.42.) The IPA
4 thus prohibits CHP from disclosing the information (personal telephone numbers, residential
5 addresses, etc.) that Plaintiff seeks under his definition of 'IDENTIFY" in the subject
6 interrogatories. (See Exh. 3 to Briscoe Dec. [Special Interrogatories], at 1:26-28.)
7 Plaintiff will argue Civil Code section 1798.76 requires CHP to disclose the residential
8 addresses, and personal telephone numbers, etc., of the survey respondents. Section 1798.76
9 provides:
10 Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to revoke, modify, or alter in any manner
any statutory provision or any judicial decision which (a) authorizes an individual to
11 gain access to any law enforcement record, or (b) authorizes discovery in criminal or
civil litigation.
12
13 Research has revealed only one reported case that construes Civil Code section 1798.76:
14. California Teachers Assn. v. California Com. on Teacher Credentialing (2003) 111 Cal.App.4"^
15 1001. (^'Teachers Assn."). That case involved an investigation by the Commission on Teacher
16 . Credentialing into alleged sexual abuse of students by a teacher, (/c/., at p. 1004). The teacher
17' and the California Teachers Association (CTA) petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel
18 disclosure of the addresses and other identifying information of complaining students and
19 witnesses. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the petition and the Court of Appeal affirmed,
20 concluding the teacher was not entitled to receive the information. (Ibid.) Teachers Assn. thus
21 prohibited disclosure of addresses and other personal identifying information. Civil Code section
22 1798.76 appears to have been drafted to make clear that the Legislature did not intend the IPA to
23 interfere with the Pitchess procedure.* Hence its reference to statutory provisions and judicial
24 decisions that authorize "an individual to gain access to any law enforcement record."
25 Furthermore, if one reviews the IPA, one finds, on the same page of the Civil Code as section
26 1798.76, section 1798.73. The latter section provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be
27 * The California Supreme Court decided Pitchess v. Superior Courl in 1974. The IPA was
28 enacted three years later, in 1977.
13
Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 construed to deny or limit any right of privacy arising under Section 1 of Article 1 ofthe
2 California Constitution." (Civ. Code, § 1798.73 [emphasis added].) In summary. Civil Code
3 section 1798.76 cannot be reasonably interpreted to override the many other parts ofthe IPA that
.4 require that the private information of public employees, and especially .law enforcement officers
5 who might be tracked down and killed by criminals seeking revenge, be kept confidential or
6 redacted.'
7 In summary, the motion to compel a further response to Interrogatory No. 10 should be
8 denied because CHP is prohibited by the IPA from disclosing the personal information Plaintiff
9 seeks with that interrogatory.
10 III. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE THE PERSONAL CONTACT
INFORMATION OF THE PATROL OFFICERS AT ISSUE IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
11 DISCOVERY.
12
13 Any party to a civil case "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
14 relevant to the subject matter involved or to the determination of any motion made in that action,
15 if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
16 discovery of admissible evidence." (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010, subd. (a) [emphasis added].)
17 • "Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
18 discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
19 location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other
20 property." (Ibid.)
21 On the other hand, although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Bd. of
22 Registered Nursing v. Superior Court of Orange Counly (2021) 59 Cal.App.5"^ 1011, 1039 [trial
23 court abused discretion in ordering production of investigatory files and administrative records
24 that would reveal names and medical information of non-litigants].) Even if information is
25 otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege, and the
26 constitutional right to privacy is a "privilege" that can bar discovery of personal identifying
27 information in a civil lawsuit. (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiff Plaintiff s motion asserts: "[I]t is clear that
28 these persons are percipient witnesses as to whether CHP's inflexible 'no-vest' policy is a
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 reasonable one." (Pltf MPA at 2:25-26.) As shown above. Plaintiff thus wants to present the
2 opinions of the survey respondents on a reasonable accommodation issue, the ultimate issue in
3 this case.
4 Lay opinion testimony is sometimes admissible when it is necessary to understand the
5 witness' observations. But where a witness can adequately describe his or her observations,
6 opinions are not allowed. In such event, opinions or conclusions on the subject are not "helpful to
7 a clear understanding" and thus inadmissible. (California Practice Guide: Civil Trial and
8 Evidence [Rutter Group 2020], ^ 8:648; see also Evi. Code, § 800 ["If a witness is not testifying
9 as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is lirnited to such an opinion as is permitted
10 by law, including but not limited to an opinion that is: (a) Rationally based on the perception of
11 the witness; and (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony"].) Thus, a lay witness may
12 properly offer an opinion that an individual was "drunk," that people were "angry," that an impact
13 • was strong enough to jar a passenger from a seat, or that a person was "trying to break up a fight."
14 (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 112-113.) However, a lay witness
15 may not, for example, in a premises liability case, offer an opinion as to an ultimate issue of fact
16 to be decided by thejury, for example, whether a condition on a property was reasonable. (Ibid.)
17 Such an opinion from a lay witness would not be helpful to an understanding of the witness'
18 testimony and would "invade the province of thejury, which was to determine the reasonableness
19 of both parties'conduct." (/c/., at p. 114.) The question of the reasonableness of an
20 accommodation is a question for thejury. (Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 53
21 Cal.App.4"^ 935, 954.)
22 Here, the respondent officers' opinions on whether it would be "reasonable" for someone in
23 Officer Ridge's position to be accommodated by being allowed to wear a hypothetical ELBV is
24 not "helpful to a clear understanding of' their testimony." (See Evi. Code, § 800.) Even if every
25 single survey respondent believes an ELBV is desirable, that would not have "any tendency in
26 reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination o f this
27 lawsuit. (See Evid. Code, § 210 ["relevant evidence" defined].) The survey respondents'
28 opinions about CHP's uniform policy are neither admissible nor reasonably calculated to lead to
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
1 the discovery of admissible evidence. Their opinions on this subject therefore are outside the
2 scope of discovery. (See Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010.) If follows that their personal information
3 is outside the scope of discovery. Even if their opinions were within the scope of discovery, CHP
4 should not be forced to reveal where these officers live or their personal phone numbers or email
5 addresses. Nor should CHP be compelled to disclose these officers' aliases, if any. Some of
6 these officers might have worked, or might be working, under cover using assumed names.
7 Revealing those names might get an officer, or more than one, killed. CHP is. willing to disclose
8 the work contact information for a limited number of officers. Plaintiff, furthermore, does not
9 need the names or contact information of any of the survey respondents to argue that most or a
10 certain percentage of them answered "yes" to any of the three survey questions (which, again, is
11 irrelevant to whether Plaintiff was reasonably accommodated).
12 In summary, the residential addresses, personal phone numbers, personal email addresses,
13 and aliases of the officers who responded to the Mallory survey are outside the scope of ,.
14 discovery. The court therefore should deny the motion to compel a further response to
15 Interrogatory No. 10.
16 IV. SANCTIONS AGAINST CHP OR ITS COUNSEL ARE NOT WARRANTED. RATHER, THE
COURT SHOULD ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL.
17
18 CHP participated in good faith in an effort to resolve this discovery dispute informally.
19 Plaintiffs counsel, however, will not give up on the idea that CHP should look up and disclose
20 the home addresses and personal phone numbers of more than 500 of its officers. Plaintiff wants
21 CHP to reveal personal information for hundreds of its officers so Plaintiffs counsel can ask or
22 depose them about their opinions on CHP's uniform policy. That is not reasonable. The court
23 therefore should deny Plaintiffs request for sanctions. Furthermore, the court should issue
24 sanctions of $ 1,540.00 against Attorney Briscoe and Mayall Hurley, P.C, jointly and severally,
25 payable to CHP, for (1) abuse of the discovery process (Code Civ. Proc, § 2023.030); and (2)
26 filing this motion unsuccessfully and without substantial justification (Code Civ. Proc,
27 § 2023.010, subd. (h).) (5ee Curran Dec, 1120.)
28
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019.00265393)
1 CONCLUSION
2 This motion should be denied as to both interrogatories, because Plaintiffs counsel has
3 failed to meet and confer in good faith. Furthermore, the information sought by Interrogatory No.
. 4 10 is privileged from discovery under the Pitchess procedure and the Information Practices Act.
5 The personal contact information of the patrol officers at issue, moreover, is outside the scope of
6 discovery. Finally, CHP requests that the court issue sanctions against Attorney John Briscoe and
7 Mayall Hurley, P.C, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,540.00.
8
Dated: April 27, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
9
ROB BONTA
10 Attorney General of California
KRISTIN M. DAILY
11 Supervising Deputy Attorney General
12
13
14 JAMES F. CURRAN
Deputy Attorney General
15 Attorneys for Defendant
California Highway Patrol
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Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393)
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL
Case Name: David Ridge v. CHP
No.: 34-2019-00265393
L declare:
L am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the
California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or
older and not a party to this matter. 1 am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the
Attomey General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United
States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal
rnail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States
Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of
business.
On April 27, 2022.1 served the attached DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY- - -
PATROL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET THREE by transmitting a true
copy via electronic mail addressed as follows:
John P. Briscoe
Mayall Hurley P.C.
E-mail Address:
ibriscoe(a),mavallaw.com
lrilev(aimavallaw.com
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States
of America the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on April 27/
2022, at Sacramento, California. ^
Christopher R. Irby
Declarant Signature
SA20I9I06238
36124314.docx
Preview
ROB BONTA Attomey General of California 2 KRISTIN M . DAILY Supervising Deputy Attorney General FlLED/EfyOORSED 3 JAMES F. CURRAN Deputy Attomey General 4 State'Bar No. 142041 APR 2 7 2022 v,l-300 I. Street, Suite 125 •,5 P.O. Box 944255 By:. E. Macdonald Deputy Clerk Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 )6 Telephone: (916)210-6113 Fax: (916) 324-5567 7 E-mail: James.Curran@doj.ca.gov Allorneys for Defendant .8 California Highway Patrol 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 11 12 1.3 DAVID RIDGE, Case No. 34-2019-00265393 14 Plaintiff DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY 1.5 PATROL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 16 FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET THREE .17 THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Date: May 10,2022 18 Time: 1:30 p.m. Defendants. Dept: 53 19 Judge: Hon. Richard K. Sueyoshi Trial Date: April 4, 2023 20 Action Filed: September 23, 2019 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 Introduction 5 ^ Statement of Facts , 6 I. Facts Pertinent to Plaintiff Ridge's Tenure With CHP arid His Request for 5 An External, Load-Bearing Vest as a Reasonable Accommodation..: 6 II. Facts Pertinent to Why CHP's Uniform Policy Does Not Authorize Patrol 6 Officers to Wear External, Load-Bearing Vests 7 7 III. Facts Pertinent to Officer Erik Mallory's Survey '. 9 g Argument 9 I. This Motion Should Be Denied Because Plaintiffs Counsel Has Failed to 9 Meet and Confer in Good Faith on the Issues. Presented 9 A. Plaintiff s Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith 10 Concerning Special Interrogatory No. 9 ; 9 11 B. Plaintiffs Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith Concerning Special Interrogatory No. 10 10 12 II. This Motion Should Be Denied Because the Information Sought by ,^ Interrogatory No. 10 is "Privileged" From Discovery Under the Statutes and Case Law That Protect Information in Peace Officer Personnel . . Records From Disclosure (The "Pitchess" Procedure) and Under the Information Practices Act ; 11 15 A. Protections From Disclosure Provided by the Pitchess Procedure 11 B. Protections Offered by the Information Practices Act 12 16 III. This Motion Should Be Denied Because the Personal Contact Information 17 of the Patrol Officers at Issue is Outside the Scope of Discovery 14 IV. Sanctions Against CHP or Its Counsel Are Not Warranted. Rather, the 18 Court Should Issue Sanctions Against Plaintiffs Counsel 16 19 Conclusion 17 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page 3 CASES .4 Bd. of Registered Nursing V. Superior Court of Orange County v 5 (202I)59Cal.App.5th 1011 14 ^ California Teachers Assn. v. California Com. on Teacher Credentialing 7 (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1001' 13 8 City of San Jose v. Superior Court (Eli) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135 11 9 Obregon v. Superior Courl (Cimm's, Inc.) '0 (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424 , : 12 Osborn v.. Mission Ready Mix 12 (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104 15 13 Pitchess v. Superior Court (Echeveria) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 897 passim 14 Prilliman V. United Air Lines, Inc. 15 (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 935 '. 15 STATUTES Civil Code 3 § 1798, et.seq 12 § 1798.1 12 19 §1798.3 12 § 1798.20 12 20 § 1798.42 13 § 1798.45 :........:..;...;... 12 21 § 1798.63 13 22 §1798.73 : 13 § 1798.73 ; : 14 23 § 1798.76 '. : 13, 14 § 1798.76 13 24 Code of Civil Procedure 25 §2017.010...: 16 25 §2017.010, subd. (a) 14 § 2023.010, subd. (h) 16 27 § 2023.030 16 § 2030.220, subd. (c) 10 28 3 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page 3 Evidence Code § 210 : 15 § 800 : 15 § 1043 11 § 1043, subd. (b)(3) 11 6 § 1046 11 7 Penal Code § 832.5. 8 § 832.7 5 ^ § 832.7, subd. (a) : 1 OTHER AUTHORITIES 10 ]I California Practice Guide: Civil Trial and Evidence [Rutter Group 2020] 15 12 Edmon and Karnow, California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) p : 1162.1 11 13 14 1,5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23' 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1. INTRODUCTION 2 , . 3 Plaintiff asks this court to force the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to reveal the home 4 addresses and personal phone numbers, among other personal information, of approximately 530 5 CHP patrol officers who filled out a non-CHP authorized, third-party survey regarding the CHP 6 uniform. Plaintiffs counsel apparently wants to ask each of them for their lay opinions on a 7 reasonable accommodation issue. Plaintiff asks this court to force CHP to divulge each officer's 8 last known residential address; all known telephone numbers; all known e-mail addresses, and all 9 aliases.' CHP is prohibited from disclosing this information by Penal Code section 832.7 (part of 10 the Pitchess motion procedure).'^ Furthermore, the lay opinions of officers regarding the uniform 11 policy are not relevant to whether Plaintiff was reasonably accomrriodated, or to whether CHP 12 engaged in the interactive process. 13 The third-party survey to which these officers responded asked them if they believed an 14 external, load-bearing vest (ELBV), worn outside a patrol officer's uniform shirt, "would benefit 15 employees and the department."^ This survey was distributed by an Officer Erik Mallqry, 16 unconnected to his official duties with CHP. Plaintiff noticed Mallory's deposition, during which 17 Mallory testified he still had the response forms in a paper file. {See Mallory depo. tscrpt., 18 Briscoe Dec, Exh. 1. at 19:1-20:21:15.). After the deposition. Officer Mallory scanned and 19 emailed pdf copies of the survey forms to CHP's counsel of record. Prior to this time, neither 20 CHP nor the undersigned counsel was in possession of the survey response forms. 21 CHP has produced to Plaintiff all ofthe survey response forms given to it by Mallory. 22 Mallory conceived of the survey himself without CHP's authority or approval. Furthermore, the 23 response forms do not list the responding officers' home addresses,or personal phone numbers or 24 email addresses. Plaintiff asks this court to order CHP to look up that information for each of the 25 1 See definition of "IDENTIFY" in Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set Three, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of John Briscoe [hereinafter "Briscoe Dec."] at 1:26-28, and 26 Special Interrogatory No. 10, at 2:5-6 of Exh. 3 to the Briscoe Dec. 2 See Pitchess v. Superior Court (Echeveria) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 897. 27 3 cpjp's Uniform Committee has never been presented with a prototype of an ELBV that it found to be acceptable for patrol officer use, so ELBVs are not approved uniform items for 28 CHP's patrol officers. Plaintiff requested an ELBV as an accommodation of his disability. 5 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 530 officers and to turn it over to Plaintiff Plaintiff claims he should be allowed to interview (or, 2 one imagines, depose) every single one of the survey respondents about whether "CHP's 3 inflexible 'no-vest' policy is a reasonable one." (Pltf Memorandum of Points and Authorities 4 ["MPA"] at 2:25-26.) Plaintiff fails to notify the court, however, of the undisputed fact CHP 5 offered Plaintiff an alternative accommodation: a Uniform Committee-approved, load-bearing 6 suspenders system worn under the uniform shirt known as The Back Defender. CHP's "policy" 7 thus is far from "inflexible." Plaintiff also failed to inform the court of CHP's meet-and-confer 8 efforts, wherein CHP offered to disclose the work addresses and phone numbers of a sample of 9 the survey respondents. Regardless, Plaintiff seeks to interview or depose over 500 officers about 10 their inadmissible lay opinions on a CHP policy. That information is neither relevant nor 11 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding whether Plaintiff 12 was reasonably accommodated. Moreover, peace officers' personal information is protected by 13 statute and decisional law, including the Pitchess motion process, the Information Practices Act, 14 and reported cases interpreting and applying those statutes. The court therefore should deny, and 15 should award attorney's fees to CHP for having to defend, this motion. 16 STATEMENT OF FACTS 17 I, FACTS PERTINENT TO PLAINTIFF RIDGE'S TENURE W I T H CHP AND HIS REQUEST FOR AN EXTERNAL, LOAD-BEARING VEST AS A REASONABLE ACCOMIVIODATION 18 19 This is a disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation case. (See Complaint, , 20 Exh. 2, Curran Dec.) Plaintiff began working as a patrol officer for CHP in 1995. (Plaintiffs 21 Complaint, Exh. 2, Curran Dec, at 3:1-3.) He claims he suffered a back injury while on the job. 22 (/c/., at 3:4-6.) In April 2018, Plaintiff underwent major back surgery. After a leave of absence, 23 Plaintiff returned to light duty in January 2019. Between February and April 2019, Plaintiff was 24 cleared to return to full duty but was placed in the office. Plaintiff, however, told his then- 25 commander, Cpt. Stover, that he was physically incapable of "working the road," i.e., working as 26 a patrol officer because of his chronic back problems. (Transcript of Deposition of Matthew 27 Stover, Exh. 11 to Curran Dec, at 70:5-12.) Pending resolution of Plaintiff s physical status by 28 the agreed medical examiners in his workers' compensation case. Plaintiff remained on light duty. 6 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 (Plaintiffs Complaint, Exh. 2, Curran Dec, at 3:1-8.) Plaintiff alleges he, on April 5, 2019, 2 submitted to his direct supervisor, Sgt. Mueller, a request that be allowed to return to full duty 3 and a request that he be allowed to wear an ELBV, i.e., a weight-bearing vest that is worn over 4 the patrol officer's uniform shirt, (/c/., at 3:9-13.) No prototype of an ELBV has been tested or 5 approved by CHP's Uniform Committee, and CHP offered Plaintiff an alternative 6 accommodation: the Back Defender,'' a load-bearing suspenders system worn under the uniform 7 shirt. (Stover Depo., Exh. I I , Curran Dec, at 88:7-89:25.) The Back Defender had been . 8 approved by CHP's Uniform Committee and conformed to its uniform policy. (Ibid.) Plaintiff, 9 in response, told Cpt. Stover and Sgt. Mueller the Back Defender would not work for him. (Ibid.) 10 Plaintiff told them he knew someone who tried to use the Back Defender and did not like it, so 11 Plaintiff declined to even try the Back Defender. (Ibid.) 12 In August 2019, the Agreed Medical Examiner in Plaintiffs workers' compensation case 13 issued a report opining Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the patrol officer 14 position. Plaintiff disability retired effective January 3, 2020. (.See Disability Retirement 15 Approval Letter, Exh. 12, Curran Dec pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff requested, in late October 2021, to be 16 reinstated. (See Reinstatement Application, Exh. 13, Curran Dec), and was ordered to report for 17 requalification training at CHP's training academy in February 2022. (See Requalification 18 Training Course Memorandum, Exh. 14, Curran Dec.) CHP is informed and believes Plaintiff (a) 19 has completed the requalification course, (b) is presently working full duty (not limited or "light 20 duty") as a patrol officer out of CHP's area office in Santa Ana, (c) Plaintiff is performing patrol 21 officer duties while wearing the regular "duty belt," or Sam Browne belt, and (d) has made no 22 request for reasonable accommodation of his disability since returning to work with CHP. 23 (Curran Dec, Tl 18.) 24 II. FACTS PERTINENT TO W H Y CHP's UNIFORM POLICY DOES NOT AUTHORIZE PATROL OFFICERS TO WEAR EXTERNAL, LOAD-BEARING VESTS. 25 26 CHP's Uniform Committee ("Committee") has evaluated two ELBV prototypes. The first 27 prototype was presented to the Committee in June 2014, and the second in March 2017. The 28 ^ See https://www.backdefensesystems.com. 7 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 Committee was "impressed" with the first prototype but concluded it posed an officer safety issue 2 to areas around the shoulder and base of that could be easily grabbled." (See Second Quarter 3 2014 Minutes, Exhibit 15, Curran Dec, pp. 2-3.) The minutes further reflect that the Committee 4 felt the overall look of the first prototype was "a bit sloppy since the base of the vest carrier .did 5 not tuck into the uniform pants, yet hovered around the top of the duty belt." (Ibid.) The relevant 6 entry in the minutes concludes: "The item died for lack of a motion." (Ibid.) 7 With respect to the second prototype, presented by Officer Erik Mallory, the Committee 8 members "agreed the vest's appearance must be refined and the color matched to the current tan 9 uniform before, moving forward," and the relevant meeting minutes state that Officer Mallory was 10 to "work with the vendor on the vest's appearance, and in the meantime he will present the vest to 11 the Departmental Occupational Safety Board." (See First Quarter 2017 Meeting Minutes, Exh. 12 16, Curran Dec, p. 2.) Officer Mallory never presented a prototype to the Occupational Safety 13 Board.^ The minutes of the next Committee meeting, in July 2017, reflect that Officer Mallory 14 "was contacted by multiple members of the Committee in order to gain perspective of his 15 progress." (5ee Second Quarter 2017 Minutes, Exh. 17, Curran Dec, p. 2.) These minutes, 16 : reflect the Committee was "eager to see his next sample vest." (Ibid.) Officei- Mallory never 17 returned to the Committee to present a new prototype. (Mallory Depo. Trscrpt., Exh. 1, Briscoe 18 Dec, 38:1-12.) The Committee therefore never entertained a motion to approve Officer 19 Mallory's prototype. Review of the Committee's meeting minutes reveals it apparently has not 20 evaluated any other ELBV prototype since Officer Mallory presented his in March 2017. (Curran 21 Dec, ^ 17.) Because the Committee has never approved an ELBV prototype, CHP's Uniform 22 Policy does not authorize patrol officers to wear ELBVs.^ 23 ^ Mallory testified he brought a prototype to a meeting at which one Occupational Safety 24 Board member was present, but it was not an official meeting of that board. (Trscrpt. of Mallory Depo., Exh. 1 to Briscoe Dec, at 38:1-40:7.) Mallory also brought a prototype to an official 25 meeting of the Occupational Safety Board but never actually presented the prototype at the meeting. Rather, Mallory, discouraged by some comments he heard during the lunch break, left 26 during that break without showing his prototype to the Board, (Id. at 45:21-50:4.) ^ Certain non-patrol officers, e.g., CHP's aviation personnel, are allowed to wear external 27 vests because a traditional "duty beh" is impractical due to the confined spaces of aircraft cockpits, but those vests "carry" fewer equipment items and are not designed for patrol officers 28 working the road. 8 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 111. FACTS PERTINENT TO OFFICER E R I K MALLORY'S SURVEY 2 Officer Mallory is not in risk management. He is not part of CHP's Equal Employment 3 Opportunity Office. He is not part of CHP's Human Resources Department. He is not qualified 4 as any expert on any subject. He is a lay witness. Plaintiff concedes Mallory did not seek or 5 receive CHP approval for the survey. (Pltf Memo, of Points and Authorities, 6:27-7:3; Mallory 6 Depo., Exh. 1 to Briscoe Dec, at 19:6-20:21.) Still, Mallory created the forms with the CHP 7 . emblem at the top of each page. (See survey response forms, Exh. 2, Briscoe Dec.) 8 Approximately 530 officers responded to the survey.^ Mallory enlisted the help of a CHP union 9 representative to distribute the survey. (Mallory Depo., Exh. 1 to Briscoe Dec, at 19:6-20:21.) It 10 is unknown what, if anything, those who filled out and returned the survey forms were told with 11 regard to who would have access to the surveys, or whether they could or would be filed in open 12 court and used in a private lawsuit. Nowhere on the response forms did the responding officers 13 consent to disclosure of their personal information or anything else. (See response, forms, Exh. 2, 14 Briscoe Dec) 15 ARGUMENT 16 I. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL HAS FAILED TO M E E T AND CONFER IN GOOD FAITH ON THE ISSUES PRESENTED. 17 A. Plaintifrs Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith Concerning 18 Special Interrogatory No. 9. 19 This motion concerns two interrogatories: Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories Nos. 9 and 10. 20 No. 9 asks if any CHP officer has "told" CHP's Uniform Committee that ELBVs should be 21 approved for patrol officers. No. 10 asks CHP to "IDENTIFY" every officer who responded to 22 the Mallory survey by providing each officer's residential address, all known telephone numbers, 23 all known email addresses, and all known aliases, among other information. (See Exh. 3 to 24 Briscoe Dec, at pp. 1-2.) On April 5, 2022, CHP's counsel sent Plaintiffs counsel an email 25 informing him that, with respect to Special Interrogatory No. 9, CHP was in the process of 26 determining if there was any record of any CHP officer "telling" the Uniform Committee that 27 ^ There might be duplication among the survey response forms, but this number is our best 28 estimate after counting the names of all of the respondents that appear in the forms. 9 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 external vests should be approved for patrol officers. CHP's counsel informed Mr. Briscoe that if 2 there was any such record, CHP would serve a further response to Interrogatory No. 9 with the 3 work contact information of any officers who made such a statement to the Uniform Committee. 4 CHP's counsel has since contacted the appropriate CHP personnel about whether such a record 5 exists. (Curran Dec, ^ 10.) CHP's counsel just received, in April 25, 2022, the final response for 6 which he was waiting. (Ibid.) CHP's counsel is now informed and believes there is no such 7 record of any CHP officer making the specified statement to the Uniform Committee. (Ibid.) 8 CHP therefore will serve, as soon as possible, a further response to Interrogatory No. 9 stating 9 CHP has made a "reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to" the 10 appropriate persons (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.220, subd. (c)). (Curran Dec, 10.) Plaintiff filed 11 the present motion on April 7, 2022. Plaintiffs counsel thus did not confer in good faith with 12 CHP's counsel about Interrogatory No. 9 prior to filing this motion, and the motion should be 13 denied as to that interrogatory. 14 B. Plaintiff s Counsel Did Not Meet and Confer in Good Faith Concerning Special Interrogatory No. 10. 16 Counsel for Plaintiff and CHP have been conferring about the information in the survey 17 forms since late December 2021. (See Curran Dec, ^TI 4-10.) CHP has repeatedly pointed out 18 that it is not permitted to disclose residential addresses, personal phone numbers and personal 19 email addresses, or aliases, of its officers. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has never backed off from his quest 20 for this Pitchess-protected information, however. (Ibid.) CHP agreed, as part of the meet-and- 21 confer process, to Plaintiffs suggestion that the parties split the costs of a third-party 22 administrator (TPA) to contact the survey respondents to obtain their permission to disclose their 23 personal information, subject to Mr. Briscoe obtaining two cost estimates from prospective TPAs, 24 and as long as the information was confined to "attorneys' eyes only." (Curran Dec, Yl\ 5-7.) 25 CHP also has offered to produce the work addresses, work telephone numbers and work email 26 addresses of up to 20 survey respondents. (Id., ^ 10.) Mr. Briscoe flatly turned down both ideas. 27 (CurranDec.,Tl«117, 10.) 28 10 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 Plaintiffs counsel thus has failed to meet and confer in good faith about Interrogatory No. 2 10. This motion therefore should be denied as to Interrogatory No. 10, as well, and Plaintiff s 3 counsel and his law firm should be sanctioned. 4 5 II. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY INTERROGATORY NO. 10 is "PRIVILEGED" FROM DISCOVERY UNDER THE 6 STATUTES AND CASE LAW THAT PROTECT INFORMATION IN PEACE O F F I C E R PERSONNEL RECORDS FROM DISCLOSURE ( T H E "PITCHESS" PROCEDURE) AND 7 UNDERTHE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT. 8 A. Protections From Disclosure Provided by the Pitchess Procedure. 9 Plaintiff seeks information that is protected by the Pitchess procedure. Penal Code section 10 832.7, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: "Except as provided in subdivision (b) [listing 11 exceptions not applicable here], the personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and 12 records maintained by a state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained 13 from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding 14 except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code." (Pen. Code, 15 § 832.7, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) The personal telephone numbers, residential addresses, 16 personal email addresses, and aliases of the CHP officers who responded to the Mallory survey 17 would have to be obtained from these officers' personnel records. Therefore, Plaintiff would 18 have to file a Pitchess motion pursuant to sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code to obtain 19 those phone numbers, addresses and aliases. Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(3) 20 requires that a motion to discover information in confidential police personnel records must be 21 supported by an affidavit which demonstrates good cause and sets forth specific and sufficient 22 facts demonstrating the materiality of the requested information to the subject matter involved in 23 the pending litigation. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (Eli) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 24 1145.) Plaintiff has not filed such a motion. This motion therefore should be denied as to 25 Interrogatory NO. 10. 26 When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear 27 reasonably related to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an 28 intent to harass and improperly burden. (Edmon and Karnow, California Practice Guide, Civil 11 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) [hereinafter "Civil Procedure"] 18:1162.1; 2 Obregon v. Superior Court (Cimm's. Inc.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4"^ 424, 430-431.) Here, 3 Interrogatory No. 10 is grossly overbroad on its face because it seeks Pitchess-protected 4 information about patrol officers. Plaintiff propounded Interrogatory No. 10 without having filed 5 a Pitchess motion. That interrogatory thus is not reasonably related to a legitimate discovery 6 need. (See Obregon, j-w/?ra, at pp. 430-431.) 7 Additionally, it is not reasonable for CHP to spend time tracking down the work contact 8 information for the 500-plus officers who responded to the survey. Plaintiff argues "CHP must 9 concede that the of its own officers is of relevance." (Pltf Memo, of Points and 10 Authorities, 7:4-7 [emphasis added].). Plaintiff thus wants to gather inadmissible opinion 11 evidence from lay witnesses unfamiliar with the facts of this case. Plaintiff has already filed one 12 unsuccessful motion to compel a lay witness to give an opinion on the reasonable accommodation 13 " issue.. (See Curran Dec, ^ 1, and Exh. 1 to the Curran Dec.) An abuse of discovery procedures in 14 • one instance can imply a continuing intent to abuse in other instances. (Obregon, supra, at 431.) 15 Accordingly, not only should this motion be denied as to Interrogatory No. 10, but Plaintiffs 16 counsel should be sanctioned to prevent future abuse. 17 B. Protections Offered by the Information Practices Act. 18 The State of California places a high priority on preserving the privacy of peace officers 19 and other public employees by limiting access to their personnel records. (See Civ. Code, § 1798, 20 et. seq. [the Information Practices Act of 1977, hereinafter "IPA"].) The right to privacy "is a 21 personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of California and by the United 22 States Constitution." (Civ. Code, § 1798.1.) The IPA defines "personal information" as 23 including, but not limited to, an individual's home address and home telephone number. (Civ. 24 Code, § 1798.3.) The IPA requires California State agencies to "ensure the security and 25 confidentiality" of personal information and personnel records, and to "protect against anticipated 26 threats or hazards to their security or integrity which could result in any injury." (Civ. Code, § 27 1798.20.) The IPA provides that an individual may bring a civil lawsuit against an agency that 28 fails to comply with any of the IPA's provisions. (Civ. Code, § 1798.45.) The provisions of the 12 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 IPA "shall be liberally construed so as to protect the rights of privacy arising under this chapter or 2 under the Federal or state Constitution." (Civ. Code, § 1798.63.) The IPA specifically provides 3 for redaction of information to avoid a prohibited disclosure. (Civ. Code, § 1798.42.) The IPA 4 thus prohibits CHP from disclosing the information (personal telephone numbers, residential 5 addresses, etc.) that Plaintiff seeks under his definition of 'IDENTIFY" in the subject 6 interrogatories. (See Exh. 3 to Briscoe Dec. [Special Interrogatories], at 1:26-28.) 7 Plaintiff will argue Civil Code section 1798.76 requires CHP to disclose the residential 8 addresses, and personal telephone numbers, etc., of the survey respondents. Section 1798.76 9 provides: 10 Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to revoke, modify, or alter in any manner any statutory provision or any judicial decision which (a) authorizes an individual to 11 gain access to any law enforcement record, or (b) authorizes discovery in criminal or civil litigation. 12 13 Research has revealed only one reported case that construes Civil Code section 1798.76: 14. California Teachers Assn. v. California Com. on Teacher Credentialing (2003) 111 Cal.App.4"^ 15 1001. (^'Teachers Assn."). That case involved an investigation by the Commission on Teacher 16 . Credentialing into alleged sexual abuse of students by a teacher, (/c/., at p. 1004). The teacher 17' and the California Teachers Association (CTA) petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel 18 disclosure of the addresses and other identifying information of complaining students and 19 witnesses. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the petition and the Court of Appeal affirmed, 20 concluding the teacher was not entitled to receive the information. (Ibid.) Teachers Assn. thus 21 prohibited disclosure of addresses and other personal identifying information. Civil Code section 22 1798.76 appears to have been drafted to make clear that the Legislature did not intend the IPA to 23 interfere with the Pitchess procedure.* Hence its reference to statutory provisions and judicial 24 decisions that authorize "an individual to gain access to any law enforcement record." 25 Furthermore, if one reviews the IPA, one finds, on the same page of the Civil Code as section 26 1798.76, section 1798.73. The latter section provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be 27 * The California Supreme Court decided Pitchess v. Superior Courl in 1974. The IPA was 28 enacted three years later, in 1977. 13 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 construed to deny or limit any right of privacy arising under Section 1 of Article 1 ofthe 2 California Constitution." (Civ. Code, § 1798.73 [emphasis added].) In summary. Civil Code 3 section 1798.76 cannot be reasonably interpreted to override the many other parts ofthe IPA that .4 require that the private information of public employees, and especially .law enforcement officers 5 who might be tracked down and killed by criminals seeking revenge, be kept confidential or 6 redacted.' 7 In summary, the motion to compel a further response to Interrogatory No. 10 should be 8 denied because CHP is prohibited by the IPA from disclosing the personal information Plaintiff 9 seeks with that interrogatory. 10 III. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE THE PERSONAL CONTACT INFORMATION OF THE PATROL OFFICERS AT ISSUE IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF 11 DISCOVERY. 12 13 Any party to a civil case "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is 14 relevant to the subject matter involved or to the determination of any motion made in that action, 15 if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 16 discovery of admissible evidence." (Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) 17 • "Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 18 discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 19 location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other 20 property." (Ibid.) 21 On the other hand, although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Bd. of 22 Registered Nursing v. Superior Court of Orange Counly (2021) 59 Cal.App.5"^ 1011, 1039 [trial 23 court abused discretion in ordering production of investigatory files and administrative records 24 that would reveal names and medical information of non-litigants].) Even if information is 25 otherwise discoverable, it may be protected by a constitutional or statutory privilege, and the 26 constitutional right to privacy is a "privilege" that can bar discovery of personal identifying 27 information in a civil lawsuit. (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiff Plaintiff s motion asserts: "[I]t is clear that 28 these persons are percipient witnesses as to whether CHP's inflexible 'no-vest' policy is a 14 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 reasonable one." (Pltf MPA at 2:25-26.) As shown above. Plaintiff thus wants to present the 2 opinions of the survey respondents on a reasonable accommodation issue, the ultimate issue in 3 this case. 4 Lay opinion testimony is sometimes admissible when it is necessary to understand the 5 witness' observations. But where a witness can adequately describe his or her observations, 6 opinions are not allowed. In such event, opinions or conclusions on the subject are not "helpful to 7 a clear understanding" and thus inadmissible. (California Practice Guide: Civil Trial and 8 Evidence [Rutter Group 2020], ^ 8:648; see also Evi. Code, § 800 ["If a witness is not testifying 9 as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is lirnited to such an opinion as is permitted 10 by law, including but not limited to an opinion that is: (a) Rationally based on the perception of 11 the witness; and (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony"].) Thus, a lay witness may 12 properly offer an opinion that an individual was "drunk," that people were "angry," that an impact 13 • was strong enough to jar a passenger from a seat, or that a person was "trying to break up a fight." 14 (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 112-113.) However, a lay witness 15 may not, for example, in a premises liability case, offer an opinion as to an ultimate issue of fact 16 to be decided by thejury, for example, whether a condition on a property was reasonable. (Ibid.) 17 Such an opinion from a lay witness would not be helpful to an understanding of the witness' 18 testimony and would "invade the province of thejury, which was to determine the reasonableness 19 of both parties'conduct." (/c/., at p. 114.) The question of the reasonableness of an 20 accommodation is a question for thejury. (Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 53 21 Cal.App.4"^ 935, 954.) 22 Here, the respondent officers' opinions on whether it would be "reasonable" for someone in 23 Officer Ridge's position to be accommodated by being allowed to wear a hypothetical ELBV is 24 not "helpful to a clear understanding of' their testimony." (See Evi. Code, § 800.) Even if every 25 single survey respondent believes an ELBV is desirable, that would not have "any tendency in 26 reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination o f this 27 lawsuit. (See Evid. Code, § 210 ["relevant evidence" defined].) The survey respondents' 28 opinions about CHP's uniform policy are neither admissible nor reasonably calculated to lead to 15 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) 1 the discovery of admissible evidence. Their opinions on this subject therefore are outside the 2 scope of discovery. (See Code Civ. Proc, § 2017.010.) If follows that their personal information 3 is outside the scope of discovery. Even if their opinions were within the scope of discovery, CHP 4 should not be forced to reveal where these officers live or their personal phone numbers or email 5 addresses. Nor should CHP be compelled to disclose these officers' aliases, if any. Some of 6 these officers might have worked, or might be working, under cover using assumed names. 7 Revealing those names might get an officer, or more than one, killed. CHP is. willing to disclose 8 the work contact information for a limited number of officers. Plaintiff, furthermore, does not 9 need the names or contact information of any of the survey respondents to argue that most or a 10 certain percentage of them answered "yes" to any of the three survey questions (which, again, is 11 irrelevant to whether Plaintiff was reasonably accommodated). 12 In summary, the residential addresses, personal phone numbers, personal email addresses, 13 and aliases of the officers who responded to the Mallory survey are outside the scope of ,. 14 discovery. The court therefore should deny the motion to compel a further response to 15 Interrogatory No. 10. 16 IV. SANCTIONS AGAINST CHP OR ITS COUNSEL ARE NOT WARRANTED. RATHER, THE COURT SHOULD ISSUE SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL. 17 18 CHP participated in good faith in an effort to resolve this discovery dispute informally. 19 Plaintiffs counsel, however, will not give up on the idea that CHP should look up and disclose 20 the home addresses and personal phone numbers of more than 500 of its officers. Plaintiff wants 21 CHP to reveal personal information for hundreds of its officers so Plaintiffs counsel can ask or 22 depose them about their opinions on CHP's uniform policy. That is not reasonable. The court 23 therefore should deny Plaintiffs request for sanctions. Furthermore, the court should issue 24 sanctions of $ 1,540.00 against Attorney Briscoe and Mayall Hurley, P.C, jointly and severally, 25 payable to CHP, for (1) abuse of the discovery process (Code Civ. Proc, § 2023.030); and (2) 26 filing this motion unsuccessfully and without substantial justification (Code Civ. Proc, 27 § 2023.010, subd. (h).) (5ee Curran Dec, 1120.) 28 16 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019.00265393) 1 CONCLUSION 2 This motion should be denied as to both interrogatories, because Plaintiffs counsel has 3 failed to meet and confer in good faith. Furthermore, the information sought by Interrogatory No. . 4 10 is privileged from discovery under the Pitchess procedure and the Information Practices Act. 5 The personal contact information of the patrol officers at issue, moreover, is outside the scope of 6 discovery. Finally, CHP requests that the court issue sanctions against Attorney John Briscoe and 7 Mayall Hurley, P.C, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,540.00. 8 Dated: April 27, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 9 ROB BONTA 10 Attorney General of California KRISTIN M. DAILY 11 Supervising Deputy Attorney General 12 13 14 JAMES F. CURRAN Deputy Attorney General 15 Attorneys for Defendant California Highway Patrol 16 SA20I9I06238 17 36125638.docx 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17 Defendant CHP's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses (34-2019-00265393) DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL Case Name: David Ridge v. CHP No.: 34-2019-00265393 L declare: L am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. 1 am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attomey General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal rnail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business. On April 27, 2022.1 served the attached DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY- - - PATROL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET THREE by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail addressed as follows: John P. Briscoe Mayall Hurley P.C. E-mail Address: ibriscoe(a),mavallaw.com lrilev(aimavallaw.com I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on April 27/ 2022, at Sacramento, California. ^ Christopher R. Irby Declarant Signature SA20I9I06238 36124314.docx