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  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
  • FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS INC.  vs.  KJ MILLWORKS, et al(06) Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty document preview
						
                                

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1 Alan L. Martini SB#77316 SHEUERMAN, MARTINI, TABARI & GARVIN 2 A Professional Corporation 652 North Santa Cruz Avenue, Suite A 5/26/2023 3 Los Gatos, CA 95030 (408) 288-9700 4 Fax: (408) 295-9900 Email: amartini@smtlaw.com 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff, FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS, INC. 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 10 FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS, INC., ) No. 22-CIV-03356 ) 11 Plaintiff, ) PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO ) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE 12 v. ) DEFAULT JUDGMENT ) 13 ) KJ MILLWORKS; and ) Assigned for All Purposes to: 14 JOEL K. BULAYA, ) Hon. Robert D. Foiles - Dept. 21 ) 15 Defendants. ) Hearing: 6/23/2023 ) Time: 9:00 a.m. 16 ) Dept. 21 Honorable Robert D. Foiles 17 Complaint Filed: August 16, 2022 18 19 20 21 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 22 On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff, FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS, INC. (“FCE”), filed its 23 complaint for damages against Defendants, KJ MILLWORKS and JOEL K. BULAYA. Defendants 24 were duly served with the Summons and Complaint on August 23, 2022. It was plainly stated on the 25 Summons that Defendants must file a response within 30 CALENDAR DAYS of service. 26 Defendants failed to file any response within 30 days and Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry 27 of Default on October 13, 2022, which was entered by the court on October 13, 2022. 28 On December 9, 2022, defendant, in pro per, filed a motion to set aside default and quash PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 1 1 service of summons based upon defendant, Joel Bulaya’s, declaration that, as an immigrant to the 2 United States from Congo whose second language is English, he is unfamiliar with the legal system 3 in the United States and was served with the lawsuit at approximately the time that his wife’s father 4 died. He sought relief from default on the following grounds: “[d]ue to his unfamiliarity with the 5 United States legal system and the family emergency, he neglected to file a timely answer to the 6 complaint.” 7 Plaintiff duly filed an opposition. On January 13, 2023, this Court issued its tentative ruling 8 to deny the motion on the grounds that the motion was procedurally defective for failure to attached 9 a proposed responsive pleading to the motion, as required by CCP section 473(b) and “defendants’ 10 motion also fails on the merits because “ignorance of the law coupled with negligence in 11 ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief.” Furthermore, defendants were not 12 entitled to equitable relief for two reasons. With regard to Mr. Bulaya’s statement that his father-in- 13 law’s death distracted him, affected him psychologically, and affected his ability to notice details, 14 such as the fact that on the summons it stated that he must file a written answer to the complaint, the 15 court concluded: “This statement does not indicate that Mr. Bulaya was experiencing any condition 16 would have prevented him from responding to this action.” Additionally, the Court found 17 “defendants have not demonstrated that they have a meritorious defense to the action, as is required 18 in order to warrant equitable relief.” (See this Court’s tentative ruling in the attached Request for 19 Judicial Notice, Exhibit A.) 20 Mr. Bulaya appeared at the hearing on his motion and the court decided to deny it without 21 prejudice, to allow defendant to correct the deficiencies. 22 Defendants retained counsel and filed this motion for relief, also under CCP section 473, 23 based upon the same grounds and very similar declaration, which fails for the same reasons noted by 24 this Court in the tentative ruling to the original motion. Furthermore, defendants continue to fail to 25 demonstrate they have a meritorious defense to the action, as is required in order to warrant 26 equitable relief. The motion should therefore be denied. 27 II. ARGUMENT 28 Defendants now seek relief under “Code of Civil Procedure section 473” based upon PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 2 1 purported failure of service, although Defendants were clearly served with the Summons and 2 Complaint, and also on the grounds of excusable neglect, under Code of Civil Procedure section 3 473(b). Defendants claim that because they are “unfamiliar with the United States legal system” and 4 Defendant, JOEL BULAYA was “distracted” and “affected psychologically” by the death of his 5 father-in-law on August 11, 2022 (five days before this action was filed), affecting his “ability to 6 notice details”, such as that the Summons served upon him stated that he must respond within 30 7 days, that the default should be set aside on the grounds of “excusable neglect.” 8 Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) states that a court “may upon any terms 9 as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order or 10 other proceeding taken against him or through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 11 excusable neglect.” In other words, the initial burden is on the moving party to prove inadvertence, 12 surprise, excusable neglect or mistake by a “preponderance of the evidence.” (Kendall v. Barker 13 (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 623-24.) “Mistake is not a ground for relief under section 473, 14 subdivision (b), when the court finds that the ‘mistake’ is simply the result of general ignorance of 15 the law or unjustifiable negligence in discovering the law.” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 16 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.) Defendants’ legal argument that the court should set aside the default on 17 the grounds that Defendants were not validly served is without merit, as there is no evidence to 18 support such a conclusion. In fact, the declaration of Defendant, Joel Bulaya, admits he received a 19 copy of the Summons and Complaint, but simply did not realize that he needed to file a written 20 response. (Bulaya Declaration, ¶ 7.) Defendants’ admitted ignorance of law does not constitute 21 excusable neglect. 22 A valid judgment will not be set aside merely because it was obtained by extrinsic fraud or 23 mistake. The plaintiff must plead and prove that he or she has a meritorious case, i.e., a good 24 defense that, if asserted in the case, would be likely to result in a favorable judgment. (Rappleyea v. 25 Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982.) 26 While an “honest and reasonable mistake of law” may well justify relief from default where 27 “complex and debatable” legal issues are involved (City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 28 Cal.3d 335, 345) defendants’ obligation to file a responsive pleading to the complaint is not a PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 3 1 complex or debatable legal issue, whether defendants had legal training or not. Propria persona 2 litigants are held to the same standards as those litigants represented by counsel. (Robert J. v. 3 Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1527.) 4 Here, defendants acted with inexcusable neglect and were unreasonably mistaken in their 5 failure to file a timely response because: the law is clear that defendants must file an appropriate 6 responsive pleading within 30 days of being served and the Summons explicitly warned them they 7 may want to speak to an attorney and they incorrectly believed that they did not have to file a 8 responsive pleading. Defendants conducted no legal research and made no effort to speak to an 9 attorney until after the default was entered. This does not qualify as excusable neglect. (Robbins v. 10 Los Angeles School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 [“ignorance of the law coupled with 11 negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief [Citations.]”]; Davis v. 12 Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 906.) 13 Mr. Bulaya filed a declaration explaining his ignorance of the law. However, he did not 14 address his failure to ascertain whether in fact the law required an answer to be filed in response to 15 the service. He only states that as a layman, he did not figure it out and merely assumed that he 16 merely had to “show up” to the Case Management Conference in December 2022 and did not need 17 to file a responsive pleading. This is not excusable neglect. Furthermore, his explanation that his 18 father-in-law’s death several months before default was entered “perhaps” distracted him from his 19 ability to notice details, such as that the Summons clearly stated that he must file a response within 20 30 days, does not explain his unreasonable mistake of law. This does not fulfill defendants’ burden 21 of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on the issue. 22 Mr. Bulaya’s declaration does not indicate that he suffered from a serious mental disability, 23 nor does it establish that he has a mental condition that prevented him from understanding the nature 24 or effects of his failure to file a timely response. The declaration does not show that he had a mental 25 condition that affected his ability to file an answer in the time frame required by law. 26 Defendants’ reasons for their default do not constitute mistake, inadvertence, or excusable 27 neglect under section 473, subdivision (b). “As for inadvertence or neglect, ‘[t]o warrant relief 28 under section 473 a litigant’s neglect must have been such as might have been the act or a reasonably PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 4 1 prudent person under the same circumstances. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief.” 2 [Citations.] It is the duty of every party desiring to resist an action or to participate in a judicial 3 proceeding to take timely and adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to avoid an 4 undesirable judgment. Unless in arranging for his defense he shows that he has exercised such 5 reasonable diligence as a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows upon important business his 6 motion for relief under section 473 will be denied. [Citation.] Courts neither act as guardians for 7 incompetent parties nor for those who are grossly careless of their own affairs. . . . The only 8 occasion for the application of section 473 is where a party is unexpectedly placed in a situation to 9 his injury without fault or negligence of his own and against which ordinary prudence could not have 10 guarded.’ [Citation.]” (Hearn v. Howardi, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at 1206.) 11 Nor have defendants established that they are entitled to equitable relief. (Rappleyea v. 12 Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 982.) Defendants continue to fail to demonstrate that they have a 13 meritorious defense to the action, as is required to warrant equitable relief. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for relief does not significantly differ from 16 their original motion, which the Court has already determined was not meritorious and defendants’ 17 motion to set aside the defaults should be therefore denied. 18 19 Dated: May 26, 2023 SHEUERMAN, MARTINI, TABARI & GARVIN 20 21 ALAN L. MARTINI Attorney for Plaintiff 22 FCE BENEFIT ADMINISTRATORS, INC. 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 5 1 CASE NAME: FCE Benefit Administrators, Inc. v. Joel K. Bulaya, et al. 2 San Mateo County Superior Court, Case No. 22-CIV-03356 3 PROOF OF SERVICE 4 [CCP §§ 1012.5, 1013a and 2015.5; CRC 2008] 5 I am a citizen of the United States. My business address is 652 N. Santa Cruz Avenue, Suite A, Los Gatos, California 95030. My email address is aobey@smtlaw.com. I am employed in Santa 6 Clara County where this service occurred. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within cause. I am readily familiar with my employer's normal business practice for collection and 7 processing of correspondence for mailing and facsimile. In the case of mailing [other than overnight delivery], the practice is that correspondence is deposited in the U.S. Postal Service the same day as 8 the day of collection in the ordinary course of business. 9 On May 26, 2023, I served the within: PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 10 on the PARTIES in said action as follows: 11 Mark A. Ruiz, Esq. 12 The Law Offices of Mark Ruiz 5650 Marconi Avenue, Suite 3 13 Carmichael, CA 95608 Telephone: 916.695.9103 14 Email: MarkRuizLaw@yahoo.com 15 X (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Based on the court’s Local Rules ordering mandatory 16 e-filing of all documents for this type of case, and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.253(b)(1)(A), in which all parties represented by attorneys in all civil cases shall file and 17 serve documents electronically (except when personal service is required by statute or rule and excluding ex parte applications), I caused each of the above-named documents to be 18 delivered by email to the parties via One Legal E-Service upload link. I did not receive within a reasonable time after the transmission any electronic message or other indication 19 that the transmission was unsuccessful. 20 xx (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. 21 Dated: May 26, 2023 22 Annamarie Obey 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 6