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170V318162
Santa Clara — Civil
P. Hernandez
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP Electronically Filed
Melinda S. Riechert, Bar No. 65504 by Superior Court of CA,
1400 Page Mill Road County of Santa Clara,
Palo Alto, California 94304 on 2/18/2022 11:52 AM
Telephone: +1.650.843.4000
Facsimile: +1.650.843.4001
Reviewed By: P. Hernandez
melinda.riechert@morganlewis.com Case #17CV318162
Envelope: 8325865
Joseph R. Lewis, Bar No. 316770
One Market, Spear Street Tower
San Francisco, California 94105-1596
Telephone: +1.415.442.1000
Facsimile: +1.415.442.1001
joseph.lewis@morganlewis.com
Attorneys for Defendants
SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA, INC.,
PRANAV MISTRY, and SAJID SADI
10
11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
13
14 JAWAHAR JAIN, an individual, Case No. 17CV318162
15 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
16 Vv. PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
17 SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA, INC., AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS
a California corporation; PRANAV MISTRY, ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG
18 an individual; SAJID SADI, an individual; and LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
19 OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Defendants.
20 Trial Date: March 21, 2022
Dept: 19
21 Date: TBD
Time: TBD
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ATTORNEYSAT LAW DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF
SILICON VALLEY
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG
LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
IL. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A Factual Background
B Procedural History Regarding Plaintiff's Claim for Denial Of His Medical
Leave
Il. LEGAL STANDARD.
IV. ARGUMENT
A Sanctions Are Warranted Under Section 128.7 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
1 Plaintiff Did Not Meet the High Standard Required To Obtain
Discovery Of A Defendant’s Net Worth In Support Of His Claim
10 For Punitive Damages
This Court Previously Found That Plaintiff Cannot Prevent
11 Defendants from Attempting to Disprove Plaintiff's Claim for
Interference with FMLA and CFRA Rights at Trial.............
12
This Court Also Found That It Is Not Aware of a Duty That
13 Samsung Owed to Plaintiff After Deciding to Terminate His
Employment to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process and to
14 Take All Steps to Prevent and Investigate Discrimination .
15 Plaintiff's Request for Financial Information is an Attempt to Pressure
Defendant into Settling to Avoid Divulging Its Financial Information,
16
Confirming that the Motion was Brought for an Improper Purpose
17 Defendant Requests That the Court Award It $22,415.47 In Sanctions
Against Both Plaintiff And His Counsel
18
Vv. CONCLUSION 12
19
20
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22
23
24
25
26
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ATTORNEYSAT LAW -i-
SILICON VALLEY
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enter., Inc.
(1991) 498 U.S. 533...
City of Burlington v. Dague,
505 U.S. 557 (1992) 9, 10
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
(1990) 496 U.S. 384
Cromwell v. Cummings,
10
65 Cal. App.4th 10 (1998).
11
Davis v. City of San Diego
12 (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 893 . 10
13 Doak v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
(1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 825
14
Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,
15
167 Cal. App. 4th 567 (2008) 10
16
Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik
17 (2019) 3 Cal.App.5th 638
18 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.
(9th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1531...
19
Hensley v. Eckhart,
20 461 U.S. 424 (1983) 10
21
In re HPL Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation,
22 366 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 11
23 Jabro y. Superior Court,
95 Cal.App.4th at 757 2, 3,9
24
Kerner v. Superior Court
25 (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84 ... 3,9
26 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
27 (4G r 2d (DiC: Cir 1084) ie ll
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THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG
LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Morales v. City of San Rafael,
96 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996). 9, 10
Musaelian v, Adams,
45 Cal. 4th 512 (2009)
Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fund
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911 6,7
Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270 ..cccsoo.
PLCM Group, In. v. Drexler,
22 Cal. 4th 1084 (2000)
Sino Century Dev. Ltd. v. Farley,
10 211 Cal. App. 4th 688 (2012 11
11 Syers Properties LI, Inc. v. Rankin,
226 Cal. App. 4th 691, 697 (2nd Div. 2014) 11
12
Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California
13 (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771 6,7
14
Statutes
15
Civil Code section 3294(a) ..
16
Civil Code section 3295 6,7
17
Civil Code section 3295(c)
18
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 passim
19
Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7(b)
20
Code for Civil Procedure § 128.7(d) 10
21
22 FMLA 2,7
23 Other Authorities
24 California Rules of Court Rule 2.30(d)............. cessesenees 10, 11
25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11...
26 Samsung cannot be made to prove Jain’s seventh through tenth causes of action,
nor can Samsung be prevented from trying to disprove those claims at trial.”
27
Order ........0000+
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Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF
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LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
TO PLAINTIFF JAWAHAR JAIN AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, unless Plaintiff withdraws his Motion to Compel
Financial Information (“Motion”) about Defendant Samsung Research America, Inc. (“SRA”),
within twenty-one (21) days after the date of service of this motion or such other time as the
Court may prescribe, Defendants SRA, Pranav Mistry, and Sajid Sadi (“Defendants”) will move
this Court for an order awarding sanctions against Plaintiff and his attorney under Code of Civil
Procedure Section 128.7(b) for the attorneys’ fees and other expenses that have been and will be
expended by Defendants in opposing Plaintiff's Motion and preparing this Motion for Sanctions
Pursuant to Section 128.7. The Motion is made upon the grounds that Plaintiff's Motion was
10 brought primarily for an improper purpose, such as to needlessly increase the cost of litigation,
11 the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein were not warranted by existing law, and
12 the allegations and other factual contentions had no evidentiary support. This Motion is based
13 upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the attached declaration of
14 Joseph R. Lewis, and upon the pleadings and records in this action.
15 Dated: January 27, 2022 MORGAN, LEWIS BOCKIUS LLP
16
By: /s/ Melinda S. Riechert
17 Melinda S. Riechert
Joseph R. Lewis
18 Attorneys for Defendants
SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA, INC.,
19 SAJID SADI, and PRANAV MISTRY
20
21
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LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
L INTRODUCTION
“Plaintiff—and, more precisely, his counsel—are using every procedural device to try and
extort a payment by Defendants by threats.” Those are the words of the Honorable James P.
Kleinberg (ret.), the Referee in this case in denying Plaintiff's motions seeking terminating
sanctions, issue sanctions, monetary sanctions, and disqualification of Defendants’ Counsel, and
recommending sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel for bringing the motions.
Defendants now seek sanctions pursuant to Section 128.7 against Plaintiff and his counsel
because Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Information (“Motion”) of Defendant Samsung
10 Research America, Inc. (“SRA” or “Samsung”) is another attempt by Plaintiff and his Counsel to
11 needlessly increase the cost of this litigation. Plaintiffs Motion was brought primarily for an
12 improper purpose, the claims and legal contentions were not warranted by existing law, and the
13 allegations and other factual contentions had no evidentiary support.
14 In the underlying Motion, Plaintiff seeks financial information about Defendant SRA’s net
15 worth in support of his claim for punitive damages in advance of a finding that Defendant is liable
16 for punitive damages. Pretrial discovery of a defendant’s financial condition in support of a
17 punitive damage claim is generally prohibited. Doak v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
18 (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 825, 832-834. A plaintiff can compel pretrial discovery of a defendant’s
19 financial condition if he can establish that there is a “substantial probability” that he will prevail
20 ona claim for punitive damages. Jabro, 95 Cal.App.4th 754, 755 (court “must (1) weigh the
21 evidence presented by both sides, and (2) make a finding that it is very likely the plaintiff will
22 prevail on his claim for punitive damages.”)
23 Plaintiff's Motion was based on the erroneous claim that “Defendant Samsung has no
24 defense to Plaintiff's claim for violation of medical leave rights guaranteed by FMLA and
25 CFRA”. Motion, p. 1:7-8. This allegation was based on the argument that this Court had denied
26 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim. /d. at 1:15-20. But as Plaintiff's
27 1 See Proposed Order re: Plaintiffs Motion for Terminating and Other Sanctions (Declaration of Joseph R. Lewis
(“Lewis Decl.”) J 7, Ex. E, p. 6:1-2.
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LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
counsel well knows, the denial of a motion for summary judgment does not mean that Defendant
has no defense to the claim. In addition, Plaintiff brought his own motion for summary
adjudication on this exact issue, asking that the court adjudicate that Defendant had no defense to
this claim. If Plaintiff were right that Defendant has no defense to his claim, the Court would
have granted Plaintiff's motion for summary adjudication of this issue. It did not. The Court
denied Plaintiff's motion, specifically finding that “Samsung cannot be made to prove Jain’s
seventh through tenth causes of action, nor can Samsung be prevented from trying to disprove
those claims at trial.” Order re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication. Lewis Decl. § 3,
Ex. A, p. 14:25-27. Plaintiff's Writ to the Court of Appeal on the denial of his Motion for
10 Summary Adjudication was rejected. Lewis Decl. 4 6, Ex. D.
11 Not only was there no factual or legal basis for Plaintiff's Motion, it was also brought for
12 an improper purpose. Plaintiff states in his moving papers (Motion, ii:22-24 and 1:22-2:1) that
13 Defendant has never made him a settlement offer”, suggesting that this Motion is being brought to
14 try to force Defendant to make him an offer. However, this is the very reason why discovery of a
15 party’s financial condition is not permitted until after a finding of liability and a finding that
16 punitive damages are warranted. “As stated by the bill’s author . . . the statute is ‘intended to
17 protect defendants from being pressured into settling non-meritorious cases in order to avoid
18 divulging their financial privacy in civil discovery.”” Jabro v. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App.4th at
19 757; see also Kerner v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84.
20 Thus, Plaintiff should be sanctioned under CCP 128.7 for the time spent by Defendants in
21 opposing his Motion and for the time spent bringing this motion.
22 IL. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
23 A Factual Background
24 As stated by this Court in ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the key
25 facts are as follows:
26 On September 11, 2017, Jain was informed that his employment was being terminated due
27 ? Plaintiff fails to mention that settlement demands and offers were exchanged in the mediation of
this case.
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to his conduct towards a female co-worker, his last day in the office would be September 15,
2017, and his last day on payroll would be October 6, 2017. Lewis Decl. ¥ 8, Ex. F, p. 25:14-20.
Samsung sent Jain a formal termination letter on September 14, 2017, stating that his employment
was terminated for violating the company’s anti-harassment policy. Jd. The Court found that
Plaintiff was terminated or legitimate non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons. Id. p. 30:3-20.
Plaintiff first requested medical leave for his depression the day after he was notified of
his termination on September 11, 2017. /d. at 46:13-16. He claims that Defendant should have
granted his medical leave, even though he had already been notified of his termination. Motion, p.
2:17-22.
10 B. Procedural History Regarding Plaintiff's Claim for Denial Of His Medical
Leave
11
On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication (“Plaintiff's
12
MSA”) seeking to summarily adjudicate twelve (12) issues, including:
13
14 Issue One: Defendant Owed a Duty to Plaintiff to Respond to His Request for
Medical Leave in September 2017;
15
Issue Two: Defendant Owed a Duty to Plaintiff to Grant His Request for Medical
16 Leave in September 2017;
17
Issue Three: There Is No Merit to Defendant’s Sixteenth Affirmative Defense That
18 Plaintiff Was Not Eligible for Medical Leave
Lewis Decl. 4 4, Ex. B, p. ii:5-12.
19
On April 27, 2020, this Court denied Plaintiff's MSA in its entirety. Lewis Decl. § 3, Ex.
20
A. Regarding Issues One through Three of Plaintiff's MSA, the Court ruled:
21
22 Jain does not cite, and the Court is not aware of, any analogous case in which court
declared whether the defendant was required to take certain actions under various
23 labor laws. . . Accordingly, Jain’s motion for summary adjudication of Issue Nos.
1,2, 4, 8, and 12 is DENIED.
24
25 Through this motion for summary adjudication, Samsung cannot be made to prove
Jain’s seventh through tenth causes of action nor can Samsung be prevented from
26 trying to disprove those claims at trial. Accordingly. Jain’s motion for summary
adjudication of Issue Nos. 3, 6, 7, and 11 is DENIED.
2
Id. at 12:8-13, 12:25-26, 14:24-15:2.
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After the summary adjudication denial, Plaintiff filed a Writ of Mandate arguing,
“Petitioner’s writ petition should be granted, therefore, because . . . Samsung Owed a Duty to
Grant Plaintiff's Sep. 12, 2017 Request for Leave; and Samsung’s Defense of Ineligibility Fails
as a Matter of Law.” Lewis Decl. ] 5, Ex. C, p. 32. On June 16, 2020, in a one-page Order, the
Court of Appeal denied Plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate. Lewis Decl. § 6, Ex. D.
Til. LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 “authorizes trial courts to impose sanctions to
check abuses in the filing of pleadings, petitions, written notices of motions or similar papers.”
Musaelian v. Adams, 45 Cal. 4th 512, 515 (2009). This code provision was modeled after Federal
10 Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and, compared to California’s prior sanction statutes, imposes a higher
11 standard on California attorneys as to the merits of pleadings filed with the court. California
12 courts view federal law construing Rule 11 as “persuasive authority with regard to the meaning of
13 section 128.7.” Cromwell v. Cummings, 65 Cal. App.4th 10, 14 (1998). The certification process
14 mandated by C.C.P. § 128.7 is designed to create an affirmative duty on the part of attorneys to
15 verify and investigate both the legal and factual basis for any pleading or paper filed with the
16 court. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enter., Inc. (1991) 498 U.S. 533.
17 Section 128.7 was enacted primarily to deter dilatory or abusive tactics and to streamline
18 litigation by excluding baseless filings. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (1990) 496 U.S.
19 384; Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. (9th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1531, 1542.
20 Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7(b) provides, in pertinent part:
21 By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating, a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper,
22 an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
23 circumstances, all of the following conditions are met:
24 (1) It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase in the cost of litigation.
25
(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
26 existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.
27
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(3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief
IV. ARGUMENT
A Sanctions Are Warranted Under Section 128.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
1. Plaintiff Did Not Meet the High Standard Required To Obtain
Discovery Of A Defendant’s Net Worth In Support Of His Claim For
Punitive Damage:
Punitive damages are permissible under Civil Code section 3294(a), only where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud,
10
or malice. Civil Code section 3295(c) provides guidance on whether discovery as to a defendant’s
11
financial condition is warranted: “Upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate
12
affidavits and after a hearing, if the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court may at any
13
time enter an order permitting the discovery otherwise prohibited by this subdivision if the court
14
finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has
15
established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim
16
pursuant to Section 3294.” (emphasis added).
17
Courts have held that Civil Code section 3295(c) was enacted to protect defendants from
18
the premature disclosure of their financial condition when punitive damages are sought. Farmers
19
& Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik (2019) 3 Cal.App.5th 638; see also Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.
20
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270; Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771.
21
“The purpose behind Civil Code section 3295, which allows bifurcation and preclusion of
22
evidence of a defendant’s wealth and profits during the liability phase of trial, is to minimize
23
prejudice prior to the jury’s determination of a prima facie case of liability for punitive damages.”
24
Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911.
25
Courts have held that Civil Code section 3295(c) was enacted to protect defendants from
26
the premature disclosure of their financial condition when punitive damages are sought. Farmers
27
& Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik (2019) 3 Cal.App.5th 638; see also Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.
28
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Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF
Arrorviysar Law
SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG
LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270; Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771.
“The purpose behind Civil Code section 3295, which allows bifurcation and preclusion of
evidence of a defendant’s wealth and profits during the liability phase of trial, is to minimize
prejudice prior to the jury’s determination of a prima facie case of liability for punitive damages.”
Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911.
As detailed in Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant to
provide financial information regarding its net worth in connection with Plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages, in advance of a finding by a jury that there is any such liability, Plaintiff fails
to establish a substantial probability of winning punitive damages at trial.
10 2. This Court Previously Found That Plaintiff Cannot Prevent
Defendants from Attempting to Disprove Plaintiffs Claim fo
11
Interference with FMLA and CFRA Rights at Trial
12 In Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Information of Defendant SRA, Plaintiff argues,
13 “there is a substantial probability that he will prevail on his claim for punitive damages” because
14 “Defendant Samsung has no defense to Plaintiff's claim for violation of medical leave rights
15 guaranteed by FMLA and CFRA.” Motion, 1:2-8. However, this Court held exactly the opposite
16 in ruling on Plaintiff's MSA:
17
The sixteenth affirmative defense is a denial of Jain’s allegation that he was an
18 eligible employee entitled to certain rights and medical leave under the CFRA
and/or the FMLA . . . Through this motion for summary adjudication, Samsung
19 cannot be made to prove Jain’s seventh through tenth causes of action, nor can
Samsung be prevented from trying to disprove those claims at trial.
20
Lewis Decl. 4 3, Ex. A, p. 14:18-27 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court ordered that Defendants
21
cannot be prevented from defending Plaintiffs seventh through tenth causes of action at trial.
22
Yet, as if the Court ruled the opposite way and granted Plaintiff's MSA, Plaintiff argues that
23
Defendants have no defense to his claim for interference with FMLA or CFRA rights, and
24
Plaintiff therefore has a substantial probability of recovering punitive damages. Section 128.7
25
proscribes Parties from bringing motions lacking a factual or legal basis and for an improper
26
purpose, such as needlessly increasing the costs of litigation. This is exactly what Plaintiff and
27
his counsel did here. Given that this Court and the Court of Appeal already rejected Plaintiff's
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argument that Defendants do not have a defense to Plaintiff's claim for interference with
CFRA/FMLA rights, there is no basis for Plaintiff to put forward the same argument to justify his
claim for pretrial discovery of Defendant’s net worth.
3. This Court Also Found That It Is Not Aware of a Duty That Samsung
Owed to Plaintiff After Deciding to Terminate His Employment to
Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process and to Take All Steps to
Prevent and Investigate Discrimination
Plaintiff's Motion also recycles other arguments from his unsuccessful MSA where the
Court held that SRA did not have a legal duty to engage in the interactive process or prevent and
investigate discrimination:
10 Issue 4 of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication:
“Samsung owed him a duty to engage in a good faith interactive process in and
11 after September 2017.”
12 Issue 8 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication:
“Samsung owed him a duty to take all steps to prevent and investigate
13 discrimination in and after September 2017.”
14 Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication:
“Jain does not cite, and the Court is not aware of, any analogous case in which a
15
court declared whether the defendant was required to take certain actions under
16 various labor laws. Despite Jain’s resourceful notice drafting, the Court is not
persuaded the summary adjudication procedure can be employed to resolve the
17 issues raised by Issues Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, and 12.”
18 Lewis Decl. 3, Ex. A, pp. 7:12-8:15, 12:8-13. Yet, despite the Court’s previous ruling that it
19 was not aware of such duties, Plaintiff's Motion asserts the same arguments without
20 acknowledging or distinguishing the prior ruling:
21 Section IV(A) of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Condition of SRA:
“Samsung Had a Duty to Prevent and Investigate”
22
Section V(C) of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Financial Condition of SRA:
23 “Samsung failed its duties to accommodate disabilities”
24 Motion, p. 11:17-18, 14:8-9.
25 Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Information about Defendant SRA
26 resurfaces arguments that have already been denied at the summary adjudication phase. Plaintiff
27 does not present new cases, new evidence, or argue how this time it is different. In fact, the
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Motion does not mention Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication at all. This Court has
already explained that it is not aware of any cases standing for the proposition that the Defendant
was required to take certain actions under various labor laws. Plaintiff therefore did not meet his
high burden of establishing a “substantial probability” that he will obtain punitive damages at trial
as to these claims. Since there was no factual or legal basis for Plaintiff to bring the Motion,
which was made for the purpose of increasing the costs of litigation, sanctions should be awarded
against both Plaintiff and his counsel.
B. Plaintiff's Request for Financial Information is an Attempt to Pressur:
Defendant into Settling to Avoid Divulging Its Financial Information,
Confirming that the Motion was Brought for an Improper Purpos
10 In his moving papers, Plaintiff comments on the history of settlement negotiations
11 between the parties suggesting that this Motion is being brought to try to force Defendant to make
12 him an offer. Motion, 1:21-22 (“Despite the clear violation and resulting permanent injuries,
13 Samsung has never communicated a settlement offer.”) However, this is the very reason why
14 discovery of a party’s financial condition is not permitted until after a finding of liability and a
15 finding that punitive damages are warranted. “As stated by the bill’s author . . . the statute is
16 ‘intended to protect defendants from being pressured into settling non-meritorious cases in order
17 to avoid divulging their financial privacy in civil discovery.”” Jabro v. Superior Court (2002) 95
18 Cal.App.4th 754, 757; See also Kerner v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84.
19 Plaintiff's reference to the lack of a settlement offer is not only false, but also it confirms
20 that the Motion was brought for an improper purpose.
21
C. Defendant Requests That the Court Award It $22,415.47 In Sanctions Against
22 Both Plaintiff And His Counsel
23
California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent and the
24
reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee
25
award. PLCM Group, In. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095-97 (2000); Morales v. City of San
26
Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996); see also City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562
27
(1992). The Lodestar Method is the most prevalent method of calculating attorneys’ fees, and
28
Moran, LEWIS & 9 Case No. 17CV318162
Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF
Arrorviysar Law
SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG
LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
there is a very strong presumption that it is reasonable. /d. The Lodestar amount is calculated by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.
Given the “strong presumption” that the Lodestar figure is reasonable, it should only be
reduced in “rare instances.” Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.8. The most critical factor in determining
whether to adjust the Lodestar amount is the degree of success obtained by the prevailing party:
Where a [defendant] has obtained excellent results, his attorney
should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will
encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and
indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may
be justified. ... The result is what matters.
Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983); Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 167 Cal.
10 App. 4th 567, 627-28 (2008) (affirming the trial court’s award of $421,357 in attorneys’ fees to
11 prevailing party using the lodestar method, including the trial court’s application of a multiplier of
12 0.25 to increase the award: “[a] trial court has broad discretion to determine the reasonable
13 amount of an attorney fee award, including whether to increase . . . the lodestar figure”). In
14 general, California law requires less documentation of comparable rates than federal law. See
15 Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 893, 903 (affirming rate awarded even
16 though no evidence other than counsel’s own statements presented; rejecting federal standard in
17 favor of more lenient California standard).
18 Here, as detailed in the Declaration of Joseph Lewis filed herewith, SRA’s counsel spent
19 25.1 hours opposing Plaintiff's underlying Motion to Compel Financial Information of Samsung.
20 Lewis Decl. 4 9. 2.2 hours were spent by the partner, Melinda Riechert and 22.9 hours were
21 spent by the associate, Joseph Lewis. Jd. The rate for Melinda Riechert, the partner, and Joseph
22 Lewis, the associate, is $410/hour. In addition, Defendant spent $70.47 in costs opposing the
23 Motion. /d. Thus, Defendant seeks $10,361.47 in fees and costs for opposing the underlying
24 Motion.
25 Defendant is also entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs for the time spent bringing
26 this motion for sanctions. Section 128.7 provides, “the sanction may consist of, or include . . . all
27 of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.”
28
Moran, LEWIS & 10 Case No. 17CV318162
Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF
Arrorviysar Law
SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG
LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
C.C.P. § 128.7(d). Rule 2.30(d) of the California Rules of Court offers further support for a
movant’s ability to recovery fees incurred in preparing a Motion for Sanctions: “the court may
order the person who has violated an applicable rule to pay to the party aggrieved by the violation
that party’s reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, incurred in
connection with the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause.” Id.; see also Sino Century
Dev. Ltd. v. Farley, 211 Cal. App. 4th 688, 699 (2012) (“trial court did not err in awarding
[movant] attorney fees incurred in preparing the sanctions motion.”)
As further detailed in the Declaration of Joseph Lewis filed herewith, Defendant has spent
an additional 16.4 hours incurred in preparing this Motion. Lewis Decl. ]9. 1.6 hours were
10 spent by the partner, Melinda Riechert and 14.8 hours were spent by the associate, Joseph Lewis.
11 Id. The rate for Riechert and Lewis is $410 per hour. /d. Defendant also anticipates spending an
12 additional 3 hours by the partner and 10 by the associate reviewing Plaintiff's opposition to the
13 motion and preparing the reply and attending the hearing on the motion. Jd. Thus, Defendant
14 seeks $12,054.00 in fees and costs for bringing this motion for sanctions.
15 The rate of $410/hour for Joseph Lewis, a fifth-year associate who specializes in
16 employment law, and Melinda Riechert, a
Preview
170V318162 Santa Clara — Civil P. Hernandez MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP Electronically Filed Melinda S. Riechert, Bar No. 65504 by Superior Court of CA, 1400 Page Mill Road County of Santa Clara, Palo Alto, California 94304 on 2/18/2022 11:52 AM Telephone: +1.650.843.4000 Facsimile: +1.650.843.4001 Reviewed By: P. Hernandez melinda.riechert@morganlewis.com Case #17CV318162 Envelope: 8325865 Joseph R. Lewis, Bar No. 316770 One Market, Spear Street Tower San Francisco, California 94105-1596 Telephone: +1.415.442.1000 Facsimile: +1.415.442.1001 joseph.lewis@morganlewis.com Attorneys for Defendants SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA, INC., PRANAV MISTRY, and SAJID SADI 10 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 13 14 JAWAHAR JAIN, an individual, Case No. 17CV318162 15 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 16 Vv. PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA, INC., AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS a California corporation; PRANAV MISTRY, ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG 18 an individual; SAJID SADI, an individual; and LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 19 OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION Defendants. 20 Trial Date: March 21, 2022 Dept: 19 21 Date: TBD Time: TBD 22 23 24 25 26 27 Morcax, Lewis 28 Bockius LLP Case No. 17CV318162 ATTORNEYSAT LAW DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF SILICON VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION IL. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A Factual Background B Procedural History Regarding Plaintiff's Claim for Denial Of His Medical Leave Il. LEGAL STANDARD. IV. ARGUMENT A Sanctions Are Warranted Under Section 128.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1 Plaintiff Did Not Meet the High Standard Required To Obtain Discovery Of A Defendant’s Net Worth In Support Of His Claim 10 For Punitive Damages This Court Previously Found That Plaintiff Cannot Prevent 11 Defendants from Attempting to Disprove Plaintiff's Claim for Interference with FMLA and CFRA Rights at Trial............. 12 This Court Also Found That It Is Not Aware of a Duty That 13 Samsung Owed to Plaintiff After Deciding to Terminate His Employment to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process and to 14 Take All Steps to Prevent and Investigate Discrimination . 15 Plaintiff's Request for Financial Information is an Attempt to Pressure Defendant into Settling to Avoid Divulging Its Financial Information, 16 Confirming that the Motion was Brought for an Improper Purpose 17 Defendant Requests That the Court Award It $22,415.47 In Sanctions Against Both Plaintiff And His Counsel 18 Vv. CONCLUSION 12 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Morcax, Lewis 28 Bockius LLP ATTORNEYSAT LAW -i- SILICON VALLEY TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enter., Inc. (1991) 498 U.S. 533... City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) 9, 10 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (1990) 496 U.S. 384 Cromwell v. Cummings, 10 65 Cal. App.4th 10 (1998). 11 Davis v. City of San Diego 12 (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 893 . 10 13 Doak v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 825 14 Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 15 167 Cal. App. 4th 567 (2008) 10 16 Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik 17 (2019) 3 Cal.App.5th 638 18 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. (9th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1531... 19 Hensley v. Eckhart, 20 461 U.S. 424 (1983) 10 21 In re HPL Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation, 22 366 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 11 23 Jabro y. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App.4th at 757 2, 3,9 24 Kerner v. Superior Court 25 (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84 ... 3,9 26 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 27 (4G r 2d (DiC: Cir 1084) ie ll Morcax, Lewis 28 Bockius LLP ii Case No. 17CV318162 ATTORNEYSAT LAW DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF SILICON VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996). 9, 10 Musaelian v, Adams, 45 Cal. 4th 512 (2009) Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911 6,7 Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270 ..cccsoo. PLCM Group, In. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084 (2000) Sino Century Dev. Ltd. v. Farley, 10 211 Cal. App. 4th 688 (2012 11 11 Syers Properties LI, Inc. v. Rankin, 226 Cal. App. 4th 691, 697 (2nd Div. 2014) 11 12 Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California 13 (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771 6,7 14 Statutes 15 Civil Code section 3294(a) .. 16 Civil Code section 3295 6,7 17 Civil Code section 3295(c) 18 Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 passim 19 Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7(b) 20 Code for Civil Procedure § 128.7(d) 10 21 22 FMLA 2,7 23 Other Authorities 24 California Rules of Court Rule 2.30(d)............. cessesenees 10, 11 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11... 26 Samsung cannot be made to prove Jain’s seventh through tenth causes of action, nor can Samsung be prevented from trying to disprove those claims at trial.” 27 Order ........0000+ 28 Moran, LEWIS & iii Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION TO PLAINTIFF JAWAHAR JAIN AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, unless Plaintiff withdraws his Motion to Compel Financial Information (“Motion”) about Defendant Samsung Research America, Inc. (“SRA”), within twenty-one (21) days after the date of service of this motion or such other time as the Court may prescribe, Defendants SRA, Pranav Mistry, and Sajid Sadi (“Defendants”) will move this Court for an order awarding sanctions against Plaintiff and his attorney under Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7(b) for the attorneys’ fees and other expenses that have been and will be expended by Defendants in opposing Plaintiff's Motion and preparing this Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Section 128.7. The Motion is made upon the grounds that Plaintiff's Motion was 10 brought primarily for an improper purpose, such as to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, 11 the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein were not warranted by existing law, and 12 the allegations and other factual contentions had no evidentiary support. This Motion is based 13 upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the attached declaration of 14 Joseph R. Lewis, and upon the pleadings and records in this action. 15 Dated: January 27, 2022 MORGAN, LEWIS BOCKIUS LLP 16 By: /s/ Melinda S. Riechert 17 Melinda S. Riechert Joseph R. Lewis 18 Attorneys for Defendants SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA, INC., 19 SAJID SADI, and PRANAV MISTRY 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Morcax, Lewis 28 Bockius LLP 1 Case No. 17CV318162 ATTORNEYSAT LAW DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF SILICON VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES L INTRODUCTION “Plaintiff—and, more precisely, his counsel—are using every procedural device to try and extort a payment by Defendants by threats.” Those are the words of the Honorable James P. Kleinberg (ret.), the Referee in this case in denying Plaintiff's motions seeking terminating sanctions, issue sanctions, monetary sanctions, and disqualification of Defendants’ Counsel, and recommending sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel for bringing the motions. Defendants now seek sanctions pursuant to Section 128.7 against Plaintiff and his counsel because Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Information (“Motion”) of Defendant Samsung 10 Research America, Inc. (“SRA” or “Samsung”) is another attempt by Plaintiff and his Counsel to 11 needlessly increase the cost of this litigation. Plaintiffs Motion was brought primarily for an 12 improper purpose, the claims and legal contentions were not warranted by existing law, and the 13 allegations and other factual contentions had no evidentiary support. 14 In the underlying Motion, Plaintiff seeks financial information about Defendant SRA’s net 15 worth in support of his claim for punitive damages in advance of a finding that Defendant is liable 16 for punitive damages. Pretrial discovery of a defendant’s financial condition in support of a 17 punitive damage claim is generally prohibited. Doak v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County 18 (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 825, 832-834. A plaintiff can compel pretrial discovery of a defendant’s 19 financial condition if he can establish that there is a “substantial probability” that he will prevail 20 ona claim for punitive damages. Jabro, 95 Cal.App.4th 754, 755 (court “must (1) weigh the 21 evidence presented by both sides, and (2) make a finding that it is very likely the plaintiff will 22 prevail on his claim for punitive damages.”) 23 Plaintiff's Motion was based on the erroneous claim that “Defendant Samsung has no 24 defense to Plaintiff's claim for violation of medical leave rights guaranteed by FMLA and 25 CFRA”. Motion, p. 1:7-8. This allegation was based on the argument that this Court had denied 26 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim. /d. at 1:15-20. But as Plaintiff's 27 1 See Proposed Order re: Plaintiffs Motion for Terminating and Other Sanctions (Declaration of Joseph R. Lewis (“Lewis Decl.”) J 7, Ex. E, p. 6:1-2. 28 Moran, LEWIS & 2 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION counsel well knows, the denial of a motion for summary judgment does not mean that Defendant has no defense to the claim. In addition, Plaintiff brought his own motion for summary adjudication on this exact issue, asking that the court adjudicate that Defendant had no defense to this claim. If Plaintiff were right that Defendant has no defense to his claim, the Court would have granted Plaintiff's motion for summary adjudication of this issue. It did not. The Court denied Plaintiff's motion, specifically finding that “Samsung cannot be made to prove Jain’s seventh through tenth causes of action, nor can Samsung be prevented from trying to disprove those claims at trial.” Order re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication. Lewis Decl. § 3, Ex. A, p. 14:25-27. Plaintiff's Writ to the Court of Appeal on the denial of his Motion for 10 Summary Adjudication was rejected. Lewis Decl. 4 6, Ex. D. 11 Not only was there no factual or legal basis for Plaintiff's Motion, it was also brought for 12 an improper purpose. Plaintiff states in his moving papers (Motion, ii:22-24 and 1:22-2:1) that 13 Defendant has never made him a settlement offer”, suggesting that this Motion is being brought to 14 try to force Defendant to make him an offer. However, this is the very reason why discovery of a 15 party’s financial condition is not permitted until after a finding of liability and a finding that 16 punitive damages are warranted. “As stated by the bill’s author . . . the statute is ‘intended to 17 protect defendants from being pressured into settling non-meritorious cases in order to avoid 18 divulging their financial privacy in civil discovery.”” Jabro v. Superior Court, 95 Cal.App.4th at 19 757; see also Kerner v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84. 20 Thus, Plaintiff should be sanctioned under CCP 128.7 for the time spent by Defendants in 21 opposing his Motion and for the time spent bringing this motion. 22 IL. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 23 A Factual Background 24 As stated by this Court in ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the key 25 facts are as follows: 26 On September 11, 2017, Jain was informed that his employment was being terminated due 27 ? Plaintiff fails to mention that settlement demands and offers were exchanged in the mediation of this case. 28 Moran, LEWIS & 3 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION to his conduct towards a female co-worker, his last day in the office would be September 15, 2017, and his last day on payroll would be October 6, 2017. Lewis Decl. ¥ 8, Ex. F, p. 25:14-20. Samsung sent Jain a formal termination letter on September 14, 2017, stating that his employment was terminated for violating the company’s anti-harassment policy. Jd. The Court found that Plaintiff was terminated or legitimate non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons. Id. p. 30:3-20. Plaintiff first requested medical leave for his depression the day after he was notified of his termination on September 11, 2017. /d. at 46:13-16. He claims that Defendant should have granted his medical leave, even though he had already been notified of his termination. Motion, p. 2:17-22. 10 B. Procedural History Regarding Plaintiff's Claim for Denial Of His Medical Leave 11 On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication (“Plaintiff's 12 MSA”) seeking to summarily adjudicate twelve (12) issues, including: 13 14 Issue One: Defendant Owed a Duty to Plaintiff to Respond to His Request for Medical Leave in September 2017; 15 Issue Two: Defendant Owed a Duty to Plaintiff to Grant His Request for Medical 16 Leave in September 2017; 17 Issue Three: There Is No Merit to Defendant’s Sixteenth Affirmative Defense That 18 Plaintiff Was Not Eligible for Medical Leave Lewis Decl. 4 4, Ex. B, p. ii:5-12. 19 On April 27, 2020, this Court denied Plaintiff's MSA in its entirety. Lewis Decl. § 3, Ex. 20 A. Regarding Issues One through Three of Plaintiff's MSA, the Court ruled: 21 22 Jain does not cite, and the Court is not aware of, any analogous case in which court declared whether the defendant was required to take certain actions under various 23 labor laws. . . Accordingly, Jain’s motion for summary adjudication of Issue Nos. 1,2, 4, 8, and 12 is DENIED. 24 25 Through this motion for summary adjudication, Samsung cannot be made to prove Jain’s seventh through tenth causes of action nor can Samsung be prevented from 26 trying to disprove those claims at trial. Accordingly. Jain’s motion for summary adjudication of Issue Nos. 3, 6, 7, and 11 is DENIED. 2 Id. at 12:8-13, 12:25-26, 14:24-15:2. 28 Moran, LEWIS & 4 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION After the summary adjudication denial, Plaintiff filed a Writ of Mandate arguing, “Petitioner’s writ petition should be granted, therefore, because . . . Samsung Owed a Duty to Grant Plaintiff's Sep. 12, 2017 Request for Leave; and Samsung’s Defense of Ineligibility Fails as a Matter of Law.” Lewis Decl. ] 5, Ex. C, p. 32. On June 16, 2020, in a one-page Order, the Court of Appeal denied Plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate. Lewis Decl. § 6, Ex. D. Til. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 “authorizes trial courts to impose sanctions to check abuses in the filing of pleadings, petitions, written notices of motions or similar papers.” Musaelian v. Adams, 45 Cal. 4th 512, 515 (2009). This code provision was modeled after Federal 10 Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and, compared to California’s prior sanction statutes, imposes a higher 11 standard on California attorneys as to the merits of pleadings filed with the court. California 12 courts view federal law construing Rule 11 as “persuasive authority with regard to the meaning of 13 section 128.7.” Cromwell v. Cummings, 65 Cal. App.4th 10, 14 (1998). The certification process 14 mandated by C.C.P. § 128.7 is designed to create an affirmative duty on the part of attorneys to 15 verify and investigate both the legal and factual basis for any pleading or paper filed with the 16 court. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enter., Inc. (1991) 498 U.S. 533. 17 Section 128.7 was enacted primarily to deter dilatory or abusive tactics and to streamline 18 litigation by excluding baseless filings. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (1990) 496 U.S. 19 384; Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. (9th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1531, 1542. 20 Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.7(b) provides, in pertinent part: 21 By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper, 22 an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 23 circumstances, all of the following conditions are met: 24 (1) It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase in the cost of litigation. 25 (2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 26 existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. 27 28 Moran, LEWIS & 5 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION (3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. (4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief IV. ARGUMENT A Sanctions Are Warranted Under Section 128.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1. Plaintiff Did Not Meet the High Standard Required To Obtain Discovery Of A Defendant’s Net Worth In Support Of His Claim For Punitive Damage: Punitive damages are permissible under Civil Code section 3294(a), only where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, 10 or malice. Civil Code section 3295(c) provides guidance on whether discovery as to a defendant’s 11 financial condition is warranted: “Upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate 12 affidavits and after a hearing, if the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court may at any 13 time enter an order permitting the discovery otherwise prohibited by this subdivision if the court 14 finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has 15 established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim 16 pursuant to Section 3294.” (emphasis added). 17 Courts have held that Civil Code section 3295(c) was enacted to protect defendants from 18 the premature disclosure of their financial condition when punitive damages are sought. Farmers 19 & Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik (2019) 3 Cal.App.5th 638; see also Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. 20 (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270; Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771. 21 “The purpose behind Civil Code section 3295, which allows bifurcation and preclusion of 22 evidence of a defendant’s wealth and profits during the liability phase of trial, is to minimize 23 prejudice prior to the jury’s determination of a prima facie case of liability for punitive damages.” 24 Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911. 25 Courts have held that Civil Code section 3295(c) was enacted to protect defendants from 26 the premature disclosure of their financial condition when punitive damages are sought. Farmers 27 & Merchants Trust Co. v. Vanetik (2019) 3 Cal.App.5th 638; see also Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. 28 Moran, LEWIS & 6 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270; Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771. “The purpose behind Civil Code section 3295, which allows bifurcation and preclusion of evidence of a defendant’s wealth and profits during the liability phase of trial, is to minimize prejudice prior to the jury’s determination of a prima facie case of liability for punitive damages.” Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911. As detailed in Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant to provide financial information regarding its net worth in connection with Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, in advance of a finding by a jury that there is any such liability, Plaintiff fails to establish a substantial probability of winning punitive damages at trial. 10 2. This Court Previously Found That Plaintiff Cannot Prevent Defendants from Attempting to Disprove Plaintiffs Claim fo 11 Interference with FMLA and CFRA Rights at Trial 12 In Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Information of Defendant SRA, Plaintiff argues, 13 “there is a substantial probability that he will prevail on his claim for punitive damages” because 14 “Defendant Samsung has no defense to Plaintiff's claim for violation of medical leave rights 15 guaranteed by FMLA and CFRA.” Motion, 1:2-8. However, this Court held exactly the opposite 16 in ruling on Plaintiff's MSA: 17 The sixteenth affirmative defense is a denial of Jain’s allegation that he was an 18 eligible employee entitled to certain rights and medical leave under the CFRA and/or the FMLA . . . Through this motion for summary adjudication, Samsung 19 cannot be made to prove Jain’s seventh through tenth causes of action, nor can Samsung be prevented from trying to disprove those claims at trial. 20 Lewis Decl. 4 3, Ex. A, p. 14:18-27 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court ordered that Defendants 21 cannot be prevented from defending Plaintiffs seventh through tenth causes of action at trial. 22 Yet, as if the Court ruled the opposite way and granted Plaintiff's MSA, Plaintiff argues that 23 Defendants have no defense to his claim for interference with FMLA or CFRA rights, and 24 Plaintiff therefore has a substantial probability of recovering punitive damages. Section 128.7 25 proscribes Parties from bringing motions lacking a factual or legal basis and for an improper 26 purpose, such as needlessly increasing the costs of litigation. This is exactly what Plaintiff and 27 his counsel did here. Given that this Court and the Court of Appeal already rejected Plaintiff's 28 Moran, LEWIS & 7 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION argument that Defendants do not have a defense to Plaintiff's claim for interference with CFRA/FMLA rights, there is no basis for Plaintiff to put forward the same argument to justify his claim for pretrial discovery of Defendant’s net worth. 3. This Court Also Found That It Is Not Aware of a Duty That Samsung Owed to Plaintiff After Deciding to Terminate His Employment to Engage in a Good Faith Interactive Process and to Take All Steps to Prevent and Investigate Discrimination Plaintiff's Motion also recycles other arguments from his unsuccessful MSA where the Court held that SRA did not have a legal duty to engage in the interactive process or prevent and investigate discrimination: 10 Issue 4 of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication: “Samsung owed him a duty to engage in a good faith interactive process in and 11 after September 2017.” 12 Issue 8 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication: “Samsung owed him a duty to take all steps to prevent and investigate 13 discrimination in and after September 2017.” 14 Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication: “Jain does not cite, and the Court is not aware of, any analogous case in which a 15 court declared whether the defendant was required to take certain actions under 16 various labor laws. Despite Jain’s resourceful notice drafting, the Court is not persuaded the summary adjudication procedure can be employed to resolve the 17 issues raised by Issues Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, and 12.” 18 Lewis Decl. 3, Ex. A, pp. 7:12-8:15, 12:8-13. Yet, despite the Court’s previous ruling that it 19 was not aware of such duties, Plaintiff's Motion asserts the same arguments without 20 acknowledging or distinguishing the prior ruling: 21 Section IV(A) of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Condition of SRA: “Samsung Had a Duty to Prevent and Investigate” 22 Section V(C) of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Financial Condition of SRA: 23 “Samsung failed its duties to accommodate disabilities” 24 Motion, p. 11:17-18, 14:8-9. 25 Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Financial Information about Defendant SRA 26 resurfaces arguments that have already been denied at the summary adjudication phase. Plaintiff 27 does not present new cases, new evidence, or argue how this time it is different. In fact, the 28 Moran, LEWIS & 8 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION Motion does not mention Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Adjudication at all. This Court has already explained that it is not aware of any cases standing for the proposition that the Defendant was required to take certain actions under various labor laws. Plaintiff therefore did not meet his high burden of establishing a “substantial probability” that he will obtain punitive damages at trial as to these claims. Since there was no factual or legal basis for Plaintiff to bring the Motion, which was made for the purpose of increasing the costs of litigation, sanctions should be awarded against both Plaintiff and his counsel. B. Plaintiff's Request for Financial Information is an Attempt to Pressur: Defendant into Settling to Avoid Divulging Its Financial Information, Confirming that the Motion was Brought for an Improper Purpos 10 In his moving papers, Plaintiff comments on the history of settlement negotiations 11 between the parties suggesting that this Motion is being brought to try to force Defendant to make 12 him an offer. Motion, 1:21-22 (“Despite the clear violation and resulting permanent injuries, 13 Samsung has never communicated a settlement offer.”) However, this is the very reason why 14 discovery of a party’s financial condition is not permitted until after a finding of liability and a 15 finding that punitive damages are warranted. “As stated by the bill’s author . . . the statute is 16 ‘intended to protect defendants from being pressured into settling non-meritorious cases in order 17 to avoid divulging their financial privacy in civil discovery.”” Jabro v. Superior Court (2002) 95 18 Cal.App.4th 754, 757; See also Kerner v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 84. 19 Plaintiff's reference to the lack of a settlement offer is not only false, but also it confirms 20 that the Motion was brought for an improper purpose. 21 C. Defendant Requests That the Court Award It $22,415.47 In Sanctions Against 22 Both Plaintiff And His Counsel 23 California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent and the 24 reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee 25 award. PLCM Group, In. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095-97 (2000); Morales v. City of San 26 Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996); see also City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 27 (1992). The Lodestar Method is the most prevalent method of calculating attorneys’ fees, and 28 Moran, LEWIS & 9 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION there is a very strong presumption that it is reasonable. /d. The Lodestar amount is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Given the “strong presumption” that the Lodestar figure is reasonable, it should only be reduced in “rare instances.” Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.8. The most critical factor in determining whether to adjust the Lodestar amount is the degree of success obtained by the prevailing party: Where a [defendant] has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may be justified. ... The result is what matters. Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983); Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 167 Cal. 10 App. 4th 567, 627-28 (2008) (affirming the trial court’s award of $421,357 in attorneys’ fees to 11 prevailing party using the lodestar method, including the trial court’s application of a multiplier of 12 0.25 to increase the award: “[a] trial court has broad discretion to determine the reasonable 13 amount of an attorney fee award, including whether to increase . . . the lodestar figure”). In 14 general, California law requires less documentation of comparable rates than federal law. See 15 Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 893, 903 (affirming rate awarded even 16 though no evidence other than counsel’s own statements presented; rejecting federal standard in 17 favor of more lenient California standard). 18 Here, as detailed in the Declaration of Joseph Lewis filed herewith, SRA’s counsel spent 19 25.1 hours opposing Plaintiff's underlying Motion to Compel Financial Information of Samsung. 20 Lewis Decl. 4 9. 2.2 hours were spent by the partner, Melinda Riechert and 22.9 hours were 21 spent by the associate, Joseph Lewis. Jd. The rate for Melinda Riechert, the partner, and Joseph 22 Lewis, the associate, is $410/hour. In addition, Defendant spent $70.47 in costs opposing the 23 Motion. /d. Thus, Defendant seeks $10,361.47 in fees and costs for opposing the underlying 24 Motion. 25 Defendant is also entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs for the time spent bringing 26 this motion for sanctions. Section 128.7 provides, “the sanction may consist of, or include . . . all 27 of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.” 28 Moran, LEWIS & 10 Case No. 17CV318162 Bockiws LLP DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 128.7 OF Arrorviysar Law SiUICoW VALLEY THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ILG LEGAL OFFICE RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION C.C.P. § 128.7(d). Rule 2.30(d) of the California Rules of Court offers further support for a movant’s ability to recovery fees incurred in preparing a Motion for Sanctions: “the court may order the person who has violated an applicable rule to pay to the party aggrieved by the violation that party’s reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause.” Id.; see also Sino Century Dev. Ltd. v. Farley, 211 Cal. App. 4th 688, 699 (2012) (“trial court did not err in awarding [movant] attorney fees incurred in preparing the sanctions motion.”) As further detailed in the Declaration of Joseph Lewis filed herewith, Defendant has spent an additional 16.4 hours incurred in preparing this Motion. Lewis Decl. ]9. 1.6 hours were 10 spent by the partner, Melinda Riechert and 14.8 hours were spent by the associate, Joseph Lewis. 11 Id. The rate for Riechert and Lewis is $410 per hour. /d. Defendant also anticipates spending an 12 additional 3 hours by the partner and 10 by the associate reviewing Plaintiff's opposition to the 13 motion and preparing the reply and attending the hearing on the motion. Jd. Thus, Defendant 14 seeks $12,054.00 in fees and costs for bringing this motion for sanctions. 15 The rate of $410/hour for Joseph Lewis, a fifth-year associate who specializes in 16 employment law, and Melinda Riechert, a