Preview
1 MORGAN A. STEWART (State Bar No. 209852)
mstewart@manlystewart.com
2 SAUL E. WOLF (State Bar No. 244833)
swolf@manlystewart.com
3 CRISTINA J. NOLAN (State Bar No. 318495)
cnolan@manlystewart.com
4 MANLY STEWART FINALDI
19100 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800
5 Irvine, California 92612
Telephone: (949) 252-9990
6 Facsimile: (949) 252-9991
7 Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA – RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE
10
11 JANE BWN DOE, an individual, Case No. 22CV006012
12 Plaintiff, Assigned for All Purposes to:
Judge: Hon. Julie Spain
13 v. Dept,: 520
14 DOE 1, a California local public entity; DOE PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
2, an individual; and DOES 3 to 100, NOTICEIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
15 inclusive, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DOE 1’S
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S
16 Defendants. COMPLAINT
17 [Filed Concurrently with Plaintiff's
Opposition; Declaration of Cristina J. Nolan]
18
HEARING:
19 Date: June 17, 2022
Time: 2:00 p.m.
20 Dept.: 520
Reservation No. : A-06012-001
21
Complaint Filed: January, 25, 2022
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TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff hereby requests the Court take judicial notice of
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the following documents pursuant to California Evidence Code §§ 451 and 452, on the bases set
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forth below:
27
A. Legislative Materials Regarding Assembly Bill No. 218
28
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PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
1 1) Assembly Commission on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg.
2 Sess.), March 8, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 1;
3 2) Assembly Commission on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg.
4 Sess.), March 13, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 2;
5 3) Assembly Commission on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg.
6 Sess.), March 27, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 3;
7 4) Senate Judiciary Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.),
8 July 1, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 4;
9 5) Senate Committee on Appropriations, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg.
10 Sess.), August 12, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 5;
11 6) Senate Committee on Appropriations, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg.
12 Sess.), August 30, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 6;
13 7) Senate Rules Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.),
14 September 3, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 7;
15 8) Assembly Commission, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.),
16 September 14, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 8.
17 Exhibits 1 through 8 are legislative materials regarding Assembly Bill No. 218. When
18 determining whether certain relief provided by a particular statute should be considered punitive
19 or exemplary damages under Government Code section 818, a Court may properly consider
20 legislative materials, such as legislative committee reports and analyses. (Marron v. Super. Ct.
21 (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1065 [reviewing the Senate Rules Committee's analysis of a bill];
22 Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Super. Ct. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
23 261, 269-270 [reviewing reports by the Senate Rules Committee and the Assembly and Senate
24 Judiciary Committees as well as arguments in favor of the bill before the Assembly Subcommittee
25 on the Administration of Justice]; see Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Imperial
26 Irr. Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1425–1426 [a court may take judicial notice of legislative
27 materials indicative of the intent of the Legislature as a whole, such as legislative committee
28 reports and analyses, and testimony or argument to either a house of the Legislature or one of its
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PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
1 committees, including statements pertaining to the bill's purpose]; see also People v. Super. Ct.
2 (Ferguson) (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1532; People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432,
3 1444, fn. 6.) Thus, the Court may properly take judicial notice of the various legislative materials
4 regarding Assembly Bill No. 218.
5
6 DATED: June 6, 2022 MANLY STEWART FINALDI
7
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By:
9 MORGAN A. STEWART
SAUL E. WOLF
10 CRISTINA J. NOLAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
EXHIBIT 1
AB 218
Page 1
Date of Hearing: March 12, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
AB 218 (Gonzalez) – As Introduced January 16, 2019
SUBJECT: CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT: EXTENSION OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND INCREASE IN DAMAGES
KEY ISSUES:
1) IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT ARE
NOT PREVENTED FROM RECOVERING FOR THEIR INJURIES, SHOULD THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT CIVIL ACTIONS
BE EXTENDED BY 14 YEARS AND SHOULD THAT EXTENSION APPLY
RETROACTIVELY, FOR JUST THREE YEARS, TO ANY CASE FOR WHICH THERE
WAS NOT A FINAL ADJUDICATION PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THIS BILL?
2) SHOULD A VICTIM OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT BE PERMITTED TO
COLLECT TREBLE DAMAGES AGAINST A DEFENDANT WHOSE ACTIONS IN
COVERING UP A PRIOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A MINOR RESULTED IN
THE ASSAULT OF THE VICTIM?
3) SHOULD CASES OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT BASED ON CONDUCT
OCCURRING BEFORE 2009 BE EXEMPTED FROM THE GOVERNMENT TORT
CLAIMS ACT?
SYNOPSIS
Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children’s lives and continues to shock the nation
because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with
the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse.
Whether the abuse occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution,
too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that
abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state’s statute of
limitations restricts how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by
childhood sexual abuse.
Many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse because of
the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty that younger victims may have fully
understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a
timely fashion. Seven states — Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and
Minnesota — have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some
or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Many other states allow for lengthy discovery
periods in adulthood. California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought
within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date
the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or
illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period
expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990.)
AB 218
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This bill, sponsored by the Victim Policy Institute, makes significant changes to address
childhood sexual abuse. First and foremost, this bill extends the statute of limitations for
bringing an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault by
14 years – from 26 years of age to 40 years of age – and revives, for just three years, any action
for childhood sexual assault that may have expired due to the existing statute of limitations,
except for cases that have a final adjudication prior to the enactment of this bill. It expands the
existing exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act, which today only applies to conduct
occurring after January 1, 2009, to include all claims of childhood sexual assault against a local
public entity, regardless of when the abuse occurred. Thus local public entities, including
schools, could be liable for damages for childhood sexual assaults that occurred before 2009.
Lastly, this bill allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a
defendant if the victim’s sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior
sexual assault of a minor. This measure is almost identical to the author’s AB 3120 from last
year, which easily passed the Legislature, but was vetoed by the former governor.
This measure is supported by, among others, children's advocates, the police chiefs, the PTA,
and crime victims’ organizations, who write that the psychological injuries from sexually assault
emerge later in life and that victims routinely need decades to reach the psychological place
where they can come forward. If the statute of limitations is too short, then there can be no
justice and more children will be abused. The bill is opposed (unless amended) by the public
and private school officials, insurance associations, and joint powers associations. All of the
opponents raise the same basic concerns: it is very difficult to defend against old claims when
records and witnesses may be unavailable, insurance may no longer be available, and the cost of
defending these actions could be astronomical and could prevent the impacted entities from
being able to support their main work. They ask for various amendments to the bill, particularly
eliminating the revival of old claims and the allowance of treble damages. The bill is opposed
outright by the California Civil Liberties Advocacy.
SUMMARY: Extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years,
revives, for three years, old claims, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault.
Specifically, this bill:
1) Redefines childhood sexual abuse as childhood sexual assault and expands the definition
slightly.
2) Extends the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood
sexual assault to twenty-two years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 40 years of
age) or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was
caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later.
3) Prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 40th birthday unless the person or
entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that
creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent,
or failed to take reasonable steps, or to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of
childhood sexual assault.
4) Revives, until three years of January 1, 2020 or the time period under 2), above, whichever is
later, any actions for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality and that
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would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020 because of applicable statute of limitations,
claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit.
5) Allows a person, in an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood
sexual assault, to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the
result of a cover-up by the defendant of a sexual assault of a minor. Defines "cover-up" as a
concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
6) Eliminates the existing limitation on exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act and
instead exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, all claims for childhood sexual
assault against a local public entity, including those arising out of conduct occurring before
January 1, 2009.
EXISTING LAW:
1) Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action for damages is within
two years of the injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of
Civil Procedure Section 340. All further references are to this code unless otherwise noted.)
2) Provides that the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from
childhood sexual abuse, as defined, is eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e.,
until 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of
majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. (Section 340.1 (a).)
3) Allows suit against the perpetrator or specified third parties, but prohibits suit against
third parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason
to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee,
volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement
reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person,
as specified. (Section 340.1 (b).)
4) Exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, claims for childhood sexual abuse
against a local public entity, arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.
(Government Code Sections 905, 935.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock
the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and
sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-
up the abuse. Whether the abuse occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious
institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever
impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the
state’s statute of limitations restricts how long actions can be brought to recover for damages
caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault
to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for
this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14
years, revives old claims for three years, and eliminates existing limitations for claims against
public institutions. This bill applies equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and
AB 218
Page 4
applies to all local public entities. Lastly, the bill allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to
recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by
the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a minor.
In support of the bill, the author writes:
California law already recognizes childhood sexual abuse as a unique circumstance with
regards to the civil statute of limitations, but has not gone far enough to ensure that victims
will have access to justice. It is clear due to psychological trauma, shame, fear, and various
other reasons, it can take a long time for victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward
publically, to recognize or remember the assault, or want to pursue legal recourse.
AB 218 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by removing
the arbitrary time limits upon victims to pursue a case. Several states have already taken this
step and have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a
reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for
these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that “time’s up” for
the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims.
AB 218 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools
to sports league, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional
children. The bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the defendant who
covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who
never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been
properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities
who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.
It often takes victims of childhood sexual abuse years to come forward and face their abusers.
All too often, victims of childhood sexual abuse fail to report their abuse timely or sometimes
even fail to report it at all. While the victims almost always know their abusers, they often fail to
come forward timely because of threats of harm, being ashamed, blaming themselves, fear of not
being believed, failing to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, or suppressing very
painful memories. Writes the sponsor, the Victim Policy Institute:
It often takes decades before victims recognize what was done to them as abuse, realize how
they have been harmed by the abuse, or simply find the strength to come forward. When
victims are able to disclose the abuse, they often find that the civil statute of limitations has
already expired.
The current law lets too many abusers avoid accountability for their actions. The only good
thing to come out of recent scandals was an environment that encouraged well-known
women - actors or Olympians - who were victims of childhood sexual assault to come
forward. It is time for the law to recognize what we all now know – that it can take decades
before some survivors are capable of coming forward. Children being assaulted today may
not be ready to come forward until decades in the future.
The Joyful Heart Foundation adds:
One in five girls and one in twenty boys is a victim of childhood sexual assault. Sexual
assault and abuse is a crime with a lifelong, profound impact on survivors. Victims may
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experience a wide range of psychological and physical symptoms well into adulthood,
including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, eating disorders, and drug and alcohol
problems. The residual effects of the trauma impact the survivor’s education and
employment, adding to the economic loss the individual suffers as a result of the crime.
Our laws must be responsive to the reality that surrounds this crime: it is difficult for
survivors of childhood sexual assault and abuse to come forward, and it may be decades
before a survivor connects the struggles they have with their assault. Shame, guilt, fear of
scrutiny, and intimidation all factor into the delay, and when the offender is a family
member, it is particularly challenging for survivors to disclose their trauma. With the
passage of time, emotional stability, maturity, and effective therapy, survivors may one day
feel ready to fully face their perpetrator.
Survivors of childhood sexual assault and abuse must be given a path to hold their offenders
accountable and recover damages in civil court. They should not be forced to incur the costs
of the assault while the offender escapes liability. Civil suits allow survivors to reclaim
monetary losses they have incurred such as paying for health problems, counseling, and drug
or alcohol treatment related to the abuse. Civil cases can also be initiated and directed by the
survivor, reestablishing a sense of control that was lost during the abuse.
As a result, it may take years for victims to bring civil (or seek criminal) actions, if they bring
them at all, against both direct perpetrators of child sexual abuse and those who allowed the
abuse to occur and to continue.
Childhood sexual abuse claims often have extended statutes of limitation. As a result of the
unique nature of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty that many younger victims have to
fully understand the abuse, come to terms with what has occurred, and then come forward in a
timely fashion, many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual
abuse. Eight jurisdictions — Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine,
Minnesota, and Guam — have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with
respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Other states, including Oregon,
which permits claims to be filed until the victim is 40 years old or within five years of discovery,
allow for very lengthy discovery periods in adulthood.
California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the
age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers
or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the
age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108
(Lockyer), Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990.) The latter provision — within 3 years of making the
relevant connection — is called a “delayed discovery” rule.
This statute of limitations has been amended repeatedly as it applies to third parties. Prior to
1998, actions against third parties who were the legal cause of the abuse had to be commenced
within a year of the plaintiff’s 18th birthday. In 1998, the law was amended to allow the same
time limits against third parties as against the abuser, provided that the suits were commenced
before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. (AB 1651 (Ortiz), Chap. 1032, Stats. 1998.) In 2002, the
law was amended again to allow, among other things, delayed-discovery suits against such third
parties after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday under limited conditions. (SB 1779 (Burton), Chap.
149, Stats. 2002.)
AB 218
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This bill extends the statute of limitations for civil actions for childhood sexual assault against
both direct perpetrators and third parties who may have helped facilitate the abuse by 14 years,
extending the age for victims to bring suit from 26 to 40 years of age. The bill also applies this
provision retroactively, for three years of January 1, 2020, to any case not litigated to finality
before the bill's enactment.
The Legislature has the power to create, extend, and change statutes of limitation as it deems
appropriate. The policy behind statutes of limitations provides that they "are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them." (3 Witkin, California Procedure Section 433, 4th Ed.)
Nonetheless, courts have acknowledged that "the need for repose is not so overarching that the
Legislature cannot by express legislative provision allow certain actions to be brought at any
time, and it has occasionally done so." (Duty v. Abex Corp (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 742, 749,
citations omitted.) The United States Supreme Court has long held that:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than
in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. . . . They are by definition
arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate against the just and the unjust
claim, or the avoidable or unavoidable delay . . . . Their shelter has never been
regarded as what now is called a "fundamental right" . . . . [T]he history of pleas of
limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a
relatively large degree of legislative control. (Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson
(1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314.)
With regard to reviving cases previously barred by a statute of limitations, in Liebig v. Superior
Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828 and Lent v. Doe (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, the courts cited
Chase Securities and affirmed the Legislature's power to revive civil causes of action, even if the
actions were otherwise barred by the running of the statute of limitations. In both cases, the
court upheld against constitutional attack the retroactive application of prior legislation
amending Section 340.1 (the statute at issue in this bill) to revive childhood abuse actions that
had lapsed or technically expired under prior law.
Similarly, in Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1049, the court upheld the
Legislature's revival of certain insurance claims arising out of the Northridge Earthquake that
were not brought previously and that otherwise were time-barred, and allowed these claimants a
one-year window to file the revived action. (SB 1899 (Burton), Chap. 1090, Stats. 2000,
enacting Section 340.9.)
Another precedent for reviving civil claims or extending the statute of limitations in childhood
sexual abuse cases is SB 1678 (Dunn), Chap. 741, Stats. 2004. That bill revived, for a one-year
period commencing on January 1, 2005, a civil cause of action for child sexual abuse against the
perpetrator if a criminal case filed against the perpetrator for that abuse was dismissed or
overturned pursuant to a United States Supreme Court decision which held that the underlying
statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law in authorizing a criminal prosecution (as
opposed to a civil action) after the original statute of limitations for the offense had run.
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Perhaps most importantly for this bill, the Supreme Court in Quarry v. Doe I (2009) 53 Cal.4th
945, held that the provision allowing a plaintiff over 26 years of age to file suit against specified
third parties in specified circumstances did not apply to claims that had lapsed under prior law,
but did not say that the Legislature could not revive the claims by express terms; the majority
simply held that the Legislature had not done so.
Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the Legislature believes that there are sufficient public
policy reasons to support extending the statute of limitations and reviving otherwise barred
claims under this bill, and whether such an extension and revival would maintain the protections
afforded by the statute of limitations, that is, balancing the interests of the victims with the
defendants' right to defend against the claim.
In support of the need for eliminating the statute of limitations, the author states:
Current law has also failed to provide an effective deterrent on entities with a duty of care to
children from sweeping sexual assault under the rug and engaging in cover-ups. These
cover-ups have protected perpetrators of sexual assault over the well-being of the children in
their care, and allowed perpetrators to victimize more children.
For instance, A Southern California News Group investigation found that hundreds of
underage USA swimmers have been subject to sexual abuse at the hands of their coaches and
others in positions of power. “Top USA Swimming executives, board members, top officials
and coaches acknowledge […] that they were aware of sexually predatory coaches for years, in
some cases even decades, but did not take action against them”.
In another recent example at a high school in the San Diego area, a teacher was investigated
for improper behavior towards students multiple times and even removed from the classroom
once by the district. However, an investigation by Voice of San Diego found a lack of
records for additional complaints that were made to the administration over a 10-year period,
stating “some student complaints may have never left the principal’s office”. The former
students coming forward are now are in their 20s and 30s.
Additionally, at a San Diego-area middle school between 2008 and 2015, students tried to
raise concerns about a teacher to employees of the school, but were met with unhelpful
advice and no consequences for the teacher for years, until one of the former middle school
students reported a rape. (Citations omitted.)
Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time, documents are lost or destroyed,
witnesses’ memories fade, and evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the statute
of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often
have difficulty coming forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons, including threats,
shame, self-blame, lack of trust, and fear. It is often difficult for the child victims to understand
the harm done and know how to take action. Current law for younger victims accommodates
these difficulties with its delayed-discovery rule. However, current law for older victims (born
in 1976 or earlier) does not. This bill would change the law to provide more protection for
victims who come forward later in life.
The former governor had extended criminal statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse,
but not civil ones, and had vetoed similar legislation. In 2013 and 2014, the Legislature passed
legislation extending the statute of limitations for criminal and civil actions for childhood sexual
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abuse. Governor Brown signed the bill extending the criminal statute of limitations from 26
years of age to 40 years of age (SB 926 (Beall), Chap. 921, Stats. 2014), but vetoed the two civil
extensions, one for the exact same time period as the criminal expansion (SB 131 (Beall), 2013;
SB 924 (Beall), 2014). Governor Brown, in his veto of SB 924, stated:
Statutes of limitations exist as a matter of fundamental fairness. As I wrote last year, there
comes a time when an individual or organization should be secure in the reasonable
expectation that past acts are indeed in the past and not subject to further lawsuits. With the
passage of time, evidence may be lost or disposed of, memories fade and witnesses move
away or die.
There needs to be a compelling reason to lengthen the statute of limitations for civil claims
against third parties. I do not see evidence of that here.
It is not clear why the former governor was willing to extend the statute of limitations from 26
years of age to 40 for criminal prosecutions, where a defendant's fundamental liberty is at stake
(SB 926, 2014), but was unwilling to approve the exact same extension for civil actions when
money, but not liberty, is at stake. The same arguments about faded memories and lost evidence
apply in both cases and, in both cases, the plaintiff/prosecution retains the burden of proof.
The former governor vetoed an almost identical version of this bill last year – AB 3120 –
reiterating his veto message from SB 131 and adding: “The bill now before me, AB 3120, is
broader than SB 131, does not fully address the inequity between state defendants and others,
and provides a longer revival period for otherwise barred claims. For these reasons, as well as
those previously enumerated in the veto message [for SB 131], I cannot sign this bill.”
This bill revives most, but not all, old claims. This bill revives for three years – until January 1,
2023 – any action for damages for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality.
However, some cases have been litigated to finality (the cases ended) but never reached the
merits because they were terminated due to the shorter statute of limitations. Terminating a case
based on the statute of limitations does not allow for true resolution of the claims presented. As
this bill moves forward, the author may wish to consider whether cases that were litigated to
finality, but never reached the merits due to the statute of limitations should be revived during
the three-year revival period. This would be consistent with prior revival periods under SB 1779
(Burton and Escutia), Chap. 149, Stats. 2002, and SB 1678 (Dunn), Chap. 741, Stats. 2004,
which allowed cases terminated based on the statute of limitations to be revived.
Should the author decide, as the bill moves forward, to amend the bill, the following amendment
would add in claims that were terminated based on the statute of limitations:
Code of Civil Procedure 304.1(q)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim
for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not
been litigated to finality on the merits and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1,
2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other
time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of
January 1, 2020. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this
subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this
subdivision.
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(2) Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not
constitute a claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits.
This measure applies retroactively to local public agencies. The Government Tort Claims Act
(GTCA) generally governs damage claims brought against public entities. The GTCA requires
that a claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person be presented in writing
to the public entity not later than six months after the date upon which the cause of action would
be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the applicable statutes of limitation. In Shirk
v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding the childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations timeframes in Section 340.1
and its delayed discovery rule, an abuse victim must follow the six-month presentation rule in the
GTCA and cannot, without having done so, take advantage of the delayed-discovery rule
otherwise applicable to abuse victims.
However, the Legislature in 2008 waived, going forward, the local government six-month notice
of claim limitation requirement that applies to all other tort claims for victims of child sexual
abuse. (SB 640 (Simitian), Chap. 383, Stats. 2008.) Thus, beginning in 2009, victims, have the
same time period to file a claim against local public entities as against private institutions. This
bill now extends that GTCA exemption to conduct occurring before 2009. As a result, this bill
treats local public and private entities the same. It does not change the law with respect to state
public entities.
The bill also exposes those who cover up the sexual abuse of children to additional
punishment. In addition to extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault,
reviving old claims, and removing the protections of the GTCA from local public entities, this
bill allows a victim of childhood sexual assault to recover tremble damages against a defendant if
the victim's assault was the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a
minor. For example, if the defendant moved a perpetrator to another location without notifying
authorities or gave the defendant a positive job recommendation without disclosing the sexual
assault accusations, and the victim was assaulted as a result, the victim could recover treble
damages. The victim would, of course, first have to prove the case.
Opponents believe that the bill would be financially devastating to, among others, schools,
religious institutions, and insurers, and is unfair, especially as applied to third parties. This
bill is opposed, unless amended, by public and private school officials, insurance associations,
and joint powers associations. All of the opponents raise the same basic concerns: it is very
difficult to defend against old claims when records and witnesses may be unavailable, insurance
may no longer be available, and the cost of defending these actions could be astronomical and
could prevent the impacted entities from being able to support their main work.
In particular, the Association of California School Administrators, California Association of
Joint Powers Authorities, California Association of School Business Officials, California School
Boards Association, Schools Excess Liability Fund, and Schools Insurance Authorities write:
As drafted, AB 218 exposes local public schools and others, to claims of abuse going back 40
years ago and longer. It will be impossible for employers to effectively defend against these
claims when evidence is likely gone, witnesses have moved or passed away, and there has
been a turnover of staff. With these barriers, schools will be unable to adequately respond to
these claims. This failure will result in diversion of funding intended to educate students and
serve communities to financing increased legal costs, whether or not the claim is valid. This
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is particularly troubling when considering that AB 218 would permit the recovery of treble
damages, creating a windfall of public funds for trial attorneys as they take 40 percent of any
award provided.
AB 218 will create new liability that will be funded in large part by public dollars that would
otherwise go directly to funding education, as many public entities including school districts,
cities, counties and other special districts use the joint powers authority mechanism to
manage their liability and other risk related obligations in a non-profit, public entity risk
pool. These public entity risk pools are not insurance companies with large capital reserves.
Instead, they are funded by the revenues of their local government members. This
arrangement enables local government entities to band together to create sufficient
economies of scale to effectively “self-insure” for these obligations. The benefits to local
governments include better local control over their risk exposures, and efficiencies that
enable a greater portion of local government dollars to be devoted to important local
programs.
If AB 218 is not amended, there will be an immediate fiscal impact on our organizations due
to the need to assess and fund risk for older, potentially large exposures. Public entities are
already finding that liability coverage is drastically more expensive and difficult to obtain. In
fact, our members are facing significantly increased rates, hard caps, exclusions, settlement
inflation, lower limits of coverage, and stricter underwriting processes. The liability and
related cost pressures could leave our public school students, education partners, local
governments, and the risk pools they are members of, without coverage and exposed to the
direct cost of these claims.
They request that the bill be amended to eliminate the treble damages provision, eliminate the
revival period, and limit liability for third parties. They also request amendments to create and
fund procedures to prevent future abuse.
Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Southern California Regional Liability
Excess Fund, and Statewide Association of Community Colleges also oppose the bill unless
amended as requested above and, in addition, by also retaining the existing limitation on
exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act for pre-January 1, 2009 cases.
Similarly, the Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California also oppose the bill
unless amended to eliminate the treble damages provision, eliminate the revival period, and limit
liability for third parties, writing:
From the standpoint of an insurer, the changes proposed by AB 218 make it virtually
impossible to insure this risk. Reopening of the statute of limitations a second time for cases
40 years old or older signals to the industry there is really no statute of limitations in
California. . . .
Together the changes to current law proposed by AB 218 all but ensures insurance
companies will no longer be able to provide this type of coverage to public and private
institutions in California ranging from daycare facilities; schools, both public and private;
children’s hospitals; and various non-profit organizations serving the youth.
AB 218
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The Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California raise particular objection to the
application of treble damages retroactively, when it is too late to “deter bad conduct” and will
“merely [] line the pockets of the trial bar.”
Obviously, the flip side of the burden of the cost of these claims on schools, churches, and
athletic programs that protected sexual abusers of children is the lifetime damage done to those
children. Additionally, it should be noted that the elimination of the statute of limitations and the
revival of actions against perpetrators or third parties only assures that claims can be heard on
their merits. Any other applicable defense would not be affected, and plaintiffs would still have
to prove all the elements of their case.
The California Association of Private Schools (CAPS), comprised primarily of religious school,
opposes the bill unless it is amended to make state agencies subject to its provisions: “Absent
accompanying amendment of the Tort Claims Act (California Government Code Sections 810-
996.6) in such a manner as to make state entities subject to AB 218’s provisions, this measure
would permit a victim to advance a claim against Stanford University, or the University of
Southern California, but would prohibit such action were the defendant in question U.C.
Berkeley, or UCLA.” CAPS is correct that the bill does not extend the timeframe for actions
against state entities, but it does so against all local entities, including schools – the opponent’s
public equivalent. It is unclear if such a change would in any way impact these opponents or
actually change their position on the bill.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter
(NASW), writes that current law “imposes restrictive limits on the survivors of sexual assault
and does not provide an effective deterrent or sufficient remedy against those who covered up
sexual assaults, allowing for more children to be victimized.” NASW supports the bill expansion
of access to justice for “victims of childhood sexual assault by removing the current time limits
placed on victims, while increasing the amount of damages a victim may recover from those who
sought to cover up the abuse. We urge you to help victims of childhood sexual assault hold their
abusers accountable for their despicable past acts.”
Consumer Attorneys of California adds:
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, nine out of ten child sexual abuse victims are
abused by someone close to them, and may be hesitant to report them. Many initially feel it
is their fault or they will not be believed. For others it may take years, or even decades, to
come to terms with what happened and to tell others about it.
According to a 1983 UCLA Medical Center report, the five most common reactions of
children to sexual assault can be classified as the “child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome.” The five categories of reaction are: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and
accommodation; delayed, unconvincing disclosure; and, retraction. And older children are
often “groomed,” and led to believe they are in love with their abuser. There is shame,
denial, emotional problems . . . .
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: California Civil Liberties Advocacy (CCLA) opposes the
bill outright because “lifting the statutes of limitations in any matter will negatively impact civil
defendants because the availability and reliability of evidence diminishes over time.” In
particular, CCLA is concerned that there could be false allegations of sexual assault that will be
difficult to defend against. Finally, CCLA notes that “extending the statute of limitations in civil
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suits is [] more in the interests of the plaintiffs’ lawyer industry than that of the abuse survivors,
in which the negative effects will be felt in the decades to come.”
Prior Related Legislation: AB 3120 (Gonzalez, 2018) is nearly identical to this bill. It passed
the Legislature, but was vetoed by the Governor.
SB 1053 (Beall, Chap. 153, Stats. 2018) specifically exempted childhood sexual abuse claims
from procedural hurdles enacted by local public entities under the Government Tort Claims Act.
SB 926 (Beall, Chap. 921, Stats. 2014) extended the statute of limitations for felony child sex
crimes until the victim is 40 years old.
SB 924 (Beall, 2014) would have extended the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual
abuse until age 40 and would have exempted those claims brought against a local public entity
from the Government Tort Claims Act. That bill was vetoed by the Governor.
SB 131 (Beall, 2013) would have made prior extensions of the statute of limitations for
childhood sexual abuse retroactive and would have revived certain claims for a year. That bill
was vetoed by the Governor.
AB 1628 (Beall, 2012) would have extended the statute of limitations in civil cases involving
child sex abuse to 35 years of age, prohibited confidential settlements, and imposed new duties
on private entities. This bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
SB 640 (
Preview
1 MORGAN A. STEWART (State Bar No. 209852) mstewart@manlystewart.com 2 SAUL E. WOLF (State Bar No. 244833) swolf@manlystewart.com 3 CRISTINA J. NOLAN (State Bar No. 318495) cnolan@manlystewart.com 4 MANLY STEWART FINALDI 19100 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800 5 Irvine, California 92612 Telephone: (949) 252-9990 6 Facsimile: (949) 252-9991 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA – RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE 10 11 JANE BWN DOE, an individual, Case No. 22CV006012 12 Plaintiff, Assigned for All Purposes to: Judge: Hon. Julie Spain 13 v. Dept,: 520 14 DOE 1, a California local public entity; DOE PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 2, an individual; and DOES 3 to 100, NOTICEIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 15 inclusive, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DOE 1’S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S 16 Defendants. COMPLAINT 17 [Filed Concurrently with Plaintiff's Opposition; Declaration of Cristina J. Nolan] 18 HEARING: 19 Date: June 17, 2022 Time: 2:00 p.m. 20 Dept.: 520 Reservation No. : A-06012-001 21 Complaint Filed: January, 25, 2022 22 23 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff hereby requests the Court take judicial notice of 25 the following documents pursuant to California Evidence Code §§ 451 and 452, on the bases set 26 forth below: 27 A. Legislative Materials Regarding Assembly Bill No. 218 28 1 PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 1 1) Assembly Commission on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. 2 Sess.), March 8, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 1; 3 2) Assembly Commission on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. 4 Sess.), March 13, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 2; 5 3) Assembly Commission on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. 6 Sess.), March 27, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 3; 7 4) Senate Judiciary Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), 8 July 1, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 4; 9 5) Senate Committee on Appropriations, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. 10 Sess.), August 12, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 5; 11 6) Senate Committee on Appropriations, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. 12 Sess.), August 30, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 6; 13 7) Senate Rules Committee, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), 14 September 3, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 7; 15 8) Assembly Commission, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), 16 September 14, 2019, a true and correct copy attached hereto as Exhibit 8. 17 Exhibits 1 through 8 are legislative materials regarding Assembly Bill No. 218. When 18 determining whether certain relief provided by a particular statute should be considered punitive 19 or exemplary damages under Government Code section 818, a Court may properly consider 20 legislative materials, such as legislative committee reports and analyses. (Marron v. Super. Ct. 21 (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1065 [reviewing the Senate Rules Committee's analysis of a bill]; 22 Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Super. Ct. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 23 261, 269-270 [reviewing reports by the Senate Rules Committee and the Assembly and Senate 24 Judiciary Committees as well as arguments in favor of the bill before the Assembly Subcommittee 25 on the Administration of Justice]; see Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Imperial 26 Irr. Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1425–1426 [a court may take judicial notice of legislative 27 materials indicative of the intent of the Legislature as a whole, such as legislative committee 28 reports and analyses, and testimony or argument to either a house of the Legislature or one of its 2 PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 1 committees, including statements pertaining to the bill's purpose]; see also People v. Super. Ct. 2 (Ferguson) (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1532; People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 3 1444, fn. 6.) Thus, the Court may properly take judicial notice of the various legislative materials 4 regarding Assembly Bill No. 218. 5 6 DATED: June 6, 2022 MANLY STEWART FINALDI 7 8 By: 9 MORGAN A. STEWART SAUL E. WOLF 10 CRISTINA J. NOLAN Attorneys for Plaintiff 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT EXHIBIT 1 AB 218 Page 1 Date of Hearing: March 12, 2019 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY Mark Stone, Chair AB 218 (Gonzalez) – As Introduced January 16, 2019 SUBJECT: CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT: EXTENSION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND INCREASE IN DAMAGES KEY ISSUES: 1) IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RECOVERING FOR THEIR INJURIES, SHOULD THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT CIVIL ACTIONS BE EXTENDED BY 14 YEARS AND SHOULD THAT EXTENSION APPLY RETROACTIVELY, FOR JUST THREE YEARS, TO ANY CASE FOR WHICH THERE WAS NOT A FINAL ADJUDICATION PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THIS BILL? 2) SHOULD A VICTIM OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT BE PERMITTED TO COLLECT TREBLE DAMAGES AGAINST A DEFENDANT WHOSE ACTIONS IN COVERING UP A PRIOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A MINOR RESULTED IN THE ASSAULT OF THE VICTIM? 3) SHOULD CASES OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT BASED ON CONDUCT OCCURRING BEFORE 2009 BE EXEMPTED FROM THE GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT? SYNOPSIS Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children’s lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse. Whether the abuse occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state’s statute of limitations restricts how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. Many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse because of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty that younger victims may have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion. Seven states — Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and Minnesota — have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Many other states allow for lengthy discovery periods in adulthood. California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990.) AB 218 Page 2 This bill, sponsored by the Victim Policy Institute, makes significant changes to address childhood sexual abuse. First and foremost, this bill extends the statute of limitations for bringing an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault by 14 years – from 26 years of age to 40 years of age – and revives, for just three years, any action for childhood sexual assault that may have expired due to the existing statute of limitations, except for cases that have a final adjudication prior to the enactment of this bill. It expands the existing exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act, which today only applies to conduct occurring after January 1, 2009, to include all claims of childhood sexual assault against a local public entity, regardless of when the abuse occurred. Thus local public entities, including schools, could be liable for damages for childhood sexual assaults that occurred before 2009. Lastly, this bill allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the victim’s sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a minor. This measure is almost identical to the author’s AB 3120 from last year, which easily passed the Legislature, but was vetoed by the former governor. This measure is supported by, among others, children's advocates, the police chiefs, the PTA, and crime victims’ organizations, who write that the psychological injuries from sexually assault emerge later in life and that victims routinely need decades to reach the psychological place where they can come forward. If the statute of limitations is too short, then there can be no justice and more children will be abused. The bill is opposed (unless amended) by the public and private school officials, insurance associations, and joint powers associations. All of the opponents raise the same basic concerns: it is very difficult to defend against old claims when records and witnesses may be unavailable, insurance may no longer be available, and the cost of defending these actions could be astronomical and could prevent the impacted entities from being able to support their main work. They ask for various amendments to the bill, particularly eliminating the revival of old claims and the allowance of treble damages. The bill is opposed outright by the California Civil Liberties Advocacy. SUMMARY: Extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives, for three years, old claims, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. Specifically, this bill: 1) Redefines childhood sexual abuse as childhood sexual assault and expands the definition slightly. 2) Extends the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual assault to twenty-two years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 40 years of age) or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. 3) Prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or failed to take reasonable steps, or to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault. 4) Revives, until three years of January 1, 2020 or the time period under 2), above, whichever is later, any actions for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality and that AB 218 Page 3 would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020 because of applicable statute of limitations, claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit. 5) Allows a person, in an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault, to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a sexual assault of a minor. Defines "cover-up" as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault. 6) Eliminates the existing limitation on exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act and instead exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, all claims for childhood sexual assault against a local public entity, including those arising out of conduct occurring before January 1, 2009. EXISTING LAW: 1) Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action for damages is within two years of the injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340. All further references are to this code unless otherwise noted.) 2) Provides that the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined, is eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. (Section 340.1 (a).) 3) Allows suit against the perpetrator or specified third parties, but prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, as specified. (Section 340.1 (b).) 4) Exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, claims for childhood sexual abuse against a local public entity, arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Government Code Sections 905, 935.) FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal. COMMENTS: Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover- up the abuse. Whether the abuse occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state’s statute of limitations restricts how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives old claims for three years, and eliminates existing limitations for claims against public institutions. This bill applies equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and AB 218 Page 4 applies to all local public entities. Lastly, the bill allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a minor. In support of the bill, the author writes: California law already recognizes childhood sexual abuse as a unique circumstance with regards to the civil statute of limitations, but has not gone far enough to ensure that victims will have access to justice. It is clear due to psychological trauma, shame, fear, and various other reasons, it can take a long time for victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward publically, to recognize or remember the assault, or want to pursue legal recourse. AB 218 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by removing the arbitrary time limits upon victims to pursue a case. Several states have already taken this step and have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that “time’s up” for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims. AB 218 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports league, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims. It often takes victims of childhood sexual abuse years to come forward and face their abusers. All too often, victims of childhood sexual abuse fail to report their abuse timely or sometimes even fail to report it at all. While the victims almost always know their abusers, they often fail to come forward timely because of threats of harm, being ashamed, blaming themselves, fear of not being believed, failing to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, or suppressing very painful memories. Writes the sponsor, the Victim Policy Institute: It often takes decades before victims recognize what was done to them as abuse, realize how they have been harmed by the abuse, or simply find the strength to come forward. When victims are able to disclose the abuse, they often find that the civil statute of limitations has already expired. The current law lets too many abusers avoid accountability for their actions. The only good thing to come out of recent scandals was an environment that encouraged well-known women - actors or Olympians - who were victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward. It is time for the law to recognize what we all now know – that it can take decades before some survivors are capable of coming forward. Children being assaulted today may not be ready to come forward until decades in the future. The Joyful Heart Foundation adds: One in five girls and one in twenty boys is a victim of childhood sexual assault. Sexual assault and abuse is a crime with a lifelong, profound impact on survivors. Victims may AB 218 Page 5 experience a wide range of psychological and physical symptoms well into adulthood, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, eating disorders, and drug and alcohol problems. The residual effects of the trauma impact the survivor’s education and employment, adding to the economic loss the individual suffers as a result of the crime. Our laws must be responsive to the reality that surrounds this crime: it is difficult for survivors of childhood sexual assault and abuse to come forward, and it may be decades before a survivor connects the struggles they have with their assault. Shame, guilt, fear of scrutiny, and intimidation all factor into the delay, and when the offender is a family member, it is particularly challenging for survivors to disclose their trauma. With the passage of time, emotional stability, maturity, and effective therapy, survivors may one day feel ready to fully face their perpetrator. Survivors of childhood sexual assault and abuse must be given a path to hold their offenders accountable and recover damages in civil court. They should not be forced to incur the costs of the assault while the offender escapes liability. Civil suits allow survivors to reclaim monetary losses they have incurred such as paying for health problems, counseling, and drug or alcohol treatment related to the abuse. Civil cases can also be initiated and directed by the survivor, reestablishing a sense of control that was lost during the abuse. As a result, it may take years for victims to bring civil (or seek criminal) actions, if they bring them at all, against both direct perpetrators of child sexual abuse and those who allowed the abuse to occur and to continue. Childhood sexual abuse claims often have extended statutes of limitation. As a result of the unique nature of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty that many younger victims have to fully understand the abuse, come to terms with what has occurred, and then come forward in a timely fashion, many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse. Eight jurisdictions — Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Guam — have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Other states, including Oregon, which permits claims to be filed until the victim is 40 years old or within five years of discovery, allow for very lengthy discovery periods in adulthood. California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990.) The latter provision — within 3 years of making the relevant connection — is called a “delayed discovery” rule. This statute of limitations has been amended repeatedly as it applies to third parties. Prior to 1998, actions against third parties who were the legal cause of the abuse had to be commenced within a year of the plaintiff’s 18th birthday. In 1998, the law was amended to allow the same time limits against third parties as against the abuser, provided that the suits were commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. (AB 1651 (Ortiz), Chap. 1032, Stats. 1998.) In 2002, the law was amended again to allow, among other things, delayed-discovery suits against such third parties after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday under limited conditions. (SB 1779 (Burton), Chap. 149, Stats. 2002.) AB 218 Page 6 This bill extends the statute of limitations for civil actions for childhood sexual assault against both direct perpetrators and third parties who may have helped facilitate the abuse by 14 years, extending the age for victims to bring suit from 26 to 40 years of age. The bill also applies this provision retroactively, for three years of January 1, 2020, to any case not litigated to finality before the bill's enactment. The Legislature has the power to create, extend, and change statutes of limitation as it deems appropriate. The policy behind statutes of limitations provides that they "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." (3 Witkin, California Procedure Section 433, 4th Ed.) Nonetheless, courts have acknowledged that "the need for repose is not so overarching that the Legislature cannot by express legislative provision allow certain actions to be brought at any time, and it has occasionally done so." (Duty v. Abex Corp (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 742, 749, citations omitted.) The United States Supreme Court has long held that: Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. . . . They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate against the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable or unavoidable delay . . . . Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a "fundamental right" . . . . [T]he history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control. (Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314.) With regard to reviving cases previously barred by a statute of limitations, in Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828 and Lent v. Doe (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, the courts cited Chase Securities and affirmed the Legislature's power to revive civil causes of action, even if the actions were otherwise barred by the running of the statute of limitations. In both cases, the court upheld against constitutional attack the retroactive application of prior legislation amending Section 340.1 (the statute at issue in this bill) to revive childhood abuse actions that had lapsed or technically expired under prior law. Similarly, in Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1049, the court upheld the Legislature's revival of certain insurance claims arising out of the Northridge Earthquake that were not brought previously and that otherwise were time-barred, and allowed these claimants a one-year window to file the revived action. (SB 1899 (Burton), Chap. 1090, Stats. 2000, enacting Section 340.9.) Another precedent for reviving civil claims or extending the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases is SB 1678 (Dunn), Chap. 741, Stats. 2004. That bill revived, for a one-year period commencing on January 1, 2005, a civil cause of action for child sexual abuse against the perpetrator if a criminal case filed against the perpetrator for that abuse was dismissed or overturned pursuant to a United States Supreme Court decision which held that the underlying statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law in authorizing a criminal prosecution (as opposed to a civil action) after the original statute of limitations for the offense had run. AB 218 Page 7 Perhaps most importantly for this bill, the Supreme Court in Quarry v. Doe I (2009) 53 Cal.4th 945, held that the provision allowing a plaintiff over 26 years of age to file suit against specified third parties in specified circumstances did not apply to claims that had lapsed under prior law, but did not say that the Legislature could not revive the claims by express terms; the majority simply held that the Legislature had not done so. Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the Legislature believes that there are sufficient public policy reasons to support extending the statute of limitations and reviving otherwise barred claims under this bill, and whether such an extension and revival would maintain the protections afforded by the statute of limitations, that is, balancing the interests of the victims with the defendants' right to defend against the claim. In support of the need for eliminating the statute of limitations, the author states: Current law has also failed to provide an effective deterrent on entities with a duty of care to children from sweeping sexual assault under the rug and engaging in cover-ups. These cover-ups have protected perpetrators of sexual assault over the well-being of the children in their care, and allowed perpetrators to victimize more children. For instance, A Southern California News Group investigation found that hundreds of underage USA swimmers have been subject to sexual abuse at the hands of their coaches and others in positions of power. “Top USA Swimming executives, board members, top officials and coaches acknowledge […] that they were aware of sexually predatory coaches for years, in some cases even decades, but did not take action against them”. In another recent example at a high school in the San Diego area, a teacher was investigated for improper behavior towards students multiple times and even removed from the classroom once by the district. However, an investigation by Voice of San Diego found a lack of records for additional complaints that were made to the administration over a 10-year period, stating “some student complaints may have never left the principal’s office”. The former students coming forward are now are in their 20s and 30s. Additionally, at a San Diego-area middle school between 2008 and 2015, students tried to raise concerns about a teacher to employees of the school, but were met with unhelpful advice and no consequences for the teacher for years, until one of the former middle school students reported a rape. (Citations omitted.) Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time, documents are lost or destroyed, witnesses’ memories fade, and evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often have difficulty coming forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, self-blame, lack of trust, and fear. It is often difficult for the child victims to understand the harm done and know how to take action. Current law for younger victims accommodates these difficulties with its delayed-discovery rule. However, current law for older victims (born in 1976 or earlier) does not. This bill would change the law to provide more protection for victims who come forward later in life. The former governor had extended criminal statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse, but not civil ones, and had vetoed similar legislation. In 2013 and 2014, the Legislature passed legislation extending the statute of limitations for criminal and civil actions for childhood sexual AB 218 Page 8 abuse. Governor Brown signed the bill extending the criminal statute of limitations from 26 years of age to 40 years of age (SB 926 (Beall), Chap. 921, Stats. 2014), but vetoed the two civil extensions, one for the exact same time period as the criminal expansion (SB 131 (Beall), 2013; SB 924 (Beall), 2014). Governor Brown, in his veto of SB 924, stated: Statutes of limitations exist as a matter of fundamental fairness. As I wrote last year, there comes a time when an individual or organization should be secure in the reasonable expectation that past acts are indeed in the past and not subject to further lawsuits. With the passage of time, evidence may be lost or disposed of, memories fade and witnesses move away or die. There needs to be a compelling reason to lengthen the statute of limitations for civil claims against third parties. I do not see evidence of that here. It is not clear why the former governor was willing to extend the statute of limitations from 26 years of age to 40 for criminal prosecutions, where a defendant's fundamental liberty is at stake (SB 926, 2014), but was unwilling to approve the exact same extension for civil actions when money, but not liberty, is at stake. The same arguments about faded memories and lost evidence apply in both cases and, in both cases, the plaintiff/prosecution retains the burden of proof. The former governor vetoed an almost identical version of this bill last year – AB 3120 – reiterating his veto message from SB 131 and adding: “The bill now before me, AB 3120, is broader than SB 131, does not fully address the inequity between state defendants and others, and provides a longer revival period for otherwise barred claims. For these reasons, as well as those previously enumerated in the veto message [for SB 131], I cannot sign this bill.” This bill revives most, but not all, old claims. This bill revives for three years – until January 1, 2023 – any action for damages for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality. However, some cases have been litigated to finality (the cases ended) but never reached the merits because they were terminated due to the shorter statute of limitations. Terminating a case based on the statute of limitations does not allow for true resolution of the claims presented. As this bill moves forward, the author may wish to consider whether cases that were litigated to finality, but never reached the merits due to the statute of limitations should be revived during the three-year revival period. This would be consistent with prior revival periods under SB 1779 (Burton and Escutia), Chap. 149, Stats. 2002, and SB 1678 (Dunn), Chap. 741, Stats. 2004, which allowed cases terminated based on the statute of limitations to be revived. Should the author decide, as the bill moves forward, to amend the bill, the following amendment would add in claims that were terminated based on the statute of limitations: Code of Civil Procedure 304.1(q)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality on the merits and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision. AB 218 Page 9 (2) Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits. This measure applies retroactively to local public agencies. The Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA) generally governs damage claims brought against public entities. The GTCA requires that a claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity not later than six months after the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the applicable statutes of limitation. In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations timeframes in Section 340.1 and its delayed discovery rule, an abuse victim must follow the six-month presentation rule in the GTCA and cannot, without having done so, take advantage of the delayed-discovery rule otherwise applicable to abuse victims. However, the Legislature in 2008 waived, going forward, the local government six-month notice of claim limitation requirement that applies to all other tort claims for victims of child sexual abuse. (SB 640 (Simitian), Chap. 383, Stats. 2008.) Thus, beginning in 2009, victims, have the same time period to file a claim against local public entities as against private institutions. This bill now extends that GTCA exemption to conduct occurring before 2009. As a result, this bill treats local public and private entities the same. It does not change the law with respect to state public entities. The bill also exposes those who cover up the sexual abuse of children to additional punishment. In addition to extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault, reviving old claims, and removing the protections of the GTCA from local public entities, this bill allows a victim of childhood sexual assault to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the victim's assault was the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a minor. For example, if the defendant moved a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities or gave the defendant a positive job recommendation without disclosing the sexual assault accusations, and the victim was assaulted as a result, the victim could recover treble damages. The victim would, of course, first have to prove the case. Opponents believe that the bill would be financially devastating to, among others, schools, religious institutions, and insurers, and is unfair, especially as applied to third parties. This bill is opposed, unless amended, by public and private school officials, insurance associations, and joint powers associations. All of the opponents raise the same basic concerns: it is very difficult to defend against old claims when records and witnesses may be unavailable, insurance may no longer be available, and the cost of defending these actions could be astronomical and could prevent the impacted entities from being able to support their main work. In particular, the Association of California School Administrators, California Association of Joint Powers Authorities, California Association of School Business Officials, California School Boards Association, Schools Excess Liability Fund, and Schools Insurance Authorities write: As drafted, AB 218 exposes local public schools and others, to claims of abuse going back 40 years ago and longer. It will be impossible for employers to effectively defend against these claims when evidence is likely gone, witnesses have moved or passed away, and there has been a turnover of staff. With these barriers, schools will be unable to adequately respond to these claims. This failure will result in diversion of funding intended to educate students and serve communities to financing increased legal costs, whether or not the claim is valid. This AB 218 Page 10 is particularly troubling when considering that AB 218 would permit the recovery of treble damages, creating a windfall of public funds for trial attorneys as they take 40 percent of any award provided. AB 218 will create new liability that will be funded in large part by public dollars that would otherwise go directly to funding education, as many public entities including school districts, cities, counties and other special districts use the joint powers authority mechanism to manage their liability and other risk related obligations in a non-profit, public entity risk pool. These public entity risk pools are not insurance companies with large capital reserves. Instead, they are funded by the revenues of their local government members. This arrangement enables local government entities to band together to create sufficient economies of scale to effectively “self-insure” for these obligations. The benefits to local governments include better local control over their risk exposures, and efficiencies that enable a greater portion of local government dollars to be devoted to important local programs. If AB 218 is not amended, there will be an immediate fiscal impact on our organizations due to the need to assess and fund risk for older, potentially large exposures. Public entities are already finding that liability coverage is drastically more expensive and difficult to obtain. In fact, our members are facing significantly increased rates, hard caps, exclusions, settlement inflation, lower limits of coverage, and stricter underwriting processes. The liability and related cost pressures could leave our public school students, education partners, local governments, and the risk pools they are members of, without coverage and exposed to the direct cost of these claims. They request that the bill be amended to eliminate the treble damages provision, eliminate the revival period, and limit liability for third parties. They also request amendments to create and fund procedures to prevent future abuse. Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Southern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, and Statewide Association of Community Colleges also oppose the bill unless amended as requested above and, in addition, by also retaining the existing limitation on exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act for pre-January 1, 2009 cases. Similarly, the Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California also oppose the bill unless amended to eliminate the treble damages provision, eliminate the revival period, and limit liability for third parties, writing: From the standpoint of an insurer, the changes proposed by AB 218 make it virtually impossible to insure this risk. Reopening of the statute of limitations a second time for cases 40 years old or older signals to the industry there is really no statute of limitations in California. . . . Together the changes to current law proposed by AB 218 all but ensures insurance companies will no longer be able to provide this type of coverage to public and private institutions in California ranging from daycare facilities; schools, both public and private; children’s hospitals; and various non-profit organizations serving the youth. AB 218 Page 11 The Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California raise particular objection to the application of treble damages retroactively, when it is too late to “deter bad conduct” and will “merely [] line the pockets of the trial bar.” Obviously, the flip side of the burden of the cost of these claims on schools, churches, and athletic programs that protected sexual abusers of children is the lifetime damage done to those children. Additionally, it should be noted that the elimination of the statute of limitations and the revival of actions against perpetrators or third parties only assures that claims can be heard on their merits. Any other applicable defense would not be affected, and plaintiffs would still have to prove all the elements of their case. The California Association of Private Schools (CAPS), comprised primarily of religious school, opposes the bill unless it is amended to make state agencies subject to its provisions: “Absent accompanying amendment of the Tort Claims Act (California Government Code Sections 810- 996.6) in such a manner as to make state entities subject to AB 218’s provisions, this measure would permit a victim to advance a claim against Stanford University, or the University of Southern California, but would prohibit such action were the defendant in question U.C. Berkeley, or UCLA.” CAPS is correct that the bill does not extend the timeframe for actions against state entities, but it does so against all local entities, including schools – the opponent’s public equivalent. It is unclear if such a change would in any way impact these opponents or actually change their position on the bill. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter (NASW), writes that current law “imposes restrictive limits on the survivors of sexual assault and does not provide an effective deterrent or sufficient remedy against those who covered up sexual assaults, allowing for more children to be victimized.” NASW supports the bill expansion of access to justice for “victims of childhood sexual assault by removing the current time limits placed on victims, while increasing the amount of damages a victim may recover from those who sought to cover up the abuse. We urge you to help victims of childhood sexual assault hold their abusers accountable for their despicable past acts.” Consumer Attorneys of California adds: According to the U.S. Department of Justice, nine out of ten child sexual abuse victims are abused by someone close to them, and may be hesitant to report them. Many initially feel it is their fault or they will not be believed. For others it may take years, or even decades, to come to terms with what happened and to tell others about it. According to a 1983 UCLA Medical Center report, the five most common reactions of children to sexual assault can be classified as the “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.” The five categories of reaction are: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, unconvincing disclosure; and, retraction. And older children are often “groomed,” and led to believe they are in love with their abuser. There is shame, denial, emotional problems . . . . ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: California Civil Liberties Advocacy (CCLA) opposes the bill outright because “lifting the statutes of limitations in any matter will negatively impact civil defendants because the availability and reliability of evidence diminishes over time.” In particular, CCLA is concerned that there could be false allegations of sexual assault that will be difficult to defend against. Finally, CCLA notes that “extending the statute of limitations in civil AB 218 Page 12 suits is [] more in the interests of the plaintiffs’ lawyer industry than that of the abuse survivors, in which the negative effects will be felt in the decades to come.” Prior Related Legislation: AB 3120 (Gonzalez, 2018) is nearly identical to this bill. It passed the Legislature, but was vetoed by the Governor. SB 1053 (Beall, Chap. 153, Stats. 2018) specifically exempted childhood sexual abuse claims from procedural hurdles enacted by local public entities under the Government Tort Claims Act. SB 926 (Beall, Chap. 921, Stats. 2014) extended the statute of limitations for felony child sex crimes until the victim is 40 years old. SB 924 (Beall, 2014) would have extended the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual abuse until age 40 and would have exempted those claims brought against a local public entity from the Government Tort Claims Act. That bill was vetoed by the Governor. SB 131 (Beall, 2013) would have made prior extensions of the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse retroactive and would have revived certain claims for a year. That bill was vetoed by the Governor. AB 1628 (Beall, 2012) would have extended the statute of limitations in civil cases involving child sex abuse to 35 years of age, prohibited confidential settlements, and imposed new duties on private entities. This bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee. SB 640 (