Preview
FtLED
Superior Court Of C«|iifornia,
SacrBmento
07/13/2022
I MAYALL HURLEY P.C.
JOHN P. BRISCOE (SBN: 273690)
2 ibriscoefgjmavallaw.com By ». , Deputy
2453 Grand Canal Boulevard Cas« Number:
3
Stockton, California 95207-8253 34-2019-00263393
4 Telephone: (209) 477-3833
Facsimile: (209) 473-4818
5
Attorneys for PlaintifT David Ridge
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
9 DAVID RIDGE, an individual. Case No.: 34-2019-00265393
10
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION
11 TO MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
vs. PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION
12 832.7 AND EVIDENCE CODE SECTION
THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; 1043
13 and DOES 1-100, inclusive.
14 Date: July 20, 2022
Defendants. Time: 1:30 p.m.
15 Dept.: 53
Res.: 2647614
16
17
18
19 I. THE NOTICE OF MOTION IS NOT DEFECTFVE—THE MOTION SEEKS ALL
20 KNOWN CONTACT INFORMATION FOR OFFICERS WHO VOLUNTEERED
21 TO ADVOCATE FOR EXTERNAL LOAD-BEARING VESTS.
22 Defendant Califomia Highway Patrol ("CHP") begins its latest gambit to frustrate the
23 discovery process with an unsupported, hyper-technical reading of the pertinent statute.
24 According to CHP, Plaintiff David Ridge ("Ridge") was required to state, in the notice of
25 motion, whether Ridge seeks home or work addresses, home or work phone numbers, etc.
26 (Opposition, p. 9:14-16.) CHP cites no authority for this proposition. The sought discovery,/(e/-
27
28 Plaintiffs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence
Code Section 1043
Page 1 of 6
\
I the notice of motion, is for full names, job titles, any known aliases and telephone numbers,
2 addresses, email addresses. The statute requires nothing more.
3 II. CHP HYSTERICALLY CLAIMS THAT DISCLOSING WITNESS
4 INFORMATION COULD LEAD THE WITNESSES AND THEIR FAMILIES TO
5 "DEATH AND OTHER ACTS OF VENGEANCE"—THERE IS ABSOLUTELY
6 NO EVIDENCE FOR THIS ABSURD PROPOSITION.
7 To remember, all that Ridge is seeking by way of this motion is names, job titles, and
8 contact information for CHP officers (or, now, former officers) who voluntarily responded to an
9 unofficial survey concerning whether required equipment was impacting their physical health.
10 These officers, as dangerous as their job is, are not deep-cover intelligence operatives or
11 anything approaching that. They go about in public and wear their names on their chests. Yet, by
12 applying so-called "common sense", CHP claims it can't conceivably let Ridge know how to
13 locate these witnesses because it could "subject them and their families to violent aggression,
14 death, and other acts of vengeance [...]."' (Opposidon, 12:13-16.) How, exactly, is that likely to
15 happen? Is CHP suggesting that the undersigned is going to publish this information, up and
16 down the state, in some kind of reckless campaign to endanger peace officers? CHP can't be
17 bothered to elaborate—it only concludes that disclosing witness information vvill likely lead to
18 siich results. With neither supporting authority nor supporting evidence, this argument must be
19 dismissed as hollow and ridiculous.
20 ///
21 ///
22 ///
23 ///
24 ///
25
26
' CHP holds itself out as the solemn and benevolent protector of these officers, while at the same time saying that
27 their own opinions (based on their own personal experience) about required equipment and the impacts on their
physical health do not matter at all. CHP's argument in this regard is disingenuous and self-serving.
28 PlaintifTs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence
Code Section 1043
Page 2 of 6
I m. CHP ENGAGES IN RED HERRING AND OBFUSCATION. BUT THE FACT
2 REMAINS THAT CHP HAS PLACED THE REASONABLENESS OF ITS "NO-
3 VEST" POLICY AT ISSUE. AND ITS OWN OFFICERS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE
4 ADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY ON THIS RELEVANT SUBJECT.
5 CHP essentially says that what its officers think about CHP's uniform policies (more
6 specifically, the ironclad prohibition on external load-bearing vests) has no importance in this
7 case. This is because, so the argument goes, these officers don't know precisely what model
8 number vest they might conceivably wear or who the manufacturer might be, they are not
9 disabled in the precise manner that Ridge was, they don't know precisely how a vest might
10 alleviate pain and to what degree, etc. This, transparently, is both red herring and straw man at
11 once—CHP is attempting to distract the Court by misconstming Ridge's efforts as seeking
12 nothing more than what other officers think about "non-existent equipment". CHP knows full
13 well what these officers might say about what they have actually, already perceived in the course
14 of their job duties, and they are willing to move heaven and earth to stop them. This is Hide-the-
15 Ball 101.
16 It appears that what CHP is really saying is that this Court should pre-grant a motion in
17 limine, prohibiting its other officers (at least, those that might help Ridge) from testifying on
18 anything. This would be a true gift to CHP, but it is not warranted at all. CHP continues to
19 willfully ignore the precept that admissibility is not the test for discovery. The test is whether the
20 information sought might reasonably lead to other evidence that would be admissible. (Code Civ.
21 Proc, § 2017.010; see Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301; Volkswagen of
22 America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4* 1481, I490-I491.) The court mling on a
23 discovery motion cannot determine whether the information sought will in fact be relevant and
24 admissible at trial: "It can only attempt to foresee whether it is possible that information in a
25 particular subject area could be relevant or admissible at the time of trial." (Maldonado v.
26 Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4* 1390, 1397 [emphasis added].) CHP does not deny that it
27 has placed at issue the reasonableness of its "no-vest" policy. But just because an officer
28 Plaintiffs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence
Code Section 1043
Page 3 of6
1 doesn't, for instance, have in mind a particular make and model of vest does not mean they could
2 not conceivably provide admissible testimony relating to this policy. An officer could, ^z-
3 example, testify that the incidences of being grabbed by a suspect are few and far between. They
4 might testify that their shirt collars, lapels, belt, equipment, etc. could be grabbed quite easily,
5 such that wearing a vest wouldn't create much of an additional hazard. They could testify that
6 wearing the Sam Browne belt and all the required equipment, all the time, both in and out of
7 their vehicle, hurts. They could testify that the "operational and safety factors" which CHP
8 ominously (and nebulously) raises as precluding the wearing of vests really don't exist, and that
9 the only good reason to wear the Sam Browne belt is that it looks better in some way. These are
10 but mere examples—the undersigned cannot predict what these officers, with their years of
11 unique, personal experience, might each have to say. But it is absolutely absurd for CHP to
12 suggest that nothing these officers might say could possibly be admissible, to any degree, in any
13 universe. This is not a motion in limine—this is a motion to obtain the identity and location of
14 witnesses so that evidence might be obtained. CHP has no grounds to exclude testimony that
15 hasn't happened yet.
16 IV. PENAL CODE SECTION 832.7 DOES NOT FORBID DISCLOSURE OF A
17 WITNESS MERELY BECAUSE OF HIS OR HER CURRENT OR FORMER
18 STATUS AS A PEACE OFFICER.
19 CHP also claims that it "does not make sense" that Ridge should be able to discover
20 percipient witnesses, bn account of Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b)(5). ^ (Opposition,
21 10:25-11:2.) This provision provides that "An agency shall redact a record disclosed pursuant to
22 this section only for any of the following purposes: [...] (A) to remove personal data or
23 information,,such as a home address, telephone number, [...]." CHP, tellingly, does not expound
24 on this argument or offer any case law that would support its position. The plain language of the
25
26 ^ This argument is raised by CHP, shortly after advising Ridge and the Court specifically that Ridge should file a
Pitchess motion if it wishes to obtain the sought discovery. (See Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Compel
27 Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three, pp. 11-13.) CHP continues to grasp at any straw within
reach if it might preclude Ridge from locating potentially helpful witnesses.
28 Plaintiffs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence
Code Section 1043
Page 4 of 6
1 statute is also'tellihg: It d6es; «or say tHat the names and personaycbtikcl^inforinatiori of current,
2 or former peace dfficers. is, never discoverable. It merely says that an agencyj may redact.re
3 onfy under cer|ainr,circuinstanceis. :. '•<•',:
4 On point is the case ofHacketi v. Superior Court^. In that civilicase^'the Second'Dis&ict^V
5
6 protected all4nformatipri in a deputy's file (including personal:coht^t infoimation);'^^
7 the.privilege-rernained cohdiiipriat The plaintiff was not corhpletelylforeclose^^ dbtaihing;
8 the^lsought infprma^^^^ riequired "to c6mply"with;.[Evidence Gode] :sectionsl 0.43, |;:
9 [...^"..(Hackeit at'p. lO'l.) In a'brcathtaking show of its underhahdedness, Clffi
10
case
11 inform the Court ofthe crucial point Jhat personal contact infprrndtion.qfpe^
.'y •• '. , ' ' ' ' • '"' '. - --' ' •••iV'•. .9-'*',. • !.'".[
12
absolutely privilegedfrom disclosure. This material.(and, it would,seem, willful) failiii-e toV-v-.'
13 disclose adverse aiithority should notrgb iirinoticed.
14 CHP cites other statutes which demonstrate that the Legislature hasteviiiced a cbric^^^^
15 the safety of peace officers, aridtheir familiei That,.propositiqh;is, pfxpurse;' liuei'Buf.it xioes no't-
16 demonstrate that the personal contact information for peace• -officers
- " , . • , . ; • , • : •.:f->;i, , i^y;-..
is;absolutely ;iihinuhe;;^^^
• , . " , ' • „. •; . '• . , ' - '"C^:• ^ " !;^^i
17 disclosure. No such'authority exists. , 1- , • ' ' '•'
^'i! • '\l'
18 V. A WITNESS' CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE OF THEIR NAME AND CONTACT j '1 "i* .'(-''I ?
19
20 • ' . CHP last argues that none ofthe subject officers, infilling-outthe^sii^ or, • >H ': •
21 otherwise, cphsented to disclosure of their personal infonnation.'Even if that isVtriie,'CHP ' ' '
22 " ' » ' ..••'•!-•' • ' '' ' v. , • '• " • 3'' • - •'
-.'"i-'-.X':
•Jy.."''-^' .'^w
23 submits no authority as to why that matters. Conversely, it is axiomatic that.diiere is generally no;
24 prdtectiori for theadentity, addresses, and phone numbers of'pefcipieiit witriesses.;T^ court
25 may not require the party seeking discovery to obtain the withesses' consent to disclosuire: '[A]^^^ %
'; '"' ' •' '• •• ' ': - • *'•'•' "•' ,• • • • "l"'
; .• I •- s * '.f . ' .• . I ' .'•
26
27 '13 Cal.App.4* 96(i993).
28 Plaintiff s Reply to Opposition
Code Section 1043
Page 5 of6 '•''•r^'J:.' '^•.'.
1 . -..^
.' " 'Al • - :. .1. .y... .
" i. '
^:y\f-.J:
1. percipient yvitriess!s willirigness to participate in civil discovery has neyer beencb^nsidefed^^ •
1 relevant-=-witnesses may be compelled'to appear and testify whether;'they;.waht tolor.not;"^ ' f
3 (Puerto v.iSupei;i6hCourt (2m%y\S% Car.App.4* 1242,125I-1252;))T%ere;afe; ohvi^^^
4 additional safeguards when it comes .to the disclosure of peace officers' names 'ahdv^ohtacttv'^^^o^ '\ i.
5 informatioh-^-butthoseRidge-'has!,complied with. ' 'r^: .•fi'^v-\' r-'i^'^r^'^'^^
6 ' -J''^ :V •"'^^-•,;"" • ..- ;.-.:•:. .......^;^•-^C^%3^^.;y•/-•^v'^
VI. RIDGE STIPULATES TO REASONABLE PARAMETERS ON WITNESS\ ^
\r . INFORMATION.
''•i;8l • . ' ,3 CHP concludes its opposition'by Stating that, if disclos'uife -is ordered.^that' the Co'urt^ v^^^
. . • • ' • - --./.'.v.. . . • ., - -ijti -l^-.Mi-'•••S-:••••'.' ...
9 shoiild provide for-certain protections (and, to that end, submits a propbsed prbtective order• • ?^
•-. / ' '^'s.'t-'^HT, ' .- • • ."•• '• ,\'yi^':^'>.^t''::'•"{•
10 which it did not before propose tp,^Ridge). Ridge and his attonieys certainly ^ye.ho .iritentiori^^ o^^^
11 oppressing, einbarrassiiig, or annoying CHP officers, they will not iise disclosed ihfqnnatioh'^-^ ; ^
12 outside.the scdpe of this litigation, and they will delete and/dr destroy'all{recoirdS'Of^ir^
13 names action. >• ... - .
' 14 VII. CONCLUSION
15 ^names^attd:-::^;
16 infomiation. Ridjge'ihasLconipii^d with the Pitchess procedure and dem6nstrated:good caiise^fbr^ J
17 disclosiire of Jhe soughtiinformation. The motion should he granted, as reipuested>, '\
18 tit ' ' '••••• . - '• ' s' ' :
• , ' ... • -r /rf, . - ,, •• •-. •
19 DATED: July 12,2022 MAYALL HURLEY PiC.
20
2,1 By_
JOHN.P. BRJSCOE .
22. Attorneys "for/Plaihtiff ^.^:
23 DAVlbRIEiGE:^"''; >^
24
25
iz.J 'c^
26
27
:-• .^.•V'.ol;
28' Plaintiff sReplyj^tp.G
Code Section 1043 ;
Page 6 of 6
>).,• •.•^_:^l ,; (x.-.-Vi -(.,;•„
Ridge, v., Califor^hia Highway Patrol, et al,
Sacramentb.eounty;Superior Court Case No. 34-2019-00265393
1
PROOF OF SERVICE
.•;i\i
2
(, I, the'undersigned, certify and declare as follows: :
3 .. I 'am. oyer the age,of.eighteen years and not a.party to this^actjon. 'My business;address'^^ 2453
Grand'Canal-Boulevard; Stockton, California 95207 that is located in^the county .where the;mailihg 'X "
4 and/or'deliveiy ;below took place. , • • - • ;: • ' • ., "\/|^^'T^'^/>.-
5 On July 12, 2022,1 served the following document: '•. - '•''^•i*.''^i'j
6 PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO^OEEpSITIGN TO MOTION FOR DISCQVEiiY PURS^ i
PENAL C O D E SECTiON 832.7 AND EVIDENGE GiODE SECTION 1043 *
•7
addressed to:
8
James F...CLirran
9 Deputy Attolney General .... • .f • n, . "•••. .i
P.O. Box 944255
10 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550-
James.Curran@doi.ca-.gov
11 Chfistopher-IrBy
Chi^istopher.irbv@d6i.ca.gov
12
• BUSmESS PRAGTI^ TO ENTRUST DEPOSIT ^TQipTHEKS: I am readilyrfamiliar w
13 ^',the business ^pf^aiitice at my place of business for. cojlectipri aiid.^prpces^
' mailing T'wjth the IJnited" States Postal Service. Con-espondence sd icoiie^^^^^ is
14 . deposited .with the United States Postal Service that-same day. in the?ordihaiy>x
, Qn the date specified^ belpw, at my place of business at Stockton, California a^ the dociinieht
15 descnbed above was placed for deposit in the .United Statbs,;Postal Service' ih.a^sealed envelope,
,, with postage fully.'prepaid addressed tp the individuals ahd/pr;^htities: m^^^
16 . envelope was plaiied for collection and mailing on that date followihg'ordihary busihess'practice. i ^ ,
• • «• •• • 'f ' .r.
• ' - . - • • • • . • .• f- /; • -^^
17 • BY EXPRESSJSERVICE CARRIER: On the date specified belov^, I djrebted'to bedeiDosit^
box or other facility 'regularly maintained by Federal Express;or .deMyered, to ajcpurieftprrdriyei-; ^
18 .authorized by said express service carrier to receive documents,.axppy ^
above, in an env.elope designed by the said express service, carrier,' with delivery'^fees^paid':^^^
19 provided for, addiressed to the individuals and/or entities'mentibned abw '- ;• , vV
20 0 BY EMAIL:'In accordance, with Code of Civi| Procedure, Section 101.0.6, pn^the date specified^',
below, I 'caused'aicopy of the document(s) described abpve'tb be^sent.to the-person(s);at!'the e-m ,
21. address(es)'listed above;',My business e-mail address is, 1 rilev@rha'vallawxorn.I did; not^receiye;
within a, reasonable .time aftei- the transmission; any el'ectronicr m'essa'ge or ptKer indication that the ,
22 trahsmissiori was uhsiiccessful. . ' ' =.
23 I certify and declare under.penalty of perjury under the laws. pf .the'State of California'that the ?
foregoing is triie "and correct.: . . V''
'24
Executed on July 12,2022, at Stockton, Califomia. , '
25
26 LINDSAY RILEY'
27
PRGOE OF SERVICE -
28
Preview
FtLED Superior Court Of C«|iifornia, SacrBmento 07/13/2022 I MAYALL HURLEY P.C. JOHN P. BRISCOE (SBN: 273690) 2 ibriscoefgjmavallaw.com By ». , Deputy 2453 Grand Canal Boulevard Cas« Number: 3 Stockton, California 95207-8253 34-2019-00263393 4 Telephone: (209) 477-3833 Facsimile: (209) 473-4818 5 Attorneys for PlaintifT David Ridge 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 9 DAVID RIDGE, an individual. Case No.: 34-2019-00265393 10 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION 11 TO MOTION FOR DISCOVERY vs. PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 12 832.7 AND EVIDENCE CODE SECTION THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; 1043 13 and DOES 1-100, inclusive. 14 Date: July 20, 2022 Defendants. Time: 1:30 p.m. 15 Dept.: 53 Res.: 2647614 16 17 18 19 I. THE NOTICE OF MOTION IS NOT DEFECTFVE—THE MOTION SEEKS ALL 20 KNOWN CONTACT INFORMATION FOR OFFICERS WHO VOLUNTEERED 21 TO ADVOCATE FOR EXTERNAL LOAD-BEARING VESTS. 22 Defendant Califomia Highway Patrol ("CHP") begins its latest gambit to frustrate the 23 discovery process with an unsupported, hyper-technical reading of the pertinent statute. 24 According to CHP, Plaintiff David Ridge ("Ridge") was required to state, in the notice of 25 motion, whether Ridge seeks home or work addresses, home or work phone numbers, etc. 26 (Opposition, p. 9:14-16.) CHP cites no authority for this proposition. The sought discovery,/(e/- 27 28 Plaintiffs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence Code Section 1043 Page 1 of 6 \ I the notice of motion, is for full names, job titles, any known aliases and telephone numbers, 2 addresses, email addresses. The statute requires nothing more. 3 II. CHP HYSTERICALLY CLAIMS THAT DISCLOSING WITNESS 4 INFORMATION COULD LEAD THE WITNESSES AND THEIR FAMILIES TO 5 "DEATH AND OTHER ACTS OF VENGEANCE"—THERE IS ABSOLUTELY 6 NO EVIDENCE FOR THIS ABSURD PROPOSITION. 7 To remember, all that Ridge is seeking by way of this motion is names, job titles, and 8 contact information for CHP officers (or, now, former officers) who voluntarily responded to an 9 unofficial survey concerning whether required equipment was impacting their physical health. 10 These officers, as dangerous as their job is, are not deep-cover intelligence operatives or 11 anything approaching that. They go about in public and wear their names on their chests. Yet, by 12 applying so-called "common sense", CHP claims it can't conceivably let Ridge know how to 13 locate these witnesses because it could "subject them and their families to violent aggression, 14 death, and other acts of vengeance [...]."' (Opposidon, 12:13-16.) How, exactly, is that likely to 15 happen? Is CHP suggesting that the undersigned is going to publish this information, up and 16 down the state, in some kind of reckless campaign to endanger peace officers? CHP can't be 17 bothered to elaborate—it only concludes that disclosing witness information vvill likely lead to 18 siich results. With neither supporting authority nor supporting evidence, this argument must be 19 dismissed as hollow and ridiculous. 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 ' CHP holds itself out as the solemn and benevolent protector of these officers, while at the same time saying that 27 their own opinions (based on their own personal experience) about required equipment and the impacts on their physical health do not matter at all. CHP's argument in this regard is disingenuous and self-serving. 28 PlaintifTs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence Code Section 1043 Page 2 of 6 I m. CHP ENGAGES IN RED HERRING AND OBFUSCATION. BUT THE FACT 2 REMAINS THAT CHP HAS PLACED THE REASONABLENESS OF ITS "NO- 3 VEST" POLICY AT ISSUE. AND ITS OWN OFFICERS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE 4 ADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY ON THIS RELEVANT SUBJECT. 5 CHP essentially says that what its officers think about CHP's uniform policies (more 6 specifically, the ironclad prohibition on external load-bearing vests) has no importance in this 7 case. This is because, so the argument goes, these officers don't know precisely what model 8 number vest they might conceivably wear or who the manufacturer might be, they are not 9 disabled in the precise manner that Ridge was, they don't know precisely how a vest might 10 alleviate pain and to what degree, etc. This, transparently, is both red herring and straw man at 11 once—CHP is attempting to distract the Court by misconstming Ridge's efforts as seeking 12 nothing more than what other officers think about "non-existent equipment". CHP knows full 13 well what these officers might say about what they have actually, already perceived in the course 14 of their job duties, and they are willing to move heaven and earth to stop them. This is Hide-the- 15 Ball 101. 16 It appears that what CHP is really saying is that this Court should pre-grant a motion in 17 limine, prohibiting its other officers (at least, those that might help Ridge) from testifying on 18 anything. This would be a true gift to CHP, but it is not warranted at all. CHP continues to 19 willfully ignore the precept that admissibility is not the test for discovery. The test is whether the 20 information sought might reasonably lead to other evidence that would be admissible. (Code Civ. 21 Proc, § 2017.010; see Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301; Volkswagen of 22 America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4* 1481, I490-I491.) The court mling on a 23 discovery motion cannot determine whether the information sought will in fact be relevant and 24 admissible at trial: "It can only attempt to foresee whether it is possible that information in a 25 particular subject area could be relevant or admissible at the time of trial." (Maldonado v. 26 Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4* 1390, 1397 [emphasis added].) CHP does not deny that it 27 has placed at issue the reasonableness of its "no-vest" policy. But just because an officer 28 Plaintiffs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence Code Section 1043 Page 3 of6 1 doesn't, for instance, have in mind a particular make and model of vest does not mean they could 2 not conceivably provide admissible testimony relating to this policy. An officer could, ^z- 3 example, testify that the incidences of being grabbed by a suspect are few and far between. They 4 might testify that their shirt collars, lapels, belt, equipment, etc. could be grabbed quite easily, 5 such that wearing a vest wouldn't create much of an additional hazard. They could testify that 6 wearing the Sam Browne belt and all the required equipment, all the time, both in and out of 7 their vehicle, hurts. They could testify that the "operational and safety factors" which CHP 8 ominously (and nebulously) raises as precluding the wearing of vests really don't exist, and that 9 the only good reason to wear the Sam Browne belt is that it looks better in some way. These are 10 but mere examples—the undersigned cannot predict what these officers, with their years of 11 unique, personal experience, might each have to say. But it is absolutely absurd for CHP to 12 suggest that nothing these officers might say could possibly be admissible, to any degree, in any 13 universe. This is not a motion in limine—this is a motion to obtain the identity and location of 14 witnesses so that evidence might be obtained. CHP has no grounds to exclude testimony that 15 hasn't happened yet. 16 IV. PENAL CODE SECTION 832.7 DOES NOT FORBID DISCLOSURE OF A 17 WITNESS MERELY BECAUSE OF HIS OR HER CURRENT OR FORMER 18 STATUS AS A PEACE OFFICER. 19 CHP also claims that it "does not make sense" that Ridge should be able to discover 20 percipient witnesses, bn account of Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b)(5). ^ (Opposition, 21 10:25-11:2.) This provision provides that "An agency shall redact a record disclosed pursuant to 22 this section only for any of the following purposes: [...] (A) to remove personal data or 23 information,,such as a home address, telephone number, [...]." CHP, tellingly, does not expound 24 on this argument or offer any case law that would support its position. The plain language of the 25 26 ^ This argument is raised by CHP, shortly after advising Ridge and the Court specifically that Ridge should file a Pitchess motion if it wishes to obtain the sought discovery. (See Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Compel 27 Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Three, pp. 11-13.) CHP continues to grasp at any straw within reach if it might preclude Ridge from locating potentially helpful witnesses. 28 Plaintiffs Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Penal Code Section 832.7 and Evidence Code Section 1043 Page 4 of 6 1 statute is also'tellihg: It d6es; «or say tHat the names and personaycbtikcl^inforinatiori of current, 2 or former peace dfficers. is, never discoverable. It merely says that an agencyj may redact.re 3 onfy under cer|ainr,circuinstanceis. :. '•<•',: 4 On point is the case ofHacketi v. Superior Court^. In that civilicase^'the Second'Dis&ict^V 5 6 protected all4nformatipri in a deputy's file (including personal:coht^t infoimation);'^^ 7 the.privilege-rernained cohdiiipriat The plaintiff was not corhpletelylforeclose^^ dbtaihing; 8 the^lsought infprma^^^^ riequired "to c6mply"with;.[Evidence Gode] :sectionsl 0.43, |;: 9 [...^"..(Hackeit at'p. lO'l.) In a'brcathtaking show of its underhahdedness, Clffi 10 case 11 inform the Court ofthe crucial point Jhat personal contact infprrndtion.qfpe^ .'y •• '. , ' ' ' ' • '"' '. - --' ' •••iV'•. .9-'*',. • !.'".[ 12 absolutely privilegedfrom disclosure. This material.(and, it would,seem, willful) failiii-e toV-v-.' 13 disclose adverse aiithority should notrgb iirinoticed. 14 CHP cites other statutes which demonstrate that the Legislature hasteviiiced a cbric^^^^ 15 the safety of peace officers, aridtheir familiei That,.propositiqh;is, pfxpurse;' liuei'Buf.it xioes no't- 16 demonstrate that the personal contact information for peace• -officers - " , . • , . ; • , • : •.:f->;i, , i^y;-.. is;absolutely ;iihinuhe;;^^^ • , . " , ' • „. •; . '• . , ' - '"C^:• ^ " !;^^i 17 disclosure. No such'authority exists. , 1- , • ' ' '•' ^'i! • '\l' 18 V. A WITNESS' CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE OF THEIR NAME AND CONTACT j '1 "i* .'(-''I ? 19 20 • ' . CHP last argues that none ofthe subject officers, infilling-outthe^sii^ or, • >H ': • 21 otherwise, cphsented to disclosure of their personal infonnation.'Even if that isVtriie,'CHP ' ' ' 22 " ' » ' ..••'•!-•' • ' '' ' v. , • '• " • 3'' • - •' -.'"i-'-.X': •Jy.."''-^' .'^w 23 submits no authority as to why that matters. Conversely, it is axiomatic that.diiere is generally no; 24 prdtectiori for theadentity, addresses, and phone numbers of'pefcipieiit witriesses.;T^ court 25 may not require the party seeking discovery to obtain the withesses' consent to disclosuire: '[A]^^^ % '; '"' ' •' '• •• ' ': - • *'•'•' "•' ,• • • • "l"' ; .• I •- s * '.f . ' .• . I ' .'• 26 27 '13 Cal.App.4* 96(i993). 28 Plaintiff s Reply to Opposition Code Section 1043 Page 5 of6 '•''•r^'J:.' '^•.'. 1 . -..^ .' " 'Al • - :. .1. .y... . " i. ' ^:y\f-.J: 1. percipient yvitriess!s willirigness to participate in civil discovery has neyer beencb^nsidefed^^ • 1 relevant-=-witnesses may be compelled'to appear and testify whether;'they;.waht tolor.not;"^ ' f 3 (Puerto v.iSupei;i6hCourt (2m%y\S% Car.App.4* 1242,125I-1252;))T%ere;afe; ohvi^^^ 4 additional safeguards when it comes .to the disclosure of peace officers' names 'ahdv^ohtacttv'^^^o^ '\ i. 5 informatioh-^-butthoseRidge-'has!,complied with. ' 'r^: .•fi'^v-\' r-'i^'^r^'^'^^ 6 ' -J''^ :V •"'^^-•,;"" • ..- ;.-.:•:. .......^;^•-^C^%3^^.;y•/-•^v'^ VI. RIDGE STIPULATES TO REASONABLE PARAMETERS ON WITNESS\ ^ \r . INFORMATION. ''•i;8l • . ' ,3 CHP concludes its opposition'by Stating that, if disclos'uife -is ordered.^that' the Co'urt^ v^^^ . . • • ' • - --./.'.v.. . . • ., - -ijti -l^-.Mi-'•••S-:••••'.' ... 9 shoiild provide for-certain protections (and, to that end, submits a propbsed prbtective order• • ?^ •-. / ' '^'s.'t-'^HT, ' .- • • ."•• '• ,\'yi^':^'>.^t''::'•"{• 10 which it did not before propose tp,^Ridge). Ridge and his attonieys certainly ^ye.ho .iritentiori^^ o^^^ 11 oppressing, einbarrassiiig, or annoying CHP officers, they will not iise disclosed ihfqnnatioh'^-^ ; ^ 12 outside.the scdpe of this litigation, and they will delete and/dr destroy'all{recoirdS'Of^ir^ 13 names action. >• ... - . ' 14 VII. CONCLUSION 15 ^names^attd:-::^; 16 infomiation. Ridjge'ihasLconipii^d with the Pitchess procedure and dem6nstrated:good caiise^fbr^ J 17 disclosiire of Jhe soughtiinformation. The motion should he granted, as reipuested>, '\ 18 tit ' ' '••••• . - '• ' s' ' : • , ' ... • -r /rf, . - ,, •• •-. • 19 DATED: July 12,2022 MAYALL HURLEY PiC. 20 2,1 By_ JOHN.P. BRJSCOE . 22. Attorneys "for/Plaihtiff ^.^: 23 DAVlbRIEiGE:^"''; >^ 24 25 iz.J 'c^ 26 27 :-• .^.•V'.ol; 28' Plaintiff sReplyj^tp.G Code Section 1043 ; Page 6 of 6 >).,• •.•^_:^l ,; (x.-.-Vi -(.,;•„ Ridge, v., Califor^hia Highway Patrol, et al, Sacramentb.eounty;Superior Court Case No. 34-2019-00265393 1 PROOF OF SERVICE .•;i\i 2 (, I, the'undersigned, certify and declare as follows: : 3 .. I 'am. oyer the age,of.eighteen years and not a.party to this^actjon. 'My business;address'^^ 2453 Grand'Canal-Boulevard; Stockton, California 95207 that is located in^the county .where the;mailihg 'X " 4 and/or'deliveiy ;below took place. , • • - • ;: • ' • ., "\/|^^'T^'^/>.- 5 On July 12, 2022,1 served the following document: '•. - '•''^•i*.''^i'j 6 PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO^OEEpSITIGN TO MOTION FOR DISCQVEiiY PURS^ i PENAL C O D E SECTiON 832.7 AND EVIDENGE GiODE SECTION 1043 * •7 addressed to: 8 James F...CLirran 9 Deputy Attolney General .... • .f • n, . "•••. .i P.O. Box 944255 10 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550- James.Curran@doi.ca-.gov 11 Chfistopher-IrBy Chi^istopher.irbv@d6i.ca.gov 12 • BUSmESS PRAGTI^ TO ENTRUST DEPOSIT ^TQipTHEKS: I am readilyrfamiliar w 13 ^',the business ^pf^aiitice at my place of business for. cojlectipri aiid.^prpces^ ' mailing T'wjth the IJnited" States Postal Service. Con-espondence sd icoiie^^^^^ is 14 . deposited .with the United States Postal Service that-same day. in the?ordihaiy>x , Qn the date specified^ belpw, at my place of business at Stockton, California a^ the dociinieht 15 descnbed above was placed for deposit in the .United Statbs,;Postal Service' ih.a^sealed envelope, ,, with postage fully.'prepaid addressed tp the individuals ahd/pr;^htities: m^^^ 16 . envelope was plaiied for collection and mailing on that date followihg'ordihary busihess'practice. i ^ , • • «• •• • 'f ' .r. • ' - . - • • • • . • .• f- /; • -^^ 17 • BY EXPRESSJSERVICE CARRIER: On the date specified belov^, I djrebted'to bedeiDosit^ box or other facility 'regularly maintained by Federal Express;or .deMyered, to ajcpurieftprrdriyei-; ^ 18 .authorized by said express service carrier to receive documents,.axppy ^ above, in an env.elope designed by the said express service, carrier,' with delivery'^fees^paid':^^^ 19 provided for, addiressed to the individuals and/or entities'mentibned abw '- ;• , vV 20 0 BY EMAIL:'In accordance, with Code of Civi| Procedure, Section 101.0.6, pn^the date specified^', below, I 'caused'aicopy of the document(s) described abpve'tb be^sent.to the-person(s);at!'the e-m , 21. address(es)'listed above;',My business e-mail address is, 1 rilev@rha'vallawxorn.I did; not^receiye; within a, reasonable .time aftei- the transmission; any el'ectronicr m'essa'ge or ptKer indication that the , 22 trahsmissiori was uhsiiccessful. . ' ' =. 23 I certify and declare under.penalty of perjury under the laws. pf .the'State of California'that the ? foregoing is triie "and correct.: . . V'' '24 Executed on July 12,2022, at Stockton, Califomia. , ' 25 26 LINDSAY RILEY' 27 PRGOE OF SERVICE - 28