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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 09/21/2022 TIME: 01:30:00 PM DEPT: 53
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Richard K. Sueyoshi
CLERK: J. Servantez
REPORTER/ERM: T. Kenworthy #6673
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: S. Brooks, D. Yoshida
CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS CASE INIT.DATE: 09/23/2019
CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol
CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited
EVENT TYPE: Motion to Compel - Other - Civil Law and Motion
APPEARANCES
John P Briscoe, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s) remotely via video.
James F Curran, counsel, present for Defendant(s) remotely via video.
Marc B. Koenigberg, client representative, present for Defendant(s) remotely via video.
Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Signature on Auth Form and Compliance
TENTATIVE RULING
Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter
services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of
Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official
Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at
https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact
Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official
Reporters Pro Tempore available at
https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf
A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be
signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a
reporter from the Court's Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, Once the form is signed it
must be filed with the clerk.
If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a
Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the
clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than
10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter's Office
and an official reporter will be provided.
Defendant California Highway Patrol's ("CHP") motion to compel Plaintiff David Ridge's signature on
authorization is denied.
In this FEHA disability discrimination action Plaintiff alleges that CHP denied him a reasonable
accommodation for his physical disability, a back injury, which forced him into early retirement. He
DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 1
DEPT: 53 Calendar No.
CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
alleges that his disability could have been accommodated by allowing him to wear his sidearm and
equipment on a weight-bearing vest instead of the traditional leather belt. Plaintiff alleges he submitted
the request for reasonable accommodation in April 2019. In his discovery responses, Plaintiff indicated
he suffered depression, anxiety and emotional distress as a result of the adverse employment actions.
He also identified Ms. Williams (a marriage and family therapist) as a health care provider who provided
monthly therapy beginning in January 2018.
CHP issued a subpoena to Ms. Williams seeking Plaintiff's treatment records. The subject subpoena
seeks "[a]ny and all records from January 1, 2010" to present with no subject matter limitation, and
communications between Ms. Williams and Plaintiff/Plaintiff's employers/Plaintiff's insurance for the
same time period and again with no subject limitation, and any writings (medical or otherwise) relating
to plaintiff in any way from January 1, 2010 to present. (Curran Decl. Exh. 6 [emphasis added]) Ms.
Williams requested a release in order to produce the records. CHP's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel an
authorization form for Plaintiff to sign. Plaintiff declined to sign the form and the instant motion followed.
CHP argues Plaintiff has placed his emotional condition at issue through his discovery responses and
that the Court has the ability to compel Plaintiff to sign an authorization. As explained below, while the
Court may agree that it has the ability to order Plaintiff to sign an authorization, it will not order Plaintiff to
sign the subject authorization regarding the requested records. To that end, the subject subpoena is
overbroad and violates Plaintiff's right to privacy.
The Court first must address the contention by CHP that Plaintiff waived any right to refuse to sign the
authorization by failing to object or move to quash the subpoena directed to Ms. Williams. CCP §
1985.3(g) provides that a party whose personal records are sought by subpoena "may" bring a motion to
quash or modify the subpoena. But "may" is permissive not mandatory. Further CCP § 1987.1(c), which
governs motions to quash, modify or limiting subpoenas states that nothing in the section "shall require
any person to move to quash, modify, or condition any subpoena" for personal records of a consumer
served under CCP § 1985.3(b)(1), which includes a party. Thus, while Plaintiff may have been permitted
to bring a motion to quash, the failure to do so does not waive any objection to the subpoena, and thus
by extension the ability to oppose the request that he sign the authorization.
Next, the CHP's reference to a ruling from this department in August 2020 by the now retired Judge
Brown granting a motion to compel a plaintiff in an employment lawsuit to sign an authorization
regarding medical records has no relevance to this matter. This Court is not bound by the rulings of
another trial court.
Turning to the merits of the motion, in the abstract, it is true the Court has the authority to compel a party
to authorize the release of medical records. (See Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 913, 929.) However, simply because the Court has that power, does not mean it is proper
without any analysis of whether CHP is entitled to the records requested in the subject subpoena.
To that end, CHP argues Plaintiff placed his entire mental health state at issue through his discovery
responses identifying Ms. Williams and stating that CHP's actions caused him to suffer depression,
anxiety and emotional distress. The Court must examine, Plaintiff's right to privacy and whether Plaintiff
has waived any right through placing his mental condition as issue. The Court will set forth the general
legal principles below. Application of those principles demonstrates that while Plaintiff may have placed
certain mental conditions at issue, specifically, depression, anxiety and emotional distress, he has not
placed his entire condition at issue such that the Court could properly compel him to sign the
authorization to release the records.
The right to privacy in medical records has long been recognized. The right to privacy provided for in
Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 may be invoked by a litigant as justification for refusal to answer questions or
DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 2
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CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
respond to requests for information that unreasonably intrude on that right. A plaintiff asserting a privacy
claim has the burden of establishing each element, specifically: 1. A legally protected privacy interest; 2.
A reasonable expectation of privacy; and 3. A serious invasion of the privacy interest. (See, e.g. Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1) There can be no dispute that the right to privacy
encompassed a person's medical information. "A person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely
more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and
protected." (Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 678.)
[disapproved by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, fn. 8 only to the extent that the
case assumed without conducting the Hill analysis that a compelling need is automatically required
when a party seeks discovery of private information].) Plaintiff's medical records are certainly protected
by the right to privacy.
It is clear Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records. Under the Hill
framework, Plaintiff's privacy interest has been established. Further, the seriousness of the invasion is
clear given that CHP has sought all of Plaintiff's records from Ms. Williams from 2010 to present with no
subject matter limitation. As the California Supreme Court stated in Williams, not every invasion of
privacy requires the party seeking discovery of private information to establish a compelling need.
Rather, "[o]nly obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a
compelling interest." (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 557.) The invasion here is obvious. CHP was
therefore required to demonstrate a compelling need for the requested information. That is, CHP was
required to show that the information is directly relevant. As explained below, CHP cannot meet this
showing with respect to the documents requested in the subpoena because as phrased, it seeks all of
Plaintiff's records from Ms. Williams regardless of subject matter.
It is thus beyond question that Plaintiff has a legally protected interest in his medical records and that the
threatened intrusion into his privacy rights is serious given that the subpoenas seek essentially all of
Plaintiff's records from Ms. Williams from 2010 without subject matter limitation. Plaintiff also has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his records, to the extent they are unrelated to the issues in this
lawsuit. However, such right is not absolute and private information may be subject to discovery where
the party seeking such discovery demonstrates a compelling need for the information and that the
information cannot reasonably be obtained through less intrusive means of discovery such as
depositions. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525-526 disapproved by
Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 only to the extent that the case assumed without
conducting the Hill analysis that a compelling need is automatically required when a party seeks
discovery of private information].) It is, of course, also true that the physician-patient privilege is waived
as to physical or mental conditions placed at issue in a personal injury action such as the instant case.
(Evid. Code §§ 996, 1016.) But even in such cases a party "is not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to
seek redress for a specific mental or emotional injury; the scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon
the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant himself has brought before the court." (Britt v.
Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 864 [citations omitted].) "As Lifschutz explains, plaintiffs are 'not
obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury';
while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they
have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated
medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past. The trial court thus
obviously erred in ordering plaintiffs to disclose to defendant their entire lifetime medical histories and
this aspect of the challenged discovery order must also be vacated." (Id. at 864.)
"Although in seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have unquestionably waived their
physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical
conditions which they have put in issue...such waiver extends only to information relating to the medical
conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a patient's past medical history to scrutiny."
(Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849, emphasis in original; see also In re Lifschutz (1970) 2
DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 3
DEPT: 53 Calendar No.
CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
Cal. 3d 415, 435 [The scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon the nature of the injuries which the
patient-litigant herself has brought before the court].)
While CHP argues that Plaintiff has placed his mental condition at issue, the subject subpoena seeks the
entirety of Ms. Williams' records regarding Plaintiff, regardless of subject matter. Indeed, as set forth
above, the subpoena even asks for all documents related to Plaintiff "(medical or otherwise)". (Curran
Decl. Exh. 6 [emphasis added].) Moreover, as also noted above, Ms. Williams is a family and marriage
counselor, which means that there are likely documents in her possession that have nothing to do with
any issue that Plaintiff has tendered in this case related to the anxiety, depression, or emotional distress
Plaintiff alleged CHP caused.
Nor can it be said that CHP has a compelling interest for the entirety of the records requested in the
subpoena. The instant subpoena is not narrowly tailored to address a specific mental health condition
or any emotional distress related to Plaintiff's claims in this action. Rather it requested all of Plaintiff's
records with no subject matter limitation dating back to January 2010. The Court assumes the date in
the subpoena is an error because Plaintiff indicated he began seeing Ms. Williams in January 2018. But
that does not alter the analysis. Plaintiff is "entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or
psychotherapeutic treatment [he] may have undergone in the past." (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 864.)
Allowing CHP to obtain the records here would entitle it to Plaintiff's entire history in the possession of
Ms. Williams. There simply is no showing that this unlimited request, not specifically tailored to any
specific condition at issue in the lawsuit, seeks information that is directly relevant and essential to a fair
resolution of the lawsuit. (Id. at 859-860.) To the extent that CHP suggests that the entirety of the
records could lead to the discovery of admissible information, this is speculative. "Mere speculation as
to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not
suffice." (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017.)
The Court, however, rejects Plaintiff's argument that CHP is not entitled to any records related to his
treatment with Ms. Williams at all given his willingness to stipulate he will not seek anything other than
"garden variety" emotional distress damages and that he would not submit any expert testimony in
support of his emotional distress claims. The authority Plaintiff relied on is not applicable. Davis v.
Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008 dealt with a "garden-variety motor vehicle personal injury
action" where the injured plaintiff claimed pain and suffering. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of
mandate which precluded discovery into the plaintiff's psychological records because the plaintiff had not
placed her emotional distress at issue in that she did not claim mental/emotional distress injuries
separate and apart from pain and suffering damages associated with injuries in the car accident. (Id. at
1015-1016.) CCP § 2032.320, which was referred to by the parties in the meet and confer process,
precludes a mental examination of a person suffering personal injuries where that person stipulates no
claim for emotional distress is being made "over and above that usually associated with the physical
injuries claimed" and that no expert testimony regarding that distress will be offered. (CCP §
2032.230(b), (c).) First, that section deals with a motion for a mental examination, not discovery of
records. In any event, this is a disability discrimination case in which Plaintiff alleges he suffered
anxiety, depression and emotional distress in connection with the adverse employment action. There is
no "garden variety" personal injury in this action where Plaintiff could be said to only be seeking
emotional distress in connection with pain and suffering associated with the injuries. Thus, Plaintiff's
stipulation would not here preclude CHP from seeking records by way of a proper subpoena. But again,
the subject subpoena is overly broad as discussed above.
As currently phrased, CHP seeks records with no limitation as to any specific medical condition or injury
at issue in this action. While a more narrowly tailored subpoena may be appropriate, the instant one,
which seek records potentially related to any mental health condition or treatment from Ms. Williams, is
not, and the Court will not undertake the task of defining what is appropriate. As a result, the motion to
compel Plaintiff to execute an authorization for release of the records in the subpoena is denied.
DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 4
DEPT: 53 Calendar No.
CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS
In short, the motion is denied. The denial is without prejudice to CHP issuing a more narrowly tailored
subpoena.
The Court notes CHP also asked the Court to compel Ms. Williams to comply with the subpoena if it did
not order Plaintiff to execute the authorization. That request would have to be denied as Ms. Williams
was not served with the motion.
The Court need not address Plaintiff's argument that his counsel could not be compelled to execute the
authorization.
CHP's request for sanctions is denied as the motion was denied. Further, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff did not fail to meet and confer in good faith or otherwise improperly refuse to sign the
authorization.
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice
is required.
COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted.
The Court takes this matter under submission.
DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 5
DEPT: 53 Calendar No.
Preview
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE MINUTE ORDER DATE: 09/21/2022 TIME: 01:30:00 PM DEPT: 53 JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Richard K. Sueyoshi CLERK: J. Servantez REPORTER/ERM: T. Kenworthy #6673 BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: S. Brooks, D. Yoshida CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS CASE INIT.DATE: 09/23/2019 CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited EVENT TYPE: Motion to Compel - Other - Civil Law and Motion APPEARANCES John P Briscoe, counsel, present for Plaintiff(s) remotely via video. James F Curran, counsel, present for Defendant(s) remotely via video. Marc B. Koenigberg, client representative, present for Defendant(s) remotely via video. Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Signature on Auth Form and Compliance TENTATIVE RULING Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court's Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter's Office and an official reporter will be provided. Defendant California Highway Patrol's ("CHP") motion to compel Plaintiff David Ridge's signature on authorization is denied. In this FEHA disability discrimination action Plaintiff alleges that CHP denied him a reasonable accommodation for his physical disability, a back injury, which forced him into early retirement. He DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 1 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS alleges that his disability could have been accommodated by allowing him to wear his sidearm and equipment on a weight-bearing vest instead of the traditional leather belt. Plaintiff alleges he submitted the request for reasonable accommodation in April 2019. In his discovery responses, Plaintiff indicated he suffered depression, anxiety and emotional distress as a result of the adverse employment actions. He also identified Ms. Williams (a marriage and family therapist) as a health care provider who provided monthly therapy beginning in January 2018. CHP issued a subpoena to Ms. Williams seeking Plaintiff's treatment records. The subject subpoena seeks "[a]ny and all records from January 1, 2010" to present with no subject matter limitation, and communications between Ms. Williams and Plaintiff/Plaintiff's employers/Plaintiff's insurance for the same time period and again with no subject limitation, and any writings (medical or otherwise) relating to plaintiff in any way from January 1, 2010 to present. (Curran Decl. Exh. 6 [emphasis added]) Ms. Williams requested a release in order to produce the records. CHP's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel an authorization form for Plaintiff to sign. Plaintiff declined to sign the form and the instant motion followed. CHP argues Plaintiff has placed his emotional condition at issue through his discovery responses and that the Court has the ability to compel Plaintiff to sign an authorization. As explained below, while the Court may agree that it has the ability to order Plaintiff to sign an authorization, it will not order Plaintiff to sign the subject authorization regarding the requested records. To that end, the subject subpoena is overbroad and violates Plaintiff's right to privacy. The Court first must address the contention by CHP that Plaintiff waived any right to refuse to sign the authorization by failing to object or move to quash the subpoena directed to Ms. Williams. CCP § 1985.3(g) provides that a party whose personal records are sought by subpoena "may" bring a motion to quash or modify the subpoena. But "may" is permissive not mandatory. Further CCP § 1987.1(c), which governs motions to quash, modify or limiting subpoenas states that nothing in the section "shall require any person to move to quash, modify, or condition any subpoena" for personal records of a consumer served under CCP § 1985.3(b)(1), which includes a party. Thus, while Plaintiff may have been permitted to bring a motion to quash, the failure to do so does not waive any objection to the subpoena, and thus by extension the ability to oppose the request that he sign the authorization. Next, the CHP's reference to a ruling from this department in August 2020 by the now retired Judge Brown granting a motion to compel a plaintiff in an employment lawsuit to sign an authorization regarding medical records has no relevance to this matter. This Court is not bound by the rulings of another trial court. Turning to the merits of the motion, in the abstract, it is true the Court has the authority to compel a party to authorize the release of medical records. (See Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 929.) However, simply because the Court has that power, does not mean it is proper without any analysis of whether CHP is entitled to the records requested in the subject subpoena. To that end, CHP argues Plaintiff placed his entire mental health state at issue through his discovery responses identifying Ms. Williams and stating that CHP's actions caused him to suffer depression, anxiety and emotional distress. The Court must examine, Plaintiff's right to privacy and whether Plaintiff has waived any right through placing his mental condition as issue. The Court will set forth the general legal principles below. Application of those principles demonstrates that while Plaintiff may have placed certain mental conditions at issue, specifically, depression, anxiety and emotional distress, he has not placed his entire condition at issue such that the Court could properly compel him to sign the authorization to release the records. The right to privacy in medical records has long been recognized. The right to privacy provided for in Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 may be invoked by a litigant as justification for refusal to answer questions or DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 2 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS respond to requests for information that unreasonably intrude on that right. A plaintiff asserting a privacy claim has the burden of establishing each element, specifically: 1. A legally protected privacy interest; 2. A reasonable expectation of privacy; and 3. A serious invasion of the privacy interest. (See, e.g. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1) There can be no dispute that the right to privacy encompassed a person's medical information. "A person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and protected." (Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 678.) [disapproved by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, fn. 8 only to the extent that the case assumed without conducting the Hill analysis that a compelling need is automatically required when a party seeks discovery of private information].) Plaintiff's medical records are certainly protected by the right to privacy. It is clear Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records. Under the Hill framework, Plaintiff's privacy interest has been established. Further, the seriousness of the invasion is clear given that CHP has sought all of Plaintiff's records from Ms. Williams from 2010 to present with no subject matter limitation. As the California Supreme Court stated in Williams, not every invasion of privacy requires the party seeking discovery of private information to establish a compelling need. Rather, "[o]nly obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest." (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 557.) The invasion here is obvious. CHP was therefore required to demonstrate a compelling need for the requested information. That is, CHP was required to show that the information is directly relevant. As explained below, CHP cannot meet this showing with respect to the documents requested in the subpoena because as phrased, it seeks all of Plaintiff's records from Ms. Williams regardless of subject matter. It is thus beyond question that Plaintiff has a legally protected interest in his medical records and that the threatened intrusion into his privacy rights is serious given that the subpoenas seek essentially all of Plaintiff's records from Ms. Williams from 2010 without subject matter limitation. Plaintiff also has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his records, to the extent they are unrelated to the issues in this lawsuit. However, such right is not absolute and private information may be subject to discovery where the party seeking such discovery demonstrates a compelling need for the information and that the information cannot reasonably be obtained through less intrusive means of discovery such as depositions. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525-526 disapproved by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 only to the extent that the case assumed without conducting the Hill analysis that a compelling need is automatically required when a party seeks discovery of private information].) It is, of course, also true that the physician-patient privilege is waived as to physical or mental conditions placed at issue in a personal injury action such as the instant case. (Evid. Code §§ 996, 1016.) But even in such cases a party "is not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific mental or emotional injury; the scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant himself has brought before the court." (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 864 [citations omitted].) "As Lifschutz explains, plaintiffs are 'not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury'; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past. The trial court thus obviously erred in ordering plaintiffs to disclose to defendant their entire lifetime medical histories and this aspect of the challenged discovery order must also be vacated." (Id. at 864.) "Although in seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have unquestionably waived their physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical conditions which they have put in issue...such waiver extends only to information relating to the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a patient's past medical history to scrutiny." (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849, emphasis in original; see also In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 3 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS Cal. 3d 415, 435 [The scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant herself has brought before the court].) While CHP argues that Plaintiff has placed his mental condition at issue, the subject subpoena seeks the entirety of Ms. Williams' records regarding Plaintiff, regardless of subject matter. Indeed, as set forth above, the subpoena even asks for all documents related to Plaintiff "(medical or otherwise)". (Curran Decl. Exh. 6 [emphasis added].) Moreover, as also noted above, Ms. Williams is a family and marriage counselor, which means that there are likely documents in her possession that have nothing to do with any issue that Plaintiff has tendered in this case related to the anxiety, depression, or emotional distress Plaintiff alleged CHP caused. Nor can it be said that CHP has a compelling interest for the entirety of the records requested in the subpoena. The instant subpoena is not narrowly tailored to address a specific mental health condition or any emotional distress related to Plaintiff's claims in this action. Rather it requested all of Plaintiff's records with no subject matter limitation dating back to January 2010. The Court assumes the date in the subpoena is an error because Plaintiff indicated he began seeing Ms. Williams in January 2018. But that does not alter the analysis. Plaintiff is "entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment [he] may have undergone in the past." (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 864.) Allowing CHP to obtain the records here would entitle it to Plaintiff's entire history in the possession of Ms. Williams. There simply is no showing that this unlimited request, not specifically tailored to any specific condition at issue in the lawsuit, seeks information that is directly relevant and essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit. (Id. at 859-860.) To the extent that CHP suggests that the entirety of the records could lead to the discovery of admissible information, this is speculative. "Mere speculation as to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not suffice." (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017.) The Court, however, rejects Plaintiff's argument that CHP is not entitled to any records related to his treatment with Ms. Williams at all given his willingness to stipulate he will not seek anything other than "garden variety" emotional distress damages and that he would not submit any expert testimony in support of his emotional distress claims. The authority Plaintiff relied on is not applicable. Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008 dealt with a "garden-variety motor vehicle personal injury action" where the injured plaintiff claimed pain and suffering. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate which precluded discovery into the plaintiff's psychological records because the plaintiff had not placed her emotional distress at issue in that she did not claim mental/emotional distress injuries separate and apart from pain and suffering damages associated with injuries in the car accident. (Id. at 1015-1016.) CCP § 2032.320, which was referred to by the parties in the meet and confer process, precludes a mental examination of a person suffering personal injuries where that person stipulates no claim for emotional distress is being made "over and above that usually associated with the physical injuries claimed" and that no expert testimony regarding that distress will be offered. (CCP § 2032.230(b), (c).) First, that section deals with a motion for a mental examination, not discovery of records. In any event, this is a disability discrimination case in which Plaintiff alleges he suffered anxiety, depression and emotional distress in connection with the adverse employment action. There is no "garden variety" personal injury in this action where Plaintiff could be said to only be seeking emotional distress in connection with pain and suffering associated with the injuries. Thus, Plaintiff's stipulation would not here preclude CHP from seeking records by way of a proper subpoena. But again, the subject subpoena is overly broad as discussed above. As currently phrased, CHP seeks records with no limitation as to any specific medical condition or injury at issue in this action. While a more narrowly tailored subpoena may be appropriate, the instant one, which seek records potentially related to any mental health condition or treatment from Ms. Williams, is not, and the Court will not undertake the task of defining what is appropriate. As a result, the motion to compel Plaintiff to execute an authorization for release of the records in the subpoena is denied. DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 4 DEPT: 53 Calendar No. CASE TITLE: Ridge vs. The California Highway Patrol CASE NO: 34-2019-00265393-CU-OE-GDS In short, the motion is denied. The denial is without prejudice to CHP issuing a more narrowly tailored subpoena. The Court notes CHP also asked the Court to compel Ms. Williams to comply with the subpoena if it did not order Plaintiff to execute the authorization. That request would have to be denied as Ms. Williams was not served with the motion. The Court need not address Plaintiff's argument that his counsel could not be compelled to execute the authorization. CHP's request for sanctions is denied as the motion was denied. Further, the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not fail to meet and confer in good faith or otherwise improperly refuse to sign the authorization. The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required. COURT RULING The matter was argued and submitted. The Court takes this matter under submission. DATE: 09/21/2022 MINUTE ORDER Page 5 DEPT: 53 Calendar No.