Preview
ROB BONTA
Attorney General of California
•2 KRISTIN M . DAILY
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
3 JAMES F. CURRAN NOV 1 6 2022
Deputy Attorney General
4 State Bar No. 142041 By:.
1300 I Street, Suite 125 Deputy Clerk
5 P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
6 Telephone: (916)210-6113
Fax: (916) 324-5567
7 E-mail: James.Curran@doj.ca.gov
AUorneys for Defendant
8 California Highway Patrol
9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
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DAVID RIDGE, Case No. 34-2019-00265393
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Plaintiff, DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY
15 PATROL S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
16 PROTECTIVE ORDER TERMINATING
PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION AND
17 THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
and DOES 1-100, inclusive,
18 Date: December 1, 2022
Defendants. Time: 1:30 PM
19 Dept: 53
Judge: Hon. Richard K. Sueyoshi
20 Trial Date: April 3, 2023
Action Filed: September 23, 2019
21
22 INTRODUCTION
23 Plaintiffs counsel is obstructing Defendant California Highway Patrol's ability to finish the
24 deposition of Plaintiff David Ridge. CHP's counsel has deposed Plaintiff for two and one-half
25. days. The deposition questioning has been normal, respectful of Plaintiff, non-repetitive, and in
26 no way insulting or harassing. Plaintiffs counsel unilaterally cut the deposition short and has
27 filed a motion for a protective order terminating the deposition. Plaintiff's counsel's declaration
28 supporting that motion shows there is no evidence of improper questioning. It shows Plaintiff is
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Defendant's Opposition to PiaintifPs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019-
00265393)
i 1 just trying to obstruct CHP's efforts to defend this case. Defense counsel informed Plaintiffs
2 counsel that the deposition could be completed in one additional session, and pointed out that
3 CHP should be allowed to question Plaintiff about the Kay Williams records.' Plaintiff
4 nonetheless unilaterally cut off questioning of Plaintiff after four hours during the third session
5 with no justification. The court therefore should deny this motion and should issue an order
6 allowing CHP to finish its deposition questioning of Plaintiff, and should impose sanctions on the
7 Mayall Law Firm for filing this motion without sufficient grounds, failing to confer in good faith
8 about the issues presented, and filing an unsuccessful motion for an order terminating the
9 deposition.
10 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
11 Plaintiff alleges causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate,
12 failure to participate in the interactive process, retaliation for requesting reasonable
13 accommodation, and failure to prevent disability discrimination. The undersigned counsel has
14 deposed Plaintiff for two and one-half days, and anticipates the deposition can be completed in
15 one, additional session. (Curran Dec, ^| 6.)
16 CHP has attempted to discover, via subpoena, the treatment records of Kay Williams, a
17 marriage and family therapist from whom Plainfiff received treatment beginning in 2010 for
18 work-related post-traumatic stress. (Transcript of First Session of Plaintiff s Depo., Exh. 1 ,
19 Curran Dec, 199:4-202:15.) However, Plainfiff will not sign a release authorizing Ms. Williams
20 to allow copying of her treatment records. CHP has agreed to restrict the time period for the
21 records to January 1, 2018 to the present. (Curran Dec, ^ 7.) Still, Plaintiff refuses to sign the
22 release unless it is restricted to treatment records for emotional distress caused by CHP. CHP has
23 filed a second motion to compel Plaintiffs signature on the release.
24 Plaintiff bases the present motion for a protective order on the following grounds:
25 "Defendant California Highway Patrol ("Defendant") has already deposed Ridge for '
26 approximately fourteen hours over a three-day period, and that deposing him further is
27
' This Court has ordered that the second Williams motion be heard on the same day and at
28 the same time as the present motion and CHP's motion to compel Plaintiffs further deposition.
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiff's Deposition (34-2019-
00265393)
unwarranted and would only cause unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression, as
2 well as undue burden and expense." (Notice of Motion for Protective Order Terminating
3 Plainfiffs Deposition, on file herein.) CHP respectfully invites the court to review the transcripts
4 of the deposition of Plaintiff, which are attached to the Declaration of James F. Curran, submitted
5 herewith. In fact, neither the deposition questioning thus far, nor the remaining questions CHP
6 should be permitted to ask, will result in unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment or oppression of
7 Plaintiff. CHP therefore should be allowed to finish Plaintiffs deposidon, and requests that the
8 Court order that one more session of seven hours, exclusive of breaks, be allowed.
9 LEGAL STANDARD
10 The court is empowered to issue whatever order "justice requires" to protect a party or
deponent against "unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and
12 expense." (Code Civ. Proc, § 2025.420, subd. (b)^; Edmon & Karnow, California Practice
13 Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter Group 2017) (hereinafter, ''Civil Procedure'')
14 ^ 8:676.) A party may move to compel the answer to deposition questions if the deponent fails to
.15 answer those questions. (§ 2025.480, subd. (a).) The seven-hour limit on the length of certain
16 depositions, set forth in section 2025.290, subdivision (a), does not apply to depositions in
17 employment cases, i.e., in actions "brought by an employee . . . against an employer for acts or
18 omissions arising out of or relating to the employment relationship."
19 (§ 2025.290, subd. (b) (4).)
20 LEGAL ARGUMENT
21 I. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE CHP'S COUNSEL SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO COMPLETE HIS DEPOSITION QUESTIONING OF PLAINTIFF
22 REGARDLESS OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S OPINIONS ON HOW LONG THE
DEPOSITION SHOULD T A K E .
23
All experienced lifigators have had to sit through depositions they wish did not take so long.
24
That does not mean those litigators had the right to terminate such depositions. Deposition
25
questions may relate to "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter if the
26
matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
27
28 2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Terminating I'laintiffs Deposition (34-2019-
00265393)
1 discovery of admissible evidence." (§ 2011.010; Civil Procedure,'^ S:103.) The deposition
2 quesfions asked of Plaintiff thus far have sought informafion well within these parameters.
3 Therefore, this Court should order that CHP be allowed lo take one additional session of
4 Plaintiffs deposition and that CHP should be allowed to question Plaintiff about the treatinent
5 records that Marriage and Family Therapist Kay Williams created, among whatever other topics
6 CHP's counsel chooses, as long as those topics fit within the permitted scope, described above, of
7 deposition questions in California.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER PLAINTIFF TO SUHMIT TO ONE ADDITIONAL
DEPOSITION SESSION BECAUSE THE DEPOSITION QUESTIONING THUS FAR HAS
9 BEEN NORMAL, RESPECTFUL OF PLAINTIFF, NON-REPETITIVE, IN GOOD FAITH,
AND I N N O WAY HARASSING.
10
The deposition questioning thus far has been neither repetitive nor harassing. CHP just
M
wants to complete its questioning on the Kay Williams records and on selected additional topics,
12
as well as follow-up'questions. Plaintiff claims in this that CHP's counsel has spent an
13
"inordinate" amount of time questioning Plainfiff about his marital problems, divorce, and
14
relationships with his adult children." (Motion for Protective Order, Memo, of Points &
15
Authorities, on file herein, at 4:8-11.)
16
In support of this argument. Plaintiff cites to pages 432-434 and 456-466 ofthe deposition
.17
transcript, attached as Exhibit G to the Briscoe Declaration filed in support of that motion for a
18
protective order. (Ibid.) For ease of reference, copies of the condensed transcripts of the first
19
three sessions of Plaintiff s deposition, taken on August 12, August 19 and October 7, 2022, are
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attached as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, respectively, to the Declaration of James F. Curran, filed in
21
support of the present Opposifion.
22
Examination of the first excerpt shows CHP's counsel asked Plaintiff basic facts about
23
which spouse, i.e.. Plaintiff or his former wife, filed for dissolution, the county in which the
24
dissolufion was finalized, and the date on which that happened. (Transcript, Exh. 3, Curran Dec,
25
pp. 423-424.) Questioning Plaintiff about these basic facts, arising out of his divorce, something
26
that for any person is the culmination of a highly stressful series of events, is reasonably
27
calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence of non-work-related emotional distress suffered by
28
4
Defendant's Opposition to PlaintifFs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019-
00265393)
1 Plaintiff. The qtaestioniiig to which Plaintiff points in the first excerpt is therefore within the
2 scope of discovery about Plaintiff s emotional distress damages.
3 Examination of the second excerpt shows Plaintiff testified that (1) he no longer has a
4 relationship with his son, Michael; (2) they are estranged; (3) this makes Plaintiff sad, and it is
5 distressing to Plaintiff; (4) he thinks about this unfortunate situation every day; (5) his ex-wife
6 never contributed to household expenses, causing Plaintiff to have to dip into his retirement
7 savings; (6) this was a point of contention between Plaintiff and his ex-wife; and (7) his ex-
8 wife's refusal to contribute to household expenses, despite the fact she earned more money as a
9 real estate agent than Plaintiff did as a CHP officer, was "very stressful" to Plaintiff." (Exh. 3,
10 Curran Dec, 459:10-466:3.)
11 CHP is entitled to discover whether Plaintiff suffers from einotional distress due to factors
12 other than CHP's alleged misconduct. Plaintiffs testimony on emotional distress caused by
13 family relationship problems is directly relevant to his claim for emofional distress damages. It
14 would be unfair for CHP to be prevented from eliciting this testimony or from presenting it, via
15 CHP's expert witnesses or otherwise, at trial, in order to counter Plainfiffs damages claims.
16 Furthermore, at no time during the questioning recorded in these two excerpts of the transcript did
17 Plaintiffs counsel object on the ground that any question asked by CHP's counsel was unduly
18 burdensome, embarrassing, or anything similar. (Transcript, Exh. 3, Curran Dec, 459:10-466:3.)
19 Indeed, Plaintiff cites to no individual question asked at any point during the first 2.5 sessions of
20 his deposition in response to which Plaintiffs counsel objected on the grounds that the question
21 was unduly burdensome, embarrassing, or the like. That is because CHP's counsel asked no such
22 questions. It becomes evident that Plaintiffs counsel is obstructing the deposition just to stall and
23 delay, as counsel has done repeatedly in this case by taking unreasonable and unsupported
24 positions conceming discovery.
25 III. T H E COURT SHOULD SANCTION PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S LAW FIRM FOR
ATTEMPTING, IN BAD FAITH AND WITHOUT A N Y GOOD REASON, TO TERMINATE
26 PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION PREMATURELY
27 This Court should award CHP sanctions against Mayall, Hurley, et al., counsel for Plaintiff,
28 I for filing this motion without substantial justificafion, failing to confer about the issues presented
5
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019-
00265393)
1 in good faith, and for misuse of the discover process. Section 2023.030, subdivision (a) states
2 that the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that any attorney advising the misuse of
3 the discovery process pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone
4 as a result of that.conduct. It also states that the court may impose this sanction on one
5 unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on
6 any attorney who advises that assertion, or on both. Finally, secfion 2023.030, subdivision (a)
7 provides that the court "shall" impose that sanction "unless itfindsthat the one subject to the
8 sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition ofthe
9 sanction unjust."
10 Here, the Mayall law firm misused the discovery process and did not act with substantial
11 justification when it cut off CHP's counsel's deposition questioning of Plaintiff and when it filed
12 this motion. Attorneys John Briscoe and Ali Meshiwala of that firm each defended one or more
13 of the sessions of Plaintiff s deposition that have taken place thus far. (Curran Dec, *ni 2-4.)
14 Both attorneys participated in unilaterally and arbitrarily shutting down the deposition after two
15 and one-half sessions with no good reason for doing so. (Ibid.) Therefore, this court should
16 award sancfions payable to CHP by the Mayall law firm in the amount of $880.00 to reimburse
17 CHP for the attorne;y fees it will incur as a result of defense counsel having to defend this motion.
18 (Curran Dec, p . )
19 CONCLUSION
20 This Court should deny this motion and should order that Plaintiff David Ridge sit for one
21 additional session of his deposifion, not to exceed seven hours of examinafion fime, exclusive of
22 breaks, because CHP's counsel has the right to finish his deposition questioning. Plaintiff would
23 have the court cut the deposition short because Plaintiffs counsel's opinion is that the deposition
24 has taken too long. That opinion is not a valid ground for leiminating the deposition unilaterally.
25 The deposition questioning that has taken place thus far has been respectful and normal.
26 Plainfiffs counsel's argument that further questioning would be oppressive or embarrassing lacks
27 merit, as can be seen by the lack of objections to CHP's counsel's deposition questions and by the
28 questions, themselves. CHP's counsel should also be allowed to question Plainfiff about the
6
Defendant's Opposition to PlaintifFs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019-
00265393)
treatment records of Therapist Kay Williams, which records are the subject of a separate motion
2 to be heard simultaneously with this one. In forcing CHP to defend this motion for a protective
3 order, the Mayall law firm has engaged in misuse of the discovery process, and, if the court
4 denies this motion, will have unsuccessfully asserted that defense counsel has engaged in the
5 misuse of that process. Therefore, this court should award sanctions, pursuant to section
6 2023.030, subdivision (a), payable to CHP by the Mayall law firm in the amount of $880.00 lo
.7 reimburse CHP for the attorney fees it will incur as a result of its counsel being forced to defend
8 this motion. (See Curran Dec, ^ 8.)
9
10 Dated: November 16, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
11 ROB BONTA
Attorney. General of California
12 KRLSTIN M . DAILY
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
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14
15
JAMES F. CURRAN
16 Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
17 California Highway Patrol
18 SA2019106238
36714ll5.docx
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Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Temiinating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019-
00265393)
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mall
Case Name: David Ridge v. CHP
No,: 34-2019-00265393
I declare:
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is Ihe office of a member ofthe
California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. 1 am 18 years of age or
older and not a party to this matter. 1 arn familiar with the business practice at the Office ofthe
Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United
States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal
mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States
Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid thai same day in the ordinary course of,
business.
On November 16. 2022.1 served the attached DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY
PATROL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
TERMINATING PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS by
transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in
a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system ofthe Office of the Attorney General, addressed as
follows:
John P. Briscoe
Mayall Hurley P.C.
E-mail Address:
ibriscoefajmayallaw.com
lrilev@,mavallaw.com
1 declare under penally of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States
of America the foregoing is true and correct and lhal this declarafion was executed on November
16, 2022, al Sacramento, California.
Christopher R. Irby S/ Christopher R. Irby
Declarant Signature
S/\2019I06238
3669126 i.docx
Preview
ROB BONTA Attorney General of California •2 KRISTIN M . DAILY Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 JAMES F. CURRAN NOV 1 6 2022 Deputy Attorney General 4 State Bar No. 142041 By:. 1300 I Street, Suite 125 Deputy Clerk 5 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 6 Telephone: (916)210-6113 Fax: (916) 324-5567 7 E-mail: James.Curran@doj.ca.gov AUorneys for Defendant 8 California Highway Patrol 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 12 13 DAVID RIDGE, Case No. 34-2019-00265393 14 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY 15 PATROL S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 16 PROTECTIVE ORDER TERMINATING PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION AND 17 THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS and DOES 1-100, inclusive, 18 Date: December 1, 2022 Defendants. Time: 1:30 PM 19 Dept: 53 Judge: Hon. Richard K. Sueyoshi 20 Trial Date: April 3, 2023 Action Filed: September 23, 2019 21 22 INTRODUCTION 23 Plaintiffs counsel is obstructing Defendant California Highway Patrol's ability to finish the 24 deposition of Plaintiff David Ridge. CHP's counsel has deposed Plaintiff for two and one-half 25. days. The deposition questioning has been normal, respectful of Plaintiff, non-repetitive, and in 26 no way insulting or harassing. Plaintiffs counsel unilaterally cut the deposition short and has 27 filed a motion for a protective order terminating the deposition. Plaintiff's counsel's declaration 28 supporting that motion shows there is no evidence of improper questioning. It shows Plaintiff is 1 Defendant's Opposition to PiaintifPs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019- 00265393) i 1 just trying to obstruct CHP's efforts to defend this case. Defense counsel informed Plaintiffs 2 counsel that the deposition could be completed in one additional session, and pointed out that 3 CHP should be allowed to question Plaintiff about the Kay Williams records.' Plaintiff 4 nonetheless unilaterally cut off questioning of Plaintiff after four hours during the third session 5 with no justification. The court therefore should deny this motion and should issue an order 6 allowing CHP to finish its deposition questioning of Plaintiff, and should impose sanctions on the 7 Mayall Law Firm for filing this motion without sufficient grounds, failing to confer in good faith 8 about the issues presented, and filing an unsuccessful motion for an order terminating the 9 deposition. 10 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 11 Plaintiff alleges causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, 12 failure to participate in the interactive process, retaliation for requesting reasonable 13 accommodation, and failure to prevent disability discrimination. The undersigned counsel has 14 deposed Plaintiff for two and one-half days, and anticipates the deposition can be completed in 15 one, additional session. (Curran Dec, ^| 6.) 16 CHP has attempted to discover, via subpoena, the treatment records of Kay Williams, a 17 marriage and family therapist from whom Plainfiff received treatment beginning in 2010 for 18 work-related post-traumatic stress. (Transcript of First Session of Plaintiff s Depo., Exh. 1 , 19 Curran Dec, 199:4-202:15.) However, Plainfiff will not sign a release authorizing Ms. Williams 20 to allow copying of her treatment records. CHP has agreed to restrict the time period for the 21 records to January 1, 2018 to the present. (Curran Dec, ^ 7.) Still, Plaintiff refuses to sign the 22 release unless it is restricted to treatment records for emotional distress caused by CHP. CHP has 23 filed a second motion to compel Plaintiffs signature on the release. 24 Plaintiff bases the present motion for a protective order on the following grounds: 25 "Defendant California Highway Patrol ("Defendant") has already deposed Ridge for ' 26 approximately fourteen hours over a three-day period, and that deposing him further is 27 ' This Court has ordered that the second Williams motion be heard on the same day and at 28 the same time as the present motion and CHP's motion to compel Plaintiffs further deposition. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiff's Deposition (34-2019- 00265393) unwarranted and would only cause unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression, as 2 well as undue burden and expense." (Notice of Motion for Protective Order Terminating 3 Plainfiffs Deposition, on file herein.) CHP respectfully invites the court to review the transcripts 4 of the deposition of Plaintiff, which are attached to the Declaration of James F. Curran, submitted 5 herewith. In fact, neither the deposition questioning thus far, nor the remaining questions CHP 6 should be permitted to ask, will result in unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment or oppression of 7 Plaintiff. CHP therefore should be allowed to finish Plaintiffs deposidon, and requests that the 8 Court order that one more session of seven hours, exclusive of breaks, be allowed. 9 LEGAL STANDARD 10 The court is empowered to issue whatever order "justice requires" to protect a party or deponent against "unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and 12 expense." (Code Civ. Proc, § 2025.420, subd. (b)^; Edmon & Karnow, California Practice 13 Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter Group 2017) (hereinafter, ''Civil Procedure'') 14 ^ 8:676.) A party may move to compel the answer to deposition questions if the deponent fails to .15 answer those questions. (§ 2025.480, subd. (a).) The seven-hour limit on the length of certain 16 depositions, set forth in section 2025.290, subdivision (a), does not apply to depositions in 17 employment cases, i.e., in actions "brought by an employee . . . against an employer for acts or 18 omissions arising out of or relating to the employment relationship." 19 (§ 2025.290, subd. (b) (4).) 20 LEGAL ARGUMENT 21 I. THIS MOTION SHOULD B E DENIED BECAUSE CHP'S COUNSEL SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO COMPLETE HIS DEPOSITION QUESTIONING OF PLAINTIFF 22 REGARDLESS OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S OPINIONS ON HOW LONG THE DEPOSITION SHOULD T A K E . 23 All experienced lifigators have had to sit through depositions they wish did not take so long. 24 That does not mean those litigators had the right to terminate such depositions. Deposition 25 questions may relate to "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter if the 26 matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 27 28 2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Terminating I'laintiffs Deposition (34-2019- 00265393) 1 discovery of admissible evidence." (§ 2011.010; Civil Procedure,'^ S:103.) The deposition 2 quesfions asked of Plaintiff thus far have sought informafion well within these parameters. 3 Therefore, this Court should order that CHP be allowed lo take one additional session of 4 Plaintiffs deposition and that CHP should be allowed to question Plaintiff about the treatinent 5 records that Marriage and Family Therapist Kay Williams created, among whatever other topics 6 CHP's counsel chooses, as long as those topics fit within the permitted scope, described above, of 7 deposition questions in California. II. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER PLAINTIFF TO SUHMIT TO ONE ADDITIONAL DEPOSITION SESSION BECAUSE THE DEPOSITION QUESTIONING THUS FAR HAS 9 BEEN NORMAL, RESPECTFUL OF PLAINTIFF, NON-REPETITIVE, IN GOOD FAITH, AND I N N O WAY HARASSING. 10 The deposition questioning thus far has been neither repetitive nor harassing. CHP just M wants to complete its questioning on the Kay Williams records and on selected additional topics, 12 as well as follow-up'questions. Plaintiff claims in this that CHP's counsel has spent an 13 "inordinate" amount of time questioning Plainfiff about his marital problems, divorce, and 14 relationships with his adult children." (Motion for Protective Order, Memo, of Points & 15 Authorities, on file herein, at 4:8-11.) 16 In support of this argument. Plaintiff cites to pages 432-434 and 456-466 ofthe deposition .17 transcript, attached as Exhibit G to the Briscoe Declaration filed in support of that motion for a 18 protective order. (Ibid.) For ease of reference, copies of the condensed transcripts of the first 19 three sessions of Plaintiff s deposition, taken on August 12, August 19 and October 7, 2022, are 20 attached as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, respectively, to the Declaration of James F. Curran, filed in 21 support of the present Opposifion. 22 Examination of the first excerpt shows CHP's counsel asked Plaintiff basic facts about 23 which spouse, i.e.. Plaintiff or his former wife, filed for dissolution, the county in which the 24 dissolufion was finalized, and the date on which that happened. (Transcript, Exh. 3, Curran Dec, 25 pp. 423-424.) Questioning Plaintiff about these basic facts, arising out of his divorce, something 26 that for any person is the culmination of a highly stressful series of events, is reasonably 27 calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence of non-work-related emotional distress suffered by 28 4 Defendant's Opposition to PlaintifFs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019- 00265393) 1 Plaintiff. The qtaestioniiig to which Plaintiff points in the first excerpt is therefore within the 2 scope of discovery about Plaintiff s emotional distress damages. 3 Examination of the second excerpt shows Plaintiff testified that (1) he no longer has a 4 relationship with his son, Michael; (2) they are estranged; (3) this makes Plaintiff sad, and it is 5 distressing to Plaintiff; (4) he thinks about this unfortunate situation every day; (5) his ex-wife 6 never contributed to household expenses, causing Plaintiff to have to dip into his retirement 7 savings; (6) this was a point of contention between Plaintiff and his ex-wife; and (7) his ex- 8 wife's refusal to contribute to household expenses, despite the fact she earned more money as a 9 real estate agent than Plaintiff did as a CHP officer, was "very stressful" to Plaintiff." (Exh. 3, 10 Curran Dec, 459:10-466:3.) 11 CHP is entitled to discover whether Plaintiff suffers from einotional distress due to factors 12 other than CHP's alleged misconduct. Plaintiffs testimony on emotional distress caused by 13 family relationship problems is directly relevant to his claim for emofional distress damages. It 14 would be unfair for CHP to be prevented from eliciting this testimony or from presenting it, via 15 CHP's expert witnesses or otherwise, at trial, in order to counter Plainfiffs damages claims. 16 Furthermore, at no time during the questioning recorded in these two excerpts of the transcript did 17 Plaintiffs counsel object on the ground that any question asked by CHP's counsel was unduly 18 burdensome, embarrassing, or anything similar. (Transcript, Exh. 3, Curran Dec, 459:10-466:3.) 19 Indeed, Plaintiff cites to no individual question asked at any point during the first 2.5 sessions of 20 his deposition in response to which Plaintiffs counsel objected on the grounds that the question 21 was unduly burdensome, embarrassing, or the like. That is because CHP's counsel asked no such 22 questions. It becomes evident that Plaintiffs counsel is obstructing the deposition just to stall and 23 delay, as counsel has done repeatedly in this case by taking unreasonable and unsupported 24 positions conceming discovery. 25 III. T H E COURT SHOULD SANCTION PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S LAW FIRM FOR ATTEMPTING, IN BAD FAITH AND WITHOUT A N Y GOOD REASON, TO TERMINATE 26 PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION PREMATURELY 27 This Court should award CHP sanctions against Mayall, Hurley, et al., counsel for Plaintiff, 28 I for filing this motion without substantial justificafion, failing to confer about the issues presented 5 Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019- 00265393) 1 in good faith, and for misuse of the discover process. Section 2023.030, subdivision (a) states 2 that the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that any attorney advising the misuse of 3 the discovery process pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone 4 as a result of that.conduct. It also states that the court may impose this sanction on one 5 unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on 6 any attorney who advises that assertion, or on both. Finally, secfion 2023.030, subdivision (a) 7 provides that the court "shall" impose that sanction "unless itfindsthat the one subject to the 8 sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition ofthe 9 sanction unjust." 10 Here, the Mayall law firm misused the discovery process and did not act with substantial 11 justification when it cut off CHP's counsel's deposition questioning of Plaintiff and when it filed 12 this motion. Attorneys John Briscoe and Ali Meshiwala of that firm each defended one or more 13 of the sessions of Plaintiff s deposition that have taken place thus far. (Curran Dec, *ni 2-4.) 14 Both attorneys participated in unilaterally and arbitrarily shutting down the deposition after two 15 and one-half sessions with no good reason for doing so. (Ibid.) Therefore, this court should 16 award sancfions payable to CHP by the Mayall law firm in the amount of $880.00 to reimburse 17 CHP for the attorne;y fees it will incur as a result of defense counsel having to defend this motion. 18 (Curran Dec, p . ) 19 CONCLUSION 20 This Court should deny this motion and should order that Plaintiff David Ridge sit for one 21 additional session of his deposifion, not to exceed seven hours of examinafion fime, exclusive of 22 breaks, because CHP's counsel has the right to finish his deposition questioning. Plaintiff would 23 have the court cut the deposition short because Plaintiffs counsel's opinion is that the deposition 24 has taken too long. That opinion is not a valid ground for leiminating the deposition unilaterally. 25 The deposition questioning that has taken place thus far has been respectful and normal. 26 Plainfiffs counsel's argument that further questioning would be oppressive or embarrassing lacks 27 merit, as can be seen by the lack of objections to CHP's counsel's deposition questions and by the 28 questions, themselves. CHP's counsel should also be allowed to question Plainfiff about the 6 Defendant's Opposition to PlaintifFs Motion for Protective Order Terminating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019- 00265393) treatment records of Therapist Kay Williams, which records are the subject of a separate motion 2 to be heard simultaneously with this one. In forcing CHP to defend this motion for a protective 3 order, the Mayall law firm has engaged in misuse of the discovery process, and, if the court 4 denies this motion, will have unsuccessfully asserted that defense counsel has engaged in the 5 misuse of that process. Therefore, this court should award sanctions, pursuant to section 6 2023.030, subdivision (a), payable to CHP by the Mayall law firm in the amount of $880.00 lo .7 reimburse CHP for the attorney fees it will incur as a result of its counsel being forced to defend 8 this motion. (See Curran Dec, ^ 8.) 9 10 Dated: November 16, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 11 ROB BONTA Attorney. General of California 12 KRLSTIN M . DAILY Supervising Deputy Attorney General 13 14 15 JAMES F. CURRAN 16 Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Defendant 17 California Highway Patrol 18 SA2019106238 36714ll5.docx 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Temiinating Plaintiffs Deposition (34-2019- 00265393) DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mall Case Name: David Ridge v. CHP No,: 34-2019-00265393 I declare: I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is Ihe office of a member ofthe California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. 1 am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. 1 arn familiar with the business practice at the Office ofthe Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid thai same day in the ordinary course of, business. On November 16. 2022.1 served the attached DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TERMINATING PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system ofthe Office of the Attorney General, addressed as follows: John P. Briscoe Mayall Hurley P.C. E-mail Address: ibriscoefajmayallaw.com lrilev@,mavallaw.com 1 declare under penally of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America the foregoing is true and correct and lhal this declarafion was executed on November 16, 2022, al Sacramento, California. Christopher R. Irby S/ Christopher R. Irby Declarant Signature S/\2019I06238 3669126 i.docx