Preview
AC AITO
HHD CV 216142844-S
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST APPELLATE COURT
VS . HARTFORD, JD
MARK CICHY, ET AL JANUARY 13, 2023
MOTION FOR REVIEW _
Pursuant to PB secs. 66-6 and 61-14, the Defendants, Mark Cichy and Jody Horak,
move the Court to review the trial Court’s, Hon. Claudia Baio, order terminating the
appellate stay on January 03, 2023. The Defendants contend that the Court in making its
decision likely overlooked controlling principles of law.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is a civil foreclosure matter that was brought in the Hartford Superior Court and
following the entry of judgment, the Defendant Horak, co owner of the property, filed a
motion to open and the same was denied. The committee filed a motion to accept deed and
confirm the sale within the appeal period and also filed a motion for possession. Following,
the acceptance of the committee deed, the Defendant, Cichy, filed a motion to vacate its
order accepting the deed. While that motion was pending, Horak filed a motion to open. ,
The Court denied the same and terminated the appellate stay prospéctively. This motion for
review ensues. Additional facts will
be set forth as necessary.
LEGAL GROUNDS
This motion is being brought pursuant to PB secs. 66-6 and 61-14.
ARGUMENT
A. THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT A
DEFENDANT HORAK, DESPITE HAVING AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE
. PROPERTY, DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO REDEEM.
ade
YrThis Defendant, Jody Horak, is a part owner of the property being foreclosed and
has a right to redeem. To further qualify this contention, the Defendant points to JP_
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winthrop Properties LLC, 312 Conn. 662, 682 (2014), wherein
the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he right of a redemption in a foreclosure action is
premised on possessing an interest in the property. General Statutes §§ 49-19 and 49-20
create a right of redemption only for the owner in equity and subsequent encumbrancers.”
Id. Therefore, Horak has the requisite standing to seek redress for any misconduct of the
mortgagee that unnecessarily increases the underlying mortgage debt.
B.THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO OPEN IS UNTIMELY AND FAILED TO ADDRESS
THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION IN LIGHT OF
THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION FOR POSSESSION DURING THE APPEAL
PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF CGS SEC. 49-26.
Following the denial of the Defendant's, Horak, motion to open, an appellate stay
was in effect. The committee filed its motion to soon and more importantly the trial Court
granted the committee’s motion for possession during the appeal period in violation.of CGS
sec. 49-26. See Trustee v. Morgan, 98 Conn.App. 72, 909 A.2d 526 (2006). Following the
acceptance of the committee deed on September 1, 2022, the Defendant timely filed a
Practice Book sec. 63-1 motion within the appeal period, which tolls the time within which to
appeal. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to open the judgment under its continuing
’ jurisdiction powers. Counsel for. the Defendant brought it to the Court's attention that the
Court also has continuing jurisdiction because the Plaintiff failed to comply with the
mandatory foreclosure standing orders contained in JD CV. 79. The Plaintiff failed to include
the mandatory language in the notice of judgment as it pertains to the terms of the
judgment. On this basis, the Court retains jurisdiction to vindicate its judgments and to
ensure that the terms of its judgments are complied with by the parties. See WellsFargoBank, NA v. Michael John Melahn, et al, 148 Conn.App 1, 9, 85 A.3d 1 (2014). Of concern
is the Plaintiffs contention that the standing orders do not apply to mortgagors because
they are the only ones who are owners of the “equity” and therefore, it does not apply to
Horak, who is not on the note. The Court finds merit with this contention. The Defendant
disagrees as the standing orders are for all non appearing Defendants having an interest in
the proceeding. Additionally, the Defendants contend that they have a right to seek redress
as the circumstances may require under Practice Book sec. 10-10. The trial Court failed to
take into consideration that the post judgment conduct being complained of as set forth in
the motion to open could also form a basis fora complete defense to the foreclosure action.
See US Bank v. Blowers, 332 Conn. 675, 212 A.3d 226 (2019) (‘When a mortgagee’s
conduct is inequitable, a trial court in foreclosure proceeding has discretion to withhold
foreclosure. ..”) (Emphasis added).Id. In an equitable matter, “the trial court may examine
all relevant factors to ensure that complete justice is done.”
C. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN
DECIDING AN ISSUE DEALING WITH A PARTY’S MOTIVE, INTENT, AND
SUBJECTIVE FEELINGS AND REACTIONS.
“Our Supreme Court has stated that the ‘summary judgment procedure is particularly
inappropriate where the inferences which the parties seek to have drawn deal with
questions of motive, intent and subjective feelings and reactions. ......” Barasso v: Rear Still
Hill Road, LLC 81 Conn.App 798 , 806, 842 A.2d 1134 (2004), citing Urban Oil Co. v Urban
Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 376, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). As applied here,
the trial Court summarily decided issues affecting the Defendant’s motive, intent and
subjective feelings and reactions with an evidentiary hearing. The Plaintiff relied
on motions filed on behalf of the Defendant Cichy by his former attorney, where he claims ,that he wanted the foreclosure to come to an end. That motion however, does not tell the
reason for Cichy’s position. Cichy contends that he was mistaken and was led to believe by
_ the Plaintiff that a foreclosure would not affect him. Cichy also was frustrated because he
repeatedly sent submissions to the Plaintiff for loss mitigation, and the Plaintiff/Servicer
‘repeatedly would either lose the documents or require that he resubmit paperwork that was
already submitted by Cichy. Cichy also found out that a foreclosure, despite
representations by Plaintiff, has collateral consequences. The trial Court refused to allow a
hearing for Cichy to testify as to these issues affecting his basis for seeking to open the
judgment and to also explain to the Court what misinformation he previously believed.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants have presented non frivolous arguments that are supported by law.
Further, the errors identified above should be addressed as a matter of public concern.
One, at a minimum, cannot have a finding/decision that an owner has no right to redeem
and that an owner is not entitled to notice of the judgment as set forth in JD CV 79. The
Court's finding that it does not have continuing jurisdiction is an error that will not likely
withstand judicial scrutiny. As a consequence, the Court should grant Defendants’ motion
for review and vacate the Court’s order terminating the Appellate stay.
Appellant
BY: _/S/422954
John A. Sodipo, Esq.
Sodipo Law Group PC
Juris# 424064
120 Oxford Street .
Hartford, CT 06105
Tel: (860) 233-2245
Fax: (860) 233-8436
john@sodipolg.comCERTIFICATION
Itis certified that pursuant to PB. Sec. 62-7 on January 13, 2023, a copy of the
foregoing was sent to: GlaSs & Braus LLC, 25 Lindbergh Street, Fairfield, CT 06824;
Phone 203-371-2213, fax. 203-371-2962; email jessica@glassbraus.com; juris
4046340; and Joseph M Busher, 433 Silas Deane Highway, Wethersfield, CT 06109;
Juris 413185; phone 860-278-4040; fax 860-527-2500;email
pleadings@jacksonokeefe.com.; and Kevin B Carroll, 2 Congress Street 2nd Floor,
Hartford, CT 06114; Juris 404553; phone 860-288-8678; fax 860-629-881 5;email
attykevincarol@gmail.com.
The Appellant also certifies that the foregoing complies with Connecticut Practice
Book Sec. 63-3 and also certifies that the foregoing satisfies the redaction rules and
does not contain any information that is prohibited under the rules of the court and
applicable statute:
1S1 422954
John Sodipo, Esq.APPENDIX
Trial Court’s Order Granting Motion to Terminate Appellate Stay ...ORDER 439589
. DOCKET NO: HHDCV216142844S SUPERIOR COURT
CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD
2020-RP2 AT HARTFORD
Vv.
CICHY, MARK Et Al 1/3/2023
ORDER
ORDER REGARDING:
12/09/2022 189.00 MOTION FOR ORDER.
The foregoing, having been considered by the Court, is hereby:
ORDER: GRANTED
The parties appeared in the virtual courtroom on December 27, 2022 to argue this motion to terminate
stay, as well as other motions. The plaintiff brings this motion, pursuant to Practice Book §61-11(d) and
(e), seeking a termination of stay for any appeal that may be filed in this matter. The plaintiff submits
that given the history of this matter and the motions filed by defense counsel, that any appeal, if pursued,
would and could only be for the purposes of delay and that the due administration of justice so requires a
termination of stay. The defendants object.
Pursuant to Practice Book §61-11(d), “[a] termination of stay may be granted ‘[i]f the judge who tried
the case is of the opinion that (1) an extension to appeal is sought, or the appeal is taken, only for delay
or (2) the due administration of justice so requires.’ It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine
whether due administration of justice warrants the termination of the stay of execution. See Northeastern
Gas Transmission Co. v. Benedict, 139 Conn. 36 (1952).” TPF Development Co. Inc. v. R.& R Pool &
Home Inc., NWH-CV-18-6003590-S, 2019 WL 7459625, 1 (May 23, 2019, Spader, J.); See also
Connecticut National Bank v. Zuckerman, 31 Conn. App. 440, 624 A.2d 1163 (1993).
Practice Book §61-11 (e) provides that: “[a] motion to terminate a stay of execution filed before
judgment is entered shall be filed with the trial court, and the judge who tried presided over the matter
may rule upon the motion when judgment is entered. If such a motion is filed after judgment but before
an appeal is filed, the motion shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and may be ruled upon by the
trial judge thereafter.”
The factors to be considered in determining whether to grant a motion to terminate stay are: (1) the
irreparable ability of the prospective harm to the applicant; (2) the effect of the delay on the other parties
as well as the public interest; (3) the likelihood that the appeal will ultimately be successful. Griffin
Hospital v. Commission-on Hospitals and Healthcare, 196 Conn. 451, 458-60, 493 A.2d 229 (1985).
The bases for the plaintiff's claims have been set forth by the plaintiff in its memorandum in support of
its motion to terminate stay as well as on the record at the oral argument held before this court on
December 27, 2022. In this matter, the court agrees with the plaintiff that the appeal has been brought
solely for purposes of delay. The court further finds that the due administration of justice warrants
termination of the stay. The court finds that all factors to be considered in determining a motion to
terminate stay way in favor of the plaintiff.
’ The court finds the plaintiffs arguments as it relates to each of those elements to be well-founded. The
plaintiff has demonstrated that it is being irreparably harmed. In addition to the arguments set forth in
the plaintiff's argument, the successful bidder, who bears the status of intervening plaintiff, has
expressed increasing frustration over the continued delays in claiming his rightful possession in this
matter in which judgment entered on February 28, 2022 and the sale took place following judgment on
HHDCV216142844S 1/3/2023 Page 1 of 3
Althe sale date of May 21, 2022; the sale was thereafter approved on September 1, 2022. The plaintiff
correctly notes-that despite a prior motion to open judgment (filed by Horak only as Cichy through
counsel expressly stated his desire for the sale to proceed) having been denied in various other motions
along the way, no appeal has been filed specifically either to the May 20, 2022 denial of the first motion
to open nor the September 1, 2022 granting of the committee’s motion for approval of the committee
sale. There have been a number of pleadings filed, some of which arguably should not have been
considered by the court.
In evaluating the effect of the delay on other parties and public policy, most notable is the concern
expressed by the successful bidder who, through counsel on the record, indicated a desire to have his
deposit returned if this matter cannot come to conclusion. It was represented on the record that the
intervening plaintiff/successful bidder has his own loan and expenses of ownership of a house that he is
not permitted to take possession of because of the continued pleadings in this matter. While-certainly
there are legitimate delays that may occur along the way in foreclosure matters, the record in this case
reflects a legitimate basis for the third-party bidder’s concern and position. Additionally, plaintiff's
counsel has correctly noted that the committee has not been paid despite the fact that the money was
deposited with the court there has been no challenge to the approval of his fees or costs.
There is also a significant concern with regard to the impact on the public interest. “Generally, courts
recognize a compelling interest in the finality of judgments which should not lightly be disregarded.
Finality of litigation is essential so the parties may rely on judgments in ordering their private affairs and
so that the moral force of the court judgments will not be undermined.) Federal National Mortgage
Association v. Farina, 182 Conn. App. 844, 854, 191 A.3d 206 (2018).
Finally, the court must consider the likelihood that the defendants would be successful on appeal. The
plaintiff again has correctly articulated the issue as it relates to the numerous motions that have been just
recently filed by the defendants over the course of the last several months of this matter, some of which
are duplicative and seek to raise defenses that were not raised prior to judgment having been rendered in
this matter by either the defendant who carried the debt, Cichy, or defendant Horak. All of the motions at
issue contain at best collateral attacks on the underlying judgment(entered on February 28, 2022); such
collateral attacks are not allowed. Federal National Mortgage Association v. Farina, supra, 852-853 (“[F]
inal judgments are ... presumptively valid ... and collateral attacks on their validity are disfavored.... The
reason for the rule against collateral attack is well stated in these words: The law aims to invest judicial
transactions with the utmost permanency consistent with justice.... Public policy requires that a term be
put to litigation and that judgments, as solemn records upon which valuable rights rest, should not
lightly be disturbed or overthrown.... [T]he law has established appropriate proceedings to which a
judgment party may always resort when he deems himself wronged by the court's decision... If he omits
or neglects to test the soundness of the judgment by these or other direct methods available for that
purpose, he is in no position to urge its defective or erroneous character when it is pleaded or produced
in evidence against him in subsequent proceedings. Unless it is entirely invalid and that fact is disclosed
by an inspection of the record itself the judgment is invulnerable to indirect assaults upon it.” (Citation
omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 771, 143
A.3d 578 (2016).” )
The court does not take lightly the determination of whether an appeal has been brought solely for
purposes of delay. The court recognizes that the evaluation must be made in a detached manner. In this
matter, however, for the reasons set forth herein as well as those articulated by the plaintiff in its motion
and at oral argument which the court finds sound, and upon reviewing all of the factors, the Court finds
they balance toward the Plaintiff and therefore finds that the due administration of justice requires it to
terminate the stay in this matter.
Based on the Court's findings including that the due administration of justice requires it to lift the stay,
the motion is granted.
Judicial Notice (JDNO) was sent regarding this order.
HHDCV2161428448 1/3/2023 Page 2 of 3
A2439589
Judge: CLAUDIA A BAJO
This document may be signed or verified electronically and has the same validity and status as a document with a physical
(pen-to-paper) signature. For more information, see Section LE. of the State of Connecticut Superior Court E-Services
Procedures and Technical Standards (littps://jud.ct.gov/external/super/E-Services/e-standards. pdf), section 51-193c of the
Connecticut General Statutes and Connecticut Practice Book Section 4-4.
HHDCV2161428448 1/3/2023 : Page 3 of 3
. A3
Preview
AC AITO HHD CV 216142844-S CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST APPELLATE COURT VS . HARTFORD, JD MARK CICHY, ET AL JANUARY 13, 2023 MOTION FOR REVIEW _ Pursuant to PB secs. 66-6 and 61-14, the Defendants, Mark Cichy and Jody Horak, move the Court to review the trial Court’s, Hon. Claudia Baio, order terminating the appellate stay on January 03, 2023. The Defendants contend that the Court in making its decision likely overlooked controlling principles of law. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This is a civil foreclosure matter that was brought in the Hartford Superior Court and following the entry of judgment, the Defendant Horak, co owner of the property, filed a motion to open and the same was denied. The committee filed a motion to accept deed and confirm the sale within the appeal period and also filed a motion for possession. Following, the acceptance of the committee deed, the Defendant, Cichy, filed a motion to vacate its order accepting the deed. While that motion was pending, Horak filed a motion to open. , The Court denied the same and terminated the appellate stay prospéctively. This motion for review ensues. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. LEGAL GROUNDS This motion is being brought pursuant to PB secs. 66-6 and 61-14. ARGUMENT A. THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT A DEFENDANT HORAK, DESPITE HAVING AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE . PROPERTY, DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO REDEEM. ade YrThis Defendant, Jody Horak, is a part owner of the property being foreclosed and has a right to redeem. To further qualify this contention, the Defendant points to JP_ Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winthrop Properties LLC, 312 Conn. 662, 682 (2014), wherein the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he right of a redemption in a foreclosure action is premised on possessing an interest in the property. General Statutes §§ 49-19 and 49-20 create a right of redemption only for the owner in equity and subsequent encumbrancers.” Id. Therefore, Horak has the requisite standing to seek redress for any misconduct of the mortgagee that unnecessarily increases the underlying mortgage debt. B.THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO OPEN IS UNTIMELY AND FAILED TO ADDRESS THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION IN LIGHT OF THE GRANTING OF THE MOTION FOR POSSESSION DURING THE APPEAL PERIOD IN VIOLATION OF CGS SEC. 49-26. Following the denial of the Defendant's, Horak, motion to open, an appellate stay was in effect. The committee filed its motion to soon and more importantly the trial Court granted the committee’s motion for possession during the appeal period in violation.of CGS sec. 49-26. See Trustee v. Morgan, 98 Conn.App. 72, 909 A.2d 526 (2006). Following the acceptance of the committee deed on September 1, 2022, the Defendant timely filed a Practice Book sec. 63-1 motion within the appeal period, which tolls the time within which to appeal. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to open the judgment under its continuing ’ jurisdiction powers. Counsel for. the Defendant brought it to the Court's attention that the Court also has continuing jurisdiction because the Plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory foreclosure standing orders contained in JD CV. 79. The Plaintiff failed to include the mandatory language in the notice of judgment as it pertains to the terms of the judgment. On this basis, the Court retains jurisdiction to vindicate its judgments and to ensure that the terms of its judgments are complied with by the parties. See WellsFargoBank, NA v. Michael John Melahn, et al, 148 Conn.App 1, 9, 85 A.3d 1 (2014). Of concern is the Plaintiffs contention that the standing orders do not apply to mortgagors because they are the only ones who are owners of the “equity” and therefore, it does not apply to Horak, who is not on the note. The Court finds merit with this contention. The Defendant disagrees as the standing orders are for all non appearing Defendants having an interest in the proceeding. Additionally, the Defendants contend that they have a right to seek redress as the circumstances may require under Practice Book sec. 10-10. The trial Court failed to take into consideration that the post judgment conduct being complained of as set forth in the motion to open could also form a basis fora complete defense to the foreclosure action. See US Bank v. Blowers, 332 Conn. 675, 212 A.3d 226 (2019) (‘When a mortgagee’s conduct is inequitable, a trial court in foreclosure proceeding has discretion to withhold foreclosure. ..”) (Emphasis added).Id. In an equitable matter, “the trial court may examine all relevant factors to ensure that complete justice is done.” C. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN DECIDING AN ISSUE DEALING WITH A PARTY’S MOTIVE, INTENT, AND SUBJECTIVE FEELINGS AND REACTIONS. “Our Supreme Court has stated that the ‘summary judgment procedure is particularly inappropriate where the inferences which the parties seek to have drawn deal with questions of motive, intent and subjective feelings and reactions. ......” Barasso v: Rear Still Hill Road, LLC 81 Conn.App 798 , 806, 842 A.2d 1134 (2004), citing Urban Oil Co. v Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 376, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). As applied here, the trial Court summarily decided issues affecting the Defendant’s motive, intent and subjective feelings and reactions with an evidentiary hearing. The Plaintiff relied on motions filed on behalf of the Defendant Cichy by his former attorney, where he claims ,that he wanted the foreclosure to come to an end. That motion however, does not tell the reason for Cichy’s position. Cichy contends that he was mistaken and was led to believe by _ the Plaintiff that a foreclosure would not affect him. Cichy also was frustrated because he repeatedly sent submissions to the Plaintiff for loss mitigation, and the Plaintiff/Servicer ‘repeatedly would either lose the documents or require that he resubmit paperwork that was already submitted by Cichy. Cichy also found out that a foreclosure, despite representations by Plaintiff, has collateral consequences. The trial Court refused to allow a hearing for Cichy to testify as to these issues affecting his basis for seeking to open the judgment and to also explain to the Court what misinformation he previously believed. CONCLUSION The Defendants have presented non frivolous arguments that are supported by law. Further, the errors identified above should be addressed as a matter of public concern. One, at a minimum, cannot have a finding/decision that an owner has no right to redeem and that an owner is not entitled to notice of the judgment as set forth in JD CV 79. The Court's finding that it does not have continuing jurisdiction is an error that will not likely withstand judicial scrutiny. As a consequence, the Court should grant Defendants’ motion for review and vacate the Court’s order terminating the Appellate stay. Appellant BY: _/S/422954 John A. Sodipo, Esq. Sodipo Law Group PC Juris# 424064 120 Oxford Street . Hartford, CT 06105 Tel: (860) 233-2245 Fax: (860) 233-8436 john@sodipolg.comCERTIFICATION Itis certified that pursuant to PB. Sec. 62-7 on January 13, 2023, a copy of the foregoing was sent to: GlaSs & Braus LLC, 25 Lindbergh Street, Fairfield, CT 06824; Phone 203-371-2213, fax. 203-371-2962; email jessica@glassbraus.com; juris 4046340; and Joseph M Busher, 433 Silas Deane Highway, Wethersfield, CT 06109; Juris 413185; phone 860-278-4040; fax 860-527-2500;email pleadings@jacksonokeefe.com.; and Kevin B Carroll, 2 Congress Street 2nd Floor, Hartford, CT 06114; Juris 404553; phone 860-288-8678; fax 860-629-881 5;email attykevincarol@gmail.com. The Appellant also certifies that the foregoing complies with Connecticut Practice Book Sec. 63-3 and also certifies that the foregoing satisfies the redaction rules and does not contain any information that is prohibited under the rules of the court and applicable statute: 1S1 422954 John Sodipo, Esq.APPENDIX Trial Court’s Order Granting Motion to Terminate Appellate Stay ...ORDER 439589 . DOCKET NO: HHDCV216142844S SUPERIOR COURT CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD 2020-RP2 AT HARTFORD Vv. CICHY, MARK Et Al 1/3/2023 ORDER ORDER REGARDING: 12/09/2022 189.00 MOTION FOR ORDER. The foregoing, having been considered by the Court, is hereby: ORDER: GRANTED The parties appeared in the virtual courtroom on December 27, 2022 to argue this motion to terminate stay, as well as other motions. The plaintiff brings this motion, pursuant to Practice Book §61-11(d) and (e), seeking a termination of stay for any appeal that may be filed in this matter. The plaintiff submits that given the history of this matter and the motions filed by defense counsel, that any appeal, if pursued, would and could only be for the purposes of delay and that the due administration of justice so requires a termination of stay. The defendants object. Pursuant to Practice Book §61-11(d), “[a] termination of stay may be granted ‘[i]f the judge who tried the case is of the opinion that (1) an extension to appeal is sought, or the appeal is taken, only for delay or (2) the due administration of justice so requires.’ It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether due administration of justice warrants the termination of the stay of execution. See Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Benedict, 139 Conn. 36 (1952).” TPF Development Co. Inc. v. R.& R Pool & Home Inc., NWH-CV-18-6003590-S, 2019 WL 7459625, 1 (May 23, 2019, Spader, J.); See also Connecticut National Bank v. Zuckerman, 31 Conn. App. 440, 624 A.2d 1163 (1993). Practice Book §61-11 (e) provides that: “[a] motion to terminate a stay of execution filed before judgment is entered shall be filed with the trial court, and the judge who tried presided over the matter may rule upon the motion when judgment is entered. If such a motion is filed after judgment but before an appeal is filed, the motion shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and may be ruled upon by the trial judge thereafter.” The factors to be considered in determining whether to grant a motion to terminate stay are: (1) the irreparable ability of the prospective harm to the applicant; (2) the effect of the delay on the other parties as well as the public interest; (3) the likelihood that the appeal will ultimately be successful. Griffin Hospital v. Commission-on Hospitals and Healthcare, 196 Conn. 451, 458-60, 493 A.2d 229 (1985). The bases for the plaintiff's claims have been set forth by the plaintiff in its memorandum in support of its motion to terminate stay as well as on the record at the oral argument held before this court on December 27, 2022. In this matter, the court agrees with the plaintiff that the appeal has been brought solely for purposes of delay. The court further finds that the due administration of justice warrants termination of the stay. The court finds that all factors to be considered in determining a motion to terminate stay way in favor of the plaintiff. ’ The court finds the plaintiffs arguments as it relates to each of those elements to be well-founded. The plaintiff has demonstrated that it is being irreparably harmed. In addition to the arguments set forth in the plaintiff's argument, the successful bidder, who bears the status of intervening plaintiff, has expressed increasing frustration over the continued delays in claiming his rightful possession in this matter in which judgment entered on February 28, 2022 and the sale took place following judgment on HHDCV216142844S 1/3/2023 Page 1 of 3 Althe sale date of May 21, 2022; the sale was thereafter approved on September 1, 2022. The plaintiff correctly notes-that despite a prior motion to open judgment (filed by Horak only as Cichy through counsel expressly stated his desire for the sale to proceed) having been denied in various other motions along the way, no appeal has been filed specifically either to the May 20, 2022 denial of the first motion to open nor the September 1, 2022 granting of the committee’s motion for approval of the committee sale. There have been a number of pleadings filed, some of which arguably should not have been considered by the court. In evaluating the effect of the delay on other parties and public policy, most notable is the concern expressed by the successful bidder who, through counsel on the record, indicated a desire to have his deposit returned if this matter cannot come to conclusion. It was represented on the record that the intervening plaintiff/successful bidder has his own loan and expenses of ownership of a house that he is not permitted to take possession of because of the continued pleadings in this matter. While-certainly there are legitimate delays that may occur along the way in foreclosure matters, the record in this case reflects a legitimate basis for the third-party bidder’s concern and position. Additionally, plaintiff's counsel has correctly noted that the committee has not been paid despite the fact that the money was deposited with the court there has been no challenge to the approval of his fees or costs. There is also a significant concern with regard to the impact on the public interest. “Generally, courts recognize a compelling interest in the finality of judgments which should not lightly be disregarded. Finality of litigation is essential so the parties may rely on judgments in ordering their private affairs and so that the moral force of the court judgments will not be undermined.) Federal National Mortgage Association v. Farina, 182 Conn. App. 844, 854, 191 A.3d 206 (2018). Finally, the court must consider the likelihood that the defendants would be successful on appeal. The plaintiff again has correctly articulated the issue as it relates to the numerous motions that have been just recently filed by the defendants over the course of the last several months of this matter, some of which are duplicative and seek to raise defenses that were not raised prior to judgment having been rendered in this matter by either the defendant who carried the debt, Cichy, or defendant Horak. All of the motions at issue contain at best collateral attacks on the underlying judgment(entered on February 28, 2022); such collateral attacks are not allowed. Federal National Mortgage Association v. Farina, supra, 852-853 (“[F] inal judgments are ... presumptively valid ... and collateral attacks on their validity are disfavored.... The reason for the rule against collateral attack is well stated in these words: The law aims to invest judicial transactions with the utmost permanency consistent with justice.... Public policy requires that a term be put to litigation and that judgments, as solemn records upon which valuable rights rest, should not lightly be disturbed or overthrown.... [T]he law has established appropriate proceedings to which a judgment party may always resort when he deems himself wronged by the court's decision... If he omits or neglects to test the soundness of the judgment by these or other direct methods available for that purpose, he is in no position to urge its defective or erroneous character when it is pleaded or produced in evidence against him in subsequent proceedings. Unless it is entirely invalid and that fact is disclosed by an inspection of the record itself the judgment is invulnerable to indirect assaults upon it.” (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 771, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).” ) The court does not take lightly the determination of whether an appeal has been brought solely for purposes of delay. The court recognizes that the evaluation must be made in a detached manner. In this matter, however, for the reasons set forth herein as well as those articulated by the plaintiff in its motion and at oral argument which the court finds sound, and upon reviewing all of the factors, the Court finds they balance toward the Plaintiff and therefore finds that the due administration of justice requires it to terminate the stay in this matter. Based on the Court's findings including that the due administration of justice requires it to lift the stay, the motion is granted. Judicial Notice (JDNO) was sent regarding this order. HHDCV2161428448 1/3/2023 Page 2 of 3 A2439589 Judge: CLAUDIA A BAJO This document may be signed or verified electronically and has the same validity and status as a document with a physical (pen-to-paper) signature. For more information, see Section LE. of the State of Connecticut Superior Court E-Services Procedures and Technical Standards (littps://jud.ct.gov/external/super/E-Services/e-standards. pdf), section 51-193c of the Connecticut General Statutes and Connecticut Practice Book Section 4-4. HHDCV2161428448 1/3/2023 : Page 3 of 3 . A3