arrow left
arrow right
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
  • Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 TrustTorts - Adult Survivors Act document preview
						
                                

Preview

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2023 08:38 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2023 Plaintiff Cheri Pierson, by and through her undersigned counsel, hereby submits this reply memorandum of law in support of Plaintiff’s cross-motion for the recovery of fees and costs against Leon Black (“Black” or “Defendant”) and his counsel Perry Guha LLP (“Perry Guha”) 1, for their submission of a baseless motion for sanctions against Plaintiff and Wigdor LLP (“Wigdor”). 2 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT On December 16, 2022, Black and his lawyers filed a motion under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 seeking sanctions against Wigdor. Dkt. No.10. This motion is a carbon copy of a motion filed the same day in the Ganieva Action. The frivolity of their request for sanctions here is evident in this mirror image motion, which in response to the cross-motion does not even attempt to explain how Wigdor’s conduct can be sanctioned based on another action, the Ganieva Action, pending before the Hon. David Cohen. Purportedly based on conduct engaged in the Ganieva Action, Black and his lawyers believe that such conduct is transferred to Ms. Pierson’s case. This is wrong. Flouting all adherence to the CPLR, they simply submit a motion filed in another, separate case, and expect the Court to waste time and resources adjudicating such nonsense. As a result, Wigdor filed a cross-motion for fees and costs associated with having to respond to their motion and file a cross- 1 Perry Guha is lead counsel for Black in the case filed by Guzel Ganieva and represents Black in this action. Ganieva v. Black, No. 155262/2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed June 1, 2021) (the “Ganieva Action”). Unless otherwise specified, all references to Black’s counsel herein means Perry Guha and includes co-counsel Michael Carlinsky and Jennifer Barrett of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Susan Estrich of Estrich Golden LLP (pro hac vice motion pending). 2 On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action. To date, no defendant has answered or otherwise moved. By stipulation, the date to respond is January 17, 2023 for Defendants the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (“Estate”), the 1953 Trust (“The Trust”), Darren K. Indyke (“Indyke”) and Richard D. Kahn (“Kahn”), in their capacities as the Executors for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, and Administrators of the 1953 Trust (collectively “the Epstein Defendants”). The date for Defendant Black to respond is February 1, 2023. 1 1 of 7 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2023 08:38 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2023 motion. Black, a billionaire with time and money to spend, cares nothing about making the Court or other lawyers expend resources on frivolous motions. Knowing that any award ordered by the Court in favor of Wigdor will be meaningless to him, Black has done what 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 expressly prohibits, filed a motion to harass, harm and victim-shame a woman who has alleged that he sexually assaulted and raped her. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, Wigdor is entitled to recover their costs in the form of their legal fees. See e.g., Mascia v. Maresco, 39 A.D.3d 504, 506 (2d Dept. 2007); Heilbut v. Heilbut, 18 A.D.3d 1, 7 (1st Dept. 2005). In their opposition in response to the cross-motion, Black and Perry Guha simply use the exact same memorandum of law filed in the Ganieva Action and submit ithere. Other than changing “Ganieva” to “Pierson” several times, there is no attempt to oppose why Wigdor’s cross- motion should not be granted. ARGUMENT I. IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE CROSS-MOTION, BLACK AND PERRY GUHA DO NOT ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS MS. PIERSON’S ARGUMENTS On December 28, 2022, Ms. Pierson submitted her opposition and included a cross-motion for fees and costs. Dkt. Nos. 50-51. Numerous arguments were raised in her memorandum of law about why Wigdor is entitled to recover their fees that apparently Black and Perry Guha did not believe they needed to respond to. First, there was no justification for how or why attaching hundreds of pages of information about Ms. Pierson’s past history involving other disputes supports their sanctions motion rather than Wigdor’s cross-motion. The sole explanation is a single sentence, “Plaintiff offers no explanation for why Black should be sanctioned for filing publicly available information in a lawsuit Wigdor commenced to advance its own self- promotional agenda.” Dkt. No. 61 at 12. Ms. Pierson’s past civil dispute history has nothing to do with Black or any named Defendant. Absolutely nothing contained therein is anything other 2 2 of 7 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2023 08:38 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2023 than a blatant attempt to embarrass or otherwise demean Ms. Pierson. Using such information as grounds for alleging improper conduct against Wigdor, for purposes of seeking relief under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is outrageous and no case law in support of their suggestion. Black and Perry Guha fail to account for this extraordinary victim-shaming, and Wigdor is entitled to be reimbursed for responding to a motion filed to harass the Plaintiff. Second, in their opposition, Black and his counsel ignore any explanation for presenting an inherently contradictory basis for their sanctions motion involving the bogus claim that Wigdor acted improperly to create a “financial windfall” despite never making any monetary demands to Black prior to commencing the litigation for Ms. Pierson (or Ms. Ganieva). See Dkt. No. 11 at 20 (“Wigdor … engaging in a campaign of harassment in an improper effort to leverage a financial windfall for itself and its clients.”) This is absurd. Although Black had the opportunity to explain this contradiction in his opposition, the argument was ignored completely. See Dkt. No. 51 at 4-5 (“According to Black’s theory, the fact that Wigdor never sought to obtain money from Black prior to filing Ms. Ganieva’s (and Ms. Pierson’s) lawsuits proves that it is motived by a desire to seek money… The fact that Perry Guha signed on to support Black in the filing of such a knowingly meritless motion warrants sanctions imposed against the firm.”) Third, in their opposition to the cross-motion, Black and his counsel assert the following as a basis for why they should not be held accountable: “Black’s Motion establishes Wigdor has engaged in a methodical pattern of filing false and unsubstantiated litigation against Black in an attempt to harass him and destroy his reputation.” Dkt. No. 61 at 12. Evidently, Black believes that because Wigdor represents two victims who both allege he violently sexually assaulted them, and because he considers such allegations as attempts to “harass him,” he is emboldened to engage in retaliatory motion practice against Ms. Pierson and her counsel. 3 3 of 7 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2023 08:38 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2023 Unquestionably, Black and Perry Guha filed a motion that they knew was baseless and intended solely to harm and harass Ms. Pierson. Truly, if the sanctions were intended against Wigdor only, which they claim, why attach any information about Ms. Pierson’s prior litigation? In their opposition to the cross-motion, not one case was offered to support their disgusting theory that Wigdor failed to conduct due diligence pre-filing because Ms. Pierson had been involved in prior civil disputes. There is no such case, and their argument that Wigdor should have doubted their client’s “reliability as a witness,” has no justification. Dkt. No. 61 at 9. This victim-shaming behavior is horrid, and Perry Guha and Black only further solidify their willingness to label women who dare to come forward as destroyers of the #MeToo movement. Contrary to their opposition, there is nothing improper about Wigdor’s notice of a cross- motion to request costs for having to respond to a frivolous motion filed solely to harm and harass the Plaintiff. Indeed, courts grant such cross-motions when it is clear that no viable grounds under New York law exists for filing a frivolous motion. A court’s authority to levy sanctions is limited to what is “sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct.” See Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, Black and his counsel must be deterred from transferring his retaliation and bullying from the Ganieva Action onto Ms. Pierson’s case, and whatever is sufficient to deter him going forward must be imposed by the Court. In their opposition, there is no accountability for yet another groundless basis for their motion – that Wigdor filed Ms. Pierson’s case improperly because Wigdor’s website contains references to its work on behalf of victims under the recently enacted Adult Survivor’s Act (“ASA”). Absolutely no attempt to refute this is provided because Black and Perry Guha know that Perry Guha itself seeks publicity of their own in connection with the ASA. Again, rather than 4 4 of 7 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2023 08:38 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2023 attempting to justify why they should not be sanctioned for putting forth a nonsensical argument in their motion, Black and his counsel simply ignore it in the opposition knowing that information on a law firm’s website about notable cases has nothing to do with a motion claiming that counsel presented “factual falsities” in a complaint. 3 Finally, although raised by Wigdor, Black and his counsel provide no clarification about their decision to file a Request for Judicial Intervention but not mark Ms. Pierson’s case as related to the Ganieva Action. Given that they filed almost the same exact motion in both cases and rely almost exclusively on the history of the Ganieva Action in the request for sanctions in this case, the avoidance of the issue in the opposition to the cross-motion shows that they wish to engage in judicial forum shopping. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Black recently filed a new separate action against Ms. Ganieva and Wigdor rather than submitting counterclaims in the Ganieva Action. See Leon Black v. Guzel Ganieva, et al, Index No. 654108/2022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), filed October 31, 2022. II. BLACK’S PROPOSITION THAT HE HAS “PROOF” THAT HE DID NOTHING WRONG IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE TO FILE A MOTION UNDER 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 As in the Ganieva Action, Wigdor is entitled to reimbursement of their costs because Perry Guha and Black based their motion on an incorrect belief that material facts in dispute warrant sanctions. Such a proposition on its face is sanctionable. As evident, Black repeatedly claims only that he and his lawyers “told” Wigdor about what he says is proof but is nothing more than his dispute of the allegations, and because Wigdor failed to dismiss the Ganieva Action, sanctions are warranted. In the face of the cross-motion as to these utterly pointless claims, which are nothing 3 See https://www.perryguha.com/media; https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/our- notable-victories/. 5 5 of 7 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2023 08:38 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2023 more than what Black believes happened versus what Ms. Ganieva said happened (and again, this is about conduct having nothing to do with Ms. Pierson), nothing is offered in opposition other than the same original statements showing Black is bending the law far beyond the bounds. Not a single decision under New York law is offered which supports the proposition that material facts in dispute can form the basis of a motion for sanctions. Indeed, to submit his motion, Black and his lawyers willfully refused to accept that his protests of falsity do nothing more than show that this is a case where, presumably, when it is time to answer or otherwise respond, Black will dispute the allegations. To submit a motion for sanctions claiming that Ms. Pierson’s Complaint contains “false facts” based on the proceedings thus far in the Ganieva Action is blatantly frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, and Black and Perry Guha have wasted the Court’s resources and harmed Ms. Pierson by engaging in such frivolous conduct. III. CASES CITED BY BLACK AND HIS COUNSEL SUPPORT THE CROSS- MOTION Wigdor has not engaged in a “pattern” of improper conduct when it comes to Black. Instead, the only pattern at issue in this case is Black’s pattern of engaging in baseless legal actions against Ms. Ganieva and Wigdor rather than attempting to litigate this case on the merits. As is evident, he plans to do the same thing with Ms. Pierson. The cases cited by Black in opposition to the cross-motion show the utter futility of his motion as these cases stand for the proposition that only deliberate conduct by lawyers abusing the system will be held sanctionable. See Dkt. No. 261 at 11 (citing Matter of Miller v. Miller, 96 A.D.3d 943, 944 (2d Dep’t 2012); Hunts Point Terminal Produce Coop. Ass 'n, Inc. v. NY. C. Econ, Dev. Corp., 54 A.D.3d 296, 296 (1st Dep’t 2008); Schiavone v. Solaris Properties, LLC, 31 Misc. 3d 67, 69 (1st Dep’t 2011)). As demonstrated above, and in Plaintiff’s moving papers, it is Black and not Ms. Ganieva or Wigdor, that is attempting to abuse the legal system. 6 6 of 7 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/09/2023 08:38 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 68 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/09/2023 CONCLUSION In sum, Black and his lawyers brought a motion under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 knowing that neither Plaintiff nor her counsel ever made any factual or legal representations that could be considered sanctionable under the law. In a final, desperate attempt to breathe life into their flailing arguments, Black and Perry Guha attach letters to their opposition papers as supposed proof that their sanctions motion was meritorious. However, these letters suffer from the same deficiencies as Black’s purported “proof” that Plaintiff’s claims are without merit – they contain nothing more than self-serving (and easily contradicted) claims by his lawyers attacking Ms. Pierson’s claims. While unfortunate, absolutely nothing in these documents support Black’s claims that Ms. Pierson or Wigdor engaged in sanctionable conduct. To the contrary, by filing a motion with no basis in law or fact, it is Black and Perry Guha that have abused the legal system, and they must be held accountable. Dated: January 9, 2023 Respectfully submitted, New York, New York WIGDOR LLP By: _____________________________ Jeanne M. Christensen Renan F. Varghese 85 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 Telephone: (212) 257-6800 Facsimile: (212) 257-6845 jchristensen@wigdorlaw.com rvarghese@wigdorlaw.com Counsel for Plaintiff 7 7 of 7