Motion for Spousal Support in Cheri Pierson v. Leon Black, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 Trust| Trellis.Law

On November 28, 2022 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Cheri Pierson, and Darren K. Indyke In His Capacity As The Executor For The Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein And Administrator Of The 1953 Trust, Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Leon Black, Richard D. Kahn In His Capacity As The Executor For The Estate Of Jeffrey E. Epstein And Administrator Of The 1953 Trust, The 1953 Trust, for Torts - Adult Survivors Act in the District Court of New York County.

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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 01/06/2023 07:10 PM INDEX NO. 952002/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 61 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/06/2023

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

CHERI PIERSON, Index No. 952002/2022
Plaintiff,
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF
v. LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
LEON BLACK, ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, AND IN OPPOSITION TO
DARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as the EXECUTOR PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-
FOR THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN and MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 1953 TRUST;
RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as the EXECUTOR Mot. Seq. No. 1
FOR THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN and
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 1953 TRUST; and THE 1953 Hon. Suzanne Adams
TRUST,

Defendants.

DEFENDANT LEON BLACK’S REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN, LLP
Michael B. Carlinsky
Jennifer J. Barrett
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, NY 10010
(212) 849-7000

PERRY GUHA LLP
E. Danya Perry
1740 Broadway, 15th Floor
New York, NY 10019
(212) 399-8330

ESTRICH GOLDIN LLP
Susan Estrich (pro hac vice pending)
8605 Santa Monica Blvd, Suite 92780
West Hollywood, CA 90069
(213) 399-2132

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................1
I. THE COURT’S GRANT OF LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT IN
GANIEVA DOES NOT FORECLOSE SANCTIONS .........................................................1
II. SANCTIONS AGAINST WIGDOR ARE WARRANTED................................................1
A. Wigdor’s Conduct Is Part Of A Pattern Intended To Harass And Injure
Black ........................................................................................................................1
B. Wigdor Asserted Material False Statements And Failed To Adequately
Investigate The Basis Of Its Claims.........................................................................1
III. THE CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS SHOULD BE DENIED ...............................1
A. Plaintiff Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proof On Its Cross-Motion. ...........................1
B. Plaintiff Provides No Showing Of Frivolity. ...........................................................1
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................1

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Cases
Breest v. Haggis,
67 Misc.3d 1218(A) (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 2020) ...................................................................... 13
Brooklyn Heights Med. v. State-Wide Ins. Co.,
6 Misc.3d 1033(A) (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Kings Cty. 2005) .......................................................... 11
Guerrero v. Club Quarters Mgmt. Co., LLC,
159 N.Y.S.3d 801 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2021) ............................................................................. 5
Hunts Point Terminal Produce Coop. Ass‘n, Inc. v. N.Y.C. Econ, Dev. Corp.,
54 A.D.3d 296 (1st Dep't 2008) ............................................................................................... 11
Jason v. Chusid,
78 N.Y.2d 1099 (1991) ............................................................................................................ 10
Kornfeld v. NRX Techs., Inc.,
93 A.D.2d 772 (1st Dep’t 1983) ................................................................................................ 9
Latorre v. Rahman,
2022 WL 2387862 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. July 1, 2022) ............................................................ 11
Llantin v. Doe,
30 A.D.3d 292 (1st Dep’t 2006) .............................................................................................. 11
Mascia v. Maresco,
39 A.D.3d 504 (2d Dep’t 2007) ................................................................................................. 6
Matter of Miller v. Miller,
96 A.D.3d 943 (2d Dep’t 2012) ......................................................................................... 11, 13
Schiavone v. Solaris Properties, LLC,
31 Misc 3d 67 (1st Dep’t 2011) ............................................................................................... 11
Stewart v. New York City Transit Auth.,
57 N.Y.S.3d 614 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. 2015) ......................................................................... 12
Stone Mountain Holdings, LLC v. Spitzer,
119 A.D.3d 548 (2d Dep’t 2014) ............................................................................................. 12
Tsabbar v. Auld,
26 A.D.3d 233 (1st Dep’t 2006) .............................................................................................. 11
Walton v. Markan,
262 A.D.2d 478 (2d Dep’t 1999) ............................................................................................. 11
Wang v. Garnett,
2017 WL 361551 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Jan. 23, 2017) ............................................................. 12
Rules / Statutes
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214-j ...................................................................................................... 2

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N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 215(3) ................................................................................................... 2, 7
22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 ........................................................................................................... 1, 5, 12
22 NYCRR § 130-1.2 ..................................................................................................................... 4
22 NYCRR 202.8 .......................................................................................................................... 16

iii

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Defendant Leon Black respectfully submits this reply in further support of his Motion for

Sanctions against Wigdor,1 pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1, and in opposition to Plaintiff’s cross-

motion for sanctions against Black and his counsel (952002/2022, NYSCEF Doc. No. 51, “Pierson

Opp.” or “Opposition”; 155262/2021, NYSCEF Doc. No. 258, “Ganieva Opp.”).2

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Defendant’s Motion (155262/2021, NYSCEF Doc. No. 226; 952002/2022, NYSCEF Doc.

No. 11, collectively “Motion”) established Wigdor’s pattern of abusing the courts to file frivolous,

unsubstantiated, and damaging falsehoods against Black in an attempt to harass him, destroy his

reputation, and promote itself. This pattern began in June 2021 with Wigdor’s filing of sexual

assault and other claims on behalf of Guzel Ganieva, with whom Black had a sporadic consensual

affair from 2008 until 2014. Shortly after, Black’s attorneys notified Wigdor of incontrovertible

evidence showing Ganieva’s claims were entirely fictitious, including recorded conversations in

which Ganieva explicitly extorted millions of dollars from Black in exchange for keeping their

affair secret. Thereafter, rather than withdrawing its claims or even reviewing the evidence,

Wigdor doubled down on its baseless allegations, amending the complaint to include even more

inflammatory allegations primarily focused on Jeffrey Epstein and not pertaining to Ganieva’s

causes of action. In its third Ganieva complaint, Wigdor repeated this pattern, adding allegations

concerning “Jane Doe,” later identified as Pierson. These false allegations allegedly occurred

1
Wigdor willfully mischaracterizes Black’s Motion. The Motion does not seek sanctions against
Pierson; rather, it seeks them only against Wigdor, due to its pattern of vexatious, abusive, and
unsubstantiated allegations across many complaints, allegations, motions, and matters. Wigdor is
equally sloppy in its cross-motion, generally referring only to “Perry Guha” in seeking sanctions
against counsel, and falsely implying that Perry Guha was involved in filing two other actions in
which Perry Guha had no part.
2
Black is submitting similar reply papers in this case and in Guzel Ganieva v. Leon Black, Index
No. 155262/2021. If these actions are consolidated, Black will assert a consolidated sanctions
motion.

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before Ganieva even met Black, and served no purpose but to create additional leverage against

Black in the hope of salvaging Ganieva’s disproven claims.

Wigdor makes clear in its Opposition it intends to continue this pattern of harassment, and

in so doing underscores why sanctions are necessary. Wigdor plans to file yet a fourth Ganieva

complaint, which will include new—but equally false—“civil assault and battery claims for

multiple acts of sexual violence, outside the CPLR 215(3) statute of limitations when she

commenced this action.” (Ganieva Opp. 4 n. 9.)3 No assault or battery ever occurred. It is telling

that although Wigdor alleged in the Ganieva SAC that Black assaulted Ganieva in 2008, it failed

to provide further detail of these allegations in any previous pleadings, correspondence, or

discussions with Black’s counsel—yet Wigdor had no issue including a slew of other time-barred,

unrelated allegations in great detail in its prior pleadings. Further, Wigdor knows Ganieva signed

a Release and Confidentiality Agreement in 2015 (the “Release”), which she ratified monthly for

many years by accepting millions of dollars in payments from Black. Wigdor’s threat of a fourth

Ganieva complaint including even more allegations against Black—which would be precluded by

the Release and are knowingly false—perfectly exemplifies Wigdor’s improper abuse of the court

system to harass Black, and makes clear why sanctions are necessary.4

3
The forthcoming Ganieva complaint purportedly will be brought under the Adult Survivors Act,
CPLR § 214-j (“ASA”). Although Wigdor supposedly has long had all the information needed to
file yet a new amended complaint in Ganieva and could have done so immediately after the ASA’s
effective date of November 24 (as in this matter), it has yet to do so. The most likely explanation
for this otherwise inexplicable delay is that Wigdor wishes to take advantage of yet another press
cycle in furtherance of its campaign of harassment and humiliation against Black.
4
At a minimum, Wigdor should await the Court’s ruling on Black’s motion to dismiss to file its
latest amended complaint. Black has made a strong showing that the Release is valid, enforceable,
and precludes all of Ganieva’s claims. Knowing there is a real possibility the Court will enforce
the Release and disallow all the claims, Wigdor should not recklessly plead additional allegations
that are certain to be as lurid and tawdry as those in earlier iterations of the complaint—but are
prohibited by the Release and therefore inappropriate.

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Wigdor has repeated its pattern of reckless destruction in Pierson. Wigdor filed the Pierson

complaint the first business day after the ASA went into effect, alleging Black sexually assaulted

Pierson on an unknown date more than twenty years ago in Epstein’s Manhattan townhouse. While

these allegations are similar to those already asserted in Ganieva, in which Pierson appeared as a

Jane Doe, there are numerous non-trivial differences between the two accounts that betray a

pervasive lack of care and of credibility in the pleadings. Once again, Wigdor has shown no

interest in the validity or accuracy of the claims it asserts. The public record related to Pierson

further reveals she has a pattern of reckless and untruthful behavior, including through misuse of

the courts. In Pierson, Wigdor either failed to perform a cursory review of these public records,

or was so desperate for another chance to sue Black that it willfully ignored Pierson’s long history

of vexatious litigation, and the inconsistencies in the story she has told about Black, which strongly

call into question her entire account and undermine her credibility. In this regard, Wigdor’s silence

in its Opposition speaks volumes: the Opposition does not refute that Wigdor failed to engage in

proper diligence regarding Pierson prior to filing a horrific and public legal campaign against

Black—or worse, that it knew of such issues and overrode what should have been natural concerns

about the weakness of the claims and the ethics of bringing this action. The Opposition likewise

does not dispute Pierson’s troubled past with 35-plus lawsuits. Nor does the Pierson complaint

allege any corroborating evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, in support of an alleged

one-time event that supposedly happened two decades ago. Pierson’s unsubstantiated case is

simply not one Wigdor—or any firm—ordinarily would or should file. Wigdor has done so in a

transparent effort to bolster its weak case in Ganieva, in which it is heavily invested.

Wigdor’s pattern of filing complaints without reasonable investigation into the merits is

sanctionable and must stop. Wigdor already has moved to sanction Quinn Emanuel and Estrich

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Goldin and to disqualify Perry Guha, and it has lost at every turn. Wigdor should also lose on this

cross-motion for sanctions. Wigdor’s over-the-top response here is that Black not only should be

denied the relief he seeks, but he and his counsel should be sanctioned for their temerity in having

sought it. Plaintiff’s infirm cross-motion is an obvious attempt to deflect and to further harass

Black and his attorneys. Black was forced to seek relief from this Court because Wigdor continues

to abuse the judicial system to intentionally file unsubstantiated, unverified, and false claims

against him. Wigdor should be sanctioned for its wrongful conduct, and its vindictive cross-

motion denied.

ARGUMENT

This Court should issue an order to “award costs or impose sanctions or both” against

Wigdor for its frivolous conduct in this action. 22 NYCRR § 130-1.2. Wigdor filed two baseless

actions as part of a campaign to maliciously harass Black, ruin his reputation, and obtain a financial

windfall. It had plenty of time in both actions to conduct thorough investigations, but willfully

opted against doing so. Instead, Wigdor persisted in larding its complaints with materially false

statements even after Black put them on notice that those allegations were contradicted by clear

documentary evidence.

I. THE COURT’S GRANT OF LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT IN
GANIEVA DOES NOT FORECLOSE SANCTIONS

Wigdor first contends sanctions are foreclosed by the decision granting Ganieva leave to

file a Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”). (Ganieva Opp. 10-11.) Specifically, Wigdor

claims Pierson’s allegations in her complaint and in Ganieva’s SAC could not possibly be frivolous

because the Ganieva Court held “[Ganieva] has demonstrated that the proposed amended

complaint is not palpably insufficient or devoid of merit.” (Ganieva Opp. 10.) This is wrong. The

Ganieva Court never ruled on the truth or falsity of Pierson’s claims, nor did it rule on Wigdor’s

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failure to do minimal due diligence in either case—both of which lie at the heart of this Motion.

22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(c) clearly provides that conduct asserting “material factual statements that

are false” is frivolous and sanctionable. Wigdor’s cumulative conduct in both the Ganieva and

Pierson complaints is frivolous because both complaints contain material statements of fact that

Wigdor knew, or should have known, were false when made, and for which the utter lack of legal

or factual basis was either apparent, or would have been apparent had Wigdor performed a

modicum of due diligence.

Wigdor attempts to avoid responsibility by misreading 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(c) and citing

case law where the falsity of the allegations was not at issue, but instead turned on whether the

challenged conduct was “completely without merit in law.” For example, Wigdor cites Guerrero

v. Club Quarters Mgmt. Co., LLC, for the proposition that “where motion to amend was granted,

motion for sanctions was inappropriate.” (Ganieva Opp. 10) (citing 159 N.Y.S.3d 801, 805 (Sup.

Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2021).) However, in Guerrero, the motion for sanctions was not based on materially

false statements, but instead allegations that the complaint was legally deficient. In contrast,

Black’s motion for sanctions is based primarily on Wigdor’s knowing inclusion of unsubstantiated

and false allegations in both Ganieva and Pierson complaints. Once Wigdor filed yet another false

complaint against him in Pierson, Black was compelled to seek redress for the cumulative effect

of Wigdor’s improper conduct across both actions.

Wigdor’s Opposition is full of contradictions in an attempt to justify its sanctionable

conduct. Wigdor casts stones at Black for filing the sanctions motion in Pierson prior to filing a

motion to dismiss, yet cites no authority for the proposition that a dismissal motion is a prerequisite

to filing a motion for sanctions. (Pierson Opp. 2, 10.) There is none. The Ganieva Court never

opined on whether the allegations in Ganieva’s SAC are true—and, as made clear by the evidence

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Black has provided Wigdor and Wigdor consciously refuses to consider—they are not. Nor did it

opine on whether the Release bars Ganieva’s claims. Black has always had a right to seek

sanctions against Wigdor in the Ganieva action, which his counsel repeatedly informed Wigdor,

in writing, beginning the month after the original complaint was filed. Once Wigdor filed the

Pierson action, Black had no choice but to seek redress to end Wigdor’s malicious campaign.

II. SANCTIONS AGAINST WIGDOR ARE WARRANTED

A. Wigdor’s Conduct Is Part Of A Pattern Intended To Harass And Injure
Black

In his opening brief, Black explains in detail Wigdor’s pattern of sanctionable conduct

across the Ganieva and Pierson complaints. Mascia v. Maresco, 39 A.D.3d 504, 506 (2d Dep’t

2007) (affirming sanctions when continuing to advance “entirely invalid claims” “appears to have

been intended primarily to harass the defendant”). Wigdor’s systematic malicious conduct, can

only be explained as an intentional effort to ruin Black’s reputation, increase leverage against

Black with a view toward a financial windfall, and shamelessly promote itself.

In 2021, Wigdor filed the first Ganieva complaint (155262/2021, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1),

despite knowing Ganieva signed the Release barring these claims, and repeatedly ratified it by

accepting monthly payments from Black for more than five years, including while Wigdor was

advising her on press strategy, again in violation of the Release. (Id. at ¶¶ 242-248.) Shortly after

the initial Ganieva complaint was filed, Black’s counsel informed Wigdor of evidence

conclusively disproving Ganieva’s allegations in the form of text-messages, audio- recordings, and

the Release. Rather than reviewing this evidence, Wigdor stuck its head in the sand and doubled

down, filing an amended complaint with even more inflammatory and irrelevant allegations and

repeating false claims that had already been debunked. (155262/2021, NYSCEF Doc. No. 155.)

This became a pattern: each time it became clear Ganieva’s allegations were provably false,

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Wigdor responded by filing new false and irrelevant allegations, further harassing Black and

harming his reputation in an attempt to increase leverage and pressure on Black. The Pierson

complaint is the latest example of this pattern.

Rather than meaningfully dispute these points, Wigdor’s Opposition makes clear this

improper pattern will continue. Wigdor states its plans to file a fourth Ganieva complaint, which

will include new but equally false “civil assault and battery claims for multiple acts of sexual

violence, outside the CPLR 215(3) statute of limitations.” (Ganieva Opp. 4 n. 9.) As Wigdor

knows, no “sexual violence” ever occurred, which is why these new allegations “outside the …

statute of limitations” period were briefly mentioned only in the SAC—even as Wigdor

introduced, in great detail, complete with purported direct quotations—other allegations from that

same time period in Ganieva’s pleadings. As Wigdor also knows, any claims based on such

allegations are barred by Ganieva’s unambiguous and binding Release. This pattern of attacking

Black by publishing false allegation after false allegation in legal complaints must end, and Wigdor

should be sanctioned for engaging in it.

B. Wigdor Asserted Material False Statements And Failed To Adequately
Investigate The Basis Of Its Claims

Wigdor’s complaints in Ganieva and Pierson contain false material statements of fact that

Wigdor either knew or should have known were false. This is sanctionable conduct. Wigdor’s

feeble attempts to distinguish away the weight of authority (Ganieva Opp. 17- 19; Pierson Opp.

16-18) are unavailing, because it cannot dispute that courts routinely impose sanctions against

attorneys for bringing frivolous legal action with the intent to harass. (Motion 20-22 (collecting

cases).) Wigdor was aware these claims lacked a basis in law or fact, or at the very least would

have known had it engaged minimal diligence prior to filing complaints against Black. Wigdor’s

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decision to file not one but four (and apparently soon, five) complaints it knew were meritless

warrants sanctions for several reasons.

First, the three Ganieva complaints are replete with demonstrably false factual statements,

each more bombastic and unfounded than the last. After the first complaint was filed, Black’s

counsel quickly notified Wigdor of contemporaneous audio-recording and text-message evidence

proving Ganieva’s claims were false and barred by the Release. (Motion 14-20.) Wigdor declined

to view these documents for nearly ten months. Instead of investigating the truth of its claims,

Wigdor amended the complaint two more times. (155262/2021, Doc. Nos. 26, 155.) Ultimately,

the court forced Wigdor to enter a standard confidentiality agreement so the documents

incriminating Ganieva could be shared (952002/2022, NYSCEF Doc. No. 152). Now, Wigdor

blames Black for Wigdor’s refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement, claiming “Plaintiff

was at all times willing to enter into a protective order in this case.” (Ganieva Opp. 14, n. 10).

This is simply untrue. Besides telling both the court and Black’s counsel multiple times that

Wigdor would not enter a standard confidentiality agreement, or even an informal provisional

agreement while the parties negotiated, Wigdor also put its position—which it now inexplicably

denies—in writing multiple times. In a letter from Wigdor on August 13, 2021, Wigdor informed

Black their firm does not “sign[] form confidentiality orders as a matter of standard protocol” and

had “no interest in meeting and conferring or discussing a confidentiality order until [the Release]

is produced.” (Affirmation of Michael Carlinsky dated January 6, 2022 (“Aff.”) Ex. 2.) Wigdor

made similar statements in an October 25, 2021, letter, confirming it “represented to the Court,

several times, that [it] would not agree to a confidentiality order.” (Id. Ex. 4.)

Since 2021, Black put Wigdor on notice of the existence of this evidence and Black’s intent

to seek sanctions because of Wigdor’s assertion of false statements in its various complaints. On

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July 19, 2021, counsel for Black informed Wigdor that many of the allegations in the original

complaint were “materially and knowingly false” and that their inclusion in the Complaint was

sanctionable. Aff. Ex. 1. On September 8, 2021, counsel for Black again informed Wigdor it was

engaging in sanctionable conduct, this time by including false information in the Amended

Complaint as part of its campaign to “harass embarrass, and defame Mr. Black.” Aff. Ex. 3.

Regardless, Wigdor continued to repeat and add statements it knew or should have known were

false to its pleadings.

Second, Wigdor failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into its clients’ allegations in both

Ganieva and Pierson. Kornfeld v. NRX Techs., Inc., 93 A.D.2d 772, 773 (1st Dep’t 1983)

(“unsubstantiated assertions” are frivolous when “clearly refuted by documentary proof which had

been offered.”). As previously noted, Wigdor went to great lengths to avoid reviewing evidence

in the Ganieva action that would have debunked her claims, and instead asserted even more

provably false allegations. Similarly, Black’s attorneys informed Wigdor, in advance of filing

Pierson’s claims, that her “allegations are not only patently false but in fact totally fabricated out

of whole cloth” and that Black would “pursue any and all remedies, including by asserting claims

for defamation and/or seeking sanctions.” (December 16, 2022 Carlinsky Aff. Ex. 1.) A cursory

review of public records would have revealed Pierson’s long record of vexatious litigation,

challenging mental health history, and record of involuntary commitment that should have raised

concerns about her reliability as a witness and the reliability of her allegations. (Motion 16-19.)

Despite being put on notice of specific factual inaccuracies in Pierson’s account, Wigdor either

did not investigate the validity of these allegations or knew the issues and proceeded anyway,

resulting in a frivolous complaint that has notable inconsistencies from the allegations as they

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appear in the Ganieva complaint. (Motion 9-10.) In either event, Wigdor acted in reckless

disregard for the falsity of the Pierson complaint, just as it had for the Ganieva complaint.

Third, Wigdor continues to abuse the judicial system with misconduct spanning across

multiple actions that has remained unchecked for a year and a half—the precise sort of conduct

that “constitute[s] a strategy of dilatory, harassive, abusive and frivolous conduct.” Jason v.

Chusid, 78 N.Y.2d 1099, 1100 (1991). In addition to its willingness to file one unsubstantiated

complaint after another, Wigdor has a pattern of going after Black’s attorneys. It filed one

sanctions motion against Quinn Emanuel and Estrich Goldin for having brought the federal

action—and lost.5 It also filed a knowingly meritless motion to disqualify Perry Guha from the

Ganieva action—and lost.6

Because of Wigdor’s continued, egregious, and frivolous conduct, sanctions are warranted,

including reimbursement of Black’s attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred in bringing this

Motion and responding to this cross-motion.

III. THE CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS SHOULD BE DENIED

Seeking both to camouflage the shortcomings of the Opposition, and to deter Black from

seeking justified relief from the Court, Plaintiff has responded to Black’s Motion with a baseless

5
Wigdor argues Quinn Emanuel is conflicted out of the Ganieva action because the firm withdrew
its representation in the federal action. (Ganieva Opp. 4, 19-20.) The federal action involved
different parties and issues, and the potential conflict that prompted withdrawal from the federal
case does not apply here.
6
No doubt because Wigdor sees Perry Guha (and not its co-counsel) as a competitor, it has always
reserved its most ad hominem invective for Perry Guha, and specifically Ms. Perry. Despite the
fact that Perry Guha played no part in the federal action and does not represent Black in the
affirmative state action he brought against Wigdor and Ganieva, Wigdor bizarrely has chosen to
make its allegations against Perry Guha alone and expressly (and nonsensically) refers to all of
Black’s counsel as “Perry Guha.” Even more egregiously, while falsely cloaking itself as a
champion of women, Wigdor simultaneously accuses Ms. Perry effectively of being a gender
traitor, repeatedly referring to her as “disgusting” and “abhorrent,” selectively quoting partial
statements without providing full context, and purporting to ascribe ugly thoughts and comments
to her and her firm that were never said and certainly not believed.

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cross-motion seeking reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in defending against

Black’s motion. The sole basis for Wigdor’s cross-motion is the mere fact that Black has brought

this Motion for sanctions against Wigdor.

The party seeking the imposition of sanctions or an award of attorney’s fees bears the

burden of proving the complained-of conduct was “frivolous within the meaning of the rule.”

Matter of Miller v. Miller, 96 A.D.3d 943, 944 (2d Dep’t 2012). New York courts award sanctions

only in extreme circumstances. Hunts Point Terminal Produce Coop. Ass‘n, Inc. v. N.Y.C. Econ,

Dev. Corp., 54 A.D.3d 296, 296 (1st Dep’t 2008) (denying motion for sanctions where attorney

“did not manifest the extreme behavior”); Schiavone v. Solaris Properties, LLC, 31 Misc 3d 67,

69 (1st Dep’t 2011) (“[T]he conduct was not frivolous … since it did not manifest the extreme

behavior”) The type of “extreme behavior” courts sanction is a continuous course of conduct

pressing “patently meritless” claims—which much more accurately describes Wigdor’s conduct

here. Tsabbar v. Auld, 26 A.D.3d 233, 234 (1st Dep’t 2006). Courts have similarly found

sanctions permissible only where counsel “knowingly falsely represented anything or intended to

delay the litigation”, Llantin v. Doe, 30 A.D.3d 292, 293 (1st Dep’t 2006), or acted in “bad faith,”

Brooklyn Heights Med. v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 6 Misc. 3d 1033(A) (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Kings Cty.

2005); Latorre v. Rahman, 2022 WL 2387862, at *2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. July 1, 2022) (denying

cross-motion for sanctions and giving “defense counsel the benefit of the doubt that [motion] was

a fervent attempt in serving its client”); Walton v. Markan, 262 A.D.2d 478, 478 (2d Dep’t 1999)

(affirming denial of cross-motion for sanctions). Plaintiff has not made such a showing here.

A. Plaintiff Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proof On Its Cross-Motion.

“The party seeking sanctions has the burden to demonstrate that its opponent’s conduct

was frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130–1.1(c).” Stone Mountain Holdings, LLC v.

Spitzer, 119 A.D.3d 548, 550 (2d Dep’t 2014). Nowhere does Plaintiff demonstrate it meets this

Case Info

Judge

Suzanne J. Adams Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

January 06, 2023

Case Filing Date

November 28, 2022

County

Parties

BARRETT, JENNIFER JACKSON Attorney for the Defendant
CARLINSKY, MICHAEL BARRY Attorney for the Defendant
Cheri Pierson Plaintiff
CHRISTENSEN, JEANNE-MARIE BATES Attorney for the Plaintiff
Darren K. Indyke in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust Defendant
Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein Defendant
GWYNNE, PETER ANTHONY Attorney for the Defendant
Leon Black Defendant
MOSKOWITZ, BENNET J Attorney for the Defendant
PARACHINI, ALEXANDER KITSOCK Attorney for the Defendant
PERRY, E DANYA Attorney for the Defendant
Richard D. Kahn in his capacity as the Executor for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and Administrator of The 1953 Trust Defendant
The 1953 Trust Defendant
VARGHESE, RENAN F. Attorney for the Plaintiff
DAVID COLE Attorney
STEVEN MANKET Attorney
HERBERT SUBIN Attorney
GEORGE SURGENT Attorneys for Defendants
WILLIAM UNROCH Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ROBERT BOGLE Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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