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1 Alison M. Crane, SBN 197359
Tara A. Murray, SBN 284871
2 BLEDSOE, DIESTEL, TREPPA & CRANE LLP
180 Sansome Street, 5th Floor
3 San Francisco, California 94104-3713
Telephone: (415) 981-5411
4 Facsimile: (415) 981-0352
acrane@bledsoelaw.com
5 tmurray@bledsoelaw.com
6 Attorneys for Defendant BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS
OF AMERICA, a California corporation
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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTEREY
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11 JANE BE DOE an individual, Case No. 21CV000805
12 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG
SISTERS OF AMERICA’S OPPOSITION
13 v. TO PLAINTIFF JANE BE DOE’S
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
14 BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
AMERICA, a California corporation; BIG INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
15 BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF SALINA,
a California corporation; JON DAVID Date: January 27, 2023
16 WOODY, an individual; and DOES 1-50, Time: 8:30 a.m.
inclusive, Judge: Thomas W. Wills
17 Dept: 15
Defendants.
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19 I. INTRODUCTION
20 Defendant BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA (hereinafter “BBBSA” or
21 “Defendant”) submits the following Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Defendant to
22 produce further documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set Two, which seeks
23 information that would violate third party privacy rights, which BBBSA and Plaintiff cannot
24 waive. Further, this Court has twice denied Plaintiff’s prior motions to obtain the identities of
25 third-party minor children.
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
1 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
2 Plaintiff alleges that while she was a minor participant with a local affiliate Big Brothers
3 Big Sisters of Monterey County (“BBBS Monterey County”) from approximately 2000 through
4 2002, she was the victim of childhood sexual abuse by a BBBS Monterey County volunteer Jon
5 David Woody (hereinafter “Woody”) while she was matched with Woody and his wife as a “Big
6 Couple.” (Complaint, ¶ 19 attached as Ex. A to the Declaration of Tara Murray [hereinafter
7 “Murray Decl.”].) In 2008, Woody was charged and ultimately convicted for his abuse of
8 Plaintiff and other minor children. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
9 Importantly, this Court has already twice ordered the protection of the identities of the
10 third-party minor children that Plaintiff’s Motion again seeks. As set forth below, this Court
11 ordered redactions of identifying information for third-party minor children from Monterey
12 County Sherriff’s Office’s records and the BBBS Monterey County records.
13 First, this Court ordered redactions of third-party minor children’s identifying information
14 from the production of Monterey County Sherriff’s Office’s (“Sherriff”) records related to
15 Woody, which were the subject of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel that was heard by this Court on
16 August 20, 2021.
17 Next, this Court again denied Plaintiff discovery of the identities of third-party children
18 who made allegations against Woody and/or were matched with Woody at BBBS Monterey
19 County when Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Request for Production, Set One, was heard
20 on April 15, 2022. This Court noted that the discovery was not a scavenger hunt for new clients.
21 After the hearing, Defendant produced the records with the court-ordered redactions of
22 identifying information (e.g. the children’s names, addresses, phone numbers, family members’
23 names, schools) for the third-party minor children referenced in the BBBS Monterey County
24 records 1 regarding Woody.
25 ///
26 1
In 2008, BBBS Monterey County sent its file for Woody to this defendant, who is the national organization, and the
27 file included information regarding Woody, Plaintiff, and numerous other third parties, including but not limited to
information regarding then-minor children (both minor children who were and were not matched with Woody) as
well as their families. Defendant produced its copy of BBBS Monterey County’s records with redactions, including
28 the information of third-party minor children, for whom this Defendant could not waive their privacy rights.
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
1 Accordingly, very detailed and personal BBBS Monterey County records were produced
2 with those Court-ordered redactions intended to protect their privacy. Now, Plaintiff seeks to
3 remove that last privacy protection with a slightly differently worded request so that she can gain
4 extremely private personal information about third-party minor children that this Court previously
5 denied. Moreover, if the requested minor identities were disclosed, the identities of at least some
6 of the minors identified in the Sherriff’s records would then be discernable by cross-reference.
7 Therefore, Defendant should not be ordered to provide the third-party minor child
8 identities that Plaintiff now (again) moves to compel, specifically:
9 • SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 61: IDENTIFY EACH minor participant of
10 [BBBS Monterey County] who was matched with WOODY.
11 • SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 62: IDENTITY EACH minor participant of
12 [BBBS Monterey County] who alleged that WOODY engaged in SEXUAL
13 MISCONDUCT.
14 To the above requests, Defendant properly asserted objections to the requests, including
15 objections to the disclosure of such private information.
16 Additionally, as this Court has repeatedly ruled that Plaintiff is not entitled to the
17 disclosure of the identities of third-party minors that they continue to seek, Plaintiff does not
18 present any new information or argument on which Plaintiff bases her continued demand for the
19 minor third-party children’s identities, Plaintiff’s continued requests for the identities of third-
20 party minor children and Plaintiff’s motions to compel the same are an abuse of the discovery
21 process. For these reasons, as set forth in detail infra, BBBSA respectfully requests that the Court
22 deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.
23 III. ARGUMENT
24 A. BBBSA Cannot Waive the Privacy Rights of Third-Party Minor Children and
Plaintiff is Not Entitled to the Private Information
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The California Constitution Article 1, Section 1, “protects the individual’s reasonable
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expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics (USA) v. Superior Ct.
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(“Pioneer Electronics”) (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360.) Protected privacy interests exist ‘when well-
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
1 established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and
2 use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity’ and there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
3 from an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms.
4 (Pioneer Electronics, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 370–371, discussing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
5 Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1.) An intrusion on the Constitutional right of privacy is not justified by
6 speculation that such information may lead to relevant information. “Even when discovery of private
7 information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically
8 allowed; there must then be a ‘careful balancing’ of the ‘compelling public need’ for discovery
9 against the ‘fundamental right of privacy.’” (Binder v. Superior Court (“Binder”) (1987) 196
10 Cal.App.3d 893, 900, quoting Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (“Board of Trustees”) (1981)
11 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525 [emphasis added].) When a compelling state interest is present, the
12 disclosure must be narrowly specified. (See Board of Trustees, supra 119 Cal.App.3d at 526, quoting
13 Britt v. Superior Court (“Britt”) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 856.) Allowing discovery into private
14 matters is an abuse of discretion if less intrusive means are available to obtain the essential
15 information, so any discovery must be as narrowly tailored as possible. (See Allen v. Superior
16 Court (“Allen”) (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 447, 449.) The mere possibility that the requested
17 information might lead to other relevant evidence is insufficient to abridge the significant privacy
18 rights of the third-party minor children. (See Binder, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 900, quoting Bd.
19 of Trustees, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 525.)
20 Here, the third-party minor children, who participated in a local Big Brothers Big Sisters
21 program more than twenty years ago, have a “reasonable expectation of privacy . . . founded on
22 broadly based and widely accepted community norms” regarding unsubstantiated and substantiated
23 allegations of sexual misconduct. (Life Technologies v. Super. Ct. (2011) 197 Cal. App.4th 640, 652,
24 quoting Pioneer Electronics, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 370-371; Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 864.) The
25 third-party minor children’s rights cannot be waived by BBBSA or Plaintiff.
26 Further, Plaintiff has not and cannot establish that such private information is directly
27 relevant to Plaintiff’s claims that she was sexually abused by Woody or that there is a compelling
28 public need for such third-party disclosure that outweighs the privacy rights of the individuals
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
1 that would be included by Plaintiff’s improper fishing expedition. The case cited by Plaintiff, In
2 Re Clergy Cases I (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1224, has nothing to do with the instant issue of third-party
3 minor children’s privacy rights and instead addressed the entirely distinct issue of the post-settlement
4 public release of confidential records of accused clergy who were members of a religious order. (Id. at
5 pp. 1228-1229, [“In a settlement of the lawsuits, plaintiffs and the [defendant religious order] asked
6 the court to retain jurisdiction to determine if it was appropriate to publicly release confidential files
7 of the alleged clergy perpetrators.) In fact, there is no case law that supports that Plaintiff is entitled to
8 violate the privacy rights of third-party minor children who were matched with Woody or accused
9 him of abuse as part of an fishing expedition that is impermissible as it is based on the mere
10 possibility that those third-parties might lead Plaintiff to other relevant evidence (e.g. potential
11 evidence of notice) and/or is an effort to find new potential plaintiffs.. (See Binder, supra, 196
12 Cal.App.3d at p. 900, quoting Bd. of Trustees, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 525.)
13 Additionally, Plaintiff’s request is not narrowly tailored. Plaintiff argues that the
14 disclosure of these third-party identities could possibly lead to discovery of evidence to support
15 that this Defendant had notice that Woody was a sexual abuser, but Plaintiff seeks a much broader
16 disclosure of anyone who was matched with Woody (in fact, no children were matched with
17 Woody as all were matched by BBBS Monterey County with Woody and his wife together as a
18 couple), including those who never alleged that Woody abused them and Plaintiff does not limit
19 the requested discovery to any third-party minor children who made allegations about Woody
20 before or during the years when Plaintiff’s alleged abuse occurred (2000-2002), which would be
21 the only time period relevant to notice in this action.
22 Moreover, this Court has already twice ordered the same information withheld from
23 Plaintiff, specifically the identities of the third-party minor children referenced in the Sherriff’s
24 records and BBBS Monterey County records. Now Plaintiff seeks to discover the same minor
25 children’s identities with a slightly differently worded request to gain extremely private personal
26 information that this Court already denied. Importantly, detailed private information about the
27 third-party minors was produced in the redacted records, so were Plaintiff to learn the identities of
28 these individuals, Plaintiff would gain far more private and personal information than just the
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
1 names and contact information of third-party minor children who were matched with Woody
2 and/or alleged that Woody engaged in sexual misconduct.
3 There is no merit to Plaintiff’s argument’s argument that an alleged victim of sexual
4 abuse’s discovery rights trumps the privacy rights of all other alleged victims or third-party minor
5 children who had a similar relationship with the alleged perpetrator. For example, as evidenced in
6 the clergy sex abuse cases, for the protections of the third parties who were minors during the
7 time of the alleged conduct, the plaintiffs were not entitled to discover the identities of all alleged
8 victims or all children who had a similar relationship as the plaintiff (e.g. student, parishioner).
9 By protecting their identities, such third parties are protected from Plaintiff’s counsel disturbing
10 them (potentially multiple times, even over decades, if new cases are filed) by contacting them
11 about sexual abuse allegations to either to further a case for another plaintiff or in an attempt to
12 solicit that individual to become a plaintiff themselves.
13 B. The Protective Order Does Not Authorize BBBSA’s Disclosure of Third-Party
Private Information
14
15 There is no merit to Plaintiff’s claims that the existing protective order provides for the
16 disclosure of such third-party minor children’s identities. The protective order allows the parties
17 to produce confidential records for use in this litigation only; however, the protective order does
18 not empower BBBSA to waive the privacy rights of third parties by disclosing their identities in
19 this litigation. In fact, as set forth supra, there are two prior orders from this Court to apply
20 redactions to protect the requested third-party minor children’s identities.
21 ///
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
IV. CONCLUSION
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Based on the foregoing important third-party privacy interests, this Court’s prior rulings
2
protecting this private information, the lack of any new facts or argument by Plaintiff in support
3
of this continued demand for the minor third-party children’s identities, BBSA respectfully
4
requests that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.
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Dated: January 13, 2023 BLEDSOE, DIESTEL, TREPPA & CRANE LLP
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By:
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Alison M. Crane
10 Tara A. Murray
Attorneys for Defendant BIG BROTHERS BIG
11 SISTERS OF AMERICA, a California corporation
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
Jane Be Doe v. Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, et al.
1 Monterey Superior Court Case No. 21CV000805
HAN03-16113
2
3 PROOF OF SERVICE
4 I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party
to the within action. My business address is 180 Sansome Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco,
5 California 94104-3713. On the date indicated below, I caused to be served the following
document(s):
6
7 DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA’S OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF JANE BE DOE’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
8 SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
9 DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF LODGEMENT CONDITIONALLY UNDER SEAL
OF DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S UNREDACTED SEPARATE
10
STATEMENT ISO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
11 INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
12 DECLARATION OF TARA A. MURRAY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT BIG
BROTHER BIG SISTES OF AMERICA’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF JANE BE
13 DOE’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
14
15 DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF’S REDACTED SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
16 COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
17 DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF’S UNREDACTED SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
18
TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
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upon the interested parties in said action by the means specified below:
20
21 John C. Manly Attorneys for Plaintiff, JANE BE DOE
Courtney P. Pendry Tel: (949) 252-9990
22 Manly, Stew Art & Finaldi Fax: (949) 252-9991
19100 Von Karman Ave., Suite 800 jmanly@manlystewart.com
23 Irvine, CA 92612 cpendry@manlystewart.com
acunny@manlystewart.com
24
kfrederiksen@manlystewart.com
25 sanwar@manlystewart.com
26 Paul Caleo Attorneys for co-defendant Boys and Girls
Mark Heisey Club of Monterey County
27 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI Direct: (510) 463-8530
YOUR 50 STATE PARTNER Tel: (510) 463-8600
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
1 1111 Broadway, Suite 1700 F: (510) 984-1721
Oakland, CA 94607 pcaleo@grsm.com
2 mheisey@grsm.com
khernandez@grsm.com
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4 XXX BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION by causing the documents to be
sent to the persons at the e-mail addresses set forth above. I did not receive, within a
5 reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the
transmission was unsuccessful.
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
7 foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on January 13, 2023, at
Brentwood, California.
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11 LAURA KETTLE
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO
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1 Alison M. Crane, SBN 197359 Tara A. Murray, SBN 284871 2 BLEDSOE, DIESTEL, TREPPA & CRANE LLP 180 Sansome Street, 5th Floor 3 San Francisco, California 94104-3713 Telephone: (415) 981-5411 4 Facsimile: (415) 981-0352 acrane@bledsoelaw.com 5 tmurray@bledsoelaw.com 6 Attorneys for Defendant BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA, a California corporation 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTEREY 10 11 JANE BE DOE an individual, Case No. 21CV000805 12 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA’S OPPOSITION 13 v. TO PLAINTIFF JANE BE DOE’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER 14 BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF RESPONSES TO SPECIAL AMERICA, a California corporation; BIG INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 15 BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF SALINA, a California corporation; JON DAVID Date: January 27, 2023 16 WOODY, an individual; and DOES 1-50, Time: 8:30 a.m. inclusive, Judge: Thomas W. Wills 17 Dept: 15 Defendants. 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Defendant BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA (hereinafter “BBBSA” or 21 “Defendant”) submits the following Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Defendant to 22 produce further documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set Two, which seeks 23 information that would violate third party privacy rights, which BBBSA and Plaintiff cannot 24 waive. Further, this Court has twice denied Plaintiff’s prior motions to obtain the identities of 25 third-party minor children. 26 /// 27 /// 28 -1- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 1 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 Plaintiff alleges that while she was a minor participant with a local affiliate Big Brothers 3 Big Sisters of Monterey County (“BBBS Monterey County”) from approximately 2000 through 4 2002, she was the victim of childhood sexual abuse by a BBBS Monterey County volunteer Jon 5 David Woody (hereinafter “Woody”) while she was matched with Woody and his wife as a “Big 6 Couple.” (Complaint, ¶ 19 attached as Ex. A to the Declaration of Tara Murray [hereinafter 7 “Murray Decl.”].) In 2008, Woody was charged and ultimately convicted for his abuse of 8 Plaintiff and other minor children. (Id. at ¶ 15.) 9 Importantly, this Court has already twice ordered the protection of the identities of the 10 third-party minor children that Plaintiff’s Motion again seeks. As set forth below, this Court 11 ordered redactions of identifying information for third-party minor children from Monterey 12 County Sherriff’s Office’s records and the BBBS Monterey County records. 13 First, this Court ordered redactions of third-party minor children’s identifying information 14 from the production of Monterey County Sherriff’s Office’s (“Sherriff”) records related to 15 Woody, which were the subject of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel that was heard by this Court on 16 August 20, 2021. 17 Next, this Court again denied Plaintiff discovery of the identities of third-party children 18 who made allegations against Woody and/or were matched with Woody at BBBS Monterey 19 County when Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Request for Production, Set One, was heard 20 on April 15, 2022. This Court noted that the discovery was not a scavenger hunt for new clients. 21 After the hearing, Defendant produced the records with the court-ordered redactions of 22 identifying information (e.g. the children’s names, addresses, phone numbers, family members’ 23 names, schools) for the third-party minor children referenced in the BBBS Monterey County 24 records 1 regarding Woody. 25 /// 26 1 In 2008, BBBS Monterey County sent its file for Woody to this defendant, who is the national organization, and the 27 file included information regarding Woody, Plaintiff, and numerous other third parties, including but not limited to information regarding then-minor children (both minor children who were and were not matched with Woody) as well as their families. Defendant produced its copy of BBBS Monterey County’s records with redactions, including 28 the information of third-party minor children, for whom this Defendant could not waive their privacy rights. -2- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 1 Accordingly, very detailed and personal BBBS Monterey County records were produced 2 with those Court-ordered redactions intended to protect their privacy. Now, Plaintiff seeks to 3 remove that last privacy protection with a slightly differently worded request so that she can gain 4 extremely private personal information about third-party minor children that this Court previously 5 denied. Moreover, if the requested minor identities were disclosed, the identities of at least some 6 of the minors identified in the Sherriff’s records would then be discernable by cross-reference. 7 Therefore, Defendant should not be ordered to provide the third-party minor child 8 identities that Plaintiff now (again) moves to compel, specifically: 9 • SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 61: IDENTIFY EACH minor participant of 10 [BBBS Monterey County] who was matched with WOODY. 11 • SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 62: IDENTITY EACH minor participant of 12 [BBBS Monterey County] who alleged that WOODY engaged in SEXUAL 13 MISCONDUCT. 14 To the above requests, Defendant properly asserted objections to the requests, including 15 objections to the disclosure of such private information. 16 Additionally, as this Court has repeatedly ruled that Plaintiff is not entitled to the 17 disclosure of the identities of third-party minors that they continue to seek, Plaintiff does not 18 present any new information or argument on which Plaintiff bases her continued demand for the 19 minor third-party children’s identities, Plaintiff’s continued requests for the identities of third- 20 party minor children and Plaintiff’s motions to compel the same are an abuse of the discovery 21 process. For these reasons, as set forth in detail infra, BBBSA respectfully requests that the Court 22 deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. 23 III. ARGUMENT 24 A. BBBSA Cannot Waive the Privacy Rights of Third-Party Minor Children and Plaintiff is Not Entitled to the Private Information 25 The California Constitution Article 1, Section 1, “protects the individual’s reasonable 26 expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics (USA) v. Superior Ct. 27 (“Pioneer Electronics”) (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360.) Protected privacy interests exist ‘when well- 28 -3- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 1 established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and 2 use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity’ and there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 3 from an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms. 4 (Pioneer Electronics, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 370–371, discussing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic 5 Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1.) An intrusion on the Constitutional right of privacy is not justified by 6 speculation that such information may lead to relevant information. “Even when discovery of private 7 information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically 8 allowed; there must then be a ‘careful balancing’ of the ‘compelling public need’ for discovery 9 against the ‘fundamental right of privacy.’” (Binder v. Superior Court (“Binder”) (1987) 196 10 Cal.App.3d 893, 900, quoting Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (“Board of Trustees”) (1981) 11 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525 [emphasis added].) When a compelling state interest is present, the 12 disclosure must be narrowly specified. (See Board of Trustees, supra 119 Cal.App.3d at 526, quoting 13 Britt v. Superior Court (“Britt”) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 856.) Allowing discovery into private 14 matters is an abuse of discretion if less intrusive means are available to obtain the essential 15 information, so any discovery must be as narrowly tailored as possible. (See Allen v. Superior 16 Court (“Allen”) (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 447, 449.) The mere possibility that the requested 17 information might lead to other relevant evidence is insufficient to abridge the significant privacy 18 rights of the third-party minor children. (See Binder, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 900, quoting Bd. 19 of Trustees, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 525.) 20 Here, the third-party minor children, who participated in a local Big Brothers Big Sisters 21 program more than twenty years ago, have a “reasonable expectation of privacy . . . founded on 22 broadly based and widely accepted community norms” regarding unsubstantiated and substantiated 23 allegations of sexual misconduct. (Life Technologies v. Super. Ct. (2011) 197 Cal. App.4th 640, 652, 24 quoting Pioneer Electronics, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 370-371; Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 864.) The 25 third-party minor children’s rights cannot be waived by BBBSA or Plaintiff. 26 Further, Plaintiff has not and cannot establish that such private information is directly 27 relevant to Plaintiff’s claims that she was sexually abused by Woody or that there is a compelling 28 public need for such third-party disclosure that outweighs the privacy rights of the individuals -4- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 1 that would be included by Plaintiff’s improper fishing expedition. The case cited by Plaintiff, In 2 Re Clergy Cases I (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1224, has nothing to do with the instant issue of third-party 3 minor children’s privacy rights and instead addressed the entirely distinct issue of the post-settlement 4 public release of confidential records of accused clergy who were members of a religious order. (Id. at 5 pp. 1228-1229, [“In a settlement of the lawsuits, plaintiffs and the [defendant religious order] asked 6 the court to retain jurisdiction to determine if it was appropriate to publicly release confidential files 7 of the alleged clergy perpetrators.) In fact, there is no case law that supports that Plaintiff is entitled to 8 violate the privacy rights of third-party minor children who were matched with Woody or accused 9 him of abuse as part of an fishing expedition that is impermissible as it is based on the mere 10 possibility that those third-parties might lead Plaintiff to other relevant evidence (e.g. potential 11 evidence of notice) and/or is an effort to find new potential plaintiffs.. (See Binder, supra, 196 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 900, quoting Bd. of Trustees, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 525.) 13 Additionally, Plaintiff’s request is not narrowly tailored. Plaintiff argues that the 14 disclosure of these third-party identities could possibly lead to discovery of evidence to support 15 that this Defendant had notice that Woody was a sexual abuser, but Plaintiff seeks a much broader 16 disclosure of anyone who was matched with Woody (in fact, no children were matched with 17 Woody as all were matched by BBBS Monterey County with Woody and his wife together as a 18 couple), including those who never alleged that Woody abused them and Plaintiff does not limit 19 the requested discovery to any third-party minor children who made allegations about Woody 20 before or during the years when Plaintiff’s alleged abuse occurred (2000-2002), which would be 21 the only time period relevant to notice in this action. 22 Moreover, this Court has already twice ordered the same information withheld from 23 Plaintiff, specifically the identities of the third-party minor children referenced in the Sherriff’s 24 records and BBBS Monterey County records. Now Plaintiff seeks to discover the same minor 25 children’s identities with a slightly differently worded request to gain extremely private personal 26 information that this Court already denied. Importantly, detailed private information about the 27 third-party minors was produced in the redacted records, so were Plaintiff to learn the identities of 28 these individuals, Plaintiff would gain far more private and personal information than just the -5- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 1 names and contact information of third-party minor children who were matched with Woody 2 and/or alleged that Woody engaged in sexual misconduct. 3 There is no merit to Plaintiff’s argument’s argument that an alleged victim of sexual 4 abuse’s discovery rights trumps the privacy rights of all other alleged victims or third-party minor 5 children who had a similar relationship with the alleged perpetrator. For example, as evidenced in 6 the clergy sex abuse cases, for the protections of the third parties who were minors during the 7 time of the alleged conduct, the plaintiffs were not entitled to discover the identities of all alleged 8 victims or all children who had a similar relationship as the plaintiff (e.g. student, parishioner). 9 By protecting their identities, such third parties are protected from Plaintiff’s counsel disturbing 10 them (potentially multiple times, even over decades, if new cases are filed) by contacting them 11 about sexual abuse allegations to either to further a case for another plaintiff or in an attempt to 12 solicit that individual to become a plaintiff themselves. 13 B. The Protective Order Does Not Authorize BBBSA’s Disclosure of Third-Party Private Information 14 15 There is no merit to Plaintiff’s claims that the existing protective order provides for the 16 disclosure of such third-party minor children’s identities. The protective order allows the parties 17 to produce confidential records for use in this litigation only; however, the protective order does 18 not empower BBBSA to waive the privacy rights of third parties by disclosing their identities in 19 this litigation. In fact, as set forth supra, there are two prior orders from this Court to apply 20 redactions to protect the requested third-party minor children’s identities. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// -6- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO IV. CONCLUSION 1 Based on the foregoing important third-party privacy interests, this Court’s prior rulings 2 protecting this private information, the lack of any new facts or argument by Plaintiff in support 3 of this continued demand for the minor third-party children’s identities, BBSA respectfully 4 requests that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. 5 6 Dated: January 13, 2023 BLEDSOE, DIESTEL, TREPPA & CRANE LLP 7 8 By: 9 Alison M. Crane 10 Tara A. Murray Attorneys for Defendant BIG BROTHERS BIG 11 SISTERS OF AMERICA, a California corporation 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO Jane Be Doe v. Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, et al. 1 Monterey Superior Court Case No. 21CV000805 HAN03-16113 2 3 PROOF OF SERVICE 4 I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 Sansome Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, 5 California 94104-3713. On the date indicated below, I caused to be served the following document(s): 6 7 DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF JANE BE DOE’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO 8 SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 9 DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF LODGEMENT CONDITIONALLY UNDER SEAL OF DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S UNREDACTED SEPARATE 10 STATEMENT ISO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL 11 INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 12 DECLARATION OF TARA A. MURRAY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT BIG BROTHER BIG SISTES OF AMERICA’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF JANE BE 13 DOE’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 14 15 DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S REDACTED SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 16 COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 17 DEFENDANT BIG BROTHERS BIG SISTERS OF AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S UNREDACTED SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 18 TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 19 upon the interested parties in said action by the means specified below: 20 21 John C. Manly Attorneys for Plaintiff, JANE BE DOE Courtney P. Pendry Tel: (949) 252-9990 22 Manly, Stew Art & Finaldi Fax: (949) 252-9991 19100 Von Karman Ave., Suite 800 jmanly@manlystewart.com 23 Irvine, CA 92612 cpendry@manlystewart.com acunny@manlystewart.com 24 kfrederiksen@manlystewart.com 25 sanwar@manlystewart.com 26 Paul Caleo Attorneys for co-defendant Boys and Girls Mark Heisey Club of Monterey County 27 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI Direct: (510) 463-8530 YOUR 50 STATE PARTNER Tel: (510) 463-8600 28 -8- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO 1 1111 Broadway, Suite 1700 F: (510) 984-1721 Oakland, CA 94607 pcaleo@grsm.com 2 mheisey@grsm.com khernandez@grsm.com 3 4 XXX BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION by causing the documents to be sent to the persons at the e-mail addresses set forth above. I did not receive, within a 5 reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 6 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 7 foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on January 13, 2023, at Brentwood, California. 8 9 10 __________________________ 11 LAURA KETTLE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -9- DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET TWO