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1 JESSICA RIGGIN (SBN 281712)
jriggin@rukinhyland.com
2 RUKIN HYLAND & RIGGIN LLP
1939 Harrison Street, Suite 290
3
Oakland, CA 94612
4 Telephone: (415) 421-1800
Facsimile: (415) 421-1700
5
MATTHEW C. HELLAND (SBN 250451)
6 helland@nka.com
DANIEL BROME (SBN 278915)
7 dbrome@nka.com
NICHOLS KASTER, LLP
8 235 Montgomery Street, Suite 810
San Francisco, CA 94104
9 Telephone: (415) 277-7235
Facsimile: (415) 277-7238
10
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
11
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
13
ALIDA MAZARIEGOS, PAULA CASE NO.: 20-CIV-04267
14 GONZALEZ, and JAIME AMAYA
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
15 RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves
16 and all others similarly situated, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
17 v. MOTION FOR CLASS
VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS, CERTIFICATION AND
18 APPOINTMENT AS CLASS COUNSEL
INC.; RR FRANCHISING, INC., D/B/A
19 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND D/B/A Judge: Hon. Nancy L. Fineman
20 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF Dept.: 04
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA; BUDDHA Date: March 28, 2023
21 CAPITAL CORPORATION, D/B/A Time: 2:00 p.m.
22 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF
SACRAMENTO, D/B/A VANGUARD
23 CLEANING SYSTEMS OF THE
CENTRAL VALLEY, AND D/B/A
24 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF
THE CENTRAL COAST; AND WINE
25 COUNTRY VENTURES, INC. D/B/A
26 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF
THE NORTH BAY, AND DOES 1
27 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,
28 Defendants.
PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 2
2
II. PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED CLASS DEFINITION IS APPROPRIATE .......................... 3
3
A. The Personal Service Requirement in Plaintiffs’ Class Definition is Appropriate
4 and no Bar to Certification ...................................................................................... 4
5 1. The Court Can Shift The Burden to Defendants to Show That Cleaners
Did Not Personally Perform Work .............................................................. 6
6
III. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WERE DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES IS SUBJECT TO
7
COMMON PROOF............................................................................................................. 7
8
A. Whether the ABC Test Applies to All of Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims Presents a
9 Common Legal Question ........................................................................................ 8
10 B. Common Questions Predominate Under the ABC Test .......................................... 9
11 1. Common Questions Predominate With Respect to Prong B ....................... 9
12 2. Common Questions Predominate With Respect to Prong A..................... 11
13 3. There Will Be No Individualized Issues Related to The Business-To-
14 Business Exception ................................................................................... 13
15 C. Common Questions Predominate with Respect to Borello ................................... 15
16 D. VCS Is Wrong That a Joint Employer Standard Would Apply Here.................... 17
17 IV. THE CLASS CAN BE CERTIFIED AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ UNDERLYING LABOR
CODE CLAIMS ................................................................................................................ 19
18
A. Defendants Again Raise Unfounded Exemption Defenses, Which Have Been
19 Waived and Are Subject to Common Proof .......................................................... 19
20
B. Plaintiffs’ Reimbursement and Deduction Claims Are Subject to Common Proof
21 ............................................................................................................................... 20
22 C. Plaintiffs’ Wage Statement Claims Are Subject to Common Proof ..................... 22
23 V. DEFENDANTS OFFER NO PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST MANGABILITY,
SUPERIORITY, OR ADEQUACY .................................................................................. 23
24
A. Defendants’ Arbitration and Release Agreements Do Not Defeat Manageability.
25
............................................................................................................................... 23
26
B. Defendants’ Remaining Adequacy and Typicality Arguments Are Meritless ...... 26
27
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 27
28
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1 Page(s)
2
Federal Cases
3
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,
4 (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3d 981 ..................................................................................................... 15
5 Alfred v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.,
(C.D. Cal. 2017) 322 F.R.D. 519, modified (C.D. Cal., July 13, 2017, No.
6
LACV1407086JAKRZX) 2017 WL 5665019 ................................................................ 4, 19, 21
7
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
8 (1946) 328 U.S. 680 .................................................................................................................... 5
9 Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.,
(D. Mass. 2010) 707 F.Supp.2d 80 ....................................................................................... 9, 10
10
11 Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
(9th Cir. 2017) 844 F.3d 1121 ............................................................................................... 4, 22
12
Costello v. BeavEx, Inc.,
13 (7th Cir. 2016) 810 F.3d 1045 ..................................................................................................... 8
14
Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
15 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 148 F. Supp. 3d 884 ...................................................................................... 24
16 Fleming v. Matco Tools Corp.,
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2021) 2021 WL 673445 ............................................................................. 21
17
18 Haitayan v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,
(9th Cir. 2019) 762 Fed. Appx. 393 .......................................................................................... 23
19
Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp.,
20 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 656 F.Supp.2d 1128 ...................................................................................... 16
21 James v. Uber Techs. Inc.,
22 (N.D. Cal. 2021) 338 F.R.D. 123 ............................................................................ 15, 16, 18, 21
23 Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc.
(S.D. Cal., July 5, 2022) No. 18CV1190-JO-JLB, 2022 WL 244129 ………………………….4
24
Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc.,
25 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) 2019 WL 3858999 ........................................................................... 14
26
Narayan v. EGL, Inc.,
27 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 285 F.R.D. 473 ............................................................................................ 4, 5
28 Norris-Wilson v. Delta-T Group, Inc.,
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
ii
(S.D. Cal. 2010) 270 F.R.D. 596 ............................................................................................... 15
1
2 O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc.
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097 ........................................ 16
3
Omar Alvarez v. XPO Logistics Cartage, LLC,
4 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2020, No. 218CV03736RGKE) 2020 WL 6253322 ............................... 18
5 Rehberg v. Flowers Baking Co. of Jamestown, LLC
6 (W.D.N.C., Mar. 24, 2015) No. 3:12-CV-00596-MOC, 2015 WL 1346125 ........................... 19
7 Roman v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc.,
(N.D. Cal. 2022) 342 F.R.D. 274 ................................................................................ 1, 9, 14, 17
8
Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc.,
9 235 F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Cal. 2006)............................................................................................... 19
10
Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp.,
11 (9th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3d 1093 ............................................................................................. 16, 18
12 Salinas v. Cornwell Quality Tools Co.
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2022) No. 519CV02275FLASPX, 2022 WL 16735359…………………...7
13
Soares v. Flowers Foods, Inc.,
14
(N.D. Cal. 2017) 320 F.R.D. 464 ............................................................................................ 4, 5
15
Spencer v. Beavex, Inc.
16 (S.D. Cal., Dec. 15, 2006, No. 05-CV-1501WQH(WMC)) 2006 WL 6500597……………….4
17 Urena v. Earthgrains
(C.D. Cal., July 19, 2017) 2017 WL 4786106 ............................................................................ 4
18
19 Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc.,
(9th Cir. 2019) 923 F.3d 575, amended and superseded by Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising
20 Int’l, Inc. (9th Cir. 2021) 986 F.3d 1106 .................................................................... 9,12, 17, 22
21 Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc.,
(N.D. Cal. 2014) 303 F.R.D. 588 .................................................................................... 4, 16, 20
22
23 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
(2011) 564 U.S. 338 .................................................................................................................. 12
24
State Cases
25
Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2,
26 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157 .................................................................................................. 5, 6
27
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.,
28 (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522................................................................................................ 1, 10, 14, 15
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
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1 Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court,
2 (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004.............................................................................................................. 21
3 Cislaw v. Southland Corp.,
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284 ........................................................................................................ 12
4
Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc.,
5
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1137 .................................................................................................... 22
6
Curry v. Equilon Enters., LLC,
7 (2018) 23 Cal. App. 5th 289 ...................................................................................................... 17
8 DaCosta v. Vanguard Cleaning Systems Inc.,
(Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 2017) 2017 WL 4817349 .......................................................... 5, 10, 22
9
10 Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.,
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1.................................................................................................................... 22
11
Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court,
12 (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903........................................................................................................... passim
13
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP,
14 (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937.......................................................................................................... 21, 23
15 Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1 ...................................................................................................... 3, 16
16
17 Fireside Bank v. Superior Court,
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069.............................................................................................................. 23
18
Garcia v. Border Transp. Group, LLC
19 (2018) 28 Cal. App. 5th 558, as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 13, 2018)…...….………...7
20 Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, Inc.,
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1131 ........................................................................................................ 7
21
22 Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transportation, Inc.,
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1213 .................................................................................................... 24
23
Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.,
24 (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 .................................................................................................... 25
25
Kao v. Holiday,
26 (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 947 ........................................................................................................ 22
27 Linton v. Desoto Cab Company, Inc.,
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1208 ...................................................................................................... 12
28
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
iv
Lopez v. Brown,
1 (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1114 .................................................................................................... 12
2
Myers v. Raley's,
3 (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1239 ...................................................................................................... 10
4 Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 955................................................................................................................ 4, 6
5
6 Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,
(2022) 489 Mass. 356 ................................................................................................................ 12
7
Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC,
8 (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474................................................................................................................ 12
9
Payton v. CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc.,
10 (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 832 ........................................................................................................ 25
11 People v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
(2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 266 .................................................................................................. 8, 17
12
Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist.,
13
(2019) 7 Cal. 5th 798................................................................................................................. 18
14
Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., Inc.,
15 (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785................................................................................................................ 18
16 S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations,
17 (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 ................................................................................................................... 1
18 Semprini v. Wedbush Securities, Inc.,
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 246 ........................................................................................................ 19
19
Sky Sports, Inc. v. Superior Court,
20 (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1363 .............................................................................................. 24, 25
21
Soderstedt v. CBIZ Southern California, LLC,
22 (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 133 ...................................................................................................... 24
23 Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc.,
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 944................................................................................................................ 11
24
Federal Statutes
25
26 29 U.S.C. § 201 ............................................................................................................................. 19
27 State Statutes
28 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.80, subd. (a) .............................................................................................. 18
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
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Lab. Code § 206.5 ......................................................................................................................... 23
1 Lab. Code § 2776(a)(1) ................................................................................................................. 13
2 Lab. Code § 2776(a)(2) ................................................................................................................. 13
Lab. Code § 1174 ............................................................................................................................ 5
3 Lab. Code § 2776(a) ...................................................................................................................... 12
Lab. Code § 2802 .......................................................................................................................... 23
4 Lab. Code § 2804 ..................................................................................................................... 21,23
5 Federal Regulations
6
29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a) .................................................................................................................. 19
7
State Regulations
8
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 1(A)(1)(f) ......................................................................... 18
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
vi
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Vanguard Cleaning Systems, Inc. (“VCS”) and the Regional Franchises offer scattershot
3 arguments against class certification that do not undermine the core common question in this case:
4 were Vanguard’s Cleaners, who are contractually required to comply with Vanguard-negotiated
5 cleaning contracts and manuals, Vanguard’s employees? Courts have routinely certified the
6 employment status question in similar cases (see Plfs’ Br. at 18–25), and this Court should reach
7 the same result. Under the appropriate legal test—the ABC test—the central issue of
8 misclassification is common, the substantive claims that flow from that misclassification are
9 common, and class certification is warranted.
10 In opposing Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification, Defendants again effectively
11 concede Plaintiffs’ common evidence under Prong B, which asks whether the worker performs
12 work outside the usual course of the hiring company’s business. This concession is unsurprising
13 given the undisputed fact that Defendants rely on Cleaners to perform the commercial cleaning
14 work central to Defendants’ business and revenue. Courts can and do grant certification based on
15 Prong B alone—and, at minimum, this Court should certify as to Prong B. Dynamex Operations
16 W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 966 (because the ABC test is conjunctive, and any
17 prong can be determinative, commonality “under part B of the ABC test is sufficient in itself to
18 support . . . class certification”) (citation omitted); accord Roman v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l,
19 Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2022) 342 F.R.D. 274 (granting class certification under Prong B against a three-
20 tier janitorial franchising company that is one of Vanguard’s competitors).
21 Defendants also fail to mount a compelling argument regarding the relevant legal test under
22 Prong A and their preferred legal standard—Borello. 1 Defendants again misstate the appropriate
23 inquiry, which is whether the right to control varies across the class, instead focusing on irrelevant
24 variations in the exercise of control and non-material differences among the form unit franchise
25 agreements over time. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 533
26 (“what matters under the common law is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much
27 control the hirer retains the right to exercise”). Because Defendants’ rights to control the details of
28
1
S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341.
PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
1 class members’ work—as spelled out in the contracts, account agreements, and manuals that class
2 members are contractually required to follow—are uniform across the putative class and
3 subclasses, common questions also predominate as to Prong A and Borello’s primary right to
4 control factor.
5 Failing to effectively challenge the central misclassification issue, Defendants point to
6 irrelevant distinctions and advance a variety of unconvincing arguments. Defendants argue that
7 Plaintiffs’ class definition is not certifiable; as explained below, however, courts routinely certify
8 independent contractor misclassification cases with personal performance requirements.
9 Defendants’ arguments against this class definition amount to manageability and damages
10 arguments. Class members can self-identify and describe when they personally performed cleaning
11 work, and Plaintiffs and the class only seek to recover for work personally performed and expenses
12 incurred for such work. Individualized damages issues are not a basis for denying class
13 certification. For the reasons stated below, the class should be certified.
14 II. PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED CLASS DEFINITION IS APPROPRIATE
15 As an initial matter, Vanguard’s challenges to Plaintiffs’ class definition are misplaced.
16 Plaintiffs and the class—California owner-operator franchisee cleaners who signed a franchise
17 agreement with VCS or the Regional Franchise and personally performed cleaning work—seek to
18 recover only based on cleaning services they personally performed. There is no dispute that many
19 putative class members sometimes had others—often family members, either paid or unpaid, and
20 occasionally formal employees—perform some of the cleaning work on their Vanguard accounts.
21 Those helpers are not class members. 2 And there is no claim that a class member should recover
22 under the Wage Orders or the Labor Code for work performed by a helper.
23 Plaintiffs’ proposal is simple and has been successfully used in other similar cases: class
24 members will need to confirm that they did personally perform cleaning work, and if damages are
25 2
For example, the Regional Franchises’ passing argument that Plaintiffs’ claim for improper
26 deductions implicates the personal service requirement because Plaintiffs ask the Court to
“assume” all contract signatories personally performed work (Regional Franchises’ Opposition
27 Brief (“Reg. Br.”) at 26) is simply incorrect. Only those contract signatories who personally
performed work will be class members per Plaintiffs’ definition—and, as described herein, that
28 can be determined at a later date. It is also telling that Defendants have submitted no evidence
from any franchisee who did not personally perform cleaning work.
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
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1 being calculated, class members will need to provide an estimate of the portion of their franchise’s
2 work that they personally performed. These issues do not go to the merits of the claims. Nor is
3 there a risk that the class will sweep in individuals with no claims, as even the large franchises
4 who provided declarations for Defendants testify that they personally performed cleaning services.
5 (E.g., Carpenter Dec. ¶ 5 (testifying to performing cleaning services).)
6 A. The Personal Service Requirement in Plaintiffs’ Class Definition is Appropriate and
no Bar to Certification
7
Defendants’ argument that the “personal service” requirement—i.e. the fact that Plaintiffs’
8
class definition includes a requirement that all class members personally performed cleaning
9
services—operates as a bar to class certification is a faulty attempt to shift blame. The Court should
10
reject Defendants’ attempt to avoid liability because they failed to maintain required records. (Reg.
11
Br. at 28; VCS’s Opposition Brief (“VCS Br.”) at 33–34.) In California, it is appropriate to define
12
a class by objective characteristics that are “sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify
13
himself as having a right to recover based on the description.” Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package
14
System, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (emphasis added). In other words, it is not necessary
15
that the list of class members is defined at the time of certification; instead, the class may be
16
“identified from [defendant’s] records and through discovery.” Id. Indeed, in Estrada, an
17
independent contractor misclassification case, “class certification was granted on the accepted
18
condition that discovery would define the class.” Id. at 26. The trial court approved a class member
19
questionnaire to determine which drivers fit the class definition and had compensable damages.
20
Id. That class definition, like the definition here, was explicitly limited to individuals who “who
21
personally perform or performed pickup and delivery services,” with other limitations. Id. at 4, n.
22
1. The California Supreme Court recently upheld this reasoning, in agreeing that a class definition
23
must allow class members to identify themselves as having a right to recover, “when that
24
identification becomes necessary.” Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980. 3
25
These principles of California law mean that even where discovery may be necessary to
26
27
3
See also Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 844 F.3d 1121, 1132 (class proponents
28 are not required to demonstrate that there is administratively feasible way to determine who is in
the class in order for the class to be certified).
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
4
1 precisely identify class members and determine damages, those are not the sort of “individualized
2 inquiries” that the court should consider in a predominance analysis. The inapposite federal cases
3 cited by VCS do not change the conclusion. (VCS Br. at 33–34.) First, those cases 4 follow federal
4 authorities – not one of them even cites to Estrada. Given that the Court here was clear that it will
5 follow California authorities, Defendants’ reliance on only federal cases is telling. 5 Second, those
6 cases all predated Dynamex and so offer no guidance for a court considering misclassification
7 under the ABC test. Third, Defendants’ cited cases did not deny certification solely because of
8 manageability concerns from the personal service requirement. See Soares, 320 F.R.D. at 486
9 (agreeing that certification should not be denied based solely on manageability issues); Urena,
10 2017 WL 4786106, at *10 (heavy administrative burdens do not show a class action is not
11 superior). Instead, these cases denied certification because they found that individualized inquiries
12 predominated as to substantive issues relating to the entirety of the independent contractor
13 analysis. See Urena, 2017 WL 4786106, at **6, 10 (because of “significant contractual differences
14 . . . the critical factor of whether Defendants retain all necessary control is not a common question
15 that predominates over individual issues” so individualized inquiries would be necessary for
16 determining class members’ classification, not just for identifying class members). The other three
17 cases found that common issues did not predominate because the personal service element went
18 to secondary Borello factors about whether the putative employees were engaged in independent
19 businesses. Soares, 320 F.R.D. at 486; Spencer, 2006 WL 6500597, at *16; Narayan, 285 F.R.D.
20 at 480. But here, for the reasons explained below, certification here is proper under the ABC test
21 4
Soares v. Flowers Foods, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2017) 320 F.R.D. 464; Urena v. Earthgrains
22 Distribution, LLC (C.D. Cal., July 19, 2017) 2017 WL 4786106; Spencer v. Beavex, Inc. (S.D.
Cal., Dec. 15, 2006, No. 05-CV-1501WQH(WMC)) 2006 WL 6500597; and Narayan v. EGL, Inc.
23 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 285 F.R.D. 473.
5
Nor do those cases reflect a uniform view among the federal courts. Plaintiffs previously cited to
24 multiple cases in which federal courts certified independent contractor misclassification cases with
25 personal service requirements. Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc. (S.D. Cal., July 5, 2022) No.
18CV1190-JO-JLB, 2022 WL 2441295, at *4 (certifying a class limited to those who worked
26 under defendants’ contracts and excluding “absentee owners” who did not perform work); Alfred
v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2017) 322 F.R.D. 519, 551, modified (C.D. Cal., July 13,
27 2017, No. LACV1407086JAKRZX) 2017 WL 5665019 (certifying a class limited to those
distributors who personally performed work and excluding helpers); Villalpando v. Exel Direct
28 Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2014) 303 F.R.D. 588, 610 (certifying a class of persons who “personally provided
delivery services for [Defendant]”).
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
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1 as well as under Borello. And, even under Borello, this second secondary factor is not
2 individualized, notwithstanding variations in personal service, as it examines the nature of
3 Defendants’ business, which is common across the class, and common evidence from Defendants’
4 contracts will show restrictions on Cleaners’ ability to operate independent businesses. See Section
5 II.C., infra.
6 1. The Court Can Shift the Burden to Defendants to Show That Cleaners Did Not
Personally Perform Work
7
Defendants complain that no common evidence shows which franchisees personally
8
performed cleaning work, but the lack of records is a problem of Defendants’ own making. The
9
Labor Code requires that employers keep “records showing the hours worked daily by and the
10
wages paid to, and the number of piece-rate units earned by and any applicable piece rate paid to,
11
employees[.]” Lab. Code § 1174. 6 Had Defendants done so, there would be no issue of showing
12
through common evidence which Cleaners performed work for Vanguard.
13
Courts have long recognized that where an employer’s records are inaccurate or
14
inadequate, it would be unfair “to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery on the
15
ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a result would
16
place a premium on an employer’s failure to keep proper records in conformity with his statutory
17
duty; it would allow the employer to keep the benefits of an employee’s labors without paying due
18
compensation[.]” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680, 687. “Relying
19
on Anderson, California courts have shifted the burden of proof to employers when inadequate
20
records prevent employees from proving their claims.” Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163
21
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1189 (citations omitted).
22
Importantly, this type of burden shifting is not limited to the amount of uncompensated
23
work, but was approved in Amaral as a means of establishing the fact of violations. In that case,
24
the employer did not separate work performed on city contracts from work for other clients, so any
25
production worker might have performed some work on the relevant contracts. Id. at 1188. The
26
27 6
At least one court has already held that VCS is an employer of cleaners under the ABC test, and
there is virtually no dispute that under Prong B, Cleaners are employees of VCS and the Regional
28 Franchises here. See infra Section II.B.1.; DaCosta v. Vanguard Cleaning Systems Inc., (Mass.
Super. Sept. 29, 2017) 2017 WL 4817349 at **5–6.
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
6
1 Court of Appeal held that the Anderson-based burden shifting framework was appropriate because
2 “Cintas is in the best position to know which class members worked on the City contracts and at
3 which times.” Id. at 1190.
4 Here, VCS and the Regional Franchises as the putative employers are in the best position
5 to have records of who performed cleaning services for which clients and at which times. It is
6 appropriate to presume that the individuals who signed franchise agreements with a Vanguard
7 entity performed some cleaning work. To avoid an over-inclusive class, that presumption should
8 be confirmed, but confirmation can happen much later in the case. Noel, 7 Cal.5th at 980–83
9 (explaining that ascertainability requires the eventual identification of class members based on
10 objective criteria, but rejecting argument that “the proponent of class treatment demonstrate, as a
11 prerequisite for certification, that (much less how) class members eventually will receive
12 individual notice of the action”) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the Regional Franchises recognize
13 that such a presumption could be applied here, and that they could then seek “to rebut that inference
14 with individualized evidence.” (Reg. Br. at 21, n. 2.)
15 Accordingly, questions about the extent of work that class members personally performed 7
16 relate to damages, not to certification. Each class member will recover for the damages related to
17 the work that class member personally performed. If, for instance, a Class Member had one account
18 that she never personally cleaned, then she would not have damages from that account. This is a
19 quintessential damages issue, which cannot prevent class certification.
20 III. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WERE DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES IS SUBJECT TO
21 COMMON PROOF
22 Defendants misstate and misapply the relevant legal inquiries in an effort to avoid the
23 obvious conclusion that common questions predominate on the applicable legal standard: the ABC
24 test. Defendants further incorrectly suggest that the question of which test to apply is somehow
25 individualized – not so. Finally, even were the Borello test to apply to some or all of Plaintiffs’
26 and class members’ claims, common questions still predominate.
27
28
7
See VCS Br. at 15–17 (describing happy camper declarations).
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
7
A. Whether the ABC Test Applies to All of Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims Presents a Common
1 Legal Question
2 While VCS no longer incorrectly claims that the ABC test does not apply to Plaintiffs’
3 Labor Code claims predating 2020, the Regional Franchises now assert a version of VCS’s prior
4 incorrect argument. See Reg. Br. at 18 (asserting that Borello applies to expense reimbursement
5 claims that accrued before December 31, 2019). The argument remains false. The ABC test is the
6 appropriate legal standa
Preview
1 JESSICA RIGGIN (SBN 281712) jriggin@rukinhyland.com 2 RUKIN HYLAND & RIGGIN LLP 1939 Harrison Street, Suite 290 3 Oakland, CA 94612 4 Telephone: (415) 421-1800 Facsimile: (415) 421-1700 5 MATTHEW C. HELLAND (SBN 250451) 6 helland@nka.com DANIEL BROME (SBN 278915) 7 dbrome@nka.com NICHOLS KASTER, LLP 8 235 Montgomery Street, Suite 810 San Francisco, CA 94104 9 Telephone: (415) 277-7235 Facsimile: (415) 277-7238 10 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 13 ALIDA MAZARIEGOS, PAULA CASE NO.: 20-CIV-04267 14 GONZALEZ, and JAIME AMAYA PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 15 RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves 16 and all others similarly situated, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 17 v. MOTION FOR CLASS VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS, CERTIFICATION AND 18 APPOINTMENT AS CLASS COUNSEL INC.; RR FRANCHISING, INC., D/B/A 19 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND D/B/A Judge: Hon. Nancy L. Fineman 20 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF Dept.: 04 NORTHERN CALIFORNIA; BUDDHA Date: March 28, 2023 21 CAPITAL CORPORATION, D/B/A Time: 2:00 p.m. 22 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF SACRAMENTO, D/B/A VANGUARD 23 CLEANING SYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY, AND D/B/A 24 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL COAST; AND WINE 25 COUNTRY VENTURES, INC. D/B/A 26 VANGUARD CLEANING SYSTEMS OF THE NORTH BAY, AND DOES 1 27 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE, 28 Defendants. PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 2 2 II. PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED CLASS DEFINITION IS APPROPRIATE .......................... 3 3 A. The Personal Service Requirement in Plaintiffs’ Class Definition is Appropriate 4 and no Bar to Certification ...................................................................................... 4 5 1. The Court Can Shift The Burden to Defendants to Show That Cleaners Did Not Personally Perform Work .............................................................. 6 6 III. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WERE DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES IS SUBJECT TO 7 COMMON PROOF............................................................................................................. 7 8 A. Whether the ABC Test Applies to All of Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims Presents a 9 Common Legal Question ........................................................................................ 8 10 B. Common Questions Predominate Under the ABC Test .......................................... 9 11 1. Common Questions Predominate With Respect to Prong B ....................... 9 12 2. Common Questions Predominate With Respect to Prong A..................... 11 13 3. There Will Be No Individualized Issues Related to The Business-To- 14 Business Exception ................................................................................... 13 15 C. Common Questions Predominate with Respect to Borello ................................... 15 16 D. VCS Is Wrong That a Joint Employer Standard Would Apply Here.................... 17 17 IV. THE CLASS CAN BE CERTIFIED AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ UNDERLYING LABOR CODE CLAIMS ................................................................................................................ 19 18 A. Defendants Again Raise Unfounded Exemption Defenses, Which Have Been 19 Waived and Are Subject to Common Proof .......................................................... 19 20 B. Plaintiffs’ Reimbursement and Deduction Claims Are Subject to Common Proof 21 ............................................................................................................................... 20 22 C. Plaintiffs’ Wage Statement Claims Are Subject to Common Proof ..................... 22 23 V. DEFENDANTS OFFER NO PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST MANGABILITY, SUPERIORITY, OR ADEQUACY .................................................................................. 23 24 A. Defendants’ Arbitration and Release Agreements Do Not Defeat Manageability. 25 ............................................................................................................................... 23 26 B. Defendants’ Remaining Adequacy and Typicality Arguments Are Meritless ...... 26 27 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 Page(s) 2 Federal Cases 3 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 4 (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3d 981 ..................................................................................................... 15 5 Alfred v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., (C.D. Cal. 2017) 322 F.R.D. 519, modified (C.D. Cal., July 13, 2017, No. 6 LACV1407086JAKRZX) 2017 WL 5665019 ................................................................ 4, 19, 21 7 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 8 (1946) 328 U.S. 680 .................................................................................................................... 5 9 Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., (D. Mass. 2010) 707 F.Supp.2d 80 ....................................................................................... 9, 10 10 11 Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., (9th Cir. 2017) 844 F.3d 1121 ............................................................................................... 4, 22 12 Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 13 (7th Cir. 2016) 810 F.3d 1045 ..................................................................................................... 8 14 Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc., 15 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 148 F. Supp. 3d 884 ...................................................................................... 24 16 Fleming v. Matco Tools Corp., (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2021) 2021 WL 673445 ............................................................................. 21 17 18 Haitayan v. 7-Eleven, Inc., (9th Cir. 2019) 762 Fed. Appx. 393 .......................................................................................... 23 19 Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp., 20 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 656 F.Supp.2d 1128 ...................................................................................... 16 21 James v. Uber Techs. Inc., 22 (N.D. Cal. 2021) 338 F.R.D. 123 ............................................................................ 15, 16, 18, 21 23 Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc. (S.D. Cal., July 5, 2022) No. 18CV1190-JO-JLB, 2022 WL 244129 ………………………….4 24 Moreno v. JCT Logistics, Inc., 25 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) 2019 WL 3858999 ........................................................................... 14 26 Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 27 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 285 F.R.D. 473 ............................................................................................ 4, 5 28 Norris-Wilson v. Delta-T Group, Inc., PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION ii (S.D. Cal. 2010) 270 F.R.D. 596 ............................................................................................... 15 1 2 O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097 ........................................ 16 3 Omar Alvarez v. XPO Logistics Cartage, LLC, 4 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2020, No. 218CV03736RGKE) 2020 WL 6253322 ............................... 18 5 Rehberg v. Flowers Baking Co. of Jamestown, LLC 6 (W.D.N.C., Mar. 24, 2015) No. 3:12-CV-00596-MOC, 2015 WL 1346125 ........................... 19 7 Roman v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2022) 342 F.R.D. 274 ................................................................................ 1, 9, 14, 17 8 Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 9 235 F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Cal. 2006)............................................................................................... 19 10 Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 11 (9th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3d 1093 ............................................................................................. 16, 18 12 Salinas v. Cornwell Quality Tools Co. (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2022) No. 519CV02275FLASPX, 2022 WL 16735359…………………...7 13 Soares v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 14 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 320 F.R.D. 464 ............................................................................................ 4, 5 15 Spencer v. Beavex, Inc. 16 (S.D. Cal., Dec. 15, 2006, No. 05-CV-1501WQH(WMC)) 2006 WL 6500597……………….4 17 Urena v. Earthgrains (C.D. Cal., July 19, 2017) 2017 WL 4786106 ............................................................................ 4 18 19 Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., (9th Cir. 2019) 923 F.3d 575, amended and superseded by Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising 20 Int’l, Inc. (9th Cir. 2021) 986 F.3d 1106 .................................................................... 9,12, 17, 22 21 Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2014) 303 F.R.D. 588 .................................................................................... 4, 16, 20 22 23 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, (2011) 564 U.S. 338 .................................................................................................................. 12 24 State Cases 25 Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 26 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157 .................................................................................................. 5, 6 27 Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 28 (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522................................................................................................ 1, 10, 14, 15 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION iii 1 Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 2 (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004.............................................................................................................. 21 3 Cislaw v. Southland Corp., (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284 ........................................................................................................ 12 4 Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc., 5 (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1137 .................................................................................................... 22 6 Curry v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 7 (2018) 23 Cal. App. 5th 289 ...................................................................................................... 17 8 DaCosta v. Vanguard Cleaning Systems Inc., (Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 2017) 2017 WL 4817349 .......................................................... 5, 10, 22 9 10 Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn., (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1.................................................................................................................... 22 11 Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 12 (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903........................................................................................................... passim 13 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 14 (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937.......................................................................................................... 21, 23 15 Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1 ...................................................................................................... 3, 16 16 17 Fireside Bank v. Superior Court, (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069.............................................................................................................. 23 18 Garcia v. Border Transp. Group, LLC 19 (2018) 28 Cal. App. 5th 558, as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 13, 2018)…...….………...7 20 Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, Inc., (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1131 ........................................................................................................ 7 21 22 Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transportation, Inc., (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1213 .................................................................................................... 24 23 Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc., 24 (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 .................................................................................................... 25 25 Kao v. Holiday, 26 (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 947 ........................................................................................................ 22 27 Linton v. Desoto Cab Company, Inc., (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1208 ...................................................................................................... 12 28 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION iv Lopez v. Brown, 1 (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1114 .................................................................................................... 12 2 Myers v. Raley's, 3 (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1239 ...................................................................................................... 10 4 Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955................................................................................................................ 4, 6 5 6 Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., (2022) 489 Mass. 356 ................................................................................................................ 12 7 Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 8 (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474................................................................................................................ 12 9 Payton v. CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc., 10 (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 832 ........................................................................................................ 25 11 People v. Uber Techs., Inc., (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 266 .................................................................................................. 8, 17 12 Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist., 13 (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 798................................................................................................................. 18 14 Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., Inc., 15 (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785................................................................................................................ 18 16 S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 17 (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 ................................................................................................................... 1 18 Semprini v. Wedbush Securities, Inc., (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 246 ........................................................................................................ 19 19 Sky Sports, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1363 .............................................................................................. 24, 25 21 Soderstedt v. CBIZ Southern California, LLC, 22 (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 133 ...................................................................................................... 24 23 Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc., (2021) 10 Cal.5th 944................................................................................................................ 11 24 Federal Statutes 25 26 29 U.S.C. § 201 ............................................................................................................................. 19 27 State Statutes 28 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.80, subd. (a) .............................................................................................. 18 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION v Lab. Code § 206.5 ......................................................................................................................... 23 1 Lab. Code § 2776(a)(1) ................................................................................................................. 13 2 Lab. Code § 2776(a)(2) ................................................................................................................. 13 Lab. Code § 1174 ............................................................................................................................ 5 3 Lab. Code § 2776(a) ...................................................................................................................... 12 Lab. Code § 2802 .......................................................................................................................... 23 4 Lab. Code § 2804 ..................................................................................................................... 21,23 5 Federal Regulations 6 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a) .................................................................................................................. 19 7 State Regulations 8 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 1(A)(1)(f) ......................................................................... 18 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION vi 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 Vanguard Cleaning Systems, Inc. (“VCS”) and the Regional Franchises offer scattershot 3 arguments against class certification that do not undermine the core common question in this case: 4 were Vanguard’s Cleaners, who are contractually required to comply with Vanguard-negotiated 5 cleaning contracts and manuals, Vanguard’s employees? Courts have routinely certified the 6 employment status question in similar cases (see Plfs’ Br. at 18–25), and this Court should reach 7 the same result. Under the appropriate legal test—the ABC test—the central issue of 8 misclassification is common, the substantive claims that flow from that misclassification are 9 common, and class certification is warranted. 10 In opposing Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification, Defendants again effectively 11 concede Plaintiffs’ common evidence under Prong B, which asks whether the worker performs 12 work outside the usual course of the hiring company’s business. This concession is unsurprising 13 given the undisputed fact that Defendants rely on Cleaners to perform the commercial cleaning 14 work central to Defendants’ business and revenue. Courts can and do grant certification based on 15 Prong B alone—and, at minimum, this Court should certify as to Prong B. Dynamex Operations 16 W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 966 (because the ABC test is conjunctive, and any 17 prong can be determinative, commonality “under part B of the ABC test is sufficient in itself to 18 support . . . class certification”) (citation omitted); accord Roman v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, 19 Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2022) 342 F.R.D. 274 (granting class certification under Prong B against a three- 20 tier janitorial franchising company that is one of Vanguard’s competitors). 21 Defendants also fail to mount a compelling argument regarding the relevant legal test under 22 Prong A and their preferred legal standard—Borello. 1 Defendants again misstate the appropriate 23 inquiry, which is whether the right to control varies across the class, instead focusing on irrelevant 24 variations in the exercise of control and non-material differences among the form unit franchise 25 agreements over time. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 533 26 (“what matters under the common law is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much 27 control the hirer retains the right to exercise”). Because Defendants’ rights to control the details of 28 1 S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341. PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 1 class members’ work—as spelled out in the contracts, account agreements, and manuals that class 2 members are contractually required to follow—are uniform across the putative class and 3 subclasses, common questions also predominate as to Prong A and Borello’s primary right to 4 control factor. 5 Failing to effectively challenge the central misclassification issue, Defendants point to 6 irrelevant distinctions and advance a variety of unconvincing arguments. Defendants argue that 7 Plaintiffs’ class definition is not certifiable; as explained below, however, courts routinely certify 8 independent contractor misclassification cases with personal performance requirements. 9 Defendants’ arguments against this class definition amount to manageability and damages 10 arguments. Class members can self-identify and describe when they personally performed cleaning 11 work, and Plaintiffs and the class only seek to recover for work personally performed and expenses 12 incurred for such work. Individualized damages issues are not a basis for denying class 13 certification. For the reasons stated below, the class should be certified. 14 II. PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED CLASS DEFINITION IS APPROPRIATE 15 As an initial matter, Vanguard’s challenges to Plaintiffs’ class definition are misplaced. 16 Plaintiffs and the class—California owner-operator franchisee cleaners who signed a franchise 17 agreement with VCS or the Regional Franchise and personally performed cleaning work—seek to 18 recover only based on cleaning services they personally performed. There is no dispute that many 19 putative class members sometimes had others—often family members, either paid or unpaid, and 20 occasionally formal employees—perform some of the cleaning work on their Vanguard accounts. 21 Those helpers are not class members. 2 And there is no claim that a class member should recover 22 under the Wage Orders or the Labor Code for work performed by a helper. 23 Plaintiffs’ proposal is simple and has been successfully used in other similar cases: class 24 members will need to confirm that they did personally perform cleaning work, and if damages are 25 2 For example, the Regional Franchises’ passing argument that Plaintiffs’ claim for improper 26 deductions implicates the personal service requirement because Plaintiffs ask the Court to “assume” all contract signatories personally performed work (Regional Franchises’ Opposition 27 Brief (“Reg. Br.”) at 26) is simply incorrect. Only those contract signatories who personally performed work will be class members per Plaintiffs’ definition—and, as described herein, that 28 can be determined at a later date. It is also telling that Defendants have submitted no evidence from any franchisee who did not personally perform cleaning work. PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 3 1 being calculated, class members will need to provide an estimate of the portion of their franchise’s 2 work that they personally performed. These issues do not go to the merits of the claims. Nor is 3 there a risk that the class will sweep in individuals with no claims, as even the large franchises 4 who provided declarations for Defendants testify that they personally performed cleaning services. 5 (E.g., Carpenter Dec. ¶ 5 (testifying to performing cleaning services).) 6 A. The Personal Service Requirement in Plaintiffs’ Class Definition is Appropriate and no Bar to Certification 7 Defendants’ argument that the “personal service” requirement—i.e. the fact that Plaintiffs’ 8 class definition includes a requirement that all class members personally performed cleaning 9 services—operates as a bar to class certification is a faulty attempt to shift blame. The Court should 10 reject Defendants’ attempt to avoid liability because they failed to maintain required records. (Reg. 11 Br. at 28; VCS’s Opposition Brief (“VCS Br.”) at 33–34.) In California, it is appropriate to define 12 a class by objective characteristics that are “sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify 13 himself as having a right to recover based on the description.” Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package 14 System, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (emphasis added). In other words, it is not necessary 15 that the list of class members is defined at the time of certification; instead, the class may be 16 “identified from [defendant’s] records and through discovery.” Id. Indeed, in Estrada, an 17 independent contractor misclassification case, “class certification was granted on the accepted 18 condition that discovery would define the class.” Id. at 26. The trial court approved a class member 19 questionnaire to determine which drivers fit the class definition and had compensable damages. 20 Id. That class definition, like the definition here, was explicitly limited to individuals who “who 21 personally perform or performed pickup and delivery services,” with other limitations. Id. at 4, n. 22 1. The California Supreme Court recently upheld this reasoning, in agreeing that a class definition 23 must allow class members to identify themselves as having a right to recover, “when that 24 identification becomes necessary.” Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980. 3 25 These principles of California law mean that even where discovery may be necessary to 26 27 3 See also Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 844 F.3d 1121, 1132 (class proponents 28 are not required to demonstrate that there is administratively feasible way to determine who is in the class in order for the class to be certified). PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 4 1 precisely identify class members and determine damages, those are not the sort of “individualized 2 inquiries” that the court should consider in a predominance analysis. The inapposite federal cases 3 cited by VCS do not change the conclusion. (VCS Br. at 33–34.) First, those cases 4 follow federal 4 authorities – not one of them even cites to Estrada. Given that the Court here was clear that it will 5 follow California authorities, Defendants’ reliance on only federal cases is telling. 5 Second, those 6 cases all predated Dynamex and so offer no guidance for a court considering misclassification 7 under the ABC test. Third, Defendants’ cited cases did not deny certification solely because of 8 manageability concerns from the personal service requirement. See Soares, 320 F.R.D. at 486 9 (agreeing that certification should not be denied based solely on manageability issues); Urena, 10 2017 WL 4786106, at *10 (heavy administrative burdens do not show a class action is not 11 superior). Instead, these cases denied certification because they found that individualized inquiries 12 predominated as to substantive issues relating to the entirety of the independent contractor 13 analysis. See Urena, 2017 WL 4786106, at **6, 10 (because of “significant contractual differences 14 . . . the critical factor of whether Defendants retain all necessary control is not a common question 15 that predominates over individual issues” so individualized inquiries would be necessary for 16 determining class members’ classification, not just for identifying class members). The other three 17 cases found that common issues did not predominate because the personal service element went 18 to secondary Borello factors about whether the putative employees were engaged in independent 19 businesses. Soares, 320 F.R.D. at 486; Spencer, 2006 WL 6500597, at *16; Narayan, 285 F.R.D. 20 at 480. But here, for the reasons explained below, certification here is proper under the ABC test 21 4 Soares v. Flowers Foods, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2017) 320 F.R.D. 464; Urena v. Earthgrains 22 Distribution, LLC (C.D. Cal., July 19, 2017) 2017 WL 4786106; Spencer v. Beavex, Inc. (S.D. Cal., Dec. 15, 2006, No. 05-CV-1501WQH(WMC)) 2006 WL 6500597; and Narayan v. EGL, Inc. 23 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 285 F.R.D. 473. 5 Nor do those cases reflect a uniform view among the federal courts. Plaintiffs previously cited to 24 multiple cases in which federal courts certified independent contractor misclassification cases with 25 personal service requirements. Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc. (S.D. Cal., July 5, 2022) No. 18CV1190-JO-JLB, 2022 WL 2441295, at *4 (certifying a class limited to those who worked 26 under defendants’ contracts and excluding “absentee owners” who did not perform work); Alfred v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2017) 322 F.R.D. 519, 551, modified (C.D. Cal., July 13, 27 2017, No. LACV1407086JAKRZX) 2017 WL 5665019 (certifying a class limited to those distributors who personally performed work and excluding helpers); Villalpando v. Exel Direct 28 Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2014) 303 F.R.D. 588, 610 (certifying a class of persons who “personally provided delivery services for [Defendant]”). PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 5 1 as well as under Borello. And, even under Borello, this second secondary factor is not 2 individualized, notwithstanding variations in personal service, as it examines the nature of 3 Defendants’ business, which is common across the class, and common evidence from Defendants’ 4 contracts will show restrictions on Cleaners’ ability to operate independent businesses. See Section 5 II.C., infra. 6 1. The Court Can Shift the Burden to Defendants to Show That Cleaners Did Not Personally Perform Work 7 Defendants complain that no common evidence shows which franchisees personally 8 performed cleaning work, but the lack of records is a problem of Defendants’ own making. The 9 Labor Code requires that employers keep “records showing the hours worked daily by and the 10 wages paid to, and the number of piece-rate units earned by and any applicable piece rate paid to, 11 employees[.]” Lab. Code § 1174. 6 Had Defendants done so, there would be no issue of showing 12 through common evidence which Cleaners performed work for Vanguard. 13 Courts have long recognized that where an employer’s records are inaccurate or 14 inadequate, it would be unfair “to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery on the 15 ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a result would 16 place a premium on an employer’s failure to keep proper records in conformity with his statutory 17 duty; it would allow the employer to keep the benefits of an employee’s labors without paying due 18 compensation[.]” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680, 687. “Relying 19 on Anderson, California courts have shifted the burden of proof to employers when inadequate 20 records prevent employees from proving their claims.” Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 21 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1189 (citations omitted). 22 Importantly, this type of burden shifting is not limited to the amount of uncompensated 23 work, but was approved in Amaral as a means of establishing the fact of violations. In that case, 24 the employer did not separate work performed on city contracts from work for other clients, so any 25 production worker might have performed some work on the relevant contracts. Id. at 1188. The 26 27 6 At least one court has already held that VCS is an employer of cleaners under the ABC test, and there is virtually no dispute that under Prong B, Cleaners are employees of VCS and the Regional 28 Franchises here. See infra Section II.B.1.; DaCosta v. Vanguard Cleaning Systems Inc., (Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 2017) 2017 WL 4817349 at **5–6. PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 6 1 Court of Appeal held that the Anderson-based burden shifting framework was appropriate because 2 “Cintas is in the best position to know which class members worked on the City contracts and at 3 which times.” Id. at 1190. 4 Here, VCS and the Regional Franchises as the putative employers are in the best position 5 to have records of who performed cleaning services for which clients and at which times. It is 6 appropriate to presume that the individuals who signed franchise agreements with a Vanguard 7 entity performed some cleaning work. To avoid an over-inclusive class, that presumption should 8 be confirmed, but confirmation can happen much later in the case. Noel, 7 Cal.5th at 980–83 9 (explaining that ascertainability requires the eventual identification of class members based on 10 objective criteria, but rejecting argument that “the proponent of class treatment demonstrate, as a 11 prerequisite for certification, that (much less how) class members eventually will receive 12 individual notice of the action”) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the Regional Franchises recognize 13 that such a presumption could be applied here, and that they could then seek “to rebut that inference 14 with individualized evidence.” (Reg. Br. at 21, n. 2.) 15 Accordingly, questions about the extent of work that class members personally performed 7 16 relate to damages, not to certification. Each class member will recover for the damages related to 17 the work that class member personally performed. If, for instance, a Class Member had one account 18 that she never personally cleaned, then she would not have damages from that account. This is a 19 quintessential damages issue, which cannot prevent class certification. 20 III. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WERE DEFENDANTS’ EMPLOYEES IS SUBJECT TO 21 COMMON PROOF 22 Defendants misstate and misapply the relevant legal inquiries in an effort to avoid the 23 obvious conclusion that common questions predominate on the applicable legal standard: the ABC 24 test. Defendants further incorrectly suggest that the question of which test to apply is somehow 25 individualized – not so. Finally, even were the Borello test to apply to some or all of Plaintiffs’ 26 and class members’ claims, common questions still predominate. 27 28 7 See VCS Br. at 15–17 (describing happy camper declarations). PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY ISO RENEWED NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 7 A. Whether the ABC Test Applies to All of Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims Presents a Common 1 Legal Question 2 While VCS no longer incorrectly claims that the ABC test does not apply to Plaintiffs’ 3 Labor Code claims predating 2020, the Regional Franchises now assert a version of VCS’s prior 4 incorrect argument. See Reg. Br. at 18 (asserting that Borello applies to expense reimbursement 5 claims that accrued before December 31, 2019). The argument remains false. The ABC test is the 6 appropriate legal standa