On October 21, 2015 a
Exhibit,Appendix
was filed
involving a dispute between
Alicia M Arundel,
Arthur A Belli Jr
As Parent And Natural Guardian Of Stephanie Belli, Deceased, And As The Administrator Of The E O Stephanie Belli,
Joelle Dimonte,
Melissa A Crai,
Mindy Grabina
A O E Amy Grabina, And Mindy Grabina, Individually,,
Olga Lipets,
Steven Baruch
A O E Lauren Baruch, Deceased, And Steven Baruch, Individually,,
Suzanne Schulman
As Administratrix Of The Estate Of Brittney M. Schulman, Deceased,
and
Cabot Coach Builders, Inc D B A Royale Limousine,
Carlos F Pino,
County Of Suffolk,
Romeo Dimon Marine Service, Inc.,
Steven D Romeo,
Town Of Southold,
Ultimate Class Limousine, Inc.,
Xyz Companies 1-5
Name Being Fictitious But Intended To Be The Remanufacturers, Distributors, And Or Sellers Of The 2007 Lincoln Town Car Stretch Limousine Involved In The Collision,,
for Tort
in the District Court of Suffolk County.
Preview
FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022
"Q"
EXHIBIT
FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022
https://www.nycourts.gov/REPORTER/3dseries/2018/2018_04573.htm
People v Pino (2018 NY Slip Op 04573)
People v Pino
2018 NY Slip Op 04573 [162 AD3d 910]
June 20, 2018
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law §
431.
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2018
[*ll
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Michael J. Miller, Elizabeth
Miller, and Glenn Green of counsel), for appellant.
Leonard Lato, Hauppauge, NY, for respondent.
Appeal by the People from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County
(Fernando M. Camacho, J.), dated October 26, 2016, as dismissed the indictment as against
the defendant.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from.
The defendant was indicted for various offenses based on a fatal accident that
occurred on July 18, 2015, at the intersection of Route 48 and Depot Lane in Suffolk
County. The evidence before the grand jury established that at approximately 5:00 p.m., the
defendant, a limousine driver, picked up eight passengers at a winery on Route 48. Upon
exiting the parking lot, the defendant was required to make a right turn, traveling east on
Route 48. Since the defendant needed to travel west on Route 48, he decided to make a
U-turn at the next intersection, which was Route 48 and Depot Lane. After stopping and
seeing no oncoming traffic, the defendant turned left into the intersection and was
broadsided by a pickup truck traveling west on Route 48. The evidence before the grand
jury indicated that the defendants view of oncoming traffic was partially obstructed by a
FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022
People v Pino (2018 NY SlipOp04573) https://www.nycourts.gov/REPORTER/3dseries!2018/2018_04573.htm
vehicle waiting to make a left turn in the opposite turning lane on the westbound side of
Route 48. Four of the passengers in the limousine died in the collision. The four surviving
passengers sustained injuries.
The defendant was charged with four counts of criminally negligent homicide, four
counts of assault in the third degree, one count of reckless driving in violation of Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1212, and four additional violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The
Supreme Court dismissed all of the counts against the defendant, concluding, inter alia, that
the evidence presented to the grand jury with respect to counts one through nine was
legally insufficient. The People appeal.
"Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate
'whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and
uncontradicted-and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence
conviction' "
-would warrant (P_eople v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting
People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999] ; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525
[1998]). CPL 70.10 (1) defines legally sufficient evidence as "competent evidence which,
if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's
thereof."
[*2]commission "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency
doubt"
means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable
(People v Bello, 92 NY2d at 526; see People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 978-979 [1987]).
This Court's inquiry "is limited to 'whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that
crimes,'
logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged and
inference' "
whether 'the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty (People v Bello,
92 NY2d at 526, quoting People v Deegan, 69 NY2d at 979).
We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to dismiss counts one through four
of the indictment, charging the defendant with criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law §
125.10), and counts five through eight, charging him with assault in the third degree (Penal
Law § 120.00 [3]). "A person is guilty of
criminally negligent homicide when, with
person"
criminal negligence, he causes the death of another (Penal Law § 125.10). A
person is guilty of assault in the third degree when "[w]ith criminal negligence, he causes
instrument"
physical injury to another person by means of. . . a dangerous (Penal Law §
120.00 [3]).
FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022
People v Pino (2018 NY Slip Op 04573) https://www.nycourts.gov/REPORTER/3dseries/2018/2018_04573.htm
The Penal Law defines criminal negligence as follows: "A person acts with criminal
negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an
offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will
occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the
failure to perceive itconstitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
situation"
reasonable person would observe in the (Penal Law § 15.05 [4]). The Court of
Appeals has stated that "the carelessness required for criminal negligence is appreciably
more serious than that for ordinary civil negligence, and that the carelessness must be such
that its seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community's general sense
of right and wrong. Moreover, criminal negligence requires a defendant to have engaged in
some blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of a proscribed result; nonperception of a risk, even if [the proscribed result occurs], is not
enough"
(People v Conway, 6 NY3d 869, 872 [2006] [internal quotation marks and
citations omitted] ; see People v Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370, 376 [2008]).
Here, the grand evidence, viewed most to the People, did not establish
jury favorably
"the kind of seriously condemnatory behavior that the Legislature envisioned when it
negligence,' fatal"
defined 'criminal even though the consequences here were (People v
Cabrera, 10 NY3d at 378; see People v McGrantham, 12 NY3d 892, 893-894 [2009] ;
People v Boutin, 75 NY2d 692, 697-698 [1990]).
We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination to dismiss count nine of
indictment, charging the defendant with reckless driving (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212).
The grand jury evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, did not establish that the
defendant operated his vehicle "under such circumstances as to show a reckless disregard
consequences"
of the (People v Grogan, 260 NY 138, 144 [1932]).
The People's remaining contention is without merit. Roman, J.P., LaSalle, Connolly
and Christopher, JJ., concur.
Preview
FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022 "Q" EXHIBIT FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022 https://www.nycourts.gov/REPORTER/3dseries/2018/2018_04573.htm People v Pino (2018 NY Slip Op 04573) People v Pino 2018 NY Slip Op 04573 [162 AD3d 910] June 20, 2018 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2018 [*ll Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Michael J. Miller, Elizabeth Miller, and Glenn Green of counsel), for appellant. Leonard Lato, Hauppauge, NY, for respondent. Appeal by the People from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Fernando M. Camacho, J.), dated October 26, 2016, as dismissed the indictment as against the defendant. Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from. The defendant was indicted for various offenses based on a fatal accident that occurred on July 18, 2015, at the intersection of Route 48 and Depot Lane in Suffolk County. The evidence before the grand jury established that at approximately 5:00 p.m., the defendant, a limousine driver, picked up eight passengers at a winery on Route 48. Upon exiting the parking lot, the defendant was required to make a right turn, traveling east on Route 48. Since the defendant needed to travel west on Route 48, he decided to make a U-turn at the next intersection, which was Route 48 and Depot Lane. After stopping and seeing no oncoming traffic, the defendant turned left into the intersection and was broadsided by a pickup truck traveling west on Route 48. The evidence before the grand jury indicated that the defendants view of oncoming traffic was partially obstructed by a FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022 People v Pino (2018 NY SlipOp04573) https://www.nycourts.gov/REPORTER/3dseries!2018/2018_04573.htm vehicle waiting to make a left turn in the opposite turning lane on the westbound side of Route 48. Four of the passengers in the limousine died in the collision. The four surviving passengers sustained injuries. The defendant was charged with four counts of criminally negligent homicide, four counts of assault in the third degree, one count of reckless driving in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212, and four additional violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Supreme Court dismissed all of the counts against the defendant, concluding, inter alia, that the evidence presented to the grand jury with respect to counts one through nine was legally insufficient. The People appeal. "Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate 'whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted-and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence conviction' " -would warrant (P_eople v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999] ; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). CPL 70.10 (1) defines legally sufficient evidence as "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's thereof." [*2]commission "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency doubt" means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable (People v Bello, 92 NY2d at 526; see People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 978-979 [1987]). This Court's inquiry "is limited to 'whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that crimes,' logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged and inference' " whether 'the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty (People v Bello, 92 NY2d at 526, quoting People v Deegan, 69 NY2d at 979). We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to dismiss counts one through four of the indictment, charging the defendant with criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10), and counts five through eight, charging him with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [3]). "A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with person" criminal negligence, he causes the death of another (Penal Law § 125.10). A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when "[w]ith criminal negligence, he causes instrument" physical injury to another person by means of. . . a dangerous (Penal Law § 120.00 [3]). FILED: SUFFOLK COUNTY CLERK 09/08/2022 12:27 PM INDEX NO. 611214/2015 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1058 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/08/2022 People v Pino (2018 NY Slip Op 04573) https://www.nycourts.gov/REPORTER/3dseries/2018/2018_04573.htm The Penal Law defines criminal negligence as follows: "A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive itconstitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a situation" reasonable person would observe in the (Penal Law § 15.05 [4]). The Court of Appeals has stated that "the carelessness required for criminal negligence is appreciably more serious than that for ordinary civil negligence, and that the carelessness must be such that its seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community's general sense of right and wrong. Moreover, criminal negligence requires a defendant to have engaged in some blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of a proscribed result; nonperception of a risk, even if [the proscribed result occurs], is not enough" (People v Conway, 6 NY3d 869, 872 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ; see People v Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370, 376 [2008]). Here, the grand evidence, viewed most to the People, did not establish jury favorably "the kind of seriously condemnatory behavior that the Legislature envisioned when it negligence,' fatal" defined 'criminal even though the consequences here were (People v Cabrera, 10 NY3d at 378; see People v McGrantham, 12 NY3d 892, 893-894 [2009] ; People v Boutin, 75 NY2d 692, 697-698 [1990]). We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination to dismiss count nine of indictment, charging the defendant with reckless driving (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212). The grand jury evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, did not establish that the defendant operated his vehicle "under such circumstances as to show a reckless disregard consequences" of the (People v Grogan, 260 NY 138, 144 [1932]). The People's remaining contention is without merit. Roman, J.P., LaSalle, Connolly and Christopher, JJ., concur.