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FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 09/30/2022 08:36 PM INDEX NO. 30287/2017E
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 28 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/30/2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF BRONX
SARAH RODRIGUEZ, Index No. 30287/2017E
Plaintiff,
–against–
CDC EAST 105TH STREET REALTY, L.P. and CDC
111TH STREET REALTY, L.P.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................... ii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................................. 1
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................. 2
RELEVANT FACTUAL HISTORY ....................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 6
I. DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS’ SHOULD
BE VACATED AND DEFENDANTS ANSWER SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED TIMELY ...................................................................................... 6
A. Defendants Did Not Receive Notice of this Action Until
June 3, 2022 and Have Otherwise Established a Reasonable
Excuse for Default ........................................................................................ 7
B. Defendants Have a Meritorious Defenses to the Complaint ......................... 9
C. The Court Should Deem Defendants’ Answer Timely Filed ...................... 11
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 12
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE(s)
CASES
Abel v. Estate of Collins,
73 A.D.3d 1423 (3d Dep’t 2010) .......................................................................................6, 7, 9
Bev. Distribs. of Nev., Inc. v. Schenley Indus.,
155 A.D.2d 356 (1st Dep’t 1989) ..............................................................................................8
Cohen v. Michelle Tenants Corp.,
63 A.D.3d 1097 (2d Dep’t 2009) ...........................................................................................6, 8
DiIorio v. Antonelli,
240 A.D.2d 537 (2d Dep’t 1997) ...............................................................................................9
Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lumber Co.,
67 N.Y.2d 138 (1986) ........................................................................................................6, 7, 8
Gomez by DeJesus v. Walton Realty Assocs.,
258 A.D.2d 307 (1st Dep’t 1999) ............................................................................................10
Inwald Enterprises, LLC v. Aloha Energy,
153 A.D.3d 1008 (3d Dep’t 2017) .........................................................................................6, 7
Leemilt’s Petroleum v. Pub. Storage,
193 A.D.2d 650 (2d Dep’t 1993) ...............................................................................................9
Luderowski v. Sexton,
152 A.D.3d 918 (3d Dep’t 2017) ...............................................................................................7
Monsanto v. Target Corp.,
2018 NY Slip Op 30303(U), (Suffolk Cty. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2018) .........................................11
Passeri v. Tomlins,
141 A.D.3d 816 (3d Dep’t 2016) ...............................................................................................7
Polir Construction Inc. v. Etingin,
297 A.D.2d 509 (1st Dep’t 2002) ............................................................................................10
Price v. Polisner,
172 A.D.2d 422 (1st Dep’t 1991) ..............................................................................................9
Puchner v. Nastke,
91 A.D.3d 1261 (3d Dep’t 2012) ...............................................................................................7
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Roche v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
58 Misc. 3d 1228(A), (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).............................................................................11
Singh v. United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, Inc.,
72 A.D.3d 272 (1st Dep’t 2010) ..............................................................................................11
Volin v. City Beach Catering Corp.,
166 A.D.2d 583 (2d Dep’t 1990) ...............................................................................................9
Wade v. Village of Whitehall,
46 A.D.3d 1302 (3d Dep’t 2007) ...............................................................................................7
Wadsworth v. Sweet,
106 A.D.3d 1433 (3d Dep’t 2013) .............................................................................................6
Statutes
Business Corporation Law § 306 .....................................................................................................8
CPLR 317............................................................................................................................... passim
CPLR 2004.................................................................................................................................1, 12
CPLR 2104.......................................................................................................................................9
CPLR 3012(d) ............................................................................................................................1, 12
CPLR 3215.......................................................................................................................................9
CPLR 3215(g)(4) .........................................................................................................................3, 4
CPLR 5015(a) ........................................................................................................................ passim
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Defendants CDC EAST 105TH STREET REALTY, L.P. and CDC 111TH STREET
REALTY, L.P. (“Defendants”) submit this memorandum of law in support of their motion pursuant
to CPLR 317 and 5015(a) to vacate the default judgment entered by Plaintiff SARAH
RODRIGUEZ (“Plaintiff”) against Defendants and to order Defendants’ Answer be deemed timely
filed pursuant to CPLR 2004 and 3012(d) nunc pro tunc.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendants request that default judgment entered by this Court on August 19, 2022 be
vacated because Defendants clearly establish: (1) excusable default; and (2) meritorious defenses
to the claims asserted by Plaintiff.
Regarding excusable default, Defendants first received actual service of papers involving
this action on June 3, 2022 at their office located at 1140 Broadway, Suite 904, New York, New
York. Upon receipt of these papers, Defendants promptly notified their insurance broker and
private attorney and filed their Answer less than one week later, on June 9, 2022 (with verbal
consent of Plaintiff’s attorney). Prior attempts at actual service on Defendants were unsuccessful
because: (1) Plaintiff incorrectly served papers to the wrong floor of Defendants’ former office
(the offices were previously located on the 3rd floor of 100 West 23rd Street, New York, New York
but Plaintiff sent papers to the 4th floor of that building); and (2) the Secretary of State (“SOS”)
had the wrong address on file for Defendants, so the SOS never served any documents on
Defendants. Defendants accordingly have a reasonable excuse for not previously appearing —
Defendants never received actual service of any papers in this action until Plaintiff’s most recent
motion for renewal, satisfying the timeliness requirements of both CPLR 317 and 5015(a). The
delay in appearing was also clearly unintentional as Defendants filed their Answer within one week
of their first notice of this matter.
Defendants also possess meritorious defenses to Plaintiff’s premises liability claims
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because Defendant CDC 111th Street Realty, L.P. (“111th Street”) never had any ownership interest,
control, or operational authority over the premises where the incident allegedly occurred at 2018
3rd Avenue a/k/a 188 East 111th Street (“Premises”). Furthermore, despite Plaintiff’s claimed injury
at the Premises on April 15, 2015 due to “a bulletin/wall board . . . suddenly dislodging,” see infra
Affidavit of Plaintiff, Exhibit C, CDC East 105th Street Realty, L.P. (“105th Street”) has no record
of the incident or records of any repairs to the bulletin/wall board. Further, 105th Street never
received any complaints about the bulletin/wall board, either before the alleged incident or after.
Together, these defenses are meritorious and raise questions about Plaintiff’s ability to show that
she suffered any injury on the property at 108 3rd Avenue as alleged, much less that Defendants
were negligent in causing such injury.
Therefore, the default judgment against Defendants should be vacated and the Court should
deem Defendants’ June 9, 2022 Answer timely filed nunc pro tunc.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed a Summons and Complaint in this action on or about October 30, 2017
(“Complaint”), claiming premises liability against Defendants. See Affirmation of John J.
Giardino (“Giardino Aff.”), Exhibit A. The Complaint provides that Defendants’ address is 100
West 23rd Street, 4th Floor, New York, New York, but at the time of service of the Complaint the
offices of Defendants were located at 1140 Broadway, Suite 904, New York, New York (and
Defendants’ office at 100 West 23rd Street was on the 3rd floor, not the 4th). See id; Affidavit of
William Guerrero dated September 30, 2022 (“Guerrero Aff.”) ¶¶ 6-7; Exhibit 1. The affidavit of
service indicates that service of the Complaint was made solely on the SOS on November 30,
2017. See Giardino Aff., Exhibit B. At the time of this service, Defendants had inadvertently not
updated their address with the SOS and were unaware the SOS had their incorrect old address on
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file. See Guerrero Aff. ¶ 17. Accordingly, Defendants never actually received the Complaint or
notice of this action at that time. Id.
On or about November 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment against
Defendants. See Giardino Aff., Exhibit C. Again, Plaintiff sent the papers to the incorrect 100
West 23rd Street, 4th Floor address and again service was made on the SOS who did not have the
correct address on file. See Giardino Aff., Exhibits C & D. Accordingly, Defendants never
received actual notice of Plaintiff’s motion for default. See Guerrero Aff. ¶¶ 9-10.
Furthermore, Plaintiff did not comply with CPLR 3215(g)(4), which requires service of the
papers seeking default on the “Defendant corporation[s] at [their] last known address” because a
simple Google search would have revealed Defendants’ office address was 1140 Broadway, Suite
904, New York, New York at that time. See Guerrero Aff. ¶ 6. On June 3, 2019, the Court denied
Plaintiff’s Motion for Default because Plaintiff failed to include any evidence that CPLR
3215(g)(4) was satisfied. See Giardino Aff., Exhibit E.
On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff appeared for a status conference where the Court ordered
“Plaintiff’s counsel to refile motion for default judgment” and also ordered that “failure to comply
with the terms of this order will result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice.” See Giardino
Aff., Exhibit F. Rather than re-filing the motion, with the procedural protections inherent to a
default motion, Plaintiff — more than two years later on May 20, 2022 — filed a motion to renew
the previously denied motion. See Giardino Aff., Exhibit G.
In the Affirmation in Support of that motion, Plaintiff argued that renewal was appropriate
because CPLR 3215(g)(4) mailings were sent to Defendants (at the wrong address) in the initial
default motion but were inadvertently not included with the motion. See Giardino Aff., Exhibit H.
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For the first time, Plaintiff served this motion on Defendants’ actual office address: 1140
Broadway, Suite 904, New York, New York. Id.
On June 3, 2022, for the first time, Defendants received service of papers relating to this
matter and for the first time had notice of the existence of this lawsuit. See Guerrero Aff. ¶¶ 9-10.
Upon receipt of these papers, the principal of Defendants, William Guerrero, immediately
contacted Defendants’ insurance broker and private attorney to respond to the lawsuit. Id; Giardino
Aff. ¶ 11. Defendants’ private attorney thereafter promptly contacted Plaintiff’s counsel via phone
and email and discussed Defendants filing an Answer (especially given that Defendants were
insured), to which Plaintiff’s counsel consented as long as the Answer was “clean.” See Giardino
Aff. ¶ 12-13, Exhibit I. Defendants’ private counsel thereafter filed what he considered to be a
“clean” Answer on June 9, 2022. See Giardino Aff. ¶ 14, Exhibit J. In reliance on Plaintiff’s
counsel’s oral and written representations that Defendants could file their Answer, Defendants filed
their Answer instead of filing an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to renew. See Giardino Aff. ¶ 15.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s counsel’s prior consent, on June 23, 2022, nearly two weeks after
Defendants served the Answer on Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Notice of Rejection
of the Answer. See Giardino Aff. ¶ 16, Exhibit K. Despite the above attempts by Defendants to
litigate amicably and with courtesy, Defendants’ counsel did not receive the reciprocal courtesy of
any notice regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s subsequent filings or Plaintiff’s counsel’s later
correspondence with the Court, despite being the counsel of record. See Giardino Aff. ¶ 17.
On August 19, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s renewal motion on the basis that evidence
that the CPLR 3215(g)(4) mailings were sent (to the wrong address) with the initial motion
warranted granting default judgment against Defendants and Plaintiff entered the order the same
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day. See Giardino Aff., Exhibits L & M. On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Note of Issue
requesting an inquest on damages. See Giardino Aff., Exhibit N.
Defendants now seek to have their default vacated and a Court order deeming their Answer
timely filed nunc pro tunc.
RELEVANT FACTUAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owned and operated the Premises and that Plaintiff
allegedly sustained injury thereat on April 15, 2015. See generally, Giardino Aff., Exhibit A. In
support of Plaintiff’s initial default motion, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit dated November 7,
2018 whereby Plaintiff averred “[t]hat on April 15, 2015, while delivering mail into mailboxes for
the United States Postal Service, to the building located at 2018 3rd Avenue a/k/a 188 East 111th
Street, County of New York, City and State of New York, a bulletin/wall board encased in glass
above the mailboxes suddenly dislodged from the wall and hit me.” See Giardino Aff., Exhibit C,
p. 3.
The Premises identified by Plaintiff in her Complaint is entirely owned and operated by
105th Street. See Guerrero Aff. ¶ 12. 111th Street has never had an ownership interest, control or
operational authority over the Premises. Id. Exhibit 1. Since receiving first notice of this action
on June 3, 2022, Defendants have investigated Plaintiff’s claims by inter alia speaking with the
superintendent of the Premises at the time of the alleged incident, Jose Tejada, and reviewing
relevant records. Id. Despite their investigation, Defendants have been unable to locate any
evidence that the incident ever occurred, any evidence that the bulletin/wall board ever fell off the
wall, any evidence that the bulletin/wall board at the Premises required repairs at any time, or any
evidence of complaints concerning the “bulletin/wall board” before or after the incident. Id.
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ARGUMENT
I. DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE VACATED AND
DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TIMELY
Pursuant to CPLR 317,
A person served with a summons other than by personal delivery to
him or to his agent for service designated under rule 318 . . . who
does not appear may be allowed to defend the action within one year
after he obtains knowledge of entry of the judgment . . . upon a
finding of the court that he did not personally receive notice of the
summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense.
A default judgment is appropriately vacated where the defendant: (1) has not been personally
served (or served via agent pursuant to CPLR 318), (2) “did not personally receive notice of the
summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense,” (3) “establishes the existence of a
potentially meritorious defense,” and (4) moves within one year of knowledge of the entry of
default judgment. Cohen v. Michelle Tenants Corp., 63 A.D.3d 1097, 1098 (2d Dep’t 2009).
Service on an entity by the Secretary of State is not considered personal service and is not an
obstacle to relief under CPLR 317. Id.
Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), it is also well settled that default will be vacated if the
defaulting party presents a reasonable excuse for default in addition to a meritorious defense. See
Wadsworth v. Sweet, 106 A.D.3d 1433, 1434 (3d Dep’t 2013); Abel v. Estate of Collins, 73 A.D.3d
1423, 1424 (3d Dep’t 2010). CPLR 5015(a) differs from CPLR 317, in that it requires the
defendant moving to show a “reasonable excuse” for its delay. Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C.
Dutton Lumber Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 141 (1986). The quantum of proof required to establish a
reasonable excuse for default is less stringent than that required on a motion for summary
judgment. See Inwald Enterprises, LLC v. Aloha Energy, 153 A.D.3d 1008, 1010 (3d Dep’t 2017)
(quoting Abel v. Estate of Collins, 73 A.D.3d 1423, 1425 (3d Dep’t 2010)). A defendant’s excuse
for defaulting will be considered reasonable when the delay in responding was not willful, lengthy
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or prejudicial to the plaintiff. See Puchner v. Nastke, 91 A.D.3d 1261, 1262 (3d Dep’t 2012). As
for a meritorious defense, a defendant is only required to make a prima facie showing of legal
merit and is not required to establish a defense as a matter of law. Luderowski v. Sexton, 152
A.D.3d 918, 920 (3d Dep’t 2017); see also Passeri v. Tomlins, 141 A.D.3d 816, 819 (3d Dep’t
2016) (“[W]e find that KVA met its burden to set forth sufficient facts to make a prima facie
showing of legal merit in its defense” (quotations omitted)).
The requirements that a defaulting party demonstrate a reasonable excuse and meritorious
defense are not exclusive; courts retain inherent discretionary power to excuse defaults for
sufficient reason and in the interests of justice. See Inwald Enterprises, LLC, 153 A.D.3d at 1010–
11. Moreover, there is a strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, rather than
by default judgment. See Wade v. Village of Whitehall, 46 A.D.3d 1302, 1303 (3d Dep’t 2007);
Puchner, 91 A.D.3d at 1262.
A. Defendants Did Not Receive Notice of this Action Until June 3, 2022 and
Have Otherwise Established a Reasonable Excuse for Default
Defendants satisfy the thresholds set by both CPLR 317 and 5015(a).
Addressing CPLR 317, the record is clear that Defendants did not receive actual notice of
this action until they were served with Plaintiff’s motion to renew on June 3, 2022 — because
Plaintiff had previously served the wrong address and the SOS did not have the correct address on
file. See Guerrero Aff. ¶ 17. Defendants also make this application within one year of Plaintiff’s
entry of the order granting default judgment on August 19, 2022. Accordingly, Defendants are
entitled to vacatur of the default judgment entered against them having satisfied the timing
requirements of CPLR 317 and demonstrating the existence of a meritorious defense (see infra
I.B.) without any need “to show a reasonable excuse for its delay.” Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.
C. Dutton Lumber Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 141-43 (1986) (an entity served by secretary of state may
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move under CPLR 317 if they “did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend
and has a meritorious defense” and there is otherwise no need to demonstrate a reasonable excuse
under this provision).
Defendants also satisfy the requirements of CPLR 5015(a), which does require a reasonable
excuse for the default, because Defendants did not realize their current address was not on file with
the SOS at the time service was made. See Guerrero Aff. ¶ 17; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d
at 142 (granting relief under CPLR 5015(a) because “corporate defendants served under Business
Corporation Law § 306 have frequently obtained relief from default judgments where they had a
wrong address on file with the Secretary of State, and consequently, did not receive actual notice
of the action in time to defend.”); Cohen v. Michelle Tenants Corp., 63 A.D.3d 1097, 1098 (2d
Dep’t 2009) (defendant corporation served via secretary of state entitled to vacatur of default where
defendant possessed a meritorious defense and there “was no evidence that the defendant was on
notice that an old address was on file with the Secretary of State”); Bev. Distribs. of Nev., Inc. v.
Schenley Indus., 155 A.D.2d 356, 357 (1st Dep’t 1989) (failure to update address with Secretary
of State such that actual notice did not occur is a “reasonable excuse” supporting vacatur of
default). Ultimately, Defendants should not be held responsible for Plaintiff’s incorrect mailing
address and it is otherwise well established that having the incorrect address on file with the
Secretary of State is a reasonable excuse for default under CPLR 5015(a).
Moreover, Defendants’ prompt action upon learning of this action conclusively
demonstrates that Defendants’ default was not willful. For example, under similar circumstances
courts have routinely excused a party’s default when the party promptly responded to their first
notice of the action. See, e.g., Abel v. Estate of Collins, 73 A.D.3d 1423, 1424-25 (3d Dep’t 2010)
(excusable default where inter alia efforts were made to vacate default as soon as they became
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aware); Price v. Polisner, 172 A.D.2d 422, 423 (1st Dep’t 1991) (where there was no willful
default and the defendant acts promptly to defend themselves unintentional default should be
vacated).
Additionally, Defendants’ default should be vacated because Defendants filed their answer,
rather than filing opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to renew, based on Plaintiff’s oral representation
Plaintiff would permit Defendants to file their Answer. See DiIorio v. Antonelli, 240 A.D.2d 537,
537 (2d Dep’t 1997) (denying plaintiff’s motion to enter default pursuant to CPLR 3215 because
“[t]he record clearly reflect[ed] that both parties had entered into an oral stipulation to extend the
defendant’s time to answer, and that the defendant relied upon such stipulation” and the “record
[wa]s inconclusive as to whether there was an agreed-upon due date, and the defendant’s brief
delay in [responding] was neither intentional nor serious enough to prejudice the plaintiff’s
prosecution of his lawsuit”); Leemilt’s Petroleum v. Pub. Storage, 193 A.D.2d 650, 650 (2d Dep’t
1993) (“a party is precluded from invoking CPLR 2104 to avoid an oral stipulation if it appears
that the stipulation was made and that the adverse party relied upon it.”); Volin v. City Beach
Catering Corp., 166 A.D.2d 583, 584 (2d Dep’t 1990) (“[w]hile the record is inconclusive as to
whether a formal stipulation extending the defendant’s time to answer was ever executed, it is clear
that such a stipulation was made, and that the parties relied upon it.”). Equities therefore favor
vacatur of the default because Defendants justifiably relied on Plaintiff’s representation
Defendants would be permitted to file their Answer.
Finally, permitting Defendants to enter their answer and defend the claims against them
would not result in any prejudice to Plaintiff. Any claim otherwise is belied by the fact Plaintiff
waited over two years to renew their motion for default undermining any claim to urgency they
might have.
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B. Defendants Have a Meritorious Defenses to the Complaint
In addition to demonstrating a lack of notice of the action until June 3, 2022 and a
reasonable excuse for their default, Defendants also have a meritorious defense to Plaintiff’s
premises liability claims. See Guerrero Aff. ¶ 18; Exhibit 1.
Plaintiff alleges “[t]hat on April 15, 2015, while delivering mail into mailboxes for the
United States Postal Service, to the building located at 2018 Third Avenue a/k/a 188 East 111th
Street, County of New York, City and State of New York, a bulletin/wall board encased in glass
above the mailboxes suddenly dislodged from the wall and hit me.” See Exhibits A & C.
However, the Premises identified by Plaintiff in her Complaint is entirely owned and operated by
105th Street and 111th Street has never had any ownership interest, control or operational authority
over the Premises. See Guerrero Aff. ¶ 13.
Therefore, 111th Street has an absolute and complete defense to Plaintiff’s claims insofar
as 111th Street cannot not be held liable for conditions at a property it does not own or control. See
e.g., Gomez by DeJesus v. Walton Realty Assocs., 258 A.D.2d 307, 308 (1st Dep’t 1999) (“An out-
of-possession owner who has relinquished control over the premises will not be held liable for
subsequent injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on the premises.”). This goes well beyond
the necessary prima facie showing that 111th Street’s defense has “potential merit.” Polir
Construction Inc. v. Etingin, 297 A.D.2d 509, 512 (1st Dep’t 2002).
Likewise, since 105th Street first received notice of this action on June 3, 2022, it has
investigated Plaintiff’s claims by inter alia speaking with the superintendent of the Premises at the
time of the alleged incident and reviewing relevant records. See Guerrero Aff. ¶¶ 15-16. Despite
the investigation, Defendants have been unable to locate any evidence that the incident occurred,
any evidence that the bulletin/wall board ever fell off the wall, any evidence that the bulletin/wall
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board at the Premises required repairs at any time, or any evidence of complaints concerning the
“bulletin/wall board” before or after the incident. Id. Therefore, 105th Street has an absolute
defense to Plaintiff’s claims insofar as they did not create or have any notice of the alleged
condition which caused Plaintiff’s injury. See e.g., Singh v. United Cerebral Palsy of New York
City, Inc., 72 A.D.3d 272, 275 (1st Dep’t 2010) (“A property owner is subject to liability for a
defective condition on its premises if a plaintiff demonstrates that the owner either created the
alleged defect or had actual or constructive notice of it.”); Roche v. New York City Hous. Auth., 58
Misc. 3d 1228(A), at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (where Plaintiff did not notice the alleged dangerous
condition prior to her incident and there is no evidence of any prior relevant complaints “any
finding that the condition had been visible and apparent for a sufficient time prior to plaintiff's
accident to permit defendant to discover and remedy it would be speculative.”); Monsanto v.
Target Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 30303(U), at *4 (Suffolk Cty. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2018) (summary
judgment granted to defendant where “the affidavits of defendant’s employees and the deposition
testimony of [defendant] establish[ed] that prior to the incident no similar injuries occurred at the
subject display and no one had ever complained about the display.”).
Therefore, Defendants possess meritorious defenses to Plaintiff’s claims which, together
with their lack of notice of this action and reasonable excuse for default, justifies vacatur of the
default judgment pursuant to CPLR 317 and CPLR 5015(a).
C. The Court Should Deem Defendants’ Answer Timely Filed
In addition to satisfying the standard for excusing a default, the circumstances in this matter
which are described above also warrant deeming Defendants’ Answer filed June 9, 2022 timely
nunc pro tunc pursuant to CPLR 2004 and 3012(d). See CPLR 2004 (“Except where otherwise
expressly prescribed by law, the court may extend the time fixed by any statute, rule or order for
doing any act, upon such terms as may be just and upon good cause shown, whether the application
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for extension is made before or after the expiration of the time fixed”); CPLR 3012(d) (“Upon the
application of a party, the court may extend the time to appear or plead, or compel the acceptance
of a pleading untimely served, upon such terms as may be just and upon a showing of reasonable
excuse for delay or default.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants CDC EAST 105TH STREET REALTY, L.P.
and CDC 111TH STREET REALTY, L.P. requests that the Court issue an order (i) vacating the
default judgment as against Defendants pursuant to CPLR 317 and CPLR 5015(a); (ii) ordering
Defendants’ Answer deemed timely filed pursuant to CPLR 2004 and 3012(d) nunc pro tunc; and
(iii) awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DATED: September 30, 2022
New York, New York
Respectfully submitted,
PRYOR CASHMAN LLP
___________________________
John J. Giardino
Nicholas Saady
7 Times Square
New York, New York 10036
(212) 421-4100
jgiardino@pryorcashman.com
Attorneys for Defendants
CO-COUNSEL
HARRIS BEACH PLLC
By:_____________________________
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FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 09/30/2022 08:36 PM INDEX NO. 30287/2017E
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 28 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/30/2022
Stanley Goos, Esq.
Andre J. Major, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant
CDC East 105th Street Realty, L.P.
100 Wall Street, 23rd Floor
New York, NY 10005
(212) 687-0100
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