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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Document Scanning Lead Sheet
Jun-07-2017 3:38 pm
Case Number: CGC-10-503332
Filing Date: Jun-07-2017 3:36
Filed by: EDWARD SANTOS
Image: 05895430
MOTIONS IN LIMINE
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY VS. FEDEX OFFICE
AND PRINT SERVICES, INC et al (PROVIDE ACCESS)
001005895430
Instructions:
Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.Ce ty AH kh WN &
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Jay Shah
Pro Se
AP3101 F I L E D
P.O. Box 2000 San Francisco County Superior Court
Vacaville, CA 95696-2000 .
JUN 07 2017
CLERK OF THE COU’
JAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH BY: Deputy Glen
EDWARD F. SANTOS
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Civil Division, 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California 94102-4514
(Unlimited Jurisdiction Civil Case)
Lead Case No. CGC-10-503332 (Consolidated
with CGC-11-512102)
SHARI HWANG; COMMONWEALTH
LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
MOTIONS IN LIMINE OF DEFENDANT
SAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH
Trial:
Vs. Date: June 12,2017
Day: Monday
JAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH, ETAL, | Time: 9:30 am.
. Dept: 206 (TBD)
Def Judge: Presiding Judge, Hon. Teri L. Jackson
AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED Place: Superior Court, San Francisco County
Civil Division, 400 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102-4514
Complaint Filed: September 8, 2010
ACTION of Hwang v. FedEx Office and
Print Services, Ine. (CGC-11-512102).
Defendant Jay Shah (“Shah”) respectfully moves in limine against Plaintiffs Shari Hwang
(“Hwang”) and Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth”) for the orders
which follow. The motions are based on this paper, including the points and authorities cited as
to each such motion, the trial brief, all pleadings and papers on file in this action, all matters that
may be judicially noticed by the court, and any additional evidence, arguments, or authorities that
may be presented at the hearing of the within motions in limine. Defendant reserves the right to
make oral motions in limine inadvertently omitted here or which arise in connection with
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MOTIONS IN LIMINE OF DEFENDANT JAY SHAHCo eID Hh RF WN |
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opposition to or concurrence with motions in limine made by other parties herein Should any
request for motions in limine re evidence be denied, plaintiff reserves the right to assert objections
on the same grounds during the examination of witnesses. The motions in limine and specific
grounds for each such motion are as follows: :
1. Preclude Hwang from Arguing Lost Profits in Connection With the Resale of the
Two Rincon Units. Shah hereby moves this Court for an order excluding Hwang from
offering any evidence of Lost Profits in connection to this case. As confirmed by the Criminal
Court in the Criminal Restitution Order, the Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the value of units 4802 and 4902 was $1,225,000 in January 2009. Further, the Court found that
the value of the units at the relevant times, including the sale price, were as followed:
Unit 4802: ,
8/08 purchase price: $1,401,500 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 9/11 sale price: $1,355,000
Unit 4902:
8/08 purchase price: $1,355,000 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 9/10 sale price: $1,370,000
After hearing the testimony of Mrs. Hwang’s experts and considering the presented
evidence, the court ruled that Hwang sold the properties for an amount greater than the appraised
values in January 2009, and thus there was no showing of restitution for Loss of Property
Value/Lost Profits. This Court should rule on similar grounds. Mrs. Hwang should be collaterally
estopped from introducing evidence of the loss of value as Mrs. Hwang may try to introduce the
same evidence. The restitution order from a criminal proceeding is attached to this motion as
Exhibit A (relevant pages are 6:25-11:2). Hwang should thus be precluded from introducing any
evidence for the loss of value for the units.
2. Preclude Hwang and Commonwealth from Claiming Damages Without Taking Into
Consideration a Set-Off Amount Paid By Defendant FedEx Office and Print Services, Inc.
to Hwang and Commonwealth in This Matter.
Shah hereby moves this Court foran order preventing Hwang and Commonwealth from
collecting all full damages demanded in this case per California Code of Civil Procedure §
431.70. California's current statutory setoff provisions emanate from the established principle in
equity that either party to a transaction involving material debts and credits can strike a balance,
holding himself owing or entitled only to the net difference. In light of this equitable origin, the
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right to setoff is not absolute, but may be restricted by judicial limitations imposed to uphold
independent state policies. Moreover, under appropriate circumstances a party may waive the
statutory right of setof£. Jess v. Herrmann (1979) 26 Cal. 3d 131.
A defendant in a civil action may not obtain an award of affirmative relief against a
plaintiff by way of C.C.P. § 431.70; rather, a defendant may only assert the setoff defensively to
defeat a plaintiff's claim in whole or in part. Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG
Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal 4th 189. The statute allows a person to assert a claim which
would otherwise be time-barred in an action commenced by another person, where cross-demands
for money have existed between the persons at a time when neither demand was time-barred, The
rights must be mutual and due from the same person to the same person to qualify as offsetting
claims under the statute, and the previous partnership was not a party against whom the producer
had a claim. Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranch (1986) 189 Cal App 3d 809. Right of setoff
under this section is available without necessity of bringing an independent action setting forth
related dealings between parties. Hauger v. Gates (1954) 42 Cal 2d 752.
In the present case, Hwang and Commonwealth received an undisclosed settlement from
Defendant FedEx Office and Print Services, Inc. in the related consolidated action, Case #CGC-
11-512102 for alleging the same damages. Hwang and Commonwealth further secks full damages ,
against Shah, including the amount that was originally awarded to her from FedEx. This would
most likely increase Hwang and Commonwealth’s chances of receiving windfall if they prevail,
and thus taking a much higher amount in damages than is fair and just. Therefore, Shah seeks an
order that precludes Hwang and Commonwealth from claiming damages without a set-off from
the amount given by Defendant FedEx to Hwang and Commonwealth as a result of the
settlement.
3. Exclude Non-Party Witnesses from Courtroom. Shah hereby moves this Court for an
order excluding from the courtroom all non-party witnesses, including expert witnesses, during any
time such witnesses are not under examination. This motion is made pursuant to Evidence
Code section 777 on the grounds that witnesses should not be permitted to gain any advantage
by hearing the testimony of the witnesses who testify before them. Restricting a witness from.
hearing other witness examinations during the trial assists in the prevention of .
tailored testimony, as well as the detection of less-than-candid testimony, that might be offered by
that witness. In this case, Shah anticipates that several trial third party witnesses on either or both
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sides will be testifying on similar issues or elements of the pending claims. As the witnesses
should not be afforded the opportunity to consciously or subconsciously conform their testimony
to, or distinguish their testimony from, that of other witnesses as a result of having heard the
testimony of such other witnesses, Shah respectfully requests that all non-party witnesses be
excluded from the courtroom except when under examination.
Date: June 5, 2017
JAY IRAKANT SHAHEXHIBIT AOMANI DWH PWN
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
THE PEOPLE OF THE )
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) Court No. 10009193
)
Plaintiff ) ORDER RE:
) MOTION TO MODIFY THE
DEFENDANT’S
v. ) SENTENCE TO INCLUDE
) A RESTITUTION ORDER
)
JAY SHAH, )
)
Defendant. )
| )
Judgment and Sentence was pronounced on March 19, 2013. At that time, the Court
retained jurisdiction to determine Victim Restitution. Subsequently, on February 20, 2014, and
on December 16, 2015, the People filed Notice Of Motion To Modify The Defendant’s Sentence
To Include A Restitution Order. The People seek victim restitution pursuant to Penal Code
§1202.4(f) for Shirley Hwang in the amount of | $5,090,277.77.' Hearings were held on February
26, March 24, May 12 and May 13, 2015. Various motions and papers were filed by the People,
by the Defendant, and by Ms. Hwang. On March 24, 2015, the Court issued its Tentative Order
from the bench; and on May 4, 2015, the Court filed its Interim Ruling Re: Motion To Modify
' The People’s Closing Brief, hereinafter identified, seeks restitution in the modified amount of $4,352,463.70. _
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The Defendant’s Sentence To Include A Restitution Order. Further evidentiary hearings were
held on May 12 and 13, 2015, and a briefing schedule was set. On May 20, 2015, Shah filed
Defendant’s Combined Closing Brief and Brief On Attorneys’ Fees; and on June 25, 2015, the
People filed its Closing Brief On Restitution Hearing.
The People are represented by Antonio J. Hernandez, Assistant District Attorney, Office
of the District Attorney of the City and County of San Francisco; Jay Shah is represented by
Dylan L. Schaffer, Esq., Riordan & Hogan; Shirley Hwang has been present at the hearings with
her counsel, Morgan K. Lopez, Esq., Glynn & Finley, LLP.
At the hearing on May 13, 2015, Mr. Lopez filed Victim Shirley Hwang’s Submission
Of Attomeys’ Fees Records.
Penal Code §1202.4(f) enumerates the items of restitution recoverable by a victim of
crime. Although the right to restitution is to be broadly and liberally construed, the victim must
make a prima facie showing of entitlement to the items of restitution claimed and the amount of
restitution. People v. Sy (2014) 223 Cal.App.4" 44, The victim has the initial burden of proof to
establish a prima facie case of entitlement and amount, and only if that burden has been met
does the burden shift to the defendant to challenge the item and/or the amount claimed for
restitution. People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4" 876, 886. The standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence. People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4* 1539, 1542-1543.
The amount of restitution may not be based merely on the trial court’s subjective belief
regarding appropriate restitution. People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4" 1114, 1125. Nor may the|
court order restitution for an item or amount based on speculation. People v. Thygesen (1999)
Cal.App.4” 988, 995. There must be evidence to support the claimed restitution; and the court is
required to use a “rational method” in computing the amount. People v. Harvest (2000) 84oan HAWN FF WN
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Cal.App.4" 641, 653. No particular formula is mandated for fixing the amount of restitution; the|
court may use any rational method that is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. In re
Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523.
The Court’s May 8, 2015, Interim Ruling established those items of claimed restitution
for which a prima facie case of entitlement had been met. With respect to certain items, such as
attorneys’ fees, the Court determined that a prima facie case for restitution as to the category had
been met, but that additional evidence was needed as to the dollar amount.
Having considered the evidence introduced and admitted, the oral arguments and written
briefs filed by counsel, the applicable law, and Good Cause Appearing Therefore, Defendant Jay
Shah’s Sentence is Modified to include Restitution as hereinafter set forth.
Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the apfount of $135.990.41 for legal
fees and costs incurred by Shirley Hwang. (Exhibits 32, 1, 2, and 47;
Hwang.) Penal Code §1202.4(£)(3)(H) specifically mandates restitution for the amount of actual
and reasonable attorney’s fees. Attorney fees incurred in a civil action to recover property taken
by the defendant are properly included in an order of restitution. People v. Maheshwari (2003)
107 Cal.App.4" 1406. The legal fees were incurred by Shirley Hwang, the victim, to quiet title,
remove the liens of the deeds of trust encumbering the property, defend against the accusation
that she was involved in the fraud, and to appropriately respond to media reports concerning the
crimes committed by Jay Shah and his fellow conspirators. The amount and nature of the legal
fees are reasonable in light of the intricate nature of the crimes, the number co-conspirator
defendants, the number of people and entities affected by the crimes, including DeWitte
? Unless otherwise noted the exhibits referenced are to those admitted at the Restitution Hearing.
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Mortgage and Kitco Holdings LLC, the nature and number of the condominium property assets,
the high profile nature of the case, and the length of time it took to quiet title and clear the
property of the fraudulent deeds of trust. To the extent that these legal fees may include some
legal work to protect Ms. Hwang from noneconomic losses, the fees are nonetheless fully
recoverable since they were principally incurred to protect and preserve Ms. Hwang’s property
assets. As opined by the court in People v. Fulton supra, 109 Cal. App.4" 876, 885:
Moreover, because of the strong public policy seeking to provide
crime victims with direct restitution for all the “losses they suffer”
(Cal. Const., art I, §28, subd. (b)), when fees cannot be reasonably
divided between the pursuit of economic losses as opposed to non-
economic losses, the victim is entitled to be fully reimbursed for all
actual and reasonable attorney fees.
The People have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that these fees were proper, logical
and necessary as a result of Defendant’s criminal conduct, and that they are reasonable in amount
for the work performed. People v. Lyon (1996) 49 Cal.App.4" 1521.
The Court finds that Ms. Hwang is not entitled to restitution for the payment made to
Nicholas Casagrande in the amount of $18,000 (Exhibit 3). The testimony of Ms. Hwang
evidences that this amount is not for paralegal services, but rather for work as a personal
assistant to Ms. Hwang. Ms. Hwang testified that the $18,000 was payment for Mr. Casagrande
supportive personal services including accompanying her when she went out in public because
she was fearful as a victim of the criminal acts. This represents costs as a result of emotional
distress or psychological harm, which are noneconomic losses and are not recoverable as
restitution for these crimes. (Penal Code §1202.4()(3)(F); People v. Fulton, supra, 109
Cal.App.4"" 879, 884.)wo ny AN FF WN =
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2. *s ation
Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the amount ef $63.655.98
Homeowner Association Fees incurred by Shirley Hwang because she was unable to market and
sell the three condominium properties as planned due to the crimes committed by Defendant.
(Penal Code §1202.4(£)(3)(A); Exhibits 10, 11, and 12; Testimony of Shirley Hwang.)
3. Property Taxes.
Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the 4
was unable to market and sell the properties as planned due to the crimes committed by
Defendant. (Penal Code 1202.4(£)(3)(A); Exhibits 13, 14, and 15; Testimony of Shirley Hwang.
Defendant Shah objects that he should not be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the
property taxes for Unit 5501 since Ms. Hwang was living in that condominium. However,
Exhibit 15, the property tax statement for Unit 5501 shows Winston Lum, Jay Shah’s Co-
Defendant, as the owner of the property; Unit 5501 remained under the cloud and stigma of
Defendant’s wrongful acts during this time. Ms. Hwang’s testimony is that her original intent
was to sell Unit 5501 and that she only decided to live in that Unit after the crimes were
committed.
4, Property Title Insurance,
Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the ame
Title Insurance Premiums. (Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3); Exhibits 17, my of
Shirley Hwang.) Ms. Hwang testified credibly that she obtained Short Term Title Insurance onoO ONIN NUH PwWH =
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the three condominium properties which would entitle her to a refund of the premiums paid if the
property was sold within two years of obtaining the polices. She was not able to market and sell
the properties as planned due to the crimes committed by the Defendant. The nature of this
expense and the amount are properly the subject of victim restitution under the broad perimeters
of Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3); People v. ‘Sy, supra, 223 Cal.App.4"" 44, 63,
§. Lost Income,
The People have not shown that Shirley Hwang is entitled to restitution for Lost Income.
The Court reaffirms its decision stated in the Interim Ruling filed May 8, 2015. The People have
not established a prima facie case for Lost Income and the People have not met their burden of
proof for restitution of this item. Ms. Hwang was not employed at the time that the crimes were
committed. She did not have any concrete prospect for a job or position, but intended to seek
information about possible positions through her business contacts. No evidence was presented
of any particular job or position; thus, there was no evidence of salary or other terms of
compensation. There was no evidence of a job offer. There was no evidence of a position open
to be filled. The claim for Lost Income is entirely speculative. There is no means or method by
which this Court could rationally calculate an amount for the claimed Lost Income. Any attempt
to calculate an amount would be arbitrary and capricious. The law does not authorize such
awards. People v, Thygesen, supra, 69 Cal.App.4" 988.
|| Z.Loss of Property Value and Lost Profits.
The People have not shown that Shirley Hwang is entitled to restitution for Loss of
Property Value.CORI AH HR WH eS
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On behalf of Ms. Hwang the People argue that Ms. Hwang purchased the condominiums
known as Unit 4802, Unit 4902, and Unit 5501, located at 425 First Street, in the City and
County of San Francisco, for investment purposes, with the intent to resell the properties at a
profit in January 2009. The argument is that because of the criminal acts of ‘Defendant, Ms.
Hwang was not able to sell Unit 4802 and Unit 4902 as planned in January 2009, and that,
therefore, she should have restitution in the amount of the profit she would have made if the
properties would have been sold at the time and price she wanted to sell them. It is further
argued that Ms. Hwang would have invested the gain she made on the resale of the properties
and that she is entitled to the amount that she would have earned on the investment of the sale
proceeds,
There is no claim for Loss of Property Value or Lost Profits with respect to Unit 5501
since Ms. Hwang made the decision to reside in Unit 5501 in the summer of 2009.
The People have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Units 4802 and/or
4902 would have been sold at the time or at the price asserted.
It is undisputed that in January 2009, the real estate market in San Francisco was ina
decline. (Exhibits 228 and C; Testimony of John Mateo; Testimony of Shirley Hwang.) Ms.
Hwang’s testimony is that in August 2008 she purchased Unit 4802 for $1 2401,500, and Unit
4902 for $1,355,500. In September 2008, she listed Unit 4902 with a real estate agent for sale at
$1,795,000; she then dropped the listing price to $1,650,000. Units 4802 and 5501 were not
listed, but were available to be shown to prospective buyers if any expressed an interest. No
evidence was presented that any prospective buyer expressed a serious interest in any of the
Units. Ms. Hwang’s testimony is that the only person to express any interest in any of theCoO HD HA F&F WN
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properties was Mr, Niroula. Mr. Niroula’s interest was not that of a genuine prospective
purchaser; he is the co-defendant involved in the conspiracy for which Mr. Shah was convicted.
Nonetheless, the People on behalf of Ms. Hwang, presented evidence that in January
2009, the properties had the following “market value”; Unit 4802: $1,600,000; Unit 4902:
$1,615,000. (Exhibit 239; Testimony of John Mateo; Testimony of Shirley Hwang.) Defendant
disputes this valuation and asserts that the market value of the properties in January 2009, was
$1,225,000 for each of Units 4802 and 4902.
Mr. Mateo’s testimony as to the market value is not persuasive for several reasons. First,
although Mr. Mateo delineated a specific geographic area for the Units for a comparison sales
analysis to arrive at market value (Exhibit 227), his analysis included property outside the
subject properties’ market area (Exhibit 230). Second, Mr. Mateo’s testimony was that
comparison sales are generally limited to a 30 day period on either.side of the specified market
value date, However, since there were so few sales in January 2009, he extended the number of
months over which he attempted to identify comparison sales. Mr. Mateo identified six
Properties for comparison sales with the following sales dates: June 2008, July 2008, September
2008, October 2008, May 2009, and May 2009 (Exhibit 230). As is apparent, none of these sal
occurred during the specified market value month of January 2009; none occurred during the 30
day period before or after; none even occurred during the 90 day: period before or after. Third,
John Mateo testified that his determination of market value is based on what the market behavior is with
comparable properties in the subject property’s market area.
‘The appraisals performed by Casey Simms in 2009 define “market value” as: “The most probable price which a
Property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and
seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus, implicit in
this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under
conditions whereby: (1) buyer and seller are typically motivated; (2) both parties are well informed or well advised,
and each acting in what he or she considers his or her own best interest; (3) a reasonable time is allowed for
exposure in the open market; (4) payment is made in terms of cash in U.S. dollars or in terms of financial
arrangements comparable thereto; and (5) the price represents the normal consideration for the property sold
unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions{...] granted by anyone associated with the sale.”
(Trial Exhibit 21.)
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Mr. Mateo, added a “floor premium™ for Units 4802 and 4902 in calculating market value from
the comparison sales properties. (Exhibit 237.) To calculate the “floor premium” Mr. Mateo
looked at five units located at 338 Spear Street — not 425 First Street where Units 4802 and 4902
are located. The evidence, however, is that Ms. Hwang purchased Unit 4802 for a greater price
than she paid for the higher floor Unit 4902. When asked about this contradiction with his “flo
premium” analysis, Mr. Mateo responded, “I agree with you, it’s problematic.” Finally, Mr.
Mateo is an expert engaged by Ms. Hwang to provide a market value for Units 4802 and 4902
supportive of her claim for restitution.
The Court finds the preponderance of the evidence supports the value of $1,225,000 for
Units 4802 and 4902 in January 2009. First, that is the value upon which the jury verdicts and
special findings are based by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. (Trial Exhibits 21 and
119.) Second, Casey Simms, the appraiser, testified credibly at trial that at the time that he
performed the appraisals he was a licensed appraiser and he authenticated the appraisal reports.*
He is an independent appraiser with no ties to any interested party. Third, in reaching his “sales
comparison approach” values of $1,225,000 for each of the units, Mr. Simms’ appraisal reports
State on their face as a basis of the values the undisputed fact: “THE MARKET IS
CONSIDERED TO BE DECLINING AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE ATTACHED
MARKET STATISTICS FROM DONEWS.COM”. Finally, the sales dates of the comparison
sales used by Mr. Simms are much closer to the January 2009 appraisal date: October 2008,
November 2008, December 2008, January 2009, and December 2008.
* Mr. Mateo’s testimony was to the effect that typically a comparable unit on an upper floor will command a higher
selling price than a unit on the lower floor.
5 Mr. Simms testified that the requirements for him to be licensed included completing 2,000 hours of training and 6
months of schooling. (Trial Transcript 4167:2-5; 4167:7-4169:9; 4170:13-4171:12.)
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Defendant asserts that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes the People from
asserting that Units 4802 and 4902 are worth more than $1,225,000.° Judicial Estoppel isan
equitable doctrine to preclude a party from gaining an unfair advantage by taking one position,
and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. Judicial Estoppel has
the two goals of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system, and of protecting a party from
unfair strategies of an opponent. As an equitable doctrine, its application is discretionary with
the court. People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4" 145, 155-156; Ryan v. Editions Ltd. West, Inc.
(2015) 786 F.3d 754, 763. Judicial Estoppel will not be applied to defeat a strong public policy,
such as victim restitution. People v. Harvest, supra, 84 Cal.App.4"" 641, 652. Further, there is
no showing that Defendant relied on the trial values for Unit 4802 and Unit 4902 in the amounts
of $1,212,000 to his detriment at trial. Mr. Shah’s position at trial was that he was not guilty of
any of the allegations; he took no position as to the market value of the Units.
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion that the People are judicially estopped
from asserting a value for the Units that is greater than $1,212,000.
Based on the foregoing, the values of the condominiums at the relevant times are as.
follows:
Unit 4802:
8/08 purchase price: $1,401,500 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 _ 9/11 sale price: $1,355,000
Unit 4902:
8/08 purchase price: $1,355,500 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 9/10 sale price: $1,370,000
{| 6 Defendant asserts judicial estoppel in the following: Notice Of Motion And Motion For Order In Limine Relating
To Hearing On Restitution Set For February 26, 2015, filed February 23, 2015; Defendant’s Withdrawal Of In
Limine Argument That There Is Collateral Estoppel As To The Value Of The Rincon Units, filed June 25, 2015;
Defendant’s Combined Closing Brief And Brief On Attorneys’ Fees, filed May 20, 2015.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Document Scanning Lead Sheet Jun-07-2017 3:38 pm Case Number: CGC-10-503332 Filing Date: Jun-07-2017 3:36 Filed by: EDWARD SANTOS Image: 05895430 MOTIONS IN LIMINE COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY VS. FEDEX OFFICE AND PRINT SERVICES, INC et al (PROVIDE ACCESS) 001005895430 Instructions: Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.Ce ty AH kh WN & fee ot DA AR BH KEK S Jay Shah Pro Se AP3101 F I L E D P.O. Box 2000 San Francisco County Superior Court Vacaville, CA 95696-2000 . JUN 07 2017 CLERK OF THE COU’ JAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH BY: Deputy Glen EDWARD F. SANTOS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Civil Division, 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California 94102-4514 (Unlimited Jurisdiction Civil Case) Lead Case No. CGC-10-503332 (Consolidated with CGC-11-512102) SHARI HWANG; COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, MOTIONS IN LIMINE OF DEFENDANT SAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH Trial: Vs. Date: June 12,2017 Day: Monday JAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH, ETAL, | Time: 9:30 am. . Dept: 206 (TBD) Def Judge: Presiding Judge, Hon. Teri L. Jackson AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED Place: Superior Court, San Francisco County Civil Division, 400 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102-4514 Complaint Filed: September 8, 2010 ACTION of Hwang v. FedEx Office and Print Services, Ine. (CGC-11-512102). Defendant Jay Shah (“Shah”) respectfully moves in limine against Plaintiffs Shari Hwang (“Hwang”) and Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth”) for the orders which follow. The motions are based on this paper, including the points and authorities cited as to each such motion, the trial brief, all pleadings and papers on file in this action, all matters that may be judicially noticed by the court, and any additional evidence, arguments, or authorities that may be presented at the hearing of the within motions in limine. Defendant reserves the right to make oral motions in limine inadvertently omitted here or which arise in connection with 1 MOTIONS IN LIMINE OF DEFENDANT JAY SHAHCo eID Hh RF WN | pee emma er2ankr BH EHS Cc 9 ee opposition to or concurrence with motions in limine made by other parties herein Should any request for motions in limine re evidence be denied, plaintiff reserves the right to assert objections on the same grounds during the examination of witnesses. The motions in limine and specific grounds for each such motion are as follows: : 1. Preclude Hwang from Arguing Lost Profits in Connection With the Resale of the Two Rincon Units. Shah hereby moves this Court for an order excluding Hwang from offering any evidence of Lost Profits in connection to this case. As confirmed by the Criminal Court in the Criminal Restitution Order, the Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the value of units 4802 and 4902 was $1,225,000 in January 2009. Further, the Court found that the value of the units at the relevant times, including the sale price, were as followed: Unit 4802: , 8/08 purchase price: $1,401,500 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 9/11 sale price: $1,355,000 Unit 4902: 8/08 purchase price: $1,355,000 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 9/10 sale price: $1,370,000 After hearing the testimony of Mrs. Hwang’s experts and considering the presented evidence, the court ruled that Hwang sold the properties for an amount greater than the appraised values in January 2009, and thus there was no showing of restitution for Loss of Property Value/Lost Profits. This Court should rule on similar grounds. Mrs. Hwang should be collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of the loss of value as Mrs. Hwang may try to introduce the same evidence. The restitution order from a criminal proceeding is attached to this motion as Exhibit A (relevant pages are 6:25-11:2). Hwang should thus be precluded from introducing any evidence for the loss of value for the units. 2. Preclude Hwang and Commonwealth from Claiming Damages Without Taking Into Consideration a Set-Off Amount Paid By Defendant FedEx Office and Print Services, Inc. to Hwang and Commonwealth in This Matter. Shah hereby moves this Court foran order preventing Hwang and Commonwealth from collecting all full damages demanded in this case per California Code of Civil Procedure § 431.70. California's current statutory setoff provisions emanate from the established principle in equity that either party to a transaction involving material debts and credits can strike a balance, holding himself owing or entitled only to the net difference. In light of this equitable origin, the 2co em YN DH HD B WN Cc . 3 right to setoff is not absolute, but may be restricted by judicial limitations imposed to uphold independent state policies. Moreover, under appropriate circumstances a party may waive the statutory right of setof£. Jess v. Herrmann (1979) 26 Cal. 3d 131. A defendant in a civil action may not obtain an award of affirmative relief against a plaintiff by way of C.C.P. § 431.70; rather, a defendant may only assert the setoff defensively to defeat a plaintiff's claim in whole or in part. Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal 4th 189. The statute allows a person to assert a claim which would otherwise be time-barred in an action commenced by another person, where cross-demands for money have existed between the persons at a time when neither demand was time-barred, The rights must be mutual and due from the same person to the same person to qualify as offsetting claims under the statute, and the previous partnership was not a party against whom the producer had a claim. Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranch (1986) 189 Cal App 3d 809. Right of setoff under this section is available without necessity of bringing an independent action setting forth related dealings between parties. Hauger v. Gates (1954) 42 Cal 2d 752. In the present case, Hwang and Commonwealth received an undisclosed settlement from Defendant FedEx Office and Print Services, Inc. in the related consolidated action, Case #CGC- 11-512102 for alleging the same damages. Hwang and Commonwealth further secks full damages , against Shah, including the amount that was originally awarded to her from FedEx. This would most likely increase Hwang and Commonwealth’s chances of receiving windfall if they prevail, and thus taking a much higher amount in damages than is fair and just. Therefore, Shah seeks an order that precludes Hwang and Commonwealth from claiming damages without a set-off from the amount given by Defendant FedEx to Hwang and Commonwealth as a result of the settlement. 3. Exclude Non-Party Witnesses from Courtroom. Shah hereby moves this Court for an order excluding from the courtroom all non-party witnesses, including expert witnesses, during any time such witnesses are not under examination. This motion is made pursuant to Evidence Code section 777 on the grounds that witnesses should not be permitted to gain any advantage by hearing the testimony of the witnesses who testify before them. Restricting a witness from. hearing other witness examinations during the trial assists in the prevention of . tailored testimony, as well as the detection of less-than-candid testimony, that might be offered by that witness. In this case, Shah anticipates that several trial third party witnesses on either or both 3oer A WwW FW NH me Se 32aaskR BRE S © 9 sides will be testifying on similar issues or elements of the pending claims. As the witnesses should not be afforded the opportunity to consciously or subconsciously conform their testimony to, or distinguish their testimony from, that of other witnesses as a result of having heard the testimony of such other witnesses, Shah respectfully requests that all non-party witnesses be excluded from the courtroom except when under examination. Date: June 5, 2017 JAY IRAKANT SHAHEXHIBIT AOMANI DWH PWN N ve Cc o _ ENDoesED AUG 20 2015 ¥ K OF COURT . \ 5 § x BY: (oy AA \ SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO THE PEOPLE OF THE ) STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) Court No. 10009193 ) Plaintiff ) ORDER RE: ) MOTION TO MODIFY THE DEFENDANT’S v. ) SENTENCE TO INCLUDE ) A RESTITUTION ORDER ) JAY SHAH, ) ) Defendant. ) | ) Judgment and Sentence was pronounced on March 19, 2013. At that time, the Court retained jurisdiction to determine Victim Restitution. Subsequently, on February 20, 2014, and on December 16, 2015, the People filed Notice Of Motion To Modify The Defendant’s Sentence To Include A Restitution Order. The People seek victim restitution pursuant to Penal Code §1202.4(f) for Shirley Hwang in the amount of | $5,090,277.77.' Hearings were held on February 26, March 24, May 12 and May 13, 2015. Various motions and papers were filed by the People, by the Defendant, and by Ms. Hwang. On March 24, 2015, the Court issued its Tentative Order from the bench; and on May 4, 2015, the Court filed its Interim Ruling Re: Motion To Modify ' The People’s Closing Brief, hereinafter identified, seeks restitution in the modified amount of $4,352,463.70. _ : 1woman DWN WN v wb RYE te BNRRRPRBRBSGSPRVIARABRETHRSCS The Defendant’s Sentence To Include A Restitution Order. Further evidentiary hearings were held on May 12 and 13, 2015, and a briefing schedule was set. On May 20, 2015, Shah filed Defendant’s Combined Closing Brief and Brief On Attorneys’ Fees; and on June 25, 2015, the People filed its Closing Brief On Restitution Hearing. The People are represented by Antonio J. Hernandez, Assistant District Attorney, Office of the District Attorney of the City and County of San Francisco; Jay Shah is represented by Dylan L. Schaffer, Esq., Riordan & Hogan; Shirley Hwang has been present at the hearings with her counsel, Morgan K. Lopez, Esq., Glynn & Finley, LLP. At the hearing on May 13, 2015, Mr. Lopez filed Victim Shirley Hwang’s Submission Of Attomeys’ Fees Records. Penal Code §1202.4(f) enumerates the items of restitution recoverable by a victim of crime. Although the right to restitution is to be broadly and liberally construed, the victim must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to the items of restitution claimed and the amount of restitution. People v. Sy (2014) 223 Cal.App.4" 44, The victim has the initial burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of entitlement and amount, and only if that burden has been met does the burden shift to the defendant to challenge the item and/or the amount claimed for restitution. People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4" 876, 886. The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4* 1539, 1542-1543. The amount of restitution may not be based merely on the trial court’s subjective belief regarding appropriate restitution. People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4" 1114, 1125. Nor may the| court order restitution for an item or amount based on speculation. People v. Thygesen (1999) Cal.App.4” 988, 995. There must be evidence to support the claimed restitution; and the court is required to use a “rational method” in computing the amount. People v. Harvest (2000) 84oan HAWN FF WN : PRN N vo om ee “ BNRREREBSBRBSCSAUAGEBGHEES Cal.App.4" 641, 653. No particular formula is mandated for fixing the amount of restitution; the| court may use any rational method that is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. In re Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523. The Court’s May 8, 2015, Interim Ruling established those items of claimed restitution for which a prima facie case of entitlement had been met. With respect to certain items, such as attorneys’ fees, the Court determined that a prima facie case for restitution as to the category had been met, but that additional evidence was needed as to the dollar amount. Having considered the evidence introduced and admitted, the oral arguments and written briefs filed by counsel, the applicable law, and Good Cause Appearing Therefore, Defendant Jay Shah’s Sentence is Modified to include Restitution as hereinafter set forth. Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the apfount of $135.990.41 for legal fees and costs incurred by Shirley Hwang. (Exhibits 32, 1, 2, and 47; Hwang.) Penal Code §1202.4(£)(3)(H) specifically mandates restitution for the amount of actual and reasonable attorney’s fees. Attorney fees incurred in a civil action to recover property taken by the defendant are properly included in an order of restitution. People v. Maheshwari (2003) 107 Cal.App.4" 1406. The legal fees were incurred by Shirley Hwang, the victim, to quiet title, remove the liens of the deeds of trust encumbering the property, defend against the accusation that she was involved in the fraud, and to appropriately respond to media reports concerning the crimes committed by Jay Shah and his fellow conspirators. The amount and nature of the legal fees are reasonable in light of the intricate nature of the crimes, the number co-conspirator defendants, the number of people and entities affected by the crimes, including DeWitte ? Unless otherwise noted the exhibits referenced are to those admitted at the Restitution Hearing. 3oon nun fk WN | N NRW NNNYWE ee eee ee RPBNRRFERRBRBRPSSCSVIADREBDEAS © 3 Mortgage and Kitco Holdings LLC, the nature and number of the condominium property assets, the high profile nature of the case, and the length of time it took to quiet title and clear the property of the fraudulent deeds of trust. To the extent that these legal fees may include some legal work to protect Ms. Hwang from noneconomic losses, the fees are nonetheless fully recoverable since they were principally incurred to protect and preserve Ms. Hwang’s property assets. As opined by the court in People v. Fulton supra, 109 Cal. App.4" 876, 885: Moreover, because of the strong public policy seeking to provide crime victims with direct restitution for all the “losses they suffer” (Cal. Const., art I, §28, subd. (b)), when fees cannot be reasonably divided between the pursuit of economic losses as opposed to non- economic losses, the victim is entitled to be fully reimbursed for all actual and reasonable attorney fees. The People have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that these fees were proper, logical and necessary as a result of Defendant’s criminal conduct, and that they are reasonable in amount for the work performed. People v. Lyon (1996) 49 Cal.App.4" 1521. The Court finds that Ms. Hwang is not entitled to restitution for the payment made to Nicholas Casagrande in the amount of $18,000 (Exhibit 3). The testimony of Ms. Hwang evidences that this amount is not for paralegal services, but rather for work as a personal assistant to Ms. Hwang. Ms. Hwang testified that the $18,000 was payment for Mr. Casagrande supportive personal services including accompanying her when she went out in public because she was fearful as a victim of the criminal acts. This represents costs as a result of emotional distress or psychological harm, which are noneconomic losses and are not recoverable as restitution for these crimes. (Penal Code §1202.4()(3)(F); People v. Fulton, supra, 109 Cal.App.4"" 879, 884.)wo ny AN FF WN = eee 2. *s ation Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the amount ef $63.655.98 Homeowner Association Fees incurred by Shirley Hwang because she was unable to market and sell the three condominium properties as planned due to the crimes committed by Defendant. (Penal Code §1202.4(£)(3)(A); Exhibits 10, 11, and 12; Testimony of Shirley Hwang.) 3. Property Taxes. Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the 4 was unable to market and sell the properties as planned due to the crimes committed by Defendant. (Penal Code 1202.4(£)(3)(A); Exhibits 13, 14, and 15; Testimony of Shirley Hwang. Defendant Shah objects that he should not be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the property taxes for Unit 5501 since Ms. Hwang was living in that condominium. However, Exhibit 15, the property tax statement for Unit 5501 shows Winston Lum, Jay Shah’s Co- Defendant, as the owner of the property; Unit 5501 remained under the cloud and stigma of Defendant’s wrongful acts during this time. Ms. Hwang’s testimony is that her original intent was to sell Unit 5501 and that she only decided to live in that Unit after the crimes were committed. 4, Property Title Insurance, Defendant Jay Shah is ordered to pay restitution in the ame Title Insurance Premiums. (Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3); Exhibits 17, my of Shirley Hwang.) Ms. Hwang testified credibly that she obtained Short Term Title Insurance onoO ONIN NUH PwWH = te SONA NADAAA BSH HS °C ° the three condominium properties which would entitle her to a refund of the premiums paid if the property was sold within two years of obtaining the polices. She was not able to market and sell the properties as planned due to the crimes committed by the Defendant. The nature of this expense and the amount are properly the subject of victim restitution under the broad perimeters of Penal Code §1202.4(f)(3); People v. ‘Sy, supra, 223 Cal.App.4"" 44, 63, §. Lost Income, The People have not shown that Shirley Hwang is entitled to restitution for Lost Income. The Court reaffirms its decision stated in the Interim Ruling filed May 8, 2015. The People have not established a prima facie case for Lost Income and the People have not met their burden of proof for restitution of this item. Ms. Hwang was not employed at the time that the crimes were committed. She did not have any concrete prospect for a job or position, but intended to seek information about possible positions through her business contacts. No evidence was presented of any particular job or position; thus, there was no evidence of salary or other terms of compensation. There was no evidence of a job offer. There was no evidence of a position open to be filled. The claim for Lost Income is entirely speculative. There is no means or method by which this Court could rationally calculate an amount for the claimed Lost Income. Any attempt to calculate an amount would be arbitrary and capricious. The law does not authorize such awards. People v, Thygesen, supra, 69 Cal.App.4" 988. || Z.Loss of Property Value and Lost Profits. The People have not shown that Shirley Hwang is entitled to restitution for Loss of Property Value.CORI AH HR WH eS 10 Ml 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Cc °Q On behalf of Ms. Hwang the People argue that Ms. Hwang purchased the condominiums known as Unit 4802, Unit 4902, and Unit 5501, located at 425 First Street, in the City and County of San Francisco, for investment purposes, with the intent to resell the properties at a profit in January 2009. The argument is that because of the criminal acts of ‘Defendant, Ms. Hwang was not able to sell Unit 4802 and Unit 4902 as planned in January 2009, and that, therefore, she should have restitution in the amount of the profit she would have made if the properties would have been sold at the time and price she wanted to sell them. It is further argued that Ms. Hwang would have invested the gain she made on the resale of the properties and that she is entitled to the amount that she would have earned on the investment of the sale proceeds, There is no claim for Loss of Property Value or Lost Profits with respect to Unit 5501 since Ms. Hwang made the decision to reside in Unit 5501 in the summer of 2009. The People have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Units 4802 and/or 4902 would have been sold at the time or at the price asserted. It is undisputed that in January 2009, the real estate market in San Francisco was ina decline. (Exhibits 228 and C; Testimony of John Mateo; Testimony of Shirley Hwang.) Ms. Hwang’s testimony is that in August 2008 she purchased Unit 4802 for $1 2401,500, and Unit 4902 for $1,355,500. In September 2008, she listed Unit 4902 with a real estate agent for sale at $1,795,000; she then dropped the listing price to $1,650,000. Units 4802 and 5501 were not listed, but were available to be shown to prospective buyers if any expressed an interest. No evidence was presented that any prospective buyer expressed a serious interest in any of the Units. Ms. Hwang’s testimony is that the only person to express any interest in any of theCoO HD HA F&F WN eee ont nunkt WwW DH F&F OO 19 c 3 properties was Mr, Niroula. Mr. Niroula’s interest was not that of a genuine prospective purchaser; he is the co-defendant involved in the conspiracy for which Mr. Shah was convicted. Nonetheless, the People on behalf of Ms. Hwang, presented evidence that in January 2009, the properties had the following “market value”; Unit 4802: $1,600,000; Unit 4902: $1,615,000. (Exhibit 239; Testimony of John Mateo; Testimony of Shirley Hwang.) Defendant disputes this valuation and asserts that the market value of the properties in January 2009, was $1,225,000 for each of Units 4802 and 4902. Mr. Mateo’s testimony as to the market value is not persuasive for several reasons. First, although Mr. Mateo delineated a specific geographic area for the Units for a comparison sales analysis to arrive at market value (Exhibit 227), his analysis included property outside the subject properties’ market area (Exhibit 230). Second, Mr. Mateo’s testimony was that comparison sales are generally limited to a 30 day period on either.side of the specified market value date, However, since there were so few sales in January 2009, he extended the number of months over which he attempted to identify comparison sales. Mr. Mateo identified six Properties for comparison sales with the following sales dates: June 2008, July 2008, September 2008, October 2008, May 2009, and May 2009 (Exhibit 230). As is apparent, none of these sal occurred during the specified market value month of January 2009; none occurred during the 30 day period before or after; none even occurred during the 90 day: period before or after. Third, John Mateo testified that his determination of market value is based on what the market behavior is with comparable properties in the subject property’s market area. ‘The appraisals performed by Casey Simms in 2009 define “market value” as: “The most probable price which a Property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus, implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby: (1) buyer and seller are typically motivated; (2) both parties are well informed or well advised, and each acting in what he or she considers his or her own best interest; (3) a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market; (4) payment is made in terms of cash in U.S. dollars or in terms of financial arrangements comparable thereto; and (5) the price represents the normal consideration for the property sold unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions{...] granted by anyone associated with the sale.” (Trial Exhibit 21.) 8Cc ° Mr. Mateo, added a “floor premium™ for Units 4802 and 4902 in calculating market value from the comparison sales properties. (Exhibit 237.) To calculate the “floor premium” Mr. Mateo looked at five units located at 338 Spear Street — not 425 First Street where Units 4802 and 4902 are located. The evidence, however, is that Ms. Hwang purchased Unit 4802 for a greater price than she paid for the higher floor Unit 4902. When asked about this contradiction with his “flo premium” analysis, Mr. Mateo responded, “I agree with you, it’s problematic.” Finally, Mr. Mateo is an expert engaged by Ms. Hwang to provide a market value for Units 4802 and 4902 supportive of her claim for restitution. The Court finds the preponderance of the evidence supports the value of $1,225,000 for Units 4802 and 4902 in January 2009. First, that is the value upon which the jury verdicts and special findings are based by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. (Trial Exhibits 21 and 119.) Second, Casey Simms, the appraiser, testified credibly at trial that at the time that he performed the appraisals he was a licensed appraiser and he authenticated the appraisal reports.* He is an independent appraiser with no ties to any interested party. Third, in reaching his “sales comparison approach” values of $1,225,000 for each of the units, Mr. Simms’ appraisal reports State on their face as a basis of the values the undisputed fact: “THE MARKET IS CONSIDERED TO BE DECLINING AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE ATTACHED MARKET STATISTICS FROM DONEWS.COM”. Finally, the sales dates of the comparison sales used by Mr. Simms are much closer to the January 2009 appraisal date: October 2008, November 2008, December 2008, January 2009, and December 2008. * Mr. Mateo’s testimony was to the effect that typically a comparable unit on an upper floor will command a higher selling price than a unit on the lower floor. 5 Mr. Simms testified that the requirements for him to be licensed included completing 2,000 hours of training and 6 months of schooling. (Trial Transcript 4167:2-5; 4167:7-4169:9; 4170:13-4171:12.) 9Cc 3 Defendant asserts that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes the People from asserting that Units 4802 and 4902 are worth more than $1,225,000.° Judicial Estoppel isan equitable doctrine to preclude a party from gaining an unfair advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. Judicial Estoppel has the two goals of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system, and of protecting a party from unfair strategies of an opponent. As an equitable doctrine, its application is discretionary with the court. People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4" 145, 155-156; Ryan v. Editions Ltd. West, Inc. (2015) 786 F.3d 754, 763. Judicial Estoppel will not be applied to defeat a strong public policy, such as victim restitution. People v. Harvest, supra, 84 Cal.App.4"" 641, 652. Further, there is no showing that Defendant relied on the trial values for Unit 4802 and Unit 4902 in the amounts of $1,212,000 to his detriment at trial. Mr. Shah’s position at trial was that he was not guilty of any of the allegations; he took no position as to the market value of the Units. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion that the People are judicially estopped from asserting a value for the Units that is greater than $1,212,000. Based on the foregoing, the values of the condominiums at the relevant times are as. follows: Unit 4802: 8/08 purchase price: $1,401,500 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 _ 9/11 sale price: $1,355,000 Unit 4902: 8/08 purchase price: $1,355,500 1/09 appraisal: $1,225,000 9/10 sale price: $1,370,000 {| 6 Defendant asserts judicial estoppel in the following: Notice Of Motion And Motion For Order In Limine Relating To Hearing On Restitution Set For February 26, 2015, filed February 23, 2015; Defendant’s Withdrawal Of In Limine Argument That There Is Collateral Estoppel As To The Value Of The Rincon Units, filed June 25, 2015; Defendant’s Combined Closing Brief And Brief On Attorneys’ Fees, filed May 20, 2015. 10© ONY HN RP WN v wv RNY ee ee ee ee PBRRERERBSRLRS