Party Statement: COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY VS. FEDEX OFFICE AND PRINT SERVICES, INC et al (PROVIDE ACCESS)

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                                IIA

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Document Scanning Lead Sheet
Jul-06-2018 4:11 pm

Case Number: CGC-10-503332
Filing Date: Jul-O6-2018 4:07
Filed by: JOHNNY SENGMANY
Image: 06405749
STATEMENT OF DECISION

COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY VS. FEDEX OFFICE
AND PRINT SERVICES, INC et al (PROVIDE ACCESS)

001006405749

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY

Plaintiff,

vs.
FEDEX OFFICE AND PRINT SERVICES
INC.; WINSTON LUM; KAUSHAL
NIROULA; JAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH;
ELVIA PALOMINO; MORAD AFRAIMI;
MELVIN LEE EMERICH; MARTINI
CHNOOGLE; GRACHELLE LANGUBAN;
MERCHANTS BONDING COMPANY, and
DOES 1-24,

Defendants.

¥ sia x.

CGC-11-512102)

Proposed
STATEMENT OF DECISION

SHIRLEY S. HWANG,
Plaintiff,

vs.

FEDEX OFFICE AND PRINT SERVICES
INC., WINSTON LUM, KAUSHAL
NIROULA, JAY CHANDRAKANT SHAH,
MELVIN LEE EMERICH, GRACHELLE
LANGUBAN, and MARTINI &
CHNOOGLE, and DOES 1-50,

Cross-Defendants.

Case No. CGC-11-512102

County of San Francisco,

JUL = 6 2018

Lead Case No. CGC-10-503332
(Consolidated for all purposes with

The matter was tried before the court sitting without a jury on August 8-15, 2017.

Plaintiff Shirley Hwang was represented by Mr. Clement L. Glynn and Mr. Morgan Lopez.

Defendant Mr. Jay Chandrakant Shaw appeared in pro per with advisory counsel, Mr. Craig

Bassett and Mr. Gene Halavanau. A substitution of counsel by advisory counsel was filed with

yMr. Shaw’s consent prior to the final rulings on motions in limine. Mr. Bassett and Mr.
Halavanau appeared generally for Mr. Shaw thereafter.

Ms. Hwang testified on her own behalf. She called as witnesses Robert Chrisman, Stan
Tish and Lynn Giufre. Mr. Shaw testified in his defense but called no other witnesses. The court
having the post trial submissions of the parties now renders its proposed statement of decision.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

“The principles of collateral estoppel mandate that any issue necessarily decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding is conclusively determined as to the
parties or their privies if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.” Miller v. Superior Court 168
Cal.App.3 376 (1985) at 381

Both parties were in agreement to its application in this case. There were, however,
questions regarding its application to Plaintiff by Defendant. Defendant argued that Plaintiff
should also be subject to the findings of the criminal court in People v. Shaw (Not Officially
Published, 2016 WL 3766427). Specifically, Defendant, the named defendant in People v. Shaw,
argued that the Plaintiff, the victim in People v. Shaw, be estopped from introducing evidence of
damages in this subsequent civil proceeding. They argued that the criminal trial court’s Penal
Code mandated findings regarding victim restitution in a post trial sentencing hearing precluded
the issue of damages being re-litigated in this subsequent civil proceeding. Additionally they
argued that portions of the victim restitution hearing be entered into evidence as part of the
defense. The Court of Appeals decision in People v. Shaw was submitted to the court by both
parties. It was not marked at trial but the court took judicial notice of it and shall designate it
Court Exhibit 1 “Decision” as suggested by Plaintiff. The criminal trial court’s “Order re:
Motion to Modify the Defendant’s Sentence To Include a Restitution Order” was marked,

identified and received into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit 509.Com YN A HW FW NR we

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The court finds that Mr. Shah, a named party, in People v. Shaw was subject to the
principles of collateral estoppel. There were issues decided in the prior adjudication identical to
those presented here, there was a final judgement on the merits, and the party against who the
plea was asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. See Miller v.
Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3™ 376, 381 citing Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins.
Co., Ltd., 58 Cal.2d 601, 604; Dillard v. McKnight 34 Cal.2d 209, 214

The court finds that Ms. Hwang, the victim in People v. Shaw was not a party nor in
privity with a in the criminal matter. The court does not see how Plaintiff becomes a party or is
placed in privity with a party because of her participation as the victim in the sentencing phase of
Mr. Shaw’s trial. In 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1223 “Issue Preclusion”, under the heading
“Victim”... “A victim is not precluded in a civil proceeding on issues decided in a criminal
proceeding, as a victim is not a party to the criminal trial and has no opportunity to litigate the
issues.” (citing Republic Ins. Co. v. Feidler, 178 Ariz. 528, 875 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1993)

In People v. Moser the Court specifically that... “[B]ecause criminal proceedings focus
on the State’s interests in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for
compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate for the
benefit of the State. Similarly, they are not accessed ‘for... compensation’ of the victim.” People
v. Moser (1996) 50 Cal.App.4" 130, 134

Defendant argued that Plaintiff like Defendant should be subject to issue preclusion
regardless of privity. “Three factors may favor the application of collateral estoppel in a given
case even though precise identity of the parties and issues may be lacking. The principle may be
invoked to protect against vexatious litigation [citations], to further the finality of litigation in
which public interests are involved [citations], or to promote the stability of adjudications in
prior criminal actions [citations]. ... The circumstances must also have been such that the non

party should reasonably have expected to be bound by the prior adjudication.” Miller at 385 TheoO em ND HW FF WN

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