Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 07/27/2022 11:44 AM INDEX NO. 452058/2022
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 14 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/27/2022
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
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KEISHE OLIVIERRE, :
Plaintiff, : Index No. 452058/2022
:
v. : Motion Seq. No. 1
:
PARKCHESTER PRESERVATION COMPANY, :
L.P. and PARKCHESTER PRESERVATION :
MANAGEMENT LLC, :
Defendants. :
:
:
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DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
HERRICK, FEINSTEIN LLP
Carol M. Goodman, Esq.
Jared D. Newman, Esq.
Two Park Avenue
New York, New York 10016
(212) 592-1400
Attorneys for Defendants
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................. 1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................... 4
A. The Rental Application Process at Parkchester .................................................... 4
B. PPM’s Business Reasons for Its Minimum Income Requirement ........................ 5
C. Plaintiff’s Application ........................................................................................... 6
C. The Complaint ...................................................................................................... 7
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 8
I. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A MANDATORY INJUNCTION
THAT CHANGES THE STATUS QUO AND GRANTS THE ULTIMATE
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS ACTION............................................................................. 8
II. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY
FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION .......................................................................... 9
A. Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits ........ 9
1. The Use Of A Minimum Income Requirement to Applications
Submitted by Voucher Holders is the Subject of Hotly Contested
Litigation ................................................................................................. 10
2. Plaintiff Cannot Demonstrate a Likelihood of Success
on a Claim of of Disparate Treatment Discrimination............................ 11
B. Plaintiff Cannot Demonstrate That the Minimum Income Requirement
Has a Disparate Impact on CityFHEPS Holders................................................. 13
III. PLAINTIFF WILL SUFFER NO IRREPARABLE INJURY IN THE
ABSENCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ....................................................... 16
A. Plaintiff Is Not Homeless .................................................................................... 17
B. PPM Did Not Cause Plaintiff’s Alleged Irreparable Harm ................................ 18
C. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Irreparable Injury Because Her Harm
Is Speculative ...................................................................................................... 19
D. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Irreparable Injury Because She Is Seeking
Recourse Against The Wrong Party ................................................................... 20
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IV. THE BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES DO NOT TIP IN PLAINTIFF’S
FAVOR ........................................................................................................................... 21
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 23
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Federal Cases
E.E.O.C. v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm.,
186, F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.1999).............................................................................................13
Boyd v. Lefrak Org.,
509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975)...................................................................................................13
Bronson v. Crestwood Holding Corp.,
724 F.Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ...........................................................................................11
Estevez v. Cosmopolitan Assocs. LLC,
2005 WL 3164146 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2005) .........................................................................21
Haber v. ASN 50th St. LLC,
847 F.Supp.2d 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)........................................................................................12
McNeill v. NYC Hous. Auth.,
719, F.Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ..........................................................................................21
Rivera v. Inc. Vill. of Farmingdale,
784 F.Supp.2d 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) .................................................................................14, 16
Short v. Manhattan Apts., Inc.,
916 F.Supp.2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)........................................................................................14
Texas Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
576 U.S. 519 (2015) .................................................................................................................16
State Cases
1234 Broadway LLC v. W. Side SRO Law Project,
86 A.D.3d 18 (1st Dep’t 2011) ..................................................................................................9
91st St. Co. v. Robinson,
242 A.D.2d 502 (1st Dep’t 1997) ............................................................................................20
Air Energy TCI, Inc. v. Cty. of Cortland,
39 Misc. 3d 234 (Sup. Ct. Cortland Cty. 2012) .......................................................................22
Bohlke v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
293 A.D.2d 198 (3d Dep’t 2002) .............................................................................................14
Civil Serv. Empls. Assoc., Inc. v. State,
73 Misc. 3d 874 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Cty. 2021) ..............................................................................19
iii
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Cox v. St. Owner LP,
2009 WL 2986667 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2009) ...........................................................................19
Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v. Recorder Tel. Network,
74 A.D.3d 738 (2d Dep’t 2010) ...............................................................................................19
Gagnon Bus Co v. Vallo Transp., Ltd.,
13 A.D.3d 334 (2d Dep’t 2004) .................................................................................................9
Giblin v. Sechzer,
97 A.D.2d 833 (2d Dep’t 1983) ...............................................................................................20
Howe v. Best Apts., Inc.,
OATH 1964/15, 2016 WL 1050864 (Mar. 14, 2016) ..............................................................12
Hirschmann v. Hassapoyannes,
11 Misc. 3d 265 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2005) .................................................................................9
Jiggetts v. Dowling,
196 Misc. 2d 678 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2003), rev. in part & vacated in part,
21 A.D.3d 178 (1st Dep’t 2005) ..............................................................................................21
Jones v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
189 A.D.3d 1565 (2d Dep’t 2020) ...........................................................................................21
Knower v. Atkins,
273 A.D. 356 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 298 N.Y. 750 (1948) ..............................................................9
Levin v. Yeshiva Univ.,
96 N.Y.2d 484 (2001) ..............................................................................................................13
Mangovski v. Dimarco,
175 A.D.3d 235 (4th Dep’t 2019) ............................................................................................20
Milione v. CUNY,
152 A.D.3d 807 (2d Dep’t 2017) .............................................................................................12
NYWC, Inc. v. Pro Beauty Concepts, Inc.,
2014 WL 1227178 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2014) .....................................................................20
Patrick’s v. City of Watervliet Zoning Bd. Of Appeals,
2013 WL 10734263 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Cty. 2013) ........................................................................22
Residential Bd. of Mgrs. of Columbia Condo. v. Alden,
178 A.D.2d 121 (1st Dep’t 1991) ..............................................................................................8
iv
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Romo v. ISS Action Sec.,
OATH 674/11, Rep. & Rec., 2011 WL 12521359 (Apr. 12, 2011),
adopted, Dec. & Ord. (June 26, 2011) ...............................................................................11, 12
Schonfeld Strategic Advisors LLC v. Sassun,
2019 WL 1517742 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) .................................................................................19
Severino v. Classic Collision, Inc.,
280 A.D.2d 463 (2d Dep’t 2001) .............................................................................................20
Shake Shack Fulton St. Brooklyn, LLC v. Allied Prop. Grp., LLC,
117 A.D.3d 924 (2d Dep’t 2019) ...............................................................................................8
SHS Baisley, LLC v. Res Land, Inc.,
18 A.D.3d 727 (2d Dep’t 2005) .................................................................................................8
SNL Capital Partners, LLC v. City of N.Y.,
68 Misc. 3d 597 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2020) ...............................................................................19
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. York Claims Serv. Inc.,
308 A.D.2d 347 (1st Dep’t 2003) ..........................................................................................1, 8
Sync Realty Grp., Inc. v. Rotterdam Ventures, Inc.,
63 A.D.3d 1429 (3d 2009) .......................................................................................................21
Williams v. N.Y. Transit Auth.,
171 A.D.3d 990 (2d Dep’t 2019) .............................................................................................12
Statutes & Codes
18 CRR-NY 304.2 .........................................................................................................................17
42 U.S. Code § 11302(a) (McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act) ......................................17
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(17)(a)(2). .......................................................................................14
NY Evid Rule 7.3 (Opinion of Lay Witness) ................................................................................15
NYC Admin Code 26-521 .............................................................................................................20
NYC Admin Code 26-521(a) ...................................................................................................17, 18
NYC Admin Code 26-521(b).........................................................................................................18
NY EXC § 296 ...............................................................................................................................11
RPAPL § 711 ...........................................................................................................................18, 20
RPAPL § 768(a).................................................................................................................17, 18, 20
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RPAPL § 768(b) ............................................................................................................................18
Miscellaneous
Tenant Selection, City of New York, www1.nyc.gov/site/fairhousing/rights-
responsibilities/tenant-selection.page ............................................................................................13
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Defendants Parkchester Preservation Company, L.P. (“PPC”)1 and Parkchester
Preservation Management LLC (“PPM”) respectfully submit this memorandum of law in
opposition to Plaintiff Keishe Olivierre’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff is not entitled to a mandatory preliminary injunction because Plaintiff has failed
to establish the elements (which is Plaintiff’s burden) warranting such drastic relief.
In this action, Plaintiff claims that Defendants engaged in source of income discrimination
under the New York City (First Cause of Action) and New York State Human Rights Law (Second
Cause of Action). Plaintiff’s claims are premised on the allegation that PPM’s use of a minimum
income requirement to evaluate Plaintiff’s rental application discriminated against her as a holder
of a CityFHEPS voucher. Based on that allegation (which will be fully adjudicated on the merits),
and ignoring the fact that PPM’s minimum income requirement is uniformly applied to all
applicants, regardless of source of income, Plaintiff seeks preliminary relief in the form of an order
requiring PPM to treat Plaintiff’s application differently than every other applicant who has come
before her.
As set forth below and in the accompanying Affidavit of Ricky Pizarro, the Chief Executive
Officer of Defendant PPM, Plaintiff is not entitled to preliminary relief under the facts and the law.
First, a mandatory injunction “should not be granted, absent extraordinary circumstances,
where the status quo would be disturbed and the plaintiff would receive the ultimate relief sought,
pendente lite.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. York Claims Serv. Inc., 308 A.D.2d 347, 349
(1st Dep’t 2003). Plaintiff is asking for mandatory injunctive relief that fundamentally alters the
1
As set forth in the Affidavit of Ricky Pizarro (“Pizaro Aff.”), sworn to July 27, 2022, and submitted in opposition to
Plaintiff’smotion, PPC is neither the owner nor lessor nor manager of any units at the Parkchester housing
development.
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status quo and gives Plaintiff the ultimate relief she is seeking in this litigation: an order to process
her application without applying the minimum income requirement. Under these circumstances –
and considering the result if an injunction is granted only to then be overturned on appeal or at the
conclusion of the case – a mandatory injunction should not be granted.
Second, as to the likelihood of success on the merits, contrary to Plaintiff’s ipse dixit
conclusions, Plaintiff has not cited to a single New York federal or state court decision which held
that a landlord’s use of a minimum income requirement constitutes source of income
discrimination in violation of either the New York City or New York State Human Rights Law --
because there are none. Rather, the use of a minimum income requirement for applicants with
government vouchers is a hotly contested legal issue that is being actively litigated in New York
federal and state court, the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings, and
complaints brought before the New York State Division of Human Rights. As set forth herein, the
actual state of the law concerning the propriety of a minimum income requirement is a far cry from
the black-letter, conclusive mandate painted by Plaintiff -- which is likely why Plaintiff relies on
jurisdictions outside of New York to support her proposition.
If that were not enough, Plaintiff fails to actually establish that PPM engaged in any
discriminatory conduct – whether disparate treatment or through a disparate impact analysis –
because (i) PPM’s minimum income requirement is uniformly applied to all applicants, regardless
of source of income, (ii) PPM does, in fact, accept and count all forms of lawful income (including
all government vouchers) towards calculating whether the applicant satisfies the minimum income
requirement, (iii) PPM is lawfully entitled to evaluate the financial qualifications for its applicants
so as to ensure they will be good tenants, and (iv) the minimum income requirement is motivated
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by a legitimate business concern that tenants are able to and will satisfy all of their financial
obligations (both rent and non-rent obligations alike) to PPM as a housing provider.
Here, Plaintiff has put forward no evidence of disparate treatment (and Plaintiff cannot
since PPM treats all applicants the same, PMM has a legitimate business reason behind its policy,
and there is no discriminatory animus) nor of disparate impact discrimination (since the Affidavit
of Sara Zuiderveen lacks the statistical foundation and comparative analysis necessary to constitute
proof of disparate impact).
At the very least, the evaluation of whether a landlord engages in source of income
discrimination under these circumstances necessitates discovery and expert opinion regarding both
the business justification and any statistical analysis and methodology that is used for purposes of
a disparate impact claim (as evidenced by the proceedings in federal, state, and city courts).
Third, Plaintiff claims that as a result of Defendant’s denial of her application, she and her
children are suffering irreparable injury because they will “remain homeless.” However, unlike
the cases she relies upon and under New York and federal statutes which define homelessness,
Plaintiff is actually not homeless nor does she have an imminent risk of homelessness. As Plaintiff
admits – and as confirmed in her applications submitted to PPM – Plaintiff has been living with
her friend at Parkchester since February 2022 (two months before Plaintiff submitted her
application to PPM). The fact that Plaintiff has resided in this apartment for more than 30 days
confers upon her legal rights to occupy that apartment whereby if she is removed other than by
formal eviction proceedings, she is vested with legal recourse and compensable damages. And
even if Plaintiff were considered to be homeless (contrary to statute and law), then (i) Defendants
did not cause her stated irreparable harm because Plaintiff was homeless prior to even applying to
Parkchester and (ii) to the extent that Plaintiff alleges she may suffer harm due to the expiration of
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her voucher, Plaintiff should seek relief from the agency that administers the voucher to extend its
term.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion for
a preliminary injunction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. The Rental Application Process at Parkchester
The Parkchester housing development (“Parkchester”) is a 12,000 unit condominium
housing complex, with roughly half of the apartments owned by individual owners and half owned
as “sponsor units.” PPM operates and manages the rental and leasing application process for the
“sponsor units” that are offered for lease to the public.
When an applicant applies to live at Parkchester, the applicant does not apply for specific
apartments or units. Rather, an applicant completes a general application and identifies the size of
the apartment that the applicant is seeking to rent. PPM has certain rental criteria that it uses to
evaluate applicants to Parkchester in order to gain assurance that the applicant will be a good tenant
at Parkchester. PPM accepts and uniformly reviews every rental application it receives from
prospective tenants, regardless of a prospective tenant’s protected characteristic or membership in
a protected class.
One of the rental criteria that PPM has is a minimum income requirement, which mandates
that an applicant must have a yearly amount of income that is at least 3 times the yearly amount of
the rent for the apartment size – i.e., a 3-to-1 income-to-rent ratio. This minimum income
requirement is uniformly applied to each and every applicant, regardless of protected characteristic
or class.
2
The following facts and any references to exhibits are culled from the Pizaro Aff.
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To calculate an applicant’s income, PPM counts, combines and uses all sources and types
of income provided by an applicant to determine whether applicants (including Plaintiff) satisfy
the minimum income requirement. In fact, PPM accepts and counts all sources of lawful income
when calculating the amount of the applicant’s income, including, but not limited to: employment
income; pension; social security benefits; disability benefits; worker’s compensation;
unemployment benefits; alimony; SNAP benefits; public assistance; cash assistance; and each and
every federal, state and city housing voucher or subsidy.
With respect to an applicant who has a housing voucher or subsidy, PPM estimates the
amount that the housing voucher or subsidy will pay towards the applicant’s rent for the year and
then adds that amount to all of the other income that the applicant has. For example, if an applicant
has income from, social security, that monthly income is multiplied by 12 to get to an annual
amount to be counted in the ‘income’ total. This combined sum of all of the applicant’s income is
then compared to the minimum income requirement for the apartment size.
If an applicant fails to meet PPM’s minimum income requirement and does not have a
qualified guarantor, that applicant is ineligible to rent an apartment at Parkchester, regardless of
status in a protected class. The same is true for a non-voucher holder.
Employment is not a condition of living at Parkchester. And by no means does Parkchester
only count income from employment towards the total amount of income that an applicant has.
B. PPM’s Business Reasons for Its Minimum Income Requirement
PPM has rental criteria to screen prospective tenants as part of an application process-
including the minimum income requirement- in order to gain assurance that the applicant will be
a good tenant, including by setting financial qualifications. Being a good tenant includes being a
tenant who is both able and likely to meet their rental and other financial obligations while living
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at Parkchester, and PPM’s rental criteria help ensure that PPM is selecting applicants who are able
and likely to satisfy all of their financial obligations to PPM.
This provides PPM and the owner and lessor of the sponsor units with the financial security
that – as a housing provider – they will have the revenue and income stream from tenants to be a
financially viable housing provider that is able to care for its tenants.
The financial obligations of tenants at Parkchester do not end at rent and include significant
sums relating to property damage and post-possession charges. Indeed, PPM evaluates its “Bad-
Debt” – which reflects unpaid rent and non-rent charges for tenants who vacated – on a routine
basis. And while the total amount of Parkchester’s “Bad-Debt” is relatively low – which confirms
that PPM is successfully approving applicants who can and do pay their financial obligations --
roughly 25% of the “Bad-Debt” that must be written-off as uncollectible relates to non-rent
charges.
Again, PPM has always applied its rental criteria – including the minimum income
requirement – uniformly to each and every applicant to Parkchester and PPM makes every
applicant aware of the criteria from the beginning of the application process.
C. Plaintiff’s Application
Through Plaintiff’s affidavit and Complaint, Plaintiff states that (i) her family moved to
Parkchester approximately 20 years ago and still resides there, and (ii) she has been living with a
friend at Parkchester while she has searched for housing using her CityFHEPS voucher.
Plaintiff alleges that she applied online on PPM’s website on or about April 8, 2022. As
reflected on the application Plaintiff completed (Exhibit A), Plaintiff states that since February 14,
2022, she resided at 1970 East Tremont Avenue, Apartment 8C, in The Bronx – which is an
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apartment at Parkchester. PPM denied Plaintiff’s application because Plaintiff failed to meet
PPM’s uniform minimum income requirement.
Plaintiff also alleges that after her April 2022 application was denied, she submitted a
second online application on June 30, 2022. As reflected on the June 2022 application that she
completed (Exhibit B), Plaintiff confirmed that she continued to live in Apartment 8C from
February 2022 through the date of her June application. With respect to Plaintiff’s June 2022
application, PPM applied its minimum income requirement in the same and consistent manner that
it applies the minimum income requirement to all applicants.
As with any applicant who failed to meet the minimum income requirement, Plaintiff’s
June application was also denied due to an insufficient amount of income because, even counting
all of the voucher income, she did not meet PPM’s minimum income requirement.
D. The Complaint
On July 12, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action by Summons and Complaint and
simultaneously filed the instant Order to Show Cause seeking a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction.
Through the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action alleging that Defendants
engaged in source of income discrimination when Plaintiff’s application was denied for failing to
meet PPM’s minimum income requirement in violation of the New York City Human Rights
Law (First Cause of Action) and the New York State Human Rights Law (Second Cause of
Action). The Complaint does not state whether Plaintiff is asserting a claim for discrimination
based on disparate treatment or disparate impact, and accordingly, both are addressed herein.
On July 12, 2022, Justice Kelly O’Neill Levy signed the Order to Show Cause and issued
the temporary restraining order set forth in the Order to Show Cause.
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ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A MANDATORY INJUNCTION THAT
CHANGES THE STATUS QUO AND GRANTS THE ULTIMATE RELIEF
SOUGHT IN THIS ACTION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction should be denied
because Plaintiff seeks the drastic remedy of a mandatory injunction that alters – rather than
maintains – the status quo and gives Plaintiff the ultimate relief she seeks in this case: processing
her application without a minimum income requirement and housing at Parkchester.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is “not to determine the ultimate rights of the
parties, but to maintain the status quo until there can be a full hearing on the merits.” Residential
Bd. of Mgrs. of Columbia Condo. v. Alden, 178 A.D.2d 121, 122 (1st Dep’t 1991). A mandatory
injunction “should not be granted, absent extraordinary circumstances, where the status quo would
be disturbed and the plaintiff would receive the ultimate relief sought, pendente lite.” St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 308 A.D.2d at 349; SHS Baisley, LLC v. Res Land, Inc., 18 A.D.3d 727, 728
(2d Dep’t 2005); Shake Shack Fulton St. Brooklyn, LLC v. Allied Prop. Grp., LLC, 117 A.D.3d
924, 927 (2d Dep’t 2019).
Here, the relief sought by Plaintiff would alter, rather than maintain, the status quo and
determine the ultimate rights of the parties because Plaintiff is asking this Court to (i) force PPM
to change its rental policies, (ii) process Plaintiff’s application differently than every other
applicant, without using PPM’s minimum income requirement, and (iii) provide Plaintiff with an
apartment upon approval of her application without the minimum income requirement. But to
reach any one of these mandates requires this Court to determine the ultimate rights of the parties
and then provide Plaintiff with the relief that she would ultimately be entitled to as a result thereof
at the conclusion of the case.
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As such, Plaintiff’s request for a mandatory injunction that alters the status quo and
provides Plaintiff with the core relief she seeks in this case is improper and should be denied. See
Hirschmann v. Hassapoyannes, 11 Misc. 3d 265 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2005) (denying a preliminary
injunction even though a buyer of an apartment established prima facie discrimination, irreparable
harm, and the balancing of the equities because “the court cannot grant the ultimate relief that he
seeks under the guise of a preliminary injunction”); see generally Knower v. Atkins, 273 A.D. 356,
358-59 (1st Dep’t) aff’d. 298 N.Y. 750 (1948) (explaining that “the law is well settled . . . that
equity will not take possession of property from one party and give it to another by mandatory
injunction”).
II. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR
A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Even if the Court holds that Plaintiff’s request for mandatory injunctive relief is permissible
(it is not), Plaintiff is still not entitled to a preliminary injunction because Plaintiff has failed to
meet her burden of establishing any of the fundamental elements necessary to be awarded a
preliminary injunction: (i) likelihood of success on the ultimate merits of Plaintiff’s underlying
claims in the Complaint; (ii) irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; and (iii) a balance
of the equities in Plaintiff’s favor. 1234 Broadway LLC v. W. Side SRO Law Project, 86 A.D.3d
18, 23 (1st Dep’t 2011).
A. Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish A Likelihood Of Success On The Merits
Plaintiff has failed to establish a strong probability of success that Defendants
discriminated against Plaintiff based on her lawful source of income under either a disparate
treatment or disparate impact theory of discrimination. See Id. at 23 (“the threshold inquiry is
whether the proponent has tendered sufficient evidence demonstrating ultimate success in the
underlying action”); Gagnon Bus Co v. Vallo Transp., Ltd., 13 A.D.3d 334, 335 (2d Dep’t 2004)
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(Preliminary injunction denied where “the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits based on undisputed facts”).
1. The Use Of A Minimum Income Requirement to Applications Submitted
by Voucher Holders is the Subject of Hotly Contested Litigation
First, contrary to Plaintiff’s ipse dixit conclusions, no New York federal or state court has
ever held that a landlord’s application of a minimum income requirement to holders of a housing
voucher constitutes source of income discrimination under the New York City or New York State
Human Rights Laws.
Rather, the propriety of a landlord applying a minimum income requirement to government
housing voucher holders is the subject of and being actively litigated in: the Southern District of
New York where a bench trial is ongoing (Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc. v. Goldfarb
Properties, Inc., Case No. 18-CV-1564); the Eastern District of New York where summary
judgment briefs were fully submitted a few months ago (Long Island Housing Services, Inc. v.
NPS Holiday Square LLC, Case No. 18-CV-3583); New York County State Supreme Court
(Housing Rights Initiative v. Corcoran Group LLC, Index No. 154010/2022); complaints brought
by the New York City Commission on Human Rights which have been litigated for nearly six
years and are proceeding towards summary judgment briefing (and potentially trial) in the New
York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings; and complaints brought by the New York
State Division on Human Rights.
Thus, by its very nature as a hotly contested and unresolved legal issue, there is an absence
of any likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim.
Under the guise of a wholesale statement that it is settled that Defendants have engaged in
source of income discrim