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  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
						
                                

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N 13 14 SONJA E. BLOMQUIST, SBN #099341, sblomquist@lowball.com PAMELA Y. LOUIE, SBN #259391, plouie@lowball.com LOW, BALL & LYNCH ELECTRONICALLY 505 Montgomery Street, 7' Floor San Francisco, California 94111-2584 s F I L ED . Telephone (415) 981-6630 County of San Francisce imile (415) 399-1506 Facsimile (is) DEC 15 2011 Attorneys for Defendant Clerk of the Court GIAMPOLINI & COMPANY BY: WILLIAM TRUPEK Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ROBERT ROSS and JEAN ROSS, Case No. CGC-10-275731 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT GIAMPOLINI & y COMPANY'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE ALLEGED ASBESTOSIS, ASBESTOS-RELATED PLEURAL DISEASE, AND OTHER LUNG INJURIES C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS; Defendants as Reflected on Exhibit I attached to the Summary Complaint herein; and DOES 1-8500, Defendants. Date: January 18, 2012 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept.: 503 Judge: Hon. Teri L. Jackson Nee eee I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs ROBERT ROSS and Jean Ross (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs" unless otherwise referenced) filed serial lawsuits based upon Plaintiff Robert Ross! alleged asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease. By filing serial lawsuits, Plaintiffs are attempting to circumvent the three-year statute of limitations period in which to serve defendants under California Code of Civil Procedure sections 335.1, 583.210 and 583.250. Defendant GIAMPOLINI & COMPANY (“Giampolini”) respectfully moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims arising from Mr. Ross’ asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease because Plaintiffs already have a pending, pre-existing personal injury lawsuit based -l- GIAMPOLINI & CO.’S MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS \\Server7\GEN-INS\2040\SF1006\Pid’ Motion to Dismiss\MPA.docoO 12 15 17 upon the same injuries (San Francisco County Superior Court Case No. CGC-07-274099). Because Plaintiff Robert Ross' claims are time-barred, Plaintiff Jean Ross’ claim for loss of consortium is also time-barred. California law precludes “splitting” a cause of action, ie., filing of multiple lawsuits to recover for the same injury. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for and relating to asbestosis, asbestos-related pleural disease, asbestos-related breathing difficulties, and other lung damage. Hi. «STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The 2007 Complaint for Asbestos-Related Personal Injuries On March 5, 2007, Plaintiff Robert Ross filed the personal injury-related complaint (2007 Complaint”) for injuries he alleged were caused by exposure to asbestos and named various and numerous defendants including 8,500 Does. (Declaration of Pamela Y. Louie ("Louie Decl.") at 43; Exhibit A attached to Louie Decl.) Giampolini was not named in the 2007 Complaint or in any subsequent amendments to the 2007 Complaint. (Louie Decl., at 413 and 4; Exhibits A, B.) Tn the 2007 Complaint, Ross alleged that his " ... exposure to asbestos, asbestos- containing products, and other toxic carcinogenic products, caused severe and permanent injury to Mr. Ross, including but not limited to breathing difficulties, asbestosis, and/or other lung damage..." (Louie Decl., at 13; Exhibit A at p. 27:12-16). Mr. Ross also alleged that he was diagnosed with asbestos-related pleural disease on or about May 2006. (Louie Decl., Exhibit A at p. 27:12-16). Jean Ross was not a party to the 2007 Complaint. (See Exhibits A, B.). Mr. Ross’ 2007 action for asbestosis, asbestos-related pleural disease, asbestos-related breathing difficulties, and other lung damage is still pending with this Court. B. The 2010 Ross Compiaint for Asbestos-Related Personal Injuries On December 17, 2010, over three and a half years after the filing of the 2007 Complaint, Plaintiffs filed a second personal injury asbestos-related lawsuit ("2010 Complaint"). (Louie Decl., at §5; Exhibit C.) In the 2010 Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Ross’ “ ...exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing products caused severe and permanent injury to Mr. Ross, including but not limited to breathing difficulties and/or lung damage. ~2- GIAMPOLINI & CO.’S MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS \Server7\GEN-INS\2040\SF1005\Pid\Motion to Dismiss\MPA.doc.Plaintiff, Mr. Ross, was diagnosed with colon cancer on or about October 2010 and with asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease on or about May 2009." (Exhibit C, at p. 41:3-6.) Both the 2007 Complaint and the 2010 Complaint seek redress for the same primary tight - asbestosis, asbestos-related pleural disease, asbestos-related breathing difficulties, and other lung damage. By doing so, Plaintiffs have violated the rule against splitting a cause of action and those claims based upon asbestosis, asbestos-related pleural disease, asbestos-related breathing difficulties, and other lung damage must be dismissed from Plaintiffs' 2010 Complaint. Iii. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Plaintiffs Are Prohibited From "Splitting" a Single Cause of Action Into Separate/Multiple Lawsuits By pursuing two separate lawsuits for the same injury, Plaintiffs have violated the rule against splitting a cause of action. The primary right theory is a theory of code pleading that has long been followed in California. California law defines a cause of action in terms of the "primary rights.” The primary right is simply plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered as distinguished from the legal theory on which liability is claimed or the type of relief sought. (Crowley v. Katleman, (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666.) The primary right theory... provides that a "cause of action" is comprised of a "primary right" of the plaintiff, and a corresponding "primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty. The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. A pleading that states the violation of one primary right in two causes of action contravenes the rule against splitting a cause of action. (id. at p. 681 (internal citations omitted); see also Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127.) "Full recovery for each cause of action (same ‘primary right’) must be obtained in a single lawsuit. A plaintiff cannot ‘split’ a cause of action into successive suits." (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) 6:250 et seq., p. 6-69 citing Hamilton, supra, at p. 1145.) More than one wrongful act may constitute a -3- GIAMPOLINI & CO.’S MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS ‘Server \GEN-INS\2040\SF 1006\Pid Motion to Dismiss\MPA docsingle cause of action. (Burdette v. Carrier Corp., (2008) 158 Cal. App.4th 1668, 1684-85.) It follows that splitting is prohibited even when multiple defendants cause a single injury: A single cause of action may not be maintained against various defendants in separate lawsuits as the plaintiff has suffered but one injury. Regardless of the number of legal theories which the Complaint states, if there is but one injury to a primary right, only one cause of action arises. (Lippert v. Bailey, (1996) 241 Cal App.2d 376, 382.) Code of Civil Procedure sections 379 and 389 regarding the permissible and compulsory joinder of parties essential to resolution of the action also suggest that the prohibition against splitting a cause of action applies equally to suits involving multiple defendants. The California Legislature recognized that the fair resolution of a claim requires that all parties materially interested in the claim be joined in one action. (See Law Revision Commission Comments to the Code of Civil Procedure section 389.) The rule against splitting a cause of action sounds in principles of res judicata and abatement. (Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1147; Grisham v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 642.) These inter-related rules are intended to “preserve the integrity of the judicial system, promote judicial economy, and protect litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation." (Vandenberg v. Superior Court, (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 829.) By filing separate lawsuits alleging the same injury and the same set of facts, Plaintiffs compromise the integrity of the court system by inviting inconsistent rulings on the same issues from different courts. It cannot be denied that there are physical injuries alleged in the 2007 Complaint which are identical to the physical injuries alleged in the 2010 Complaint. Giampolini therefore moves this Court in abatement to preclude Plaintiffs from suing Giampolini for identical injuries as alleged in the 2007 Complaint. Had Plaintiffs wanted to pursue Giampolini for these injuries they should have named Giampolini in their 2007 Complaint. : it Mit -4- GIAMPOLINI & CO.’S MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS \\Server”\GEN-INS\2040\SF I O06\PId\Motion to Dismiss\MPA doeB. Plaintiffs' Claims Based Upon Asbestosis and Asbestos-Related Pleural Disease Must be Dismissed for Failure to Serve Giampolini Within Three Years In bringing the same claims regarding asbestosis, asbestos-related pleural disease, asbestos-related breathing difficulties, and asbestos-related lung injuries in the 2010 Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to skirt the jurisdictional requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.210 and 583.250 which obligate Plaintiffs to serve all defendants in an action within three- years of filing the complaint. "From the time such a complaint is filed, the plaintiff has three years to identify and serve the defendant." (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Company, (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1118.) A plaintiff's failure to identify and serve all fictitious defendants within three years of the date of the complaint bars any later action against those defendants. (Nelson v. The State of California, (1982) 139 Cal. App.3d 72, 76-77.) Here, it is indisputable that Mr. Ross filed the 2007 Complaint alleging lung and breathing problems due to exposure to asbestos. Mr. Ross did not name Giampolini in the 2007 Complaint, nor did he name Giampolini in any subsequent "Doe" amendment. Now that it is too late for him to pursue those claims, he brings a second action for the same injuries, as well as additional injuries. Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the three year requirement of Code of Civil Procedure sections 582.210 and 583.250 by attempting to pursue Giampolini in serial litigation. C. Plaintiffs Are Barred from Naming Giampolini as a Defendant at this Late Stage Based Upon the Doctrine of Laches When a plaintiff unreasonably delays in seeking to amend his complaint, causing specific prejudice to the defendant, the court has the discretion to deny Ieave to amend to substitute the names of any Doe defendant under the doctrine of laches. Plaintiffs here have failed to exercise due diligence and unreasonably delayed naming Giampolini as a defendant in the 2007 Complaint. Plaintiffs are, therefore, attempting to bring Giampolini into this litigation more than three years later through a second lawsuit. The second lawsuit clearly is a sham to avoid the clear intent of the law and Plaintiffs should not be permitted to maintain their claims of asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease. Mi -5- GIAMPOLINI & CO.’S MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS ‘WServer\GEN-INS\204)\SF 1006\Pld\Motion to Dismiss\MPA.doc& nw D. Plaintiff Jean Ross' Loss of Consortium Claim is Barred by the Statute of Limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. To the extent that Mrs. Ross' loss of consortium claim is based upon her husband's alleged asbestosis and other lung injuries, those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In Uram v. Abex Corp., (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1425, the plaintiff spouse asserted a loss of consortium claim arising from the asbestos-related injury to her husband. Uram was the first case to specifically determine the appropriate statute of limitations period for a loss of consortium claim arising from an asbestos-related injury. (Id. at p. 1436-38.) The Uram court held that the two-year status of limitations under former Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3 (now Section 335.1) applies to claims for loss of consortium. (Uram, supra, at pp. 1436-38.) Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 states that the period for commencement of a loss of consortium claim must be within two years for injury to an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. Mr. Ross first started his asbestos litigation by filing his 2007 Complaint for his asbestos-related injuries. Mrs. Ross was not a party to the 2007 Complaint and only just filed her claim for loss of consortium in the 2010 Complaint, well past the permissible date under Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Mrs. Ross’ loss of consortium claim, if any, should therefore be limited solely to Mr. Ross’ alleged colon cancer claims. iit Mi Mi Mh tt Mt lit Mi il -6- GIAMPOLINI & CO.’8 MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS \Server7\GEN-INS\2040\SF 1006\Pid\ Motion to Dismiss\MPA doeIV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Giampolini respectfully requests that this Court dismiss those portions of the 2010 Complaint relating to Mr. Ross’ asbestosis, asbestos-related breathing difficulties, asbestos-related pleural disease and/or other lung damage, as well as the similarly associated loss of consortium claims. Dated: December 9 , 2011 By: LOW, BALL & LYNCH (ole ha SONJA E. BLOMQUIST PAMELA Y. LOUIE Attorneys for Defendant GIAMPOLINI & COMPANY -7- GIAMPOLINI & CQ.’S MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS \\Server7\GEN-INSW040\SF 1006\Pld\Motion to Dismiss\MPA.docRoss v. C.C. Moore & Co. Engineers, et al. San Francisco Case No. CGC-10-275731 PROOF OF SERVICE I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. Iam employed at Low, Ball & Lynch, 505 Montgomery Street, 7th Floor, San Francisco, California 94111. On the date indicated below, I served the following document DEFENDANT GIAMPOLINI & COMPANY'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE ALLEGED ASBESTOSIS, ASBESTOS-RELATED PLEURAL DISEASE, AND OTHER LUNG INJURIES on the listed addresses: Brayton Purcell [ ] And All Defense Counsel 222 Rush Landing Road {SEE ATTACHED LIST] Novato, CA 94948-6169 Telephone: 415 898-1555 { ] (Al counsel in this action (list attached) 415-898-1555 (voice) were faxed a letter advising of the documents 415-898-1247 (fax) provided Plaintiffs and an offer to provide copies upon request. Letter enclosed.) ] (BY MAIL) I placed a true copy, enclosed in a sealed, postage paid envelope. and deposited same for collection and mailing at San Francisco, California, following ordinary business practices, addressed as set forth below. ] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused each such envelope to be delivered by hand to the addressees noted above or on the attachment herein by Legal Services. {] (BY FACSIMILE) I caused the said document to be transmitted by Facsimile transmission to the number indicated after the addresses noted above or on the attachment herein. ] (BY OVERNIGHT COURIER) I caused each such envelope addressed to the parties to be deposited in a box or other facility regularly maintained by the overnight courier or driver authorized by the overnight courier to receive documents. X] (BY E-MAIL/ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) I caused the said document(s) to be sent to the person(s) at the e-mail address(es) indicated above or on the attachment herein. Tam readily familiar with this law firm’s practice for the collection and processing of documents for regular and certified mailing, overnight mail, personal service, electronic transmission, and facsimile transaction, and said document(s) are deposited with the United States Postal Service or overnight courier depository on the same day in the ordinary course of business. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at San Francisco, California on December _/4_, 2011. Séattet- Herrera -8- GIAMPOLINI & CO.’S MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS \Server7\GEN-INS\2040'SF 1006\PId\Motion to Dismiss\MPA.doe